

# State and Democracy Besieged by Globalization

NAKATANI Yoshikazu \*

## 1. Introduction

Although there are many definitions of globalization, a consensus about its rudimentary concept appears to be emerging (at least among the scholars who regard the words “global” and “international” as synonyms to be used interchangeably): The technological revolution in information and transportation rapidly facilitates the growth of trans-boundary social interconnectedness and the deterritorialization of a traditional social space, especially after the collapse of Soviet Union and the subsequent ascendancy of the dominant capitalist states in the world politics. Contemporary globalization supposedly has a propensity for a long-term and multi-pronged process with acceleration of its velocity<sup>1)</sup> (although there is a lingering criticism of its novelty, significance, and permanency even among scholars who agree about globalization). This means that we are facing a “turning point” in social “time” and “space” because such deterritorialization and interconnectedness demand a reconsideration of the politico-social framework based on the traditional nation-state and a concept of democracy within it.

There have also emerged many efforts to make a democratic vision of world governance in recognition of democratic defects (deficits of democracy) in the age of globalization, whether in cosmopolitans, multilateralists, critical political economists, post-structuralists.<sup>2)</sup> Modern democracy as a representative (or parliamentary) institution has been established in the nation-state (first transformation of political legitimacy). But globalization urges the second transformation of political legitimacy beyond the scale of the nation-state under the growth of deterritorial interconnectedness of the social and economic relations.

Globalization has been in connection with liberalism, whose basic policy is a tripartite of “privatization, liberalization, and deregulation”. Globalization is another expression of neo-liberalism in economic policies and its normalization around the world. It has also

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\* Special and Emeritus Professor, Ritsumeikan University

1) William E. Scheuerman, “Globalization” (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/globalization>, last access on 2010/01/15).

2) Jan A. Scholte, “Reconstructing Contemporary Democracy,” *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 15 (1), Winter 2008: 305-50.

caused the blurring of a dichotomy between "low politics" and "high politics" and has given rise to a new discipline of "International Political Economy" as well as global governance theories in political science and international relations. The emergence of New Public Management is another result of globalization. In addition, some theorists advocate that the state is declining. In these contexts, we confront the problems of how to situate the state and to reconstruct democracy in relation with ongoing globalization.

## **2. Neo-liberalism and the State**

### **1 Liberalism in Capitalism**

Liberalism is a fundamental principle of the capitalist economy and a necessary discourse for the organization of the system (liberal capitalism). The capitalist state is inseparably related to liberal principles (liberal capitalist state).

Liberalism rests on the assumption of rational actors in pursuit of interests, and their free choice is supposed to induce social prosperity as a whole. Capitalist economy is a profit-oriented, market-mediated economy among formally free possessors ("possessive individualism"), and it is based on the production and exchange of commodities. Based on this principle, some socio-economic frameworks have been contrived in particular conjunctures. But even the capitalist system is not autonomous because it involves many conflicts and contradictions. Therefore, it is necessary to control these contradictions at another level from the economic relations. Liberalism also appears as interest group liberalism by a subsumption of individual interests into a particular shared attitude: the socio-economic transformation of liberalism. In these contexts, politics has been regarded as an art of making a compromise in an aggregate of private interests (paradigm of interest group liberalism in American political science). Government can maintain a public appearance so long as it continues to perform these functions in its own way. Therefore, the liberal capitalist regime has intervened in such contradictory social relations and rearranged into a particular conjuncture. In addition, the concept of democracy has been articulated with liberalism in which democracy has been regarded as a regime acceptable to a competition among interest groups, not in an equal competition, but in a varied corporatist regimes under the hegemony of the major corporations. A multifaceted and flexible expression of liberalism may be grasped in these contexts.

Reinforcement of social rights is a response to counter movements that reveal contradictions inherent in capitalism. It has been called reform liberalism. Basic currents of liberalism are ideal-typically epitomized in two patterns: interventionist and non-interventionist liberalisms. This classification is only categorical and is, in reality, compounded in fusion. But the swing of the pendulum is discernible in a continuum of liberalism that is determined by path-dependency in history and path-formation in prospect. The features of liberalism include a neo-classical conservative liberalism and a

reformist one. In orbit of this pendulum, a prefix of “neo” has been often assigned to a new swinging back in liberalism from the latter to the former, as the term of “neo-liberalism” already, in the 1950s, appeared in the intellectual trends against New Deal liberalism.

