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Global Democracy: A Japanese Perspective

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Abstract: We have been encountering the emergence of an increasingly global society. Globalization puts into question customary concepts of modern statehood and established democratic models. The so-called Westphalian world order was purportedly composed of a set of sovereign states as selfcomplete territorial units. Depersonalization of the state and relocation of sovereignty to the people, coupled with nationalism, brought integrated nation-states into being in the western world. In this model, liberal representative democracy became nationally the first transformation of legitimacy. Globalization demands globally the second transformation of legitimacy to cope with security, maintenance of a global commons, and a more equitable distribution of wealth. The abandonment of the nation-state would, however, undercut an essential element of social cohesiveness for democratic movements. Any democratic global commonwealth would have to be founded on the idea of multi-layered global governance and of multiple identities. The fundamental principles of the Japanese Constitution are succinctly expressed in a trinity: pacifism, respect of human rights and people's sovereignty. The Constitution takes a view of co-living in peace and democracy among nations by joint efforts across national boundaries for all time. The owl of Minerva is preparing to take flight again, this time in the name of global democracy.

I. Introduction What is globalization?

About a century ago, Graham Wallas called the changing society of his day "great society". We are entering a similar era in the sense that we are encountering the emergence of a global-type "great society". It is also frequently pointed out that an international or "global civil society" has been emerging after the end of the Cold War resulting from the collapse of the western/eastern bloc system. Although the common usage of such words as "globalization" and "globalizing" did not begin until about 1960 (Waters, 1995) and there are also strong objections to the notion of an integrated global economy (Weiss, 1998; Hirst and Thompson, 1996, 2000), interconnectedness among people of many nations is, nevertheless, increasing in many dimensions, especially in the economy and culture inspired by the global penetration of technology.

Globalization literally signifies intensification of interwoven relations among people on a transnational scale and scope. So it effects the ceaseless reformation of politico-economic configurations of nation-states as well as the world system. At the turn of this century and the beginning of the new millennium we witness a great transformation of global politics in which endogenous and/or exogenous decisions and practices cause effects throughout the world. Globalization is, however, the concept of process and the globalizing world or global "great society" is in the process of formation, so the concept of globalization is, to be sure, still unsettled and controversial.

Neither a single global economy nor a sole world government has really come to pass, and the idea of a world society is not in fact shared across nations. Furthermore, international politics is still being shaped by the hegemonic rivalry and competition among individual nation-states. On the other side, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are not only extending their reach and roles, but activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) including multinational or transnational corporations (MNCs, TNCs) are also increasingly trans-territorial and transnational in scale and scope. Such growing interconnection of transnational organizations brings about a relentless internationalization and globalization or global connecting of socio-economic relations among nations, inspired by the revolution in information (Cox, 1987, ch. 9). These are, to be sure, reflected in contemporary trends of world politics.

Globalization is defined as the process of trans-territorial time-space compression of socio-economic relations involving a hierarchical and uneven restructuring of the world (Harvey, 1989). This results in the manifestation of an endogenous particularity that has been hitherto latent. The great transformation of basic socio-economic configurations always involves the vicissitude of state forms or actions and reactions even within a state. We are possibly encountering a transformation at the global level. So, it is needless to say that globalization unavoidably entails, ideologically and practically, dialectical movements in global reach and degree: integration v. fragmentation, universalism v. particularism, and assimilation v. differentiation. As the label of "fragmegration" suggests, any existing state will have been compelled to change its power configurations in these antinomic and dialectical dynamics. Therefore, disarticulation and re-articulation of the state apparatus as well as territorialization and reterritorialization of the nation-state (or national state) as a historically contingent articulate have occurred and will continue to occur (Jessop, 1997). These phenomena are empirically discernible in the transformation of the state by denationalization and de-statization of the political system entailing movements of new state or nation-building, the rise of ethnic nationalism or sub-state nationalism including irredentism and chauvinism, and dilation of democratization involving populistic countertendencies against it. So far as globalization is conceptually a movement of integration and assimilation, it also causes paradoxical trends and centrifugal propensities.

Globalization also means the penetration of information all over the world. As such it

has precipitated the tenacious revolts against the state socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, and eventually brought about the collapse of the socialist bloc and its partial inclusion into the capitalist system. Although capitalistic globalization can be traced back to the advent of "modern world system" in world system theory, it may be reasonable to suppose that contemporary globalization has rapidly advanced in the post World War II era, especially after the collapse of erstwhile socialism.

The rapidity of globalization in trade and finance is certainly unprecedented, and the worldwide systematization of production and consumption by MNCs and TNCs deeply affects national economies and economic policies as well as global mode of production. Contemporary globalization could be, therefore, grasped as a synergism of politicoeconomic and techno-cultural phenomenon caused by the impetus to restructure the capitalistic social relations globally. Globalization should not be, therefore, simply reduced to economics. So long as the production and circulation of goods and services basically revolve around a nation-state and MNCs or TNCs are not entities without state or nationality despite their transnational behaviors, their movements and trends are really dependent on, or at least required to consider the strategy and socio-economic policies of particular states. In this respect, the current movements of capital really come into view in two different, but interconnected trends: movements under the auspice of the state and a trans-territorial entity abstracted from its national particularities. In these contexts, the state facing globalization has been obliged to increase its role in the internal and external adjustments as well as in the development of technology and macro-economic policy (Carnoy, 1993; Weiss, 1998).

