Japan’s Soft Power in Africa

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Abstract

The 21st century is occasionally called “the century of Asia and Africa,” and Asia’s presence in Africa has been rapidly increasing. Emerging Asian countries have been focusing their political and economic influence on Africa. Their economic and diplomatic presence has made “China in Africa” and “India in Africa” popular issues in African studies. These issues have caused some fear in Western countries, which have traditionally been hegemonic actors in Africa. However, it is not possible to thoroughly understand Asia–Africa relations without considering non-material factors. Thus, soft power, which is based on hard power, is an important element in understanding these relations. Although soft power has not historically been a crucial element in Japan’s foreign policy, Japan was eager to show its non-material capacity in Africa after it became the world’s largest donor country in the 1990s. This paper analyzes Japan’s soft power in Africa in terms of the diplomatic strategies. This paper also provides materials for a comparative analysis of the issue of Asian soft power in Africa.

Key Words: Japan, Soft Power, Human Security, One Village One Product, Kaizen
Japan has not done all that is necessary to conceptualize Japanese creativity in a way that resonates in both industry and culture. Nor has it vigorously communicated this creatively to the world.¹

1. Introduction

The 21st century has occasionally been called “the century of Asia and Africa”, and Asia’s presence has rapidly increased in Africa. Emerging Asian countries have been focusing their political and economic influence on Africa (Iwata 2012). Due to these increasing influences, “China in Africa” and “India in Africa” have become important issues in African studies. These issues are viewed with some concern in Western countries, which are traditional hegemonic actors in Africa. A similar discourse, called “Japan in Africa,” occurred in Western countries during the late 1990s at the time of their aid fatigue.

However, it is not possible to fully understand Asia–Africa relations without considering non-material perspectives. Soft power, which is based on hard power, is increasingly becoming an important element to consider when studying Asia–Africa relations. This article aims to analyze Japan’s soft power in Africa to better understand Asia–Africa relations.

Japan’s soft power was not traditionally as influential in Africa compared to other major, and traditional, partner countries. However, Japan remains one of the most influential soft power exporters from Asia to the rest of the world. Since the beginning of 1990s, Japan has been eager to show its non-material capacity in Africa after it became the biggest donor to developing countries and began to appeal for a permanent seat on the United Nations’ Security Council (UNSC).

This article analyzes Japan’s soft power in Africa in terms of the diplomatic strategies used in Japanese governmental organizations.

2. Definition of Soft Power

Joseph Nye defined the idea of soft power as follows:

What is soft power? It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather

than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced (Nye 2004: x).

However, according to Nye, the definition of soft power remains ambiguous, much like the general concept of power itself: “Power always depends on the context in which the relationship exists” (Nye 2004: 2). The soft power of a state is produced by three resources—culture, political value, and foreign policy (Nye 2004: 11).

Power resources cannot be judged without knowing their context, nor can they avoid misperceptions of power. This misperception happens more frequently in soft power than in hard power, which bases on military and economic resources, because the measurement of soft power is done more subjectively.

Hard and soft power resources are intertwined (Nye 2004: 30). However, soft power is not necessarily a dependent variable of hard power (Nye 2004: 9). It is not easy for governments to control soft power because the effect of soft power depends on how recipient sides recognize and react to it. Because of this indirect function, we should evaluate soft power’s effect in the long term (Nye 2004: 99).

Furthermore, Nye’s concept of soft power remains ambiguous and is related to U.S. diplomacy. However, it is still useful idea to focus non-material characters and to compare Asian countries’ approaches to Africa in the 21st century. The next section in this paper shows Japan’s soft power approach in Africa through case studies.

3. Case Studies of Japan’s Soft Power in Africa

Japan’s soft power approach in Africa is not limited in governmental activities, but this article principally focuses on the activities of Japanese governmental organizations to analyze soft power in terms of diplomatic perspectives. This section considers Human Security, One Village One Product, and Kaizen as characteristic elements of Japan’s soft power in Africa.

The concept of Human Security (HS) was defined by United Nations. The origin of the concept can be traced to the Brandt Commission, the Brundtland Commission, and the Commission on Global Governance. However, HS was first re-defined by Sadako Ogata (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) and Amartya Sen (Nobel Prize of Economics winner) in the Human Development Report for the United Nations Development Program in 1994. HS was introduced to protect
“the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and fulfillment.” HS is a concept that includes human rights, good governance, and access to economic opportunity, education, and health care.2

While HS concept did not originate in Japan, the Japanese government has intended to behave as a fostering and promoting actor of this concept in the world and particularly in Africa, which is the most threatened region in terms of HS. In March 1999, the Japanese government, under Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, and the United Nations Secretariat founded the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security.3 At the United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000, the UN Secretary General set two important goals for the international community to pursue: the freedom from want and the freedom from fear.4 In addition, the Commission on Human Security (CHS) was established in 2001 on the recommendation of Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori. The CHS, which was led by co-chairmen Ms. Ogata and Prof. Sen, submitted the final report, Human Security Now, to the UN Secretary General in 2003.5 The Japanese government positioned HS in the center of its Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy in the 2003 ODA charter review and in the Medium-Term ODA policy created in 2005 (JICA pamphlet 2010).