The rise of contemporary neo-liberalism is connected with a response to the economic disturbances that happened to erupt in an accumulation of contradictions. This symbolized the end of the postwar “belle époque”. Responses to the standstill entailed the decline of the Fordist welfare regime and a reconstruction of the socio-economic relations in an international collaboration as exemplified by the “Washington Consensus” and an agreement at a London summit (1991). This international project among OECD countries brought about a new phase of globalization because it caused a reconstruction of the international division of labor and socio-economic interconnections on a transboundary scale by a strategic discourse of neo-liberalism (reembedded liberalism).

Although socio-economic relations are territorially demarcated by the state, they have been repeatedly reorganized through conflicts, competitions, and wars. World history is an overdetermined complex, and its configurations have changed according to the fluctuations in “intermestic” relations. From this point of view, globalization is a permeation process among the given scale and an incessant reorganization of it. In such a process, contradictions have been dislocated, transferred and delayed in time and space. Regionalization in three areas (North America, Europe, and East Asia) does not mean self-enclosed polarization, but localization with interconnectedness among them.

Socio-economic space is hierarchically organized by political power as well as by social and economic powers. A sovereign state is a territorially demarcated institutional power and it is often compared to a container. This container has been gradually more porous under globalization. It poses a serious problem to the concept of the state because globalization means the development of interconnectedness beyond the statehood.

## 2 State in Capitalism

There have emerged two perspectives on the state in relation with globalization: a state-centered perspective and a governance-centered perspective. The former argues that the dominant position of the state is not jeopardized even through globalization, and the latter argues that the authority of the state is increasingly exercised by international institutions, including global public-private partnerships, civil society networks and private actors.<sup>3)</sup> Both stand on an incorrect perspective so long as they supposedly regard the state as a thing, but it should be regarded as a totality of relations institutionalized in a given territory. This paper argues that the state should be examined from the relational point of

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3) P. Genschel and Z. Bernhard, *TranState Working Papers: Transformation of the State—From Monopolist to Managers of Political Authority*, No. 76, Bremen, 2008: 1.

view, and this perspective is also necessary to ponder on global democracy.

The concept of the state arises as a *persona ficta* to govern the given inhabitants dwelling in a territory. The modern state is an abstraction of the concrete entity composed of governmental, socio-economic, and national relations. It is also a political representation through which sovereignty is assigned to this entity, and the political relations appear as a common interest in illusion. In these contexts, inhabitants are transformed into a nation or a public in the given state. Additionally, as a nation-state is an artificial union in conflicts, it incessantly involves a possibility of separation between nation and state.

The state is a political representation of the given population in a territory. This abstraction is externalized by a government as an institutionalized apparatus armored by a monopoly on force. The state emerges as a juridico-political organization (statization in government). Double meanings (*méconnaissance*) of the state concept stem from such a coexistence of "integral state" in Gramscian terms and political organization in Weberian terms or *Staatlehre*. A recent distinction between "state" and "statehood" is an approach to avoid such confusion.

The instrumental approach to the state is only a metaphor to grasp the function inherent in the maintenance of hierarchically ordered social relations. As the state involves contradictions and conflicts, it is necessary to give coherence to the social relations with a "hegemonic project" besides coercion by law. A hegemonic project is mediated by a "selective strategy" of agents because the state is an abstracted representation and does not go into action by itself. State power is a political power of social forces condensed into the state, and its operation has to rely on some agents inclined to keep and develop (if possible) the given system. This is the reason why the state assumes an instrumentality.<sup>4)</sup>

### 3. Contemporary State under Globalization

Globalization is a process of global division and redivision of labor and power<sup>5)</sup>, and it accompanies the rearticulation process of the given socio-economic relations on a global scale.<sup>6)</sup> It also means a creation of new social space through extension and compression in time and scale. In this respect, globalization is an even greater extension of the market and a "greater annihilation of space by time".<sup>7)</sup> Such a deterritorialization of socio-economic relations entails a creative destruction of the configuration of state form and political regime. With this in mind, neo-liberal globalization has caused degovernmentali-

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4) Bob Jessop, *The State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach*, Polity Press, 2008.

5) James H. Mittelman, *The Globalization Syndrome*, Princeton University Press, 2000.

6) David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Blackwell, 1989.