The nation-state is still at the base of significant national identification and remains a tenacious element of social cohesion in spite of its so-called "porosity". To subsume globalization under the general category of capitalist movements and to identify it only with an integrated global economy will, therefore, ignore the necessity of external responses and internal social reconstruction by the state. Also, the efforts to induce the model of global governance from the capitalist mode of production is a sort of apolitical neo-liberalism similar to the theories of Cobden and Bright, and nothing more than an advocacy of "the end of politics." Perspectives of global democracy cannot be prescriptively induced from such a single-sighted view.

So long as globalization is a multi-dimensional, trans-territorial phenomenon and has brought about the persistent reconstruction of the world order, the traditional configurations of the nation-state (or national state) 1) must have gone through some changes in form.

¹⁾ It is estimated that there are roughly 200 state, 2,000 nations and only about 20 nation-states in the world (Galtung, 2000, 143). Most modern states are "national-states", and they are composed of a number of looser collective cultural units called ethnies that can be defined as "named units of population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements of shared culture, some link with a historic territory and some measure of solidarity, at least among their elites," and "less than 10 percent of all states in the United Nations are nation-state" (Smith, 1995, 57, 86).

If so, it could be reasonably pointed out that a new perspective of democracy is demanded especially in the era of globalization, even though it must be a tentative proposal.

II. Necessity of "the Second Transformation of Legitimacy"

International and interstate relations have traditionally been grasped in the Westphalian model in which the sovereign states have been believed to be the primary actors. The present configurations of global or international politics, however, are called a multi-layered-governance and are also likened to a sort of "new medievalism" in the sense that any state was not sovereign in the medieval society (Bull, 1977). The state is certainly no longer the sole participant in the international society, as demonstrated by the actions of NGOs and INGOs. Traditional state borders have also been blurred by the growing interdependence among different countries and many problems have acquired a global dimension, and then they need global solutions as in the case of environmental issues. It is in this current context of globalization that the conception of democracy as inseparable from the bordered nation-state needs not only to be reconsidered, but the customary political dichotomy of domestic and foreign affairs is also losing its customary relevance, and then plausibility.

In the Westphalian model that originated in the aftermath of the Thirty Year's War, sovereignty has been conceptually regarded as an exclusive attribute of the state. So the territorially sovereign state emerged as a geographical and political entity with external exclusiveness and internal inclusiveness of sovereignty, at least in Western Europe. In this model it was assumed that the international system was composed of these autonomous states. Although international order was supposedly sustained by the sovereign state abiding by the principle of international legality, its configurations were, in fact, imagined by the billiard ball model in which states would incessantly collide against each other on the table of the globe (international version of the state of nature envisaged by Hobbes).

Combined with nationalism, the state gradually assumed the shape of nation-state as a historically contingent articulate, although its shape was shadowed by an image of apocryphal entity. The modern state could, however, change into an expression of natural attachment by recourse to nationalism, and proceeded to contrive the social and cultural formation by the state force, if necessary.

The nation-state, furthermore, turned into the expression of people's will by the depersonalization of state power and the shift of sovereignty from a sovereign to the people. In the social integration, political socialization, and institutional alteration of the state apparatus, the "territorially sovereign nation-state" emerged as a vessel whose destiny was and has been identified with the fate of a relevant community. Here has internally come in view the integral nation-state in which citizenship has been conceived to be inseparable from the nation-state abstracted from particular nationality (Smith, 1995), and

then the modern state has appeared as a legitimate monopoly of force in the dualism of separation between the state and civil society. In these historical contexts, the principal and inevitable task of the state has been attributed to the maintenance of internal social order and the defense against external entities. Thus it appears as an element of social cohesion and the representative of national interests in general.

On the other hand, the modern nation-state has adapted the principle of liberal democracy as its political and ideological superstructure at least in the advanced capitalist states, involving a great diversity as to the introduction of it. The origin of democracy could be literally traced back to demokratia of Greek. But, contemporary democracy is comprehensible in the concept of liberal democracy. The term shows itself to be a confluence of different genealogy: polis (city-state) type democracy and constitutionalism. The former implies civil participation in government and control of political power by the people, and the latter means liberation from restraints, and it preceded the former in introduction to political system at least in Western Europe. In the democratic ideal, the more extensive participation in scope and number may be deemed the more democratic polity, while the less restraints, the better in classical liberalism.

Classical liberalism originated in constitutionalism that sprang from natural law theories in the medieval age. Liberalism has been represented in constitutionalism whose intended gist was, by origin, a protective notion bearing an aristocratic character, because constitutionalism historically originated in the protection of feudal orders against the absolute power. Therefore, liberalism espoused the principle of separation between the state and civil society, and tried to restrain the arbitrary invocation of political power and to subject the absolute state to some public accountability and societal control, from the viewpoint of the reliance upon human reason and in the principle of limited government. These are confirmable in the introduction of "rule of law" and "separation of power" and so on, into the state apparatus.

As mentioned above, liberalism and democracy have historically different origins. Liberalism has emphasized the individual's ability to develop his intellectual and moral facilities in conditions of maximum freedom from all externally and coercively imposed constraints, while democratic thinking has searched for the procedures and contrivances to overcome isolation among individuals and "to extend popular control over decisions about collective rules" (Bobbio, 1990; Beetham, 1999). In this respect, concepts of both go seemingly in opposite directions because liberalism is based on the principle of independence of individuals and democracy on the principle of association among people. Therefore, the former is centrifugal and the latter centripetal, in relation to state power. But, although liberalism is in principle an idea of self-development at a distance from the state power, it vesorts to the sate power as a vehicle for self-development. So, liberalism entails the two aims of simultaneously eliminating anarchical disorder and unlimited intervention to individual freedoms in the basic premise that human dignity should be

respected as much as possible. In these historical context in political ideals, liberalism has been obliged to accept the requirements of democracy. Therefore, the idea of emancipation from the economic restraints has demanded liberalism to change itself to interventionist reform liberalism or to be tolerant toward the welfare policies, given the impact of socialism and social democratic thoughts especially in the twentieth century.

