European Integration, seen from Historiography and Political Science

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Introduction: a risky methodological trial

European integration is still a young branch of historical research, young because it is an ongoing process which started only some half a century ago – nearly too young, for some historians, since archives are not yet open for research except for those from the first years of this era. Nevertheless, numerous publications presenting a partial or even a comprehensive look at European integration are available nowadays, most of them giving a fascinating account of the phenomenon, but only very few of them based on methodological reflection about the approach (unconsciously) chosen to capture this innovation somewhere between the history of (nation-) states and international relations.

On the other hand, political science is very much concerned with European integration from a very different methodological stance, with its specific methods (the inevitable “independent variable” explaining one ore more “depending variables”), turned more to the future than to the past, even if some political scientists try to get in touch with a historical approach by

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1) Research is conducted at many places, but there is only one specialised journal, the “Journal of European Integration History”, published since 1995 by the European Union Liaison Committee of Historians (itself founded in 1982). Another centre of historical research is the “European History Project at the European University Institute at Florence in Italy, where namely many important archives are at the disposal for historians. See on the whole subject and these introductory remarks Johnny Laursen: Towards a Supranational History? In: Journal of European Integration History (JEIH), Vol 8, 1 (2002), p. 5 – 11. See as well the important “state of the art”-report of Michael Gehler: Zeitgeschichte zwischen Europäisierung und Globalisierung. In: Internet-publication of the German journal "Das Parlament - Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte", Deutscher Bundestag und Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 01.08.2003.

introducing “long term trends”.³) But political scientists are rarely interested by a genuine historic approach (and are even often sceptic about the historical tendency to contend itself with an account, a sort of tale, without theoretical preconditions); they try to explain up-to-date and ongoing evolutions, and the scope of their historic résumé is often limited to the last decade.⁴)

One could consider the wide range of integration theories⁵) as an effort to bridge the gap between political science and history. As far as European integration is concerned, at least some of these theories discuss processes having a historical dimension. This is certainly the case of the (neo-) functionalist theory, one of the earliest (from Haas⁶) to Lindbergh and Scheingold⁷), which provides an explanation of the historical evolution of the European integration – an internal logic of “spill-over” effects would then explain the integration process, as if one step to integration would lead somewhat logically to the next one. It is not surprising that this theory had its apogee in the sixties, when the steps from the European Community for Coal and Steel led to the European Economic Community and to further implementation of a customs union, which seemed to imply a common market for the next generation. Unfortunately, the crisis of the mid-sixties (de Gaulle’s politics of maintaining national sovereignty) stopped this evolution, and neo-functionalists were embarrassed…

The fusion thesis is another relatively young theory, which attempts to explain European integration. This theory does so be the merger of (at least two) decision-making levels (the state level and the European level). The advantage of this theory is its ability to take into account changes (namely on the administrative level) of the nation states – but with limited explanatory potential for sudden breakthroughs (like the Single European Act in 1985) or brutal breaks (like the failure of the European Defence Community in 1954).

What I try to propose here is something rather unconventional and risks, by the way, to be considered by both historians and political scientists as too strange to them to be recognised

⁴) See Johnny Laursen, op. cit.: “[…] the history of European integration is not only pursued by historians, but also by other disciplines such as political science, law etc. […]. Not only historians (of which there are many kinds already), but also political scientists, sociologists, lawyers and many others apply themselves to this rich field. It is an example for an enriching, interdisciplinary exchange between archive-based, empirical history and more theory-oriented approaches. “ (p. 7) (Examples for Political Science books with historical introductions … see as well Wessels Forschungsbericht im Jahrbuch.)
⁵) English Beiträge der Geschichtswissenschaft zur Deutung der Europäischen Integration, in: Wilfried Loth/Wolfgang Wessels (Hrsg.), Theorien europäischer Integration, Opladen 2001, S. 87-106; Claus Giering (and his bibliography) englische Titel!
as a serious contribution to their research: It is a sort of marriage of the two of them by means of a structured model\(^8\) of the main factors (maybe one could speak of “variables”, at least in a systems analysis sense) influencing European integration since its birth. On the one hand, this model should be able to give an account of the structural conditions of integration by explaining its scope and limits in so far it is a political science model. On the other hand, it should be able to explain the evolution of Europe’s integration, dividing the fifty year old process in different periods, distinguishing eras of different nature in so far it would be a specifically historical model (if historians accept models at all, as useful methodological instruments).\(^9\) But let us see whether there might be some evidence for this risky approach, by examining the empirical background.