Currently, the concept of HS is broadly adopted in the agendas of inter-governmental and regional organizations such as the G8, the African Union, the Association of South East Asian Nations, and the European Union. At the same time, a growing number of governments and non-governmental and civil society

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groups have also accepted the concept of HS in their programs and policies.

As it is a principle of Japan’s international cooperation, many aid projects have been conducted under the title of “Human Security.” However, the content of these projects are similar to what had been conducted before having the label HS. It thus remains ambiguous how these projects are essentially renewed or different under the HS framework and how Japan’s diplomacy has used the idea of HS to promote soft power in Africa and the world.

The One Village One Product (OVOP) movement is a community centered and regional economic development approach that began in Oita prefecture in Japan in the 1960s. Farmers in the city of Oyama had struggled to increase the value of their products (e.g., new plum and chestnut production). The position of OVOP in Japan’s cooperation policy has remained ambiguous (Kurokawa et al., 2010: 1). The official OVOP movement was launched in 1979 by the Governor of Oita Prefecture, Dr. Morihiko Hiramatsu (1979–2003). He encouraged residents in villages and towns to select and to grow attractive products to sell in the national and global markets. OVOP was first introduced in abroad when Governor Hiramatsu was invited by the Mayor of Shanghai in 1983 (Matsui 2006: 145–146). Since the 1990s, Oita prefecture has been visited by Malawi government officials. OVOP delegations from Japan have also visited Malawi with JICA’s support.

Malawian President Bakili Muluzi decided to introduce OVOP in his country after his visit to Oita prefecture after the third Tokyo International Conference for Africa’s Development (TICAD) in 2003. Malawi was the first Sub-Saharan African country to introduce an OVOP project (Kurokawa et al., 2010:18). JICA started the “Project for institutional building and human resources development for OVOP movement in Malawi” in 2005, dispatching JICA experts and young volunteers (Japan Oversea Cooperation Volunteer). JICA has also received trainees from Malawi (JAICAF 2008:9).6

The Japanese government has tried to promote OVOP to the world not only in an aid framework, but also in trade. It discussed OVOP at the World Trade Organization (WTO) Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005. In 2006, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) and the Japan External Trade Organization launched an OVOP campaign.7

JICA organized an OVOP seminar for Africa in Malawi in January 2008.


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This seminar aimed to introduce the idea of OVOP and its structure and discuss several successful cases of OVOP in Japan. Mr. Hiramatsu, former Governor of Oita prefecture, was invited to give the keynote speech at this seminar. In 2008, at the 4th TICAD and G8 meetings held in Japan, the Japanese government reconfirmed its commitment to Africa's development, including its support of OVOP programs. At the 4th TICAD in May 2008, 40 African countries applied for the Japanese government's OVOP assistance program. JICA started OVOP programs in Kenya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, Zambia, Madagascar, South Africa, Senegal, Ghana, and Malawi (Kurokawa et al., 2010:1).

The OVOP movement has faced misunderstandings in developing (recipient) countries. It is a very simple and attractive slogan for the leaders in developing countries. The OVOP movement was perceived as a panacea-like measure for local development. The South Sulawesi state government (Indonesia) forced a one product on local farmers. This OVOP project was led by administrative officers the country. This was movement brought from above and outside, which was in contrast to Japan’s process that had started from below in local farmers’ daily activities. Officials in recipient countries tend to seek short-term local economic development (Matsui 2006: 148–149). We will see similar cases in Africa in the continuation of OVOP related projects. OVOP is seen in Malawi as a type of low-interest loan, such as a microcredit loan (Yoshida 2006:186). The introduction of OVOP in developing countries might be unavoidably implicated in the political interests of local communities and local politicians, as in other frameworks such as microcredit. Politicization in the local community will occur in aid projects coming from outside the country. We must consider such secondary political effects, even in OVOP projects.

It is important to note that OVOP was an important tool in local diplomacy and trade promotion in Oita prefecture. It has hosted trainees and offered OVOP training programs. This has not been done purely for humanitarian motives, but also because it is in the prefecture's own interests in domestic and international strategy. Oita prefecture has profited its advantage by the grace of successful case of OVOP to invite many governmental projects, investments, and university. Thus, we can learn from studying this successful OVOP case. We must consider whether OVOP has an aspect of local diplomacy; the conflicts related to OVOP in Oita tend to be covered.

Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso emphasized the Japanese work style as Japan’s soft power:
Yet that is not all. Japan boasts a vast and varied range of soft power that includes the Japanese work ethic by which this country recovered from the ruins of defeat in war to become an economic superpower, such as the Japanese work style of always meeting deadlines for delivery and techniques for excellence in manufacturing products of value.8 (underlined by author)

5S-Kaizen (or simply Kaizen)9 is a work discipline movement. 5S-Kaizen is a symbolic soft power that is derived from Japanese work style. 5S stands for Seiri (sort), Seiton (straighten), Seiso (scrub), Seiketsu (systematize), and Shitsuke (standardize), which are interventions to create a better working environment (Imai 1997: xxiv). Kaizen means continuous improvement in the workplace (Gemba) (Imai 1997: xv, 1), and it has been practiced in the production system at Toyota Motor Corporation for decades.10 Kaizen requires staff to reduce inefficiency and waste (Muda) in the production process to improve productivity. The concept of Kaizen is very popular in developing countries because it is based on Toyota’s experience. Toyota is recognized as one of the most well-known and successful Japanese companies in the world. 5S-Kaizen is practiced in 46 African countries, despite its decreased image in Japan. African people have enthusiastically supported this movement, as shown through their having created a 5S-Kaizen dance and song.11

JICA started a pilot project related to Kaizen, “Study on the Master Plan for Quality/Productivity Improvement,” in Tunisia from 2006 to 2008 (Kikuchi 2009: 40, Ueda 2009: 60).12 JICA also established a Kaizen training center in Egypt.13

After the first Kaizen pilot projects in Africa, JICA started another Kaizen project in Ethiopia in 2009 at the request of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. JICA organized the National Kaizen Seminar that same year in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government established a Kaizen division in the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

9. For details on kaizen philosophy and practice, please see Imai (1997).
10. Under the leadership of Taiichi Ohno, the just-in-time (JIT) production system aims to eliminate non-value-adding activities at Toyota Motor Corporation (Imai 1997:8).
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It also created a national Kaizen project. There have been Kaizen pilot projects in 30 Ethiopian companies with the goal of consulting and instructing corporate management. In Zambia, JICA organized the National Kaizen Meeting with the Zambian Agency of Development. The Japanese government has supported Kaizen as Japan’s model of successful economic development.

Japanese academic society has also been involved in Kaizen promotion in Africa. The Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) cooperated with JICA in planning Ethiopia’s industrial strategy, including the institutionalization of Kaizen in Ethiopia’s industry. In Ethiopia, Kaizen activities started at the request of Prime Minister Meles in 2009 (Kitaw 2011). Under the strong initiative of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, the Ethiopian government was actively involved in the introduction of Kaizen. The Ethiopian government established the Ethiopia Kaizen Institute inside the Ministry of Industry in 2011. Private companies in Ethiopia have started to take on Kaizen initiatives. The Ethiopian government encourages private companies to adopt Kaizen principles.

After a three year pilot term (2009–2011), a “Kaizen award” was donated to a private Ethiopian company. Kaizen was not only disseminated through governmental cooperation, but also through private consultant activities, such as the Kaizen Institute. The Kaizen Institute has valuable experience in consultation and training programs in corporations in African countries.

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20. The Kaizen Institute (KI) was founded by Mr. Masaaki Imai in 1986 and has conducted training and consultant activities regarding Lean and the practices of kaizen. Kaizen Institute website, http://www.kaizen.com/ (accessed February 1, 2013).
4. Analysis of Japan’s Soft Power in Africa

There is one common feature in the OVOP movement and Kaizen: they share the core value of continuous self-proactive improvement trials in local communities or companies through long-term efforts. Oita Prefecture and Toyota Motor Corporation have persisted for decades in their effort to improve their value or establish a professional work ethic.

JICA has attempted to combine HS and OVOP in a community based project with the aim of empowering communities through the introduction of a new mindset. JICA has sought HS achievement through the use of OVOP rural development projects. JICA has also tried combine OVOP and Kaizen. Kaizen has established a round conduct system called the PDCA cycle (Plan → Do → Check → Act → Plan...) to evaluate and improve productivity in the workplace. This cycle was applied to OVOP in JICA’s projects.21

A TICAD pre-meeting was held at Ethiopia Kaizen Institute in Addis Ababa on March 14, 2013.22 This event demonstrates that the Japanese government considers Kaizen an important issue in Japan’s African policy at the latest 5th TICAD in June 2013.