It has been frequently noted that confluence of liberalism with democracy was a contingent necessity and it is far from being out of date. In the middle of the nineteenth century, at the earliest, both were awkwardly united in tension as the concept of liberal democracy. Needless to say, its introduction unavoidably brought about the struggles about democratization between liberals and democrats. It may be, pertinent to suppose that the concept of contemporary democracy does institutionally signify a united whole of liberty rights and political rights, because it is necessary to prevent the encroachment of the former in name of the latter, and vice versa. We are required to avoid both threats of majoritarianism or parternalistic authoritarianism toward negative liberty and individualistic egocentrism toward positive liberty.

Liberal democracy has finally assumed the form of the parliamentary or representative democracy at the confluence of the long-established parliamentarism and democracy. Parliamentary democracy or indirect democracy has been introduced as a "grand discovery" to resolve the contradiction between participation and size, but it is also a compromise or eclecticism in tension because it is a coalescence of parliamentarism (rule by parliament) and control by the people. Therefore, contemporary parliamentary democracy is also a unity in tension, because it has involved the propensity to disregard democracy in the name of parliamentarism, and vice versa. But both are unified in the idea of accountability to constituents with the proviso that the representative system should be so correctly introduced as to reflect the will of the people.

In these historical contexts, the "territorially sovereign nation state" has maintained its legitimate entity with the introduction of liberal democratic parliamentarism as its superstructure. Through the formal introduction of liberal democracy into the state apparatus, the "territorially sovereign nation-state" has gone through "the first transformation of legitimacy" at the level of the state as a unit. So the nation-state has assumed the legitimate apparatus for administration. Thus, every inhabitants in the given state has been legitimately regulated by the legal-institutional restrictions of it and every passengers in the vessel called the state has identified their fate with it.

The "territorially sovereign, liberal democratic nation-state" has been prevalently regarded as the justifiable model of the advanced capitalist state in the post-World War II era. It was also called, as a whole, the Keynesian welfare state with regard to its socio-economic policies that were characteristic of almost all the advanced capitalist states. These arrangements were also supported by Pax Americana. But, it was not very long before they broke down in the collapse of the so-called Breton Woods system caused by

the economic competition and discords among the advanced capitalist states as well as tenacious opposition from the developing countries against their exploitative policies. In response to these failures arose the so-called neo-liberal ideology whose main positions were evident in the claims of deregulation and reprivatization. Curtailment of democracy and reduction of inputs into government were also demanded on the pretext of the "excess of democracy" and "overloaded government." The Keynesian welfare state, thus, shifted to post-Fordist arrangements whose features were fiscal austerity and erosion of the social compromise system, and restructuring of the world economic system, although entailing persistent claims to recover the social welfare.

Under these conditions, economic policies of the state were obliged to encourage economic flexibility through technological innovation and reconstruction of internal and external production systems. These trends, as such, involved a restructuring of coreperiphery relations and a new polarization of the Third World. These transformations of the world production system were also facilitated by the establishment of consensus-making international organizations under the leadership of major capitalist states in response to the economic crisis of 1968-75. We can, for example, enumerate the organization of Trilateral Commission (1973) and the inauguration of Summit conferences after the oil crisis (1975). The upward, downward and horizontal transfer of state power has happened in these historical phases. In retrospect from the vantage point of the 1990s, the so-called post-Fordist production- consumption system has inspired the ongoing globalization and it has also entangled the socialist bloc in the process of building up a global economy in place of an international economy.

The territorially sovereign nation-state has been gradually losing its traditional entity in the process of growing interconnectedness of politico-economical, socio-cultural relations among the people of many nations, although it certainly retains a relative autonomy. These phenomena are discernible in increasing tendencies for the state to be subjugated to the external input toward its government by the supranational policy organizations. In this respect the EU is the trans-territorial and supranational establishment of the states in regionalism and a sort of extended version of consociational democracy in European scale and scope. We can give other trans-territorial examples such as NAFTA (1994), APEC (1989), MERCOSUR (1995) and the like. Furthermore, a new alliance between regions (e.g., between EU and NAFTA) is envisaged for the future. In these contexts the state is increasingly obliged to respond to external impacts and international accords, including agreements that have been concluded by the individual state itself. Such is a distinguishing feature of contemporary world politics.

On the other side, the territorially sovereign nation-state is under the pressure of transnational social movements through their transformation into the trans-territorial pressure groups, and it has been attacked by the eruption of ethnic revolts against the historical process of the nation-state building which has been made up around a dominant

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nation by the state bureaucracies. In these circumstances, de jure sovereignty is said to be in the process of decay, or to be at least a perforated entity. Although the state, as will be mentioned in the next section, must be the core of democratic practice, sovereignty need not be the nearly complete controlling entity over the inhabitants of the relevant territory: rather, sovereign territorial entities are just functionally required for dealing with cross-border or trans-territorial issues as in the case of the EU.

It should not be conceived that the state has lost its inherent roles. The state does irrefutably retain the power of controlling a given people and territory. It is still the principal agent of maintaining and creating internal order, and assuming the responsibility for legislation and execution of law. Furthermore it justifiably has the power of adjusting the economic relations and regulating the society through the socio-economic policies. The state is decidedly the vital organ to induce legitimation for the nation-state, so long as consensus making systems such as representative government, periodical elections, political parties, interest groups and the like, indeed, work relevantly. And democratization of government and society is also around the state. In addition, international regulation and adjustment need the approval of the state, and international law presupposes the existence of the state.