Three visions for post-war Europe

As is often the case after wars, the post-war period was an unknown void.\(^10\) Nothing was obvious, everything had to be rebuilt – not only the economic structures and industrial infrastructure, but also the political patterns and frameworks. Even the nation states had no longer a natural stand, in some European areas (like in Germany) there was no state status, other nation states existed before the war and continued to exist after it (like Poland), others just reassembled the destroyed parts the war had left (like France). Neither international, nor supranational structures in Europe really existed– the political landscape was empty, and invited the existing or potential actors of the time to develop plans and visions for a new Europe, shaped in a way, which corresponded to their interests.

This was certainly the case for those powers that emerged from the war as the real historical winners, the newly so-called “superpowers”. The era of bipolarity\(^11\) began, and this meant that the two superpowers thought strategically in a global dimension. Europe was one piece, maybe even a masterpiece in this puzzle, as Europe became a key element of both

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8) For a an old (historical) but always useful definition of „model“ see : Phillip C. Wall: How scientific are Political Science Models?” In: Political Methodology 1/3 (summer 1974). New models are often to be found in game or real actor theories, but should not be confounded with the theories themselves.

9) Another terminological possibility to seize the difference of the two approaches would be to speak of a synchronic and a diachronic dimension.

10) Historical books on the post-war situation see under the website of the University of Leiden, Netherlands, http://www.eu-history.leidenuniv.nl/index.php?m=3&c=10&garb=0.40005079549039213&session ; in German, one of the first historical books based on archive research and covering the whole range of integration matters for a certain period was Wilfried Loth: Der Weg nach Europa. Geschichte der europäischen Integration 1939-1957. Göttingen 1990.

11) Historical books on the era of bipolarity, the discussion on the beginning of this era, and the term see e.g. Richard T. Griffiths « Cold War International History Project » and research within this project ; http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic_id=1409; in German see e.g. Loth: Die Teilung der Welt 1941-1955. Munich 1987.
superpowers’ global interests. On the other hand, European nation states were not likely to cede to the newly created superpowers without having a say. One could imagine a new Europe within the framework of the old structures, dominated by the nation states and their claim to sovereignty. Alternatively, between the global ambition of the superpowers and the regional weight of the nation states, an intermediate, continental, genuine European level of political power and decision-making seemed to have some historical right to emerge and co-exist alongside the superpowers. Some examples may illustrate these three dimensions and levels of shaping a new Europe after the war.

The superpower vision

One thing is so obvious that it does not need any analysis and argumentation: The Soviet Union was determined to dominate without any ambiguity the whole part of the continent conceded to it already during the famous conferences in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. It was only a question of time as to when the USSR would install, if necessary by means of putsch, regimes in the east central European states where its hegemony was most important for its imperialistic interests.

It is much more interesting to have a look on the western part of Europe and its relations to the other superpower, the United States, and to ask the question whether and how American interests prevailed in Europe, and whether in this respect European and American interests coincided? We can also ask a different question: whether there was, in a far smoother way, nevertheless an US-hegemony under way. The Marshall Plan can serve as a test: It was without any doubt motivated by the will to help Europeans to reconstruct their economies and to escape poverty and hunger, social uprising and political chaos – the humanitarian motivation of the American help is obvious and should not be questioned. At the same time, the Marshall plan also served the self-interests of the United States.

Firstly, the western part of Europe should be fortified and become a barrage against soviet expansion. This can be interpreted as the Americans investing in their own safety. Secondly, the American economy needed a commercial partner that was sufficiently well equipped and rich to buy American goods, and to serve the common interest of exchanging goods, in order to become richer. Europe was a prime candidate. Thirdly, and arguably most important of all, the Marshall plan was not neutral with respect to the economic and social system, but clearly inspired by a liberal logic. This logic is very clearly expressed in the three steps