A revitalized process is used in new projects. Since Japan’s economic crisis in the 1990s, the Japanese government has radically and continuously reduced its ODA budget. Aid agencies must emphasize their purpose and effectiveness in order to maintain their organizations, but they cannot expect to show its aid super power through increasing hard based cooperation which is based on the infrastructure project. As an infrastructure provider, Japan can no longer compete with China in Africa, which has motivated Japanese aid agencies to focus on soft power. However, in Japan’s diplomacy, soft power remains a marginal approach. The Japanese government has not consciously created soft power strategy, while it has practiced in a technical cooperation framework in JICA’s Kaizen projects.

Japan still has other abundant resources of soft power that might be broadly accepted in Africa, such as the idea of Mottainai23, sports of Japanese origin (Judo,

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23. “Mottainai” is a Japanese word that means not wasting personal belongings or public resources. Wangari Maatai, the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2004, was deeply touched by the idea during her visit to Japan and became a promoter of this idea across the world. Mottainai website, http://mottainai.info/english/who.html (accessed December 28, 2012).
Karate, and Aikidou), and having the most peaceful constitution in the world (particularly Article 9). However, in the time when its ODA is shrinking, how can Japan reestablish the relationship with Africa through soft power?

The present is a good opportunity for Japan to establish soft power in Africa and other regions in terms of transferring Japanese work ethic. It is essential to note that soft power takes time to establish. This approach cannot be done using short-term projects or training programs. It requires patience and time to realize. However, I wonder whether Japanese philosophies of work ethic, such as Kaizen, will be accepted in ten years. In the real world economy, this philosophy cannot remain influential without hard power. For example, the condition of Toyota’s business directly affects the influence of Kaizen. This leads to the question of whether Japan will be able to maintain its economic status and thus the legitimacy of Japanese working methods and philosophy.

5. Conclusion: Challenges of Japan’s Soft Power Approach in Africa

The Japanese government has not intentionally attempted to create a special approach in terms of gaining soft power in Africa. Japan has not made soft power a factor in its diplomatic strategy, but rather uses it for its economic interests. Nevertheless, the Japanese government has estimated that African countries have maintained a good image of Japan through its “hard” (infrastructure) biased cooperation for decades.

However, in 2006, Japan failed in its attempt to achieve permanent membership in the Security Council (in the G4 approach with Brazil, Germany, and India). This raised suspicion that African countries (and the African Union) had not thoroughly supported this proposition. During the 1990s, the Japanese government radically increased its ODA and organized TICAD to demonstrate its ability to be involved in Africa’s problems to encourage support from African countries for its diplomatic ambitions in the UN. This failure signified that Japan’s diplomatic and cooperation strategy in Africa had not been sufficient to realize this purpose. Japan’s approach had been focused on the material level and had not penetrated the non-material level or the consciousness of African leaders and people. This negatively affected Japan’s diplomatic stance toward Africa.

Two decades ago, TICAD was the first and only international conference on Africa’s development that was hosted by an Asian country. Currently, however, there are similar conferences held in China, India, South Korea, and Taiwan. In a recent trend, African countries and the world have paid special attention to
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the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation. TICAD’s image has faded as the world situation has changed.

Because its economic crisis has continued, Japan might no longer maintain its capacity as an influential donor in Africa. Its ODA has been radically and continuously reduced, and it has not attempted to demonstrate its soft power influence in Africa. In the current situation, Japan can no longer have influence in Africa using only the hard tool of cooperation; thus, Japan should find an alternative approach to achieve its diplomatic purpose and to contribute to Africa’s development. Soft power might be one tool to diversify and reanimate Japan’s diplomacy in the time of its shrinking ODA.

One exceptional movement of distinct soft power diplomacy was the promotion of “Cool Japan,” which aimed to increase Japan’s cultural influence and promote its exports to the world. Prime Minister Taro Aso launched the Cool Japan policy to promote Japanese pop-culture, such as anime (TV animation), manga (Comic), movies, and fashion. He hoped that this policy would promote Japan’s soft power across the world. However, this approach has been promoted only in Asian and the Western world, and not yet on the African continent. After only a one-year term as prime minister, Aso’s party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was driven into opposition as a result of the legislative election in 2009. Due to the regime change, the Cool Japan policy was no longer a priority in Japan’s diplomacy.

Thus, the establishment of Japan’s soft power in Africa may be less likely to occur. Soft power exists on the base of hard power, which for Japan is economic power. If Japan’s current diplomatic policy remains unchanged, its position as a donor country will continue to become less influential compared to other emerging countries. Japan is no longer the eminent economic power in Asia. It will be more difficult for Japan to attract African states and people through its hard power alone. This leads to the following questions: How do Japanese policy makers view this situation and how can Japan attract African countries to Japan’s economy and cultural experiences?

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