The alteration and alternation of ways of articulating political contrivances into the state apparatus is the history of governance. The direct democracy in classic G reece is city-state governance in the premise of the homogeneous demos. The governance of the modern nation-state is, by contrast, founded on the principle of a heterogeneous population in the form of indirect or representative system. But, the ongoing globalization has encompassed almost all the world and has been incessantly undermining the traditional conception of it as a self-subsistent nation-state, while entailing repulsions and counteractions toward these tendencies and inducing a new nation-state building. So decrease of the state's capacity to perform its will self-subsistently has come to the surface on the one hand, and consciousness of sharing a fate globally has swelled from the necessity of resolving such trans-territorial problems as ecosystem on the other. The emerging global governance fails to carry out its direct accountability and responsibility to the demos, because it is just phantom in the global-type "great society". Thus globalization demands an additional political system besides the liberal democratic parliamentalism in the nation-state.

As the remarks mentioned above, globalization has precipitated "the second transformation of legitimacy" at the level of the globe as a unit, in need of congruency to the principle of popular control. Here have emerged various models of global democracy such as liberal internationalism, radical republicanism and cosmopolitan democracy as global transformation group of the Open University classifies (McG rew, 1998; Head et al., eds., 1999)

III. In Search for Democratic Global Governance

The idea of a world government began with Dante's De Monarchia (1309) written for the purpose of integrating Italy; Grotius, Saint-Pierre, Rousseau and Kant in turn were to argue for a world order. Pleas and searches for pacification of the world have continued to the present among contemporary political philosophers such as Bobbio, Habermas and so on.

Hobbes deduced the sovereign state and a peaceful reign by it, from the necessity of getting out of the predicament of incessant war in the state of nature. This image of statehood has been prodigiously significant as an explanation and construction of the modern state, and it allowed for the hypothetical assumption that the world order would be constituted of sovereign states. But it is nothing more than a coexistence of internal security within the states and external insecurity among them. Ever after the location of sovereignty had been transferred to the people in the modern state, they have not really been sovereign externally and have remained a passive people in the international society. Here emerges the duality of sovereignty because it simultaneously belongs to the people internally and the state externally. A sovereign is confined in a given nation-state and can not, therefore, be a substantive existence beyond it.

On the other side, the conception of the state as a self-subsistent entity has been losing practical relevance in the globalization of politico-economic and socio-cultural relations. It should be also thought that the concept of publicity has been changing its accustomed meaning in the emergent era of globalization because the concept of it has been grasped only in the limited framework of the nation-state. So, the usual dichotomy between internal and external or domestic and foreign spheres of politics has been increasingly problematic under the globalizing conditions in which many problems also need to be solved globally. The global policy organizations have proliferated because of these contemporary needs. Traditional liberal democratic parliamentarism as a superstructure of the nation-state has, accordingly, deepened the contradiction with these international organizations, because they bear no direct responsibility and accountability to the demos who has been confined in the nation-state.

Accountability and responsibility to the constituents, or "symmetry" and "congruence" between the representatives and their electors in representative government is an indispensable principle of parliamentary democracy (Held, 1996). However, the accustomed political system that has been territorially bound by the nation-state is not only unsatisfactory to the democratic principle, but also cannot satisfactorily cope with the global issues. As we try to alleviate this discrepancy and to be active citizens with a global consciousness, it will be necessary to construct some type of global democratic governance alongside the national government.

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If the present state, in fact, alone retains the capacity to solve global problems by its own mechanisms, it will be unnecessary to create a supra-national polity. But the pressures from abroad do not only influence the state, but each sovereign also hesitates at the boundary of the state and can not institutionally cross it. This limitation calls for the same leap of imagination in the global level as the one that happened in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries for the purpose of extending democracy from the town meeting to the level of the state. This leap enabled the spatial limitation of the direct assembly to be transcended by the institutional innovation of the state apparatus in the nation state (Paine, Rights of Man, Part 2, ch. 3; Beetham, 1999). In short, we are suffering from the absence of democratic global governance by which global problems could be legitimately solved. It is in this context that we are under the pressure of realizing "the second transformation of legitimacy." The problem of size and democracy could be overcome by the introduction of a representative system. So, we must also, now, clear up the contemporary problem by contriving some democratic system relevant to the global era. In this historical context there has appeared a variety of theories of global democracy.

There has, however, been no need to abandon the nation-state and national citizenship under the premise that the ongoing nation-state and national citizenship is good for nothing. But it is necessary to advance a further democratization in social and political spheres of each state as well as to extend the historically accumulated human rights to the global level. That is to say, it is important to raise the demos up to the active citizen in the global society. In this respect, the liberal democratic nation-state is an irresistible necessity for envisaging a global democracy, because it is difficult to construct a reasonable model without the present nation-state and its democratic apparatus. The nation-state has been established in history and its democratic arrangements will be a very important position for the future. Given the nation-state and accumulated human rights, we must struggle to contrive a new democratic model for a new century.

In devising the principles of global democracy, we must take into consideration that human rights are not fixed historically, but subject to evolution. According to this view, a new phase of globalization will require a new concept of human rights based on democracy. In this respect, we can remember the "third generation of human rights (droits de l'home de la troisième generation)". These include the preservation of global commons and healthy surroundings, and the right to live in peace. It is also noteworthy that human rights of the coming generations are included in these rights. These are called the third because they have appeared following the civil-political rights (the first) and socio-economic, cultural rights (the second).