7) K. Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy* (translated with a forward by Martin Nicolaus) Penguin Books, 1973: 539.

zation and further intergovernmentarization, and has inspired a breaking away from social policy and an internationalization of capital flow. In these contexts there emerged concepts such as “end of history”, “the global state”, and “denationalization of capitalism” under the dynamics of homogenization. However, it is hasty to conclude that this indicates the appearance of a “trans-nationalized entity”. This vision can be retaliated against by taking a cursory look at the state functions of cohesion of the social relations in territory. Capitalistic production cannot, in principle, separate from the means of production and the labor force located in a particular land. It entails these contradictory relations in a localized territory, and it is necessary to keep a circulation of fictitious commodities such as land, labor force, and money. In addition, as competition among capitals appears as a rivalry among the states, it is necessary to coordinate these contradictions by agreements among them. The state is a nodal point of these functions, let alone of political legitimacy.

Socio-economic and political relations have been variably reorganized according to the changes of internal and/or external structures. From these points of view, contemporary globalization is a rapid internationalization and intergovernmentalization, accompanied by phenomena of counter-movements and counter tendencies such as religious fundamentalism and anti-neoliberalism. Therefore, it is not an inclusive and straightforward development reducible only into a capital movement, but a polymorphic, uneven and open-ended one.

On the other hand, political power has been functionally given to cross- and transnational authorities in the process of globalization. This is attributable to the flexibility and pliability of state power in historical contexts, although it does not lose its role in the “authoritative allocation of values”. This empowerment poses the question as to a dichotomy between high and low politics, or a division between internal and external dimensions in international relations. This demands reconsideration with regard to the “methodological territorialism” and “methodological nationalism” in addition to a triplet of “territory — sovereignty — people” in *Staatslehre*<sup>8)</sup>. A relation is always changeable with and adjustable to arising necessity. The same is true of the state as a relational entity. Given that globalization has been mediated by the state authorities and coordinated by the inter-state institutions like the United Nation’s organizations, and that international private actors and transnational actors have incessantly entered into globalization, it would be supposable that appearances of the modern state have been re-configured.

#### 4. Remoulding of the Modern State

The state is a comprehensive expression of social relations and it can assume a variable configuration in form and size. The modern state has emerged as a “power

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8) Scholte, op. cit., 2008.

container" as well as a social and cultural container in the concept of a territorial-sovereign entity. However, this container is not a closed self-sufficient one, but always has been only autonomous in relation to other ones. In other words, the state is a product of the domestic and foreign conditions in which the state itself is embedded, and is obliged to remold itself according to changes in the internal and external relations. The state is, therefore, in an incessant need of proactive, preemptive, and reactive actions in the given historical conjunctures to keep relative autonomy of itself. It is also a "power connector" in this sense.

There has emerged a transformation of the contemporary state in post-Fordistic globalization (*postnational constellation*).<sup>9)</sup> In the situation of neoliberal globalization, many study groups have been founded for analyzing the changing configuration of the state in many universities. TranState Research Center (Bremen) can be exemplified as one of them. The Center, first, shows a list of four basic configurations as characteristic of the world's most matured nation-states: (i) the territorial state, (ii) the constitutional state, (iii) the democratic nation state, (iv) the interventionist state.<sup>10)</sup> Each element has been introduced into the constitution of the modern state in different phases of time and has co-evolved in a linkage after introduction. And the group, next, examines the contemporary transformation according to the list.

These four features are interconnected with each other: A monopoly of force and taxation is a precondition for others, and it is necessary for the duration of these features that political legitimacy has to be induced through popular participation and the micro and macro socio-economic policies by the state. These functions are performed within a given national state under a relevant "hegemonic project", and in the name of "national interest" and "political responsibility" of the state. Then, what transformation is arising in the national state under the impact of globalization? The group examines the question from the point of organizational shift (internal state-social relations) and territorial shift (international relations). It can be epitomized as follows, but with some additional remarks.

- (1) International collaboration regimes have been reinforced to cope with a hyper liquidity of capital and organizational terrorism across the territory. State sovereignty has eclipsed into a "complex sovereignty" in these contexts, although the state basically keeps the resources of military and fiscal powers.
- (2) In developments of a networked global governance intergovernmentally, a complementary order system has been created as a world system in which domestic law and international standards has been adjusted in a mutual agreement among the states.

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9) Jürgen Habermas, *Die Postnationale Konstellation: Politische Essays*, Surkamp, 1998.

10) Achim Hurrelmann, et al., eds., *Transforming the Golden Age Nation State*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007: 9; S. Leibried and M. Zürn, eds., *Transformation of the State?*, Cambridge University Press, 2005: 4-11.