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indicated by Truman in his memoirs (more clearly than in the speech Marshall held himself 5 June 1947 at the Harvard University)\footnote{Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope. 1946-1952 (= Memoirs vol. II) New York 1965, p.135. For one of the multiple publications of the Marshall Plan see the NATO website: \url{http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1947/s470605a_e.htm}}

when he says that (1) a working economy had to be rebuilt by means of installing free markets, (2) as a condition of the evolution of social structures, which would not fail to resist to revolutionary attempts and temptations coming from the east, since they were based on healthy economic conditions, and (3) to lead to “free institutions”, a parliamentary democracy well known in the United States but under pressure (and a minority system in inter-war Europe). The US believed that by initiating a process of economic reconstruction based on a market economy and leaving it to evolve freely, one could almost guarantee that the result would be a political system corresponding more or less to the Western (or American) model.

These considerations should not be misunderstood by saying that the USA tried to dominate Europe, and that the Marshal plan was a means of imposing their hegemony. The approach was, on the contrary, exactly the opposite in comparison with the Soviet one: The Soviets believed in power and violence, the Americans in freedom; the process they initiated was, in their eyes, a free and natural one – the outcome, nevertheless, served the American interests even in so far as the western part of Europe would become similar to the USA and, consequently, a natural ally. It is undeniable that the United States regarded Europe as one part of a world wide political struggle, and attached to the free part of Europe a role in this bipolar world. Roosevelt, Truman, Marshal and other American leaders perceived Europe not from a genuine European point of view, but from an American one (which does not mean that European and American interests could not be complimentary). Their vision for the future of Europe was that Europeans had a specific role to play in the worldwide struggle between the Superpowers.

**The nation-state vision**

One week after the armistice, 15 may 1945, General de Gaulle held a speech at the French Constitutive National Assembly,\footnote{De Gaulle: Discours et messages. Pendant la guerre. 1940-1946. Paris 1970, Discours du 15 mai 1945, p. 582.} a speech that reveals his vision for the future of France and implies, as one can try to find out by extrapolation, a future of Europe on the whole. First, he considers the Second World War as another in a long series of similar wars, all of them motivated by the ambition of one or another European power to dominate all the others. “Once more …” is the formula de Gaulle uses to underline his position. This is certainly an interpretation confirmed by historians later on\footnote{For the notion of „Balance of Powers“ see Ernst B. Haas: The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda? In: World Politics 5 (July 1953), p. 442-77; Herbert Butterfield: The}.

However, one could have equally expected
that de Gaulle had the impression that this war was unique. His interpretation to the contrary is a first hint of his vision of continuity in European state and international affairs. He astutely describes the mechanism of the European system of competing nation states, which has been created over several centuries. Historians and political scientists have also come to the same conclusion and did indeed later, identifying a system of “balance of powers” or of “hegemony and equilibrium”. The Second World War in De Gaulle’s eyes is one further war in this long and bloody history. Providing that the old mechanisms still work, (e.g. a system of coalitions forged together by the challenge of a common enemy) they will be strong enough in the end to overcome, thereby the ambition of hegemony.

The second lesson to be drawn from de Gaulle’s speech is that he considers centralisation on the national level as the right means to cope with the danger, menace and challenge of those ambitions for hegemony from any foreign power. His experience during the war, as it had been for many French people, was that the division of France was an awful aberration, that it had decisively weakened the French capacity of maintaining its national integrity – and division of the French nation (and state) is a catastrophe for all (politically thinking) Frenchmen. His reaction to this challenge was to re-unite all national forces, the different and divergent resistance forces first, but later on the French nation on the whole. This huge effort of re-unification led (rightly so in de Gaulle’s eyes) to more unity and more centralisation than ever. The French nation state should be able to dispose of all the resources of the nation so that it would be strong enough to resist to every attack from outside. Once more, a small word reveals the spirit of this vision of the French nation state’s reconstitution: France should be enabled “to stay” (“rester”) what it always was. This vision is a historically based one and can be seen to draw its orientation for the future from the past.

One can easily imagine a Europe according to De Gaulle’s vision: a Europe composed of nation states able to discourage any potential enemy to attack, by a sort of multilateral deterrence on the national and continental level. Certainly, this design does not exclude specific forms of cooperation, if the national sovereignty and the individual security interests of the nation states are not questioned. Following this rationale, however, Europe would become a continent of strong, defensive and ultimately nationally minded sovereign states.