As will be mentioned in the next section, the Japanese Constitution proclaimed in

²⁾ Karel Vasak, La Déclaration Universelle des de l'Homme 30 ans après, extrait du Courrier de l'Unesco de November 1977.

1947 expressly enumerates "the right to live in peace, free from fear and want" as one of the most important rights to be enjoyed across the nations and for the coming generations. "The third generation of rights" or "the right to live in peace" may be conceived as an extended expression of solidarity and associatedness inherent in democratic idea, and we can project them into the global society. It is, however, a fact that we are still under the threat of insecurity including war and destruction of ecosystem as well as globally structured inequality and violence.

Despite its diversity in form and practice, democracy converges into political contrivances to protect and develop human rights. Even though it is certainly necessary to reconsider the prescriptive relations between universality and time-space particularity of human rights, the existence of human beings is essential beyond time and space. From this perspective it is necessary to construct a sustainable consumer society that can be in harmony with nature instead of destructive consumerism based on "possessive individualism" (Macpherson, 1962). In this respect, resort to war and military production are the most unproductive and subversive systems of the world. Their abolition should be incessantly pursued in "globalization of peace and democracy." We should renounce the fetishism of military technology. Here again the significance of "internationalism" in place of inter-statism. These ideas are already evident in the global social movements of NGOs whose purpose is to construct the global organizations from below, as discernible in their appeals for the disarmament, natural preservation and protections of human rights across states.

The more a state is committed to democracy, the more it will be obliged to promote the democratic relations among states, because democratization in one state will not be sufficient without the democratic relations among its related states, especially in the era of globalization. Therefore, endogenous progress toward democracy is linked with exogenous democratization. In other words, democratization is as much globally interconnected as socio-economic and cultural aspects, because the globalization has been blurring the lines between international and domestic areas. Nevertheless, democracy cannot be and should not be exported from abroad. Such an attempt must be only counter-productive, because democratization of each state should be submitted to its own autonomy and self-determination.

Given the multiplicity of identity, nationalism is, in principle, compatible with internationalism and regionalism so long as human rights are upheld in common. From this perspective, cosmopolitan communitarianism or communitarian cosmopolitanism is a conceivable vision, albeit the apparent contradiction in terms. When the nation-state and particularities of its socio-cultural and historical contexts are disregarded in the name of cosmopolitanism, this kind of cosmopolitan globalism or global cosmopolitanism will unavoidably lead to a sort of global governance model that will be organized around some hegemonic state and its soft power by resorting to an image of radial system or concentric

circle. Recognition of difference does not always mean the appreciation of superiority and inferiority. It is rather necessary not to impose some particulars on others so long as they observe basic human rights. In this respect, a monocentric and radial conception will induce to a hierarchical structure of global system, and will make it impossible to construct democratic global governance because it will certainly bring about serious tensions and conflicts. Therefore, some sort of polycentric-pluralistic, but organically interrelated model should be searched for as the most viable one.

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So long as the state should remain a main element to articulate and reproduce the socio-economic relations in the given territory, and it will be a functional requirement for dealing with issues beyond its capacity, the structure of democratic global governance will have to be pluralistic and multi-faceted, under the premise of relative autonomy of the state composed of democratic institutions.

Even though the nation-state has been losing its established relevance, abandoning of it does not only mean pulling up the foundation of democratic institutions and functional element of social cohesiveness by their roots, but it will also inevitably cause disastrous reactions. As the national democratic state is a compound governance composed of central-local systems, democratic global governance is also imaginable in a democratic global commonwealth based on the sharing of a polycentric structure, but not on pax cosmopolitica. Thus emerges a multilateral and multi-layered model of co-existence among national states.

To depict a democratic global governance is only a "thought experiment" and must be a tentative trial. In contriving this governance model, it is, at least, necessary to consider the next points. First, we should be, almost always, prone to resort to some sort of anarchism or paternalistic authoritarianism if democracy is conceived to be disfunctional as a basis of political legitimation. If such were the case, it might be asserted that the principles of democracy should be abandoned by reason of its disfunction. But it is essential to deploy its principles, and to apply its extended version to the new problems to which the accustomed principles are seemingly unappliable. This principle is called a "democratic fix" (Cunningham, 1987).

Second, self-consciousness of solidarity and responsibility will spring from some sort of participation, or otherwise people will look on everything as estranged bystanders. Therefore, it is necessary to organize some type of participation by the people, whether internally or externally.

Third, it should not be assumed a given premise that aggression from abroad is unavoidable, but should assumed that first of all we should make a global governance mechanisms for mutual security based on the common recognition of human dignity as a global citizenship coexisting with a national one. The sword is, to be sure, necessary to give covenants practical relevance (Hobbes). But, we should start by considering the world order system to be sufficient with non-military sanctions through the creation of

democratic global governance by which some international adjudication systems will be agreed in place of the ongoing military solutions. Taking these regards into consideration, we should contrive a model of democratic global governance, albeit tentatively.

As a "thought experiment" for institutionalization of democratic global governance, we can provisionally set up two dimensions for its construction; (i) spatial (state and supra-state), (ii) institutional / functional (governmental and non-governmental). This paradigm is delineated as Figure I and Table I, II. Some explanations will be required about them.

Nation-state (or National state)

The state remains the most important position of all governmental organizations for the aforementioned reasons, and is internally and externally a primary unit. Local authorities are parts of the self-governmental subsystem of the state. They could and should play an active and effective role in solving global problems as well as forming friendship with foreign countries, just as some Japanese local governments have already declared themselves to be nuclear-weapons free zones and have made many "sister cities" abroad. In this global governance model, each people of each state have the power to delegate his or her representatives to supra-state governmental authorities that will be created as the permanent organization. The state does, as now, but in a reformed form, intergovernmentally and multi-governmentally regulate and adjust the temporary issues through appropriate devices and organizations.