- (3) Although a main mechanism of legitimation is still based on the parliamentary system and pressure politics in the state, there emerged a noteworthy propensity to increment the capacities of transnational institutions.
- (4) There has arisen a shift from Keynesian welfare social policy regime to a Schumpeterian post-welfare flexible regime, and a strengthening of the executive power in neoliberal globalization.<sup>11)</sup>

The Center suggests that although regulatory and operational responsibilities has partly been delegated to external agents, a responsibility to provide basic normative goods (security, welfare, legitimacy) remains in the state. In these perspectives, the Center concludes as follows.

One notable result is that the basic characteristics of the Western state have not changed. It can still be characterized as territorial, constitutional, democratic and interventionist; it continues to be committed to the normative goods of physical security, legal certainty, democratic self-determination and social welfare; it still actively involved in the provision of each of these goods. What has changed, however, is that the state no longer exercises a *monopoly* over the provision of the four normative goods. While it still tends to be perceived as *the ultimate guarantor* of these goods (outcome responsibility), important areas of decision making about their provision (regulatory responsibility and to a less extent also operational services for putting these decisions into practice (operational responsibility), have *diffused* (or even shifted) to the international level.<sup>12)</sup>

Globalization includes two aspects: "globalization of politics" and "politics of globalization".<sup>13)</sup> The former is a transfer or displacement of national political capacity to the international or supranational authorities, and the latter is a political process by many driving forces in globalization. Globalization comprises both processes and orbits. It is in these contexts that many visions and critics of global democracy have arisen since the 1970s, as is evidenced by each vision of moral, institutional, and cosmopolitan democracy alongside the communitarian and poliarchival critics of it.<sup>14)</sup>

## 5. Democracy and Globalization

Although there has not been a "supranational state" or a "global historic block", there

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11) B. Jessop, *The Future of the Capitalist State*, Polity Press, 2002.

12) Achim Hurrelmann, et al., eds., *op. cit.*, 2007: 202-03.

13) C. Hay, "Globalizations Impact on State," in J. Ravenhill, *Global Political Economy* (second edition), Oxford University Press, 2008, ch. 10.

14) R. Marchetti, *Global Democracy: For and Against; Ethical theory, institutional design, and social struggles*, Routledge, 2008: 59.

emerged global governance in nebulosity. Globalization poses a problem for the theory and practice of democracy: that is the so-called global democracy. The term includes "globalization of democracy" and "democratization of globalization" in the empirical and normative views.<sup>15)</sup> The concept of global democracy has also arisen from a recognition about the "tragedy of the global commons" caused by global warming and global pollution all over the world, as well as the polarization of income distribution on a global scale.

Democracy has been methodologically considered in the framework of a triplet of territorialism, statism, and nationalism. But globalization has demanded that the triplet should be compounded with transscalar-polycentric governance in pluralism of identity.<sup>16)</sup> There has emerged a tendency of global governance besides the state, and a plurality or hybridity of collective identity even in an "imagined community" comes to surface as is evidenced by a global civil-society" or the deterritorialization of professional societies.

Democracy is a "developmental concept". It has made progress in the need for a response to changes in social relations, albeit in a meandering trajectory in history. In this meaning, democracy is not fixed, but developmental.

Global democracy has emerged in the consciousness of a globally shared task to solve the urgent problems beyond the given national state and also from the necessity of controlling the supranational authorities, because a sort of congruence between representatives and electors is, in principle, necessary in the normative meaning of democracy. Additionally, mandate and accountability are the basic framework of a representative democracy. The former stems from prospect, and the latter from retrospect. A coalescence of these elements makes representatives stay under the control of electors. In addition, deliberative participation and transparency are necessary in the process from inputs to outputs. Absence of these mechanisms would bring a deficit of democracy to the surface. A collective autonomy can be realized in these preconditions, and each one recognizes an identity toward one's political community through these institutional mechanisms, and national self-determination could be realized under these conditions.

Such mechanisms work in democracies of, at least, OECD countries albeit insufficiently. But while there are many emerging problems to be solved globally, the *demos* remains within a given territorial boundary. Various propositions have been made in relation to these problems, and the growth of interconnectedness beyond the state. Cosmopolitan democracy is one of these visions, although it has invited many critics regarding its desirability and feasibility. But it cannot be summarized in one breath, because visions of cosmopolitan democracy have a many theoretical trends. In this regard, Held (LSE) envisions a multi-tiered political system based on a "cosmopolitan democratic

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15) C. Hay, *Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction*, Palgrave, 2002.

16) Scholte, *op. cit.*, 2008.



public law". It is a projection of the principle of autonomy in liberal democracy into the global level. This model does not rely on a world government or a world state, but a sort of multi-tiered global governance, as he has pointed out in many works. There are many differences among cosmopolitans with respect to how to construct their system on a global level, especially about the position of the state in their prospects.

Habermas (Frankfurt) also mentions about a global democracy in his recognition of a *postnationale konstellation* and of an emergence of global civil society. He says as follows.

On this conception, a suitably reformed world organization could perform the vital but clearly circumscribed functions of securing peace and promoting human rights at the *supranational* level in an effective and non-selective fashion without having to assume the state-like character of a world republic. At the intermediate, *transnational* level, the major powers would address the difficult problems of a global domestic politics (*weltinnenpolitik*) which are no longer restricted to mere coordination but extended to promoting actively a rebalanced world order.<sup>17)</sup>

He also criticizes (i) the neoliberal model of a global market society, (ii) the post-Marxist scenario of a dispersed empire without a power center, and (iii) the anti-Kantian project of a system hemispheres. For he regards the first as the *hegemoniale Liberalismus* based on imperialistic powers, the second as a rootless vision without a normative restriction (a reverse side of the neoliberal project), and the third as Schmitt's "social-ontological" anti-thesis to the Kantian conception of the jurisdiction of international relations.<sup>18)</sup>

Construction of global democracy still remains as just an "experiment in thought" rather than a programmatic plan in practice. Accordingly, numerous critics also have appeared in international law as well as in political science and sociology as confirmable in a genealogy of controversy about the Kantian model for world order. One of the grounds of the controversy has been based on the realist v. idealist approaches in international relations. Realists regard the international political arena as power politics from the view of Hobbesian political psychology. In this vision, national interest subsumed by the state is a given (*raison d'être*) in the hypothesis of the "state of nature", and this state is imagined to be an empirical "fact" beyond time and space. Consequently, an incessant creation of "balance of power" has been regarded as an unavoidable condition for peace, and a justice or moral principle is deemed only as the rhetoric of power politics. In this realist paradigm, the state as a whole represents the national interest under the guise of its self-interest, and in these presentations, the state has been regarded as an amulet (or fetishized) from old times.

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17) J. Habermas, *The Divided West* (edited and translated by C. Cronin), Polity, 2006: 136.

18) *Ibid.*, 179-93.

The national state is a contingent product in historical conjunctures and is also an important element of democracy because democracy has been formed and developed in it. Nationhood is a relational complex comprised of the ethnic and civic elements. It has strong cohesion in the state, because it works psychologically as an identification of self and others. Therefore, nationalism has been a strong way to keep the domestic contradictions in unity. In view of these conditions, it would be difficult to have a prospect for democracy beyond the nation-state.

Dahl criticizes the vision of cosmopolitan democracy from his theory of polyarchy based on the nation-state. He claims that competition for political power among parties and candidates is difficult beyond the limited size, and that the exercise of influence on and control of representatives does not work in the international size of politics. These suggestions may emerge from an antinomy between size and participation. Indeed, there could emerge a danger of "universal monarchy" as Kant already indicated, if a great power would arbitrarily rule the world, and Schmitt also mentioned the danger from the different point of view (theory of Nazi imperialism in opposition to Anglo-American liberal imperialism). But it should be recalled that the antinomy was overcome by the introduction of parliamentary democracy as J. S. Mill envisioned at the advent of a mass democracy in a nation-state.

The second problem is an antinomy between internationalism and localism as is evidenced in the "clash of civilizations". However, the encounters of different cultures have not always led to a physical clash. Sen (winner of the 1998 Nobel Prize for Economics) says that "diversity is a feature of most culture in the world, and that "Western civilization is no exception."<sup>19)</sup> It is a "great mistake to treat each non-Western tradition as monolithic.

There are also and were many cases of a coexistence of, or efforts to make it among different cultures. Nationalism awakens sympathy of other nations so long as it based on a principle of legitimacy and justice. Otherwise, it is nothing but jingoism. From these points of view, diversity does not contradict the idea of democracy. It may induce a dialogue and deliberate discussion as long as violence should be excluded as an illegal odious action. Democracy does not, certainly, claim a coercive homogeneity, but presupposes heterogeneity, and is a system to induce consent by communication.

## 6. Problems and Prospects of Global Democracy

Although it would lead to dominance by some global hegemon unreasonably to advocate a global democracy (a "trap" of global democratic theory), there has emerged a "tragedy of the global commons" and an increasing interconnection of the socio-economic

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19) Amartya Sen, "Democracy as a Universal Value," *Journal of Democracy* 10, no. 3, July 1999: 15.

relations across the national state. These problems are deeply concerned with human rights for us and our descendants. Additionally, international authorities lack the transparency, let alone, delegates to them are not representatives of citizens, but of each state.

An independence of and non-interference in the state are a basic principle of world order among territorialized sovereign states, and enforcement of justice is reserved by each state. According to this principle, the state has no obligation to discharge "redistributive justice". Even the principle of justice is, indeed, subject to time and space and has been constrained within historical conjunctures. Therefore, claims of universality or general validity from a particular point of view would lead to some idea of justice beyond place and time. And the impacts of globalization are likely to induce the propensities to keep a particularity by recourse to exclude the intrusion of heterogeneity from abroad. In this respect we should be tolerant about a difference of values (cultural relativism in global scale).

Dewey defined the public as a collective influenced by "transaction" in *The Public and Its Problems* (1927). He draws out the public in a "great society" from the concept of transaction. The principle of participation and obligation has been introduced from such a concept of the public because democracy means autonomous self-decision and self-government by the people. His "public", indeed, refers to a collective in the size of a national state instead of a global one. But there has emerged a "global public" in an age of globalization, although it still remains an "*an sich*" existence.<sup>20)</sup> Globalization is a compression of time and space that involves the articulation of social relations across territory. This process entails the inclusion of others, and the relativization of oneself through the encounters with others. It urges an incessant self-reflection of self and others with a strict refrain from physical enforcement. Global democracy should be within such an axiological perspective.

Global democracy is fraught with numerous challenges. We can exemplify physical use of coercion including a resort to war and military intervention. The conundrum will be lessened in proportion to the growth in chances for discussion with a strongly shared belief against violence around the world. Especially since war is nothing but a destruction of life and nature, and only induces strong hatred and revenge as history repeatedly has shown. It is necessary to read again the principle of the charter of the United Nations (1945) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). In this respect, the Preface of the Japanese Constitution declares as follows.

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve

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20) Frank Cunningham, "The Global Public and Its Problems," in Deen K. Chatterjee, ed., *Democracy in A Global World*, Rowman Littlefield Publishers, 2008.

our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

Global democracy is congruent with the ideas declared in the Japanese Constitution. The right of living in peace is the fundamental one among other rights because it is essential to live in security. It also demands the replacement of a huge destructive consumption for warfare with welfare systems around the world. The replacement has the potential to lead to the principle of equity in the global level.

Global democracy is impossible without the domestic democratization of each state because democracy cannot be exported or imposed from the outside. In this respect, the proposition of "democratic peace" does not imply peace of the world<sup>21)</sup>. It assumes that the necessity of free trade will demand the establishment of peace and democracy over the world. But taking, for example, the foreign policies of the US, we can enumerate many instances of intervention and war. In addition, disparity between the rich and poor countries has been growing uneven development under the leadership of the advanced capitalist states. Taking this current situation, "democratic peace" would be held good only for members of the same regime, or, so long as some hegemonic state could successfully impose its system on others. It is contrary to the principle of "democratic autonomy". From this point of view, it is necessary to abstain from regarding some country's system as democratic, and to be relativized from the view that democracy is an endless journey for the future.

Another challenge is how to contrive the organization of global democracy. Its visions are various, extending from treaty-centered democratic governance to cosmo-federalism, including some intermediate forms located in the continuum<sup>22)</sup>. As mentioned above, the vision of global democracy remains an "experiment in thought". It is, however, necessary to take into consideration the relation of democracy and the state in which it is constructed. For democracy has evolved in close connection with the state. Therefore, it would be difficult to envision a global democracy without the state. But it should be theoretically to disarticulate the contingent connections of both so that we can pursue the further development of democracy in each state and explore a contrivance beyond statehood. Because the state is a relational concept and democracy is an unfinished project. It is unavoidable to release democracy from the cage of statehood in combination with a perspective beyond the given state.

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21) Ido Oren, *Our Enemies and US: America's Rivalries and the Making of Political Science*, Cornell University Press, 2003.

22) Daniele Archibugi, "Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics: A Review," *European Journal of International Relations* 10 (3): 437-74.

How should global democracy be contrived in an age of global politics? Taking the discussion above into consideration, it should be a three-tiered complex: statehood, region, and the global level. At the trans-regional level, it includes standing and ad hoc councils to discuss about the shared affairs like the EU alongside the United Nations. Global democracy would be reliable in a multi-tiered-articulated structure of democracy. The second transformation of legitimacy would be feasible in these prospects from the present point of view.

## 7. Conclusion

The prospect of world peace can be traced back to *Projet depaxis Perpetuelle* (1713) by Abbe de Saint-Pierre who attended the Peace Conference at Utrecht. Thereafter there have emerged a variety of proposals for world peace until now, representatively presentations by Kant and Rousseau. But contemporary global democracy has emerged in a different phase of history: necessity for democracy in the growth of cross-bordering and interconnection of the socio-economic relations after the formation of national states. Global democracy has been searched for in these contemporary contexts and conditions. Next is a conclusion of this essay concerning the state and democracy under the ongoing globalization.

- (1) Given the democratization of the national state, reliance on an entry or import from abroad should be avoided. It is just contradictory to collective autonomy, and is nothing but a loss of foothold for democracy in the state. In this respect, popular sovereignty based on democratic autonomy of a collective, but not state sovereignty remains a ground for a global democracy.
- (2) Democracy and the state are different in concept and are separable from each other as each was introduced in a different phase of history. It is, therefore, necessary to reconsider the assumption of inseparability and to make a democratic relation in every social place including the state, because the state is only a relation demarcated in a historically contingent necessity. It is important to contrive a multitiered, but organically articulated global democratic system in recognition of an emergent global public. And a global democratic contrivance need not be exclusively based on the state, but on a global regime compound of a standing council and an ad hoc committee at a regional and cross-regional level alongside non-governmental organizations.
- (3) An important problem for global democracy is nationalism closely connected with the state. The modern state is an entity composed of government at an institutional level, nationhood at an ideal level, and economy at a material level<sup>23)</sup>. Nationhood

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23) G. sørensen, *The Transformation of the state: Beyond the Myth of Retreat*, Palgrave Macmieean, 2004; M. Good hart, "Democracy, Globalization, and the Problem of the State," *Polity* 33, no. 4,

entails nationalism, which is an emotional element of community based on linguistic, cultural and historical bounds. Nationalism emerges as an identity of particularity only when a given community encounters with another. Consciousness of self and others is a precondition for collaborative governance. Otherwise it would be unnecessary to contrive global governance. Seen from this perspective, nationalism does not always lead to an obstacle for global democracy so long as it does not inspire or induce a jingoism and/or chauvinism. This is all more important in the period of globalization because there have appeared many strange phenomena in a nebulosity.

- (4) Legitimacy means not only validity or legality, but justifiability.<sup>24)</sup> In other words it involves a normative and analytical meaning. A *demos* gives legitimacy to its polity so long as it is a political entity oriented to democracy. Deficits of democracy will lead to a loss in the base of legitimacy. From this point of view, negativism to possibility and desirability by an appeal to difficulties is only a connivance of the "tragedy of the commons". In this respect, We should descry a prospect for a further democratization in the given reality (critical realism based on idealism).
- (5) Human rights have been accumulated through the development of democratic ideals over time. They extend from civil liberty, political rights, and rights of living. These rights are basically confirmed in the territorial nation state. It is necessary to have a prospect for human rights beyond the state in connection with further democratization of the state. In this respect, the principle of subsidiarity is a hopeful one to contrive a mechanism of global governance so long as it is closely related to the values of human rights beyond the state.

The prospect of global democracy is, of course, a Herculean task like patient work to drill a hole in a hard board by hand, and its future is still nebulous, although the EU is in the process of a "historical experiment". And it is harder in East Asia to have a prospect for a regional political organization owing to its many tragic legacies and differences in culture and regimes. Democratic values should be all the more deep and extensively shared beyond each boundary. This essay is merely a rough sketch of global democracy from a reconsideration of the state and democracy under the ongoing globalization, putting differently, just one "experiment in thought". \*

\* I deeply appreciate the apt checking of the English expressions by Mr. Francois de Soete (Instructor at Ritsumeikan University).