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Even if this model for the future of Europe is in de Gaulle’s own speeches and political action, as well as in the policy of other European statesmen, merely implicit, it was an important one. Perhaps the de Gaulle version can be seen as an extreme vision of rebuilt nation states being the only components of the Europe of tomorrow. Yet de Gaulle was of course not the only statesman in Europe who thought in these conservative terms and categories.

It is nevertheless obvious that this national or nation state based vision was incompatible with those of the superpowers. This incompatibility is exemplified by De Gaulle’s complete lack of recognition to the existence of extra-European powers in Europe after the war – There is no mention of the Soviet Union or the United States in his speech. He bases his vision solely on French experiences of the Second World War. De Gaulle insisted on the possibility – one might say illusion – of the European nation states left alone and being once more entitled and able to shape the future of the continent themselves, without foreign assistance.

A genuine European vision

A third proposition for the new Europe focussed on the continental level, and regarded Europe as such as the appropriate actor able to adapt to the new historical situation. This third vision stemmed from the logic that European nation states were incapable of resolving their conflicts peacefully so that rebuilding them would lead to the same wars as in the past, the only difference being that industrial modern weapons had the potential to kill whole peoples. It also stemmed from the recognition that the appearance of the new superpowers – with the consequence that nation states were no longer able to assure independence to the European peoples on their own. A continental political unity would not only regulate conflicts within Europe in a peaceful way, but also assure independence for the old continent.

This view of the future of Europe emerged essentially from the resistance movements in different European countries, even in Germany, but was of course not new in the history of European ideas; it drew inspiration from centuries of plans for European unification, a vision as old as that of splitting the continent into separate nation states. The First World War already encouraged plans for a unified and peaceful Europe, as for instance Count Koudenhove-Kalergi’s proposal, which was supported by his “Paneuropa”-Movement.

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21) Derek Heater, op.cit.; sources in Walter Lipgens: Documents on the History of European Integration, Berlin/New York, several volumes, 1985 …, together with Wilfried Loth from vol. 3 on.
After the Second World War, however, these plans were specifically adapted to the new challenges, as shown for example by the “Charter of Hertenstein”, the result of one of the first and most important international meetings of European federalists after the war. This meeting brought together representatives from sixteen different European countries, including for the first time Germans, and lead to the foundation of the most important pro-European movement of the post-war period, the Union of European Federalists (UEF). The Charter was agreed upon in September 1946 and outlines a European federation which had namely two tasks, one internal and another external. The former was to assure peace between the Europeans themselves and to guarantee to all European nations and cultures an autonomous existence and evolution. The latter was to assure the whole continent its independence from all extra-European powers. In the minds of the authors both aspects were linked. Only a continental community would be able to guarantee this diversity of national cultures in the future, with individual nation states being seen as too weak to assume this task vis-à-vis the menacing and predominant superpowers. The solution must be a European federation, with sufficient unity to assume its tasks efficiently, yet with a maximum of diversity to assure the autonomy of its components.

This is a third model for the post-war future of Europe: It is neither conceived in the interest of any European nation state, nor in the interest of one of the two superpowers and their world politics. It is specifically European; in so far as it’s starting point is the interest of the continental community of nations. One could say that the nation state model is of a limited, regional scope, whereas the superpower vision is of global scope – the European model, on the contrary, is of continental scope.

**Construction of a model representing the structural factors of post-war Europe**

The construction of this model aims to simplify a given historical situation. With this particular model, we try to identify in this way the structural factors, which shaped the post-war Europe. A model might contribute to a long term explanation of European integration in so far as it should be allowed to reduce complexity for a certain phase of the scientific process – once the model is constructed, once lessons are drawn, once the explanatory

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22) The charter of Hertenstein itself is to be found on the homepage of the British Federal Union: http://www.federalunion.org.uk/archives/hertenstein.shtml, as well in Lippens and Loth, oc.cit.