Regional organizations

There is a need to create new democratic authorities for the purpose of coping with regional issues in horizontal connections among nations. Each region should be transequatorial, taking the general disparity between the North and the South into consideration (Resnick, 1997), and it would be plausible to suppose, for example, three areas such as a European-African, an Asian-Pacific, and a North and South American region. Its formation may be, at the beginning, a permanent forum in which each constituent should be admitted to exercise some negative power, but it is advisable to reform it into a federal or confederal formation. It is essential to prevent these regions from changing into a closed and antagonistic blocs as happened before World War II, and it is also necessary for them to hold the respect of human dignity in common. The creation of such regions would be, however, most difficult owing to the differences in religion, culture, economic conditions, and negative legacies and/or reminiscences of imperialism. Nevertheless, such an organization is indispensable to find a perspective for new global democracy by overcoming these obstacles.


UN

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The United Nation is an indispensable organization for global democratic governance. Its roles lie in inducement of cooperation and agreements among supra-state governments and non-governmental actors as a trans-territorial organization, and it may be also reasonably anticipated that the UN will assume the leading role in promulgation of a grand design for the future. In this respect, it is advisable to promote democratization within its own architecture including the change of delegates form state representatives to national representatives elected somehow by the people. Such a device is necessary for the establishment of popular sovereignty instead of state sovereignty. From this point of view it will be necessary to reform the General Assembly and the Security Council (e.g., introduction of bicameralism in the General Assembly respecting a different representative principle, some amendments of the ongoing formation in the Security Council centering around the great powers, and reinforcement of the International Court of Justice to enable

Figure I.

A typology of democratic global governance



territorial state

 $A \cdot B \cdot C$: national (central, local) supra-state

AB · AC · BC : regional (international, cross-national)

ABC: trans-territorial

 $(multinational,\ trans-national,\ inter-regional)$

Table I.

I. Spatial

- (1) state: primary unit
- (2) supra-state
 - i) region: Euro-African, Asian-Pacific, American (new political communities)
 - ii) UN: trans-territorial
- II. Institutional/Functional
- (1) governmental


permanent

- i) state governments
- ii) regional congresses
- iii) UN organizations

temporary or ad hoc

- i) inter-governmental
- ii) multi-governmental
- (2) non-governmental
 - i) national (social groups)
 - ii) international (global social movements)

Table II.



it to enforce its decisions).

Non-governmental organization

NGOs, especially global social movements are powerful in overcoming isolationism and in mobilizing national and global public opinion (Boutros-Ghali, 2000). Global social movements, as a sort of functional representative, play the role of interest or pressure groups in national and trans-territorial scale, and apply their pressures on governmental organizations across boundaries. In this respect, we, political scientists are required to play an active role in creating the theory and practice of global democracy like the MSF (Médecins sans frontieres)

Table II shows the relations of the peoples in their own state apparatus and suprastate governmental organizations. Each people of each state share organic relations through institutional and voluntary participation, and then they will assume responsibility for the solution of contemporary global issues in sharing consciousness of solidarity all over the world. Taking this architecture into consideration, we get on to the next problem, a perspective from the Japanese Constitution.

IV. A Perspective from the Japanese Constitution

Defeat in the Second World War is the starting point of the post-war Japan. The Japanese Constitution was adapted in 1946 and proclaimed the next year, and it continues without any alteration until today. It is a total revision of the Meiji Imperial Constitution that was the firm basis of militarism in the pre-war Japan. Even though it may be supposed that the current Constitution does not presume such a high extensive and intensive globalization as the ongoing one, its fundamental principles can be certainly a means of considering democratic global governance, because it has been adapted in a farsighted perspective for the future as well as in a deep introspection of the past, even though many leaders of the state at that time did not share them.

After the so-called Meiji Restoration (1868), Japan started out to catch up with the advanced capitalist states through militarism and industrialism enforced from above. There were certainly some democratic movements initiated by the progressives and the enlightened. But, they were always suppressed and the Japanese people were forcefully demanded to perform their duty of devotional services to the Emperor identified with the state. Such a submissive climate had been cultivated among the remnants of feudalism. These social regimentations bred authoritarian and paternalistic structures in culture and politics, and in the absence of confrontation to the state power, they finally led to a gleichschaltung by it. This history shows a tragedy of modernization in the backward country.

The current Constitution was adapted against the ruling classes' will to preserve the

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moribund establishment. Modernization of Japan was compellingly enforced by the occupation army, but some of the traditional ruling systems were also utilized for its occupation policy. This type of indirect governing policy contrasted to the case of Germany whose remnants of Nazism the occupation army tried to wipe out by their roots. On the other side, cultural and socio-political remnants have not been swept away in Japan, and some of them have been inherited in Japanese society and politics. They have been lingering and often appeared outwardly as restorationist or retrogressive opinions and movements, especially in the period of transitions by reason that the Japanese Constitution contains un-Japanese elements, or that it was just "imposed" from abroad. These particularities have run through like a red thread in the post-war Japanese history. It is in these contexts that the recurring controversies over alteration and preservation of the Japanese Constitution have lasted to the present. These have continued as a paradox in Japan over the Constitution. That is, the ruling conservatives have aspired to revise it on the one hand, the progressives have struggled to conserve it on the other, and the Japanese have, on the whole, supported both the conservative parties and the Constitution.

The Japanese Constitution was adapted with hope in ruins, and it also reflects pacifism spreading all over the world shortly after the War, as confirmable in the Charter of the United Nations (1945) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The Japanese Constitution also has a grand conception that the peace of the world should be established through the efforts of disarmament and the renunciation of war. This perception is derived from the negative legacies in the War, including the fact that Japan is the sole country in world history to have been attacked by atomic weapons.

But, with the onset of the Cold War and the outbreak of the Korean War, the occupation policy began to change its demilitarization into a rearmament policy in which Japan has been made an ally of the United States in the Pacific, and the Japanese government has accepted these changes in recognition of the principle of power politics and acknowledgement of Japan's membership within the capitalist bloc, and through the interpretation of the Constitution as allowing Japan to have a military force so long as it is defensive in nature. In these historical contexts, the Japanese politico-economic structures have been vulnerable to pressures from the U. S., and have been also co-opted into the military strategy of it in Asia.

We are, however, entering a new phase in which the politico-economic structure of Japan has being incessantly globalized after the end of the Cold War, and we feel required to search for a new democratic world order. For the purpose of replying to the needs of the time, we must keep on exploring what perspectives the Japans Constitution provides for these needs, and it is also necessary to examine whether the model set up in this paper is congruent with it.

The fundamental principles of the Japanese Constitution are succinctly expressed in a trinity: pacifism, respect for human rights and popular sovereignty. The Constitution

takes the view of co-living in peace among nations and banishment of undemocratic-unequal situations by joint efforts across all boundaries for all time from the earth. Its Preamble says:

We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution.

In the above passage, we can confirm that the principle of representative democratic government by the sovereign people and their enjoyment of its attendant benefits are declared to be "a universal principle of mankind." These expressions are a succinct representation of democratic ideas and principles that have been elaborated through history. Especially, it is noteworthy to affirm that the war shall be caused from the decision-making of the government, instead of the people. The Constitution does, therefore, demand the sovereign people to watch it with vigilance and to prevent the war with all resources. In the next passage, the Preamble says:

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

In the second paragraph cited above, the Constitution recognizes an international society to be consisted of the "peace-loving peoples," and declares a determination to create a peaceful global order in concert with them. We should note the expression that "all the peoples of the world have the right to live in peace", because this right may be for the first time promulgated in the constitutional history of the world. This naturally includes freedom from fear and want. The enumeration of such right may be, therefore, reasonably regarded as the most comprehensive expression of the fundamental human rights which are "conferred upon this and future generations" (article 97). For the efforts to realize this right, it is indispensable not only internally to keep the other fundamental rights of liberty securely, but also externally to create firm friendships and collaborations with other nations. Absence or decay of either means a failure to realize the "right to live in peace". In this recognition, the Preamble says that "no nation is responsible to self alone, but that laws of political morality are universal," and concludes that "we, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources."

From the passages cited above, the Constitution demands us to pursue well-being in peace, under the premise that liberty and democracy is indispensable for realizing it, and in the recognition that it can not be established in isolation, but its realization needs a collaboration with other peace-loving nations. Therefore, the Constitution does not regard armed conflict as a given, but trusts the human ability to overcome it and to contrive a mechanism for peace. In this respect, we, the Japanese, should keep remembering the negative legacy of that War in the prospect for mutual understanding and co-existence in peace among nations, especially in Asia.

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Thus, in the very realistic point of view that any nation does not keep its own security without mutual understanding, the Japanese Constitution aspires to an international society in which the "right to live in peace" will be shared as a universal idea. It does not, therefore, adopt a passive position to accept any given situation as an insuperable condition. Its basic principle is rather based on a democratic theory that we will be able to overcome the present obstacles through its advanced application to them. In this regard, the principle of a "democratic fix" is one of the most realistic measures toward any trouble that may seem hard to be superable, and it is most unrealistic to accept any present state of affairs as an unchangeable given. We must now reconfirm the significance explicit in the Constitution and try to give life to its fundamental principles at this turning point in history.

It may be, however, said that we are still under the threat of insecurity and the destruction of the ecosystem as well as globally structured inequality and violence. Failure to solve these problems would result in nothing less than the end of humanity, and we should bequeath a bright legacy for the coming generations. These problems are undoubtedly beyond the capacity of a nation-state even if it is democratized internally. In this regard, it is necessary to consider these problems from a standpoint of "human interest" in place of "national interest" and the limited legitimate systems based on the nation-state. Thus appears the necessity to make "the second transformation of legitimacy" and to cultivate the peace-loving political culture in the era of globalization.

Taking these global problems into consideration, the ideal of the "right to live in peace" proves to be very significant, because it provides a clue for dealing with contemporary problems. According to this right as understood in the Constitution, we are required to refrain from taking it for granted that security will be only guaranteed by force. This conviction of maintaining security by force accelerates the technological fetishism of armaments, and then globally makes a military-industrial-political complex. The huge consumption systems for destructive forces should be transformed into productive systems for the survival of human beings. In this regard we should demand that the "right to live in peace" be shared beyond boundaries, and make every effort to avoid military conflicts in paradoxical situations that resorting to arms unavoidably invites the threat of insecurity. It is also urgently necessary to cope with the global destruction of the ecosystem caused by

over-exploitation of nature among the advanced states.

On the other side, economic disparity between the North and the South has persistently grown in recent years. We should note the disaster of the sub-Sahara Africa. The want of the necessities of life will always be a product of the incessant conflicts. No one should have to suffer from want of necessities, at least, if we take into account total global production of them. It is, therefore, necessary to extend globally the principle of social welfare and the right to live beyond particular nation-states under the principle of equity and in such a way that aids and resources may not be appropriated for the use of local rulers. We can not create a solid bond of solidarity without reducing the present disparity between the North and the South. The "right to live in peace" would be highly improbable without active collaboration among nations, as the Japanese Constitution declares that "no nation is responsible to itself alone" (Preamble). It does, therefore, recognize that this right will not be exclusively realized within a nation, but it is necessary to spin a global web for it in collaboration with other nations.

As aforementioned, in the "right to live in peace" we can find a perspective of democratic global governance. Problems of security and concerns for global environmental disruption and economic disparity as well as globally structured violence should and could be submitted to the supra-national deliberations from a standpoint of "human interest". Solutions of these problems should not be left to economic forces of the world market. There are already many organizations and some plans for global governance. Besides these organizations and democratic reorganization of them, there are now needs to create a democratic global governance toward which it is necessary to construct a supra-national democratic organization as well as to promote further democratization of the ongoing state governments. The Constitution demands us globally to contribute our efforts from these points of view. Even though this work is certainly hard to set about doing and would be fraught with difficulties and set backs, the possibility and necessity to do so has been increasing on account of democratization in many nations and the globalization among them. The model of democratic global governance tentatively set up in this paper is a perspective derived from and in congruence with the Japanese Constitution.

Additionally, recent issues over the Japanese Constitution should be briefly mentioned. For the Council to discuss on the alteration of the Constitution is already established in the national Diet, and its final report is to be announced officially in five years.

As mentioned above, the Constitution continues unchanged until today as it was adopted. This fact shows that it has been broadly supported through the generations. Revision has been tried in the 1950s and 1980s, but did not succeed because revisionists could not occupy 2 third of the seats in the Diet necessary for its initiation and the people strongly opposed such revisions. The revisionists still claim the Constitution to be incongruent with the contemporary trends of globalization. But their assertions incline to

further militarization under the pretext of the need to contribute to the international society by forces, not with aspirations for further democratization and global wide creation of peace systems in the era of globalization. Their underlying premises are observable in their appeals to an egocentric nationalism or xenophobic sympathy by inspiring fear caused by the process of globalization. To pursue these directions through revision of the Constitution is incongruent with the "right to live in peace" which the Constitution declared more than a half century ago.

V. Conclusion

The search for global democracy is a formidable problem in democratic theory, because its aim is to project a new design for democratic governance in the future. We should, however, remember that politics is the "art of possibility", or that "political science is the science not only of what is, but of what ought to be" (Carr, 1939). From this point of view, we need to envisage the future from the present possibilities that have been made by unceasing human efforts.

"A territorially sovereign nation-state" has been a historical product and its political legitimacy has depended upon the introduction of democracy. The articulation of the nation-state with democracy ought to be regarded as a brilliant achievement in history. This historical configuration should not be, however, a self-closed and self-sufficient entity in the present, because the process of trans-territorially interwoven relations incessantly demand a new construction of governance. Thus appears the necessity of "the second transformation of legitimacy" after the first which has already brought representative democracy into the national or nation-state.

Nevertheless, it is certain that we do not globally share the same sense of value and belief system, and that identity connected to national culture and tradition is ineradicable. Moreover, it is needless to say that the world politics are not free from the Darwinian struggles for hegemony. Taking these facts into consideration, it is seemingly very difficult to envision the image of global democracy. But, it is also truism that we have made our history through trust and sympathy. There are also, to be sure, good reasons that these feelings and human reason have been shared beyond boundary, as confirmable in the continuing existence of human beings themselves. The differences of culture merely signify a qualitative difference as in water and oil in nature. Principles of democracy do not demand to dissolve different cultures into a unified one, but should be compatible with variety and difference in its developments toward human liberation.

The abandonment of the national or nation-state would cut out not only the foundation of legitimate government by the people, but also an essential element of social cohesiveness for democratic movements, and then unavoidably cause unpredictable confusion. Any democratic global commonwealth would have, therefore, to be founded on

the idea of multi-layered global governance and of multiple identities as aforementioned in this paper. Principles of democracy are not fixed, but developmental in respect to the need of applying its advanced form to the seemingly insuperable troubles. Given the plurality of identity and a democratization of the state, we should be able to create democratic global governance in the shared interests of development of human rights and preservation of ecosystem as a global citizen's belief system beyond boundary. Supranational establishment of another commonwealth through the global application of extended principle of democracy is not only to be compatible with the democratization of the ongoing state, but it also needed for the development of democracy. Parenthetically, it is needless to say that human rights should not be merely used as the rhetoric in diplomacy or political strategy.

In retrospect, one can say that the 20th century was fraught with wars. Two World Wars, the Cold War and many smaller wars characterized the period. Exploitation and destruction of nature as well as human energy for these wars were also simply astonishing phenomena of this century. But, at the dawn of a new century, we should pave the way to a perspective of developmental democracy by extending its principle from a nation-state to regions, and to the world. That is, globalization demands a new global transformation of legitimacy to cope with security, maintenance of a global commons, and a more equitable distribution of wealth through the construction of democratic global governance. In this respect, the "right to live in peace" explicit in the Japanese Constitution is a very far-sighted view for considering a democratic global governance.

We are at a crossroad in these developments. There also appears to be another dawn of history on the horizon in the unknown depth of interconnectedness among us. The coming day is looking forward to our efforts globally to spread and deepen democracy. We need to change the possibility into a reality with a keen insight, even though this will require an Herculean effort. These strenuous efforts, at least, should have revolutionary implications. A new science of politics for democracy is needed for a new world, as Tocqueville declared about 170 years ago in Democracy in America.

Democracy is an unfinished and endless journey toward liberation of the people. At the new millennium, the owl of Minerva is preparing to take flight again, this time in the name of global democracy.

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