Husserl’s Transcendental Subjectivity and Heidegger’s Dasein

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There are scholars who claim that there are fundamental differences between transcendental subjectivity as the main topic of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Dasein as the main topic of the hermeneutic phenomenology that Heidegger developed in *Sein und Zeit*. As will be discussed later, even Husserl and Heidegger believe that there are fundamental differences between them, and some scholars share the same view under their influence. However, it is the aim of this paper to show that contrary to what they claim, there are fundamental similarities between the two philosophers. In section 1, I will show this first by demonstrating the fundamental similarity between constitution in Husserl and interpretation in Heidegger, then by addressing the similarity in a more detailed manner by critically examining some views of those scholars who claim that there is a fundamental difference between Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology. In section 2, I will critically examine the views of Walter Biemel and Paul Ricoeur on the relationship between constitution in Husserl and interpretation in Heidegger and show that there is indeed a fundamental similarity between them. In section 3, critically examining Biemel’s view that transcendental subjectivity in Husserl is without world whereas Dasein in Heidegger is always disclosed to the world, I will show that not only Heidegger’s Dasein, but also Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity is disclosed to the world and has world as its essential component. In section 4, critically assessing von Herrmann’s view that Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity based on intentionality only relates to objects within the world but not to the world itself whereas Heidegger’s Dasein always relates to the world, I will show that there is no basic difference between them in this respect. In section 5, I will close with some remarks on a future task concerning the relationship between transcendental subjectivity and Dasein.

1. The relationship between Husserl’s constitution and Heidegger’s interpretation and the structural similarity between Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity and Heidegger’s Dasein

Constitution is the main topic of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. For Husserl, the process of the transcendental constitution of the object is nothing other than the process in
which the meaning of a vaguely pre-given object is determined in more and more detail. Let’s examine the perception of a ball that is red on the front, yellow on the back. The red side of the ball is perceived in the first phase of perception (t-0), and as the ball slowly turns around, the yellow side of the ball begins to be perceived in the next phase of perception (t-1). The moment (t-1) that its yellow side is partly perceived, the ball is grasped primarily as an object with the meaning “a thing now frontally given as partly red and partly yellow.” However, what we recognize at this moment is more than this. It is true that the ball is perceived in this way at this phase of perception. But if we reflect on this, we come to see that the ball at this moment goes beyond such boundaries and is already perceived as “a thing with one red side and another side that is partly yellow and partly undetermined.” That is, the ball is perceived as an object with a meaning that is more than the immediately given. Thus the type of constitution involved in the outer perception of a ball has the characteristic of “meaning more” (Mehrmeinung, Hua I, 84 / Cartesian Meditations, 46). It should be noted that the process of the constitution of an object as the process of “meaning more” is nothing other than the process of interpretation, since the latter is the process through which a new meaning reveals itself to the subject of experience. Husserl accordingly says that “it [the object] becomes a determined object, and one undergoing further determination, in a continuation of the experience in the form of an interpreting experience, which at first unfolds only what is included in the object itself: a pure explication,”1) and he ascertains that the essence of the experience of an object lies in its interpretation. Since each different kind of constitution (including the outer perception of the ball) turns out to involve the process of “meaning more,” Husserl considers constitution—the main topic of his transcendental phenomenology—to be the same as interpretation.

For Heidegger, the interpretation of a thing is the process in which on the basis of the “understanding of Being” (Seinsverständnis, SZ 15ff. / BT 36ff.), the same thing that is experienced vaguely at the beginning is reified and becomes more concrete. For the interpretation of a thing to be possible at all, the “world” as the “totality of involvements” (Bewandtnisganzheit, SZ, 144 / BT, 184) or as a manifold of the “reference of something to something” (Verweisungsmannigfaltigkeit, SZ, 68 / BT, 97) or as the totality of useful references of something to something should be disclosed to Dasein in advance as the origin of the interpretation. And if a thing appears in the world as the totality of useful references, an interpretation of it proceeds on the basis of this “world.” As soon as a thing appears in the world, it is experienced and interpreted quite vaguely and indeterminately as “something that exists in the world,” that is, “something that lies in the totality of Dasein’s useful references and can thus retain a certain proper meaning for Dasein” in the first place. All subsequent interpretations are now nothing but a process of reifying the vague, indeterminate meaning of a being given to Dasein as this being first enters into the light of the “world.” But in order for a being that is first grasped vaguely to be interpreted more concretely, a specific useful reference should become prominent out of the totality of useful references, that is, out of the totality of possible ranges of Dasein’s activities. Right after a specific useful reference is experienced as prominent, interpretation concerning the thing in
question proceeds in a more concrete way. Now the same thing can be interpreted concretely as “a tool for building a house,” “a hammer,” “too light a hammer,” “too heavy a hammer,” etc. As we can see here, the process in which an instrumental being is interpreted by means of its specific useful reference becoming prominent, standing out from the ontological background of the “world” as the totality of useful references, is nothing other than the process of constitution in the Husserlian sense. This is the reason why Heidegger remarks in his letter to Husserl in October 1927 that “[t]ranscendental constitution is a central possibility of the existence of the factual Self” and that “the structure of the existence of Dasein makes the transcendental constitution of everything positive possible.”

In Husserl, it is transcendental subjectivity that carries out the different kinds of constitution, and in Heidegger, it is Dasein that carries out the different kinds of interpretation. But since constitution in Husserl is the same process as interpretation in Heidegger, it turns out that there is a fundamental similarity between transcendental subjectivity in Husserl and Dasein in Heidegger.

It is true that transcendental subjectivity reminds us of a thoroughly traditional subjectivistic philosophy, whereas Dasein is a result of a thorough overcoming of subjectivistic philosophy; we may therefore think that transcendental subjectivity and Dasein are totally different from each other, and this is precisely what Heidegger emphasizes. In passage after passage he criticizes the concept of subjectivity in Descartes, Kant, etc., a concept that is constructed within the framework of the “subject-object relation” (die Subjekt-Objekt Beziehung), and one of the main targets of his criticism is transcendental subjectivity in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. However, the transcendental subjectivity that carries out transcendental constitution is never a mere subject with intentionality directed toward individual objects under the premise of a subject-object relation as Heidegger might think; instead, it is that which is the bearer of many different kinds of intentionality, such as the intentionality toward the object; the “horizon-intentionality” (Horizontintentionalität, Hua I, 83 / Cartesian Meditations, 45) that is directed toward horizons; and the “world-consciousness” (Weltbewusstsein, Hua VI, 105, 111, 146 / Crisis, 103, 109, 143) that is indeed directed toward the world. On the other hand, in the case of Heidegger, Dasein would be the bearer of various kinds of interpretation on the basis of the “understanding of Being” as the experience of the world as the totality of useful references. Thus Husserl’s world-consciousness structurally corresponds to Heidegger’s “understanding of Being,” and the genetic constitution of an object on the basis of world-consciousness is identical with the interpretation of an individual being on the basis of the “understanding of Being.” Therefore we can conclude that transcendental subjectivity as the bearer of transcendental constitution and Dasein as the bearer of interpretation are structurally similar.

Husserl also misunderstands Heidegger’s concept of Dasein. He argues that there exist fundamental differences between transcendental subjectivity and Dasein, and thereby
emphasizes that his own transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology are essentially different. He accordingly writes as follows in his letter to Roman Ingarden of September 2nd, 1929:

“A thorough study of Heidegger? I came to the conclusion that I could not include this work in the domain of phenomenology that I have developed and that unfortunately I have to reject it totally with respect to its method as well as the matters that it deals with.”

As this passage shows, in his final years Husserl considers Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein as standing in sheer opposition to his own transcendental phenomenology. In fact, he considers Heidegger’s Dasein as a type of mundane subjectivity that exists in the world as constituted, just like many other constituted objects. According to Husserl, Heidegger did not clearly distinguish between transcendental and mundane subjectivity, and therefore Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology did not escape from the bonds of anthropology—it simply abolished the accomplishments of transcendental phenomenology. With respect to his view on Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology developed in Being and Time, Husserl writes as follows:

“Heidegger transposes or changes the constitutive-phenomenological clarification of all regions of entities and universals, of the total region of the world, into the anthropological; the whole problematic is shifted over: corresponding to the ego there is Dasein, etc. In that way everything becomes ponderously unclear, and philosophically loses its value.”

(“Heidegger transponiert oder transversiert die konstitutiv-phänomenologische Klärung aller Regionen des Seienden und Universalen, der totalen Region Welt ins Anthropologische; die ganze Problematic ist Übertragung, dem Ego entspricht Dasein etc. Dabei wird alles tiefssinnig unklar und philosophisch verliert es seinen Wert.”)

However, in my estimation, Husserl’s view is due to his misunderstanding of Heidegger’s Dasein. Again, above all things, Husserl’s misunderstanding might be caused by the fact that Heidegger named his Dasein Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Sein). In fact, since Husserl distinguishes between transcendental and mundane subjectivity, he understands the former as the subject constituting the world and the latter as the subject constituted within the world. Following these terminological distinctions, we can easily think that Heidegger’s Dasein as “Being-in-the-world” is the mundane subject constituted within the