24) The term “regional” might seem to be not appropriate in this context, since it is usually employed either for intra-state territorial entities, or for international “regions”, just in the continental sense (since Joseph S. Nye (ed.): International Regionalism, Boston MA 1968, Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold (eds.): Regional Integration. Cambridge 1971). Here it should express the limited dimension of the Nation state, in comparison with and opposition to the wider scope of the continental integration.
It seems that none of the three models for Europe after the Second World War briefly outlined above completely determined the future of the continent; none of them succeeded totally in exclusively dominating all the others. Europe did not completely surrender to the bloc logic, nor did it turn back to the system of “hegemony and equilibrium” – nor did a European federation appear. It is evident that the post-war Europe was a combination of all the three of these models: Nation States were rebuilt, but they did not regain the whole range of their sovereignty; the Iron Curtain came down and divided Europe in two parts, but at least the western part of Europe kept a important margin of autonomous evolution; and a continental integration came into existence, without being powerful enough to replace the nation state structures or to avoid the division of Europe into the two zones of influence of the superpowers. Instead of one model, all three of them were implemented. In reality they had to co-exist instead of being separate, unrelated activities, we find a composed model. This we can use in our effort to explain the coexistence and the historical dynamics between its components.

This model, with its three components, could be visualised as shown on the next page.

Some further explanations may be useful to understand the structures of the model, and then some lessons should be drawn from it. It suggests that Europe, in the post-war period, was divided into two spheres of influence or two blocs, limiting the extension of integration from both sides, but in the same time developing them on their own. The iron curtain was the most evident borderline in Europe soon after the war and reflects how far the Superpowers imposed their model – even if one should also bear in mind how their domination worked out differently in the two parts of Europe. The division of Europe is reflected in the horizontal dimension of the model.

The structured model takes into account as well the existence of three decision-making levels issued from the partial implementation of the three post-war models for Europe. These levels are inspired by a global, a continental and a regional (national) approach – the three visions for the new Europe after the war find their structural translation in the three coexisting levels. The coexistence of the three visions finds its visual expression in the vertical dimension of the model.

Finally, the third dimension of the model reflects the fact that that the division of power between the three post-war models for the future of Europe led to a sort of distribution of certain policies to certain actors: The Superpowers and their bloc organisations were in charge of defence and security, the Nation states regained the power and competence of
redistribution policies, education and culture etc., while some sectors of economic policy (coal and steel, later on agriculture and the project of a common market) were conferred to the new emerging continental community.

Lessons from the model

The model can be explained or understood by the lessons we can draw from it. There are two types of lessons to be drawn, following the idea of a combination of historical and political science methods: the first one is diachronic or historical in the proper sense, the second one is synchronic, structural, similar to a systemic approach, and linked to political science methodology.

Historical lessons: Chapters of a “History of European Integration”

The model suggests indeed, at least implicitly, the chapters of a history of European Integration, in a very simple way: The first era would be the construction of the reality reflected by the model, the second the period of existence of the visualised structures, and the third their breakdown. Even if this might seem banal, it reflects nevertheless the reality

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25) This translation of the model into time seems to be similar to a well-known vision of history, the vision of the “Rise and Fall” of a historic actor – one of the most famous applications of this organic model was the correspondent interpretation of the Roman Empire, and its analogy with contemporary history by Edward Gibbons. An application to European integration see Mancur Olson, footnote 29. Moreover, it would be interesting to compare the division in different chapters proposed and applied in different books on the history of European integration. Many of them divide in a similar
of the historical process:

Chapter One: Construction of the post-war framework (from the end of the war to the end of the fifties)

The first chapter of a history of European Integration deals with the emergence of the post-war structures, and one can say that this period finished by the end of the fifties. In 1945 none of the international structures existed, and some Nation states (not only Germany) were not quite sure of their existence. State structures were built up only in 1949, with the creation of the two German states. On the international level, in 1945 neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact, neither the European Community nor the Comecon (neither the Counsel of Europe nor the WEU …) existed – and some twelve years later, the whole landscape of international affairs in Europe was (again) completely covered by these structures.\(^\text{26}\)

Such a first chapter would then describe and analyse, in order to explain and to understand how these structures of international relations in Europe emerged and were forged; how the Iron Curtain came down; how the first steps to continental integration were made; which of them failed and which succeeded.

Two phenomena are obvious from this methodological approach: Firstly, for all of the three main actors, promoters of the models or visions shortly presented above, “speed was essential”, as Truman put it in his memoirs himself.\(^\text{27}\) They were conscious of the pressure of time – if it was not their vision that immediately prevailed, the others would pass with their plans, implement them and marginalize the others. Nation states, promoters of European integration and the Superpowers hastily attempted to implement their own model, in order to attract the largest part of political power in this period of reconstruction. And this conscience of the pressure of time was particularly obvious in the camp of the “Europeans” who felt that once the Nation states and the bloc structures were established, there would be little space for an autonomous European political structure.

By the end of the fifties, the structures corresponding to the model existed, and the post-

\(^{\text{26}}\) This does not mean that the evolution of international and other structures in Europe came to a complete standstill; see for the ongoing differentiation of international organisations see Hermann Lübbe: Föderalismus im 21. Jahrhundert. Zivilisationsrevolutionäre Voraussetzungen. In: Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung (ed.): Europäischer Föderalismus im 21. Jahrhundert, Tübingen 2003, p. 8-23.

war period came to an end. One can characterise this period as a sort of competition, a race or course of three competitors who started by the end of the war and reached the goal a decade or some twelve years later. All three of them indeed reached the goal, even if they were not equally successful: The division of Europe, the Iron Curtain and soon afterwards the Berlin wall showed clearly which level had become the most powerful. The Nation states were back as well, even Germany had developed state structures, and it is precisely the case of Germany, which depicts most eloquently just how much the Superpower structures were superior to the other levels. And, last and, maybe, for the time being, even least: A European decision-making structure had finally come into existence as well … The European Integration process had begun.

Furthermore, the model even gives some hints to a subdivision of this first chapter. One may consider the ambitious plans to create a complete European federation – and the failure of these plans immediately after the war as a first sub division. The Congress of the Hague (may 1948) and the relative disappointment about the creation of the Council of Europe (may 1949) mark the end of this period and the turnover to an alternative strategy, initiated by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, starting integration from an modest level, leading it step by step towards a political federation.

Chapter Two: The long life of the post-war structures (end of the fifties to middle or end of the eighties)
The second chapter of the history of European Integration deals with the long period of the unchallenged existence of the structural pattern represented by the model – a whole generation of unchanged, hard and resistant structures, 28 years of the Berlin Wall (1961-1989), 35 years between the Treaties of Rome, the promise of a common market (1957/8), and its realisation (1992/3). The division of Europe did not change in this period; neither did the division of political power between the three acting levels profoundly change on the whole.

Certainly, there were some advancements towards a European political system: a Customs union in the sixties - but cut short by the refusal of General de Gaulle, in 1965, to accept any conferral of more competences to the EEC, which led some integration theorists of the time to abandon their explanations. Ernst B. Haas for example did just that and this proves once more the utility of the model proposed here: Haas despaired because he had tried to explain the integration process almost exclusively by its internal – “functional” – logic, and this was too poor a framework to take into account the external factors shaping Europe on the whole. The model visualised in the “cube”, on the contrary, takes into account external factors as well, external to the integration process itself, but having an impact on it. In the

case of de Gaulle’s politics in 1965, this illustrates without any doubt the political will to safeguard the Nation state model. The conflict was a struggle between two of the three decision-making levels represented in the model, the Nation state and the continental level, and it proved once more impossible to advance with integration if there was no coalition of interests between the continental and another level.

After de Gaulle, other steps forward became possible, such as the creation of the European Council in 1975 and the elections of the European Parliament in 1979. But the plans for an economic and monetary union (“Werner-Plan”) did not succeed in the same decade. Enlargements were also no longer blocked by de Gaulle. The UK, Denmark, Ireland (1973), and later on Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) became member states. This certainly signifies the success and attractiveness of the European Communities. The European Communities promised the completion of the Common Market by 1970 at the latest but this remained unattained in the beginning of the 80s. Consequently there was widespread disappointment about the impossibility of a real take-off of the European integration. Hence the birth of the term “Euro sclerosis” …

Once again, subdivisions of this second chapter is possible, e.g. between the dynamic youth of the EEC (1958-1965), and the long period of stagnation (1966-1983/84). This second phase could even be subdivided again: into the years of stagnation when de Gaulle was still around (1966-1969), the years of hope (1969-1972/3), the years of crisis (“stagflation”), steps towards deepening and enlargement (1973-1982), and finally the preparation for a new departure (1983-1985).

Chapter Three: New dynamics, globalisation and European integration (from the end of the eighties to today)

Things began to move once more by the middle of the eighties: a third, and once more a fascinating era started, the era of the destruction of the model (not of all its components however!). It is somewhat curious to see that the start-off to new horizons falls in the same year in both the European Communities and in the Soviet Union: In 1985, Gorbachov took power in the USSR, and the Europeans decided, within the framework of the Single European Act, to definitively establish a framework for completing the internal market.

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and West answered the same challenge, that of the United States and Japan who had made the first steps to a new stage of economic evolution, marked by the new “high technology”, the “Chip revolution”. This breakthrough seemed to be the solution for the crisis of the seventies, the “stagflation”, a combination of inflation and unemployment. Europe was on the brink of permanently losing competition in the famous “triangle” of the three main industrial regions (North America, East Asia, and Europe itself). It risked being unable to cope with this new challenge unless European nation states renounced some part of their (illusionary) sovereignty, in favour of a common market thus providing similar advantages to the European companies as those enjoyed in the USA. This challenge proved even more dramatic for the Soviet Union. Without profound changes of its political, economic and social system, it would not be possible to maintain the status of a Superpower in the era of high-tech weapons – as Ronald Reagan decided to create with his SDI or “star wars”-initiative.

Here is not the place to analyse in detail either the origins or the evolutionary (or rather revolutionary) reform process in the USSR or in Europe. It is, however, a matter of fact that these two historical reforms led to the breakdown of the post-war structures in Europe. What had begun in 1985, culminated in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall, itself a symbol for the fall of all the communist regimes in Central Europe. For the first time in a generation, the structures of political power in Europe were profoundly changed. Since then the whole model has come down, at least in so far as the Eastern part no longer exists, neither the USSR, nor the bloc organisations, nor even some of the “Nation” states, like the German Democratic Republic or Czechoslovakia.

If one looks at the model nothing seems more natural than the extension of the western international and supranational structures to the East, with some differences nevertheless: Even if NATO enlargement occurred earlier than EU-enlargement, the question is indeed whether NATO has not already fulfilled its mission since the collapse of the Iron Curtain and whether its functions should not be overtaken by the continental integration. The borderline between the Superpower influence zones was the justification for the organisation of the third bloc level. With the end of bipolarity, the “raison d’être” of these bloc structures is less evident. These considerations explain at least the quest of NATO for new tasks, the search for a new reason to exist.

This chapter can also be subdivided from its beginning in 1985 to the decisive year 1989.


32) NATO’s quest for a new raison d’être: see e.g. the debate in the NATO review, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9804-toc.htm
from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Maastricht treaty (1990-1992) and from the early nineties to the introduction of the Euro (1993-1999/2000), etc.

The breakdown of the model concerns the last fifteen or twenty years, and is a distinguished new era of European history and of European integration history particularly. On the whole, as simple as these three periods implied by the model may seem, they indeed reflect a large part of the historical reality of Europe and its efforts to unify itself over the second half of the twentieth century. Thus, the model could and should lead historians to divide the history of European integration into these three parts, evidently with a lot of subdivisions.

Structural lessons: The explanatory potential of the model

The approach to the history of European integration proposed here is characterised by a combination of a specifically historical methodology with a political science approach, as indicated in the introduction. Up to this point, some historical implications of the model have been drawn. However, it is now time to draw specific implications for political science, since the model incorporates these two aspects.

In fact, the first politically scientific implication has already been discussed as a historical one: the idea that progress in European integration was and remains possible only (necessary condition) or always (sufficient condition) when the promoters of “Europe” were able to form a coalition of interests with either the bloc level – e.g. USA, in the case of Western Europe – or the Nation states (or both of them); some examples have already been given above (Marshall-Plan, Rome Treaty/Common market).

A second implication of the model concerns already referred to integration theories more explicitly: The model suggests indeed that the European integration process cannot be understood only by reference to its internal logic. Functionalism as well as Neo-functionalism are theories referring nearly exclusively to this internal logic, well known under the term of spillover. The idea of a three level model, on the contrary, takes into account the interaction between the continental level and the two other ones, and provides in this way explanatory tools for several characteristics of European integration:

Firstly, the choice of Coal and Steel as economic sectors to be the first ones to be integrated cannot solely be explained by any genuine European interest. On the contrary integrating these two sectors of economic policy was as much integration as the Nation states was willing to accept at that time.  

33) Jean-Maire Pelt: Robert Schuman. Paris 2001 ; in his famous speech of 9 mai 1950, Schuman said :

“Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete.”
of the post-war period. Finally, European integration was obliged to develop by means of economic integration firstly before reaching any political objective. This was imposed by nation states so that the whole character of the integration process as an economic one can be explained by the competition between Nation states and “Europe”.

Secondly, there was certainly an internal logic of further integration initiated by the projects of Monnet and Schuman. Had the internal process been free from external pressure this would have led to the integration of transport, energy, social and defence policies, all of which would have been integrated policies stemming from the Coal and steel community and following the internal logic of spill-over. However, it is not this logic, which explains why defence policy entered the agenda so soon – it was the Korean War, an external factor, derived from the bipolarity of the two Superpowers.\(^{34}\) The internal logic cannot explain why the project of a European Defence Community failed in 1954. It was the fear of the Nation states (especially France in this case) to loose too important part of its sovereignty. This goes similarly for the EEC: The choice of the policy fields to be integrated – agriculture and a market for industrial products – doesn’t find its explanation in a genuine European interest, but in a coalition of European and Franco German national interests: France was interested in guarantees for its agriculture, West-Germany in external markets for its industries – and “Europe” in advancements in any shape or form.\(^{35}\)

After the Rome treaties, the EEC had a dynamic youth and indeed reached the stage of an area of free trade and a customs union earlier than provided in the treaty. But yet again internal logic should have led to the achievement of the common market by the end of the sixties. So why did it fail to do so? The explanation is again the opposition of an external factor; the Nation state interest forwarded de Gaulle who halted integration in 1965. Internal logic may explain the steps to the common market (and even to the single European currency), but it does not explain why it failed in ’65 (and thus Haas was right to despair) or why it saw its revival only twenty years later, in 1985, with the Single European Act. It was at this point that Nation states themselves finally saw their self-interest in the common market, in a moment when they were dramatically loosing their influence in the world wide economic competition. Other examples might be quoted as well …

In all these cases, the model here proposed provides explanations of acceleration or slow-

\(^{34}\) Wilfried Loth: Der Weg nach Europa. Geschichte der europäischen Integration 1939-1957, p. 91.
down of the integration process, by placing it in the framework of the three level system. The limits of enlargement are drawn by the Iron Curtain (up to 1989 at least), which was far from being evident by the end of the Second World War. Plans for a “Third Way” seemed do offer a possibility to escape from this bloc logic, and even by the end of 1947, the UEF sent its president to Prague in order to prepare the important congress of the following year, becoming then the “Congress of the Hague”… European integration must be seen and explained within the pattern of the European post-war structures on the whole, by a system of actors, each of whom occupy a certain and specific political power. None of these actors could freely expand to other policy fields, since they were occupied by his competitors. The small cube representing the European integration, within the big cube representing Europe on the whole, visualises this situation of living and developing “in-between”, somewhat squeezed by the others: The limits of integration were drawn by the existence of the Superpower-level, the level of the Nation states, and of the Iron Curtain. The European Union became what it is today because of this structural situation. For most of its existence, its history is the history of its relations with its structural environment represented by the model.

**Limits of the model**

Every model has its limits, and it is obvious that the model developed here is not able to explain everything. Firstly, it is of course far too simple to take into account the whole complexity of the historical and political reality. There is for example no place for the neutral states in the “cube” representing Europe. Secondly, the model is limited to only three decision making levels, but there are more in the world, even in the European world – one would have to enlarge the “cube” to the regional and local level below, and to the UN- or global level above. Thirdly, the world politics of the Superpowers are only taken into account in so far as they had an impact on Europe – one could artificially enlarge the “cube” not only in a vertical dimension (regional, local, global), but also in a horizontal dimension, in order to reflect the extension of the two blocs over a larger part of the world than Europe. But the choice of the medium complexity of the model has been made consciously: all these adaptations to reality would probably not enhance the explanatory capacities of the model, but reduce its transparency and operational power, without being able to reflect the complex reality. Finally, the model is not objective in itself: It is only an aid in helping us to understand, to explain and to describe a complex reality. This is also the job of historians or political scientists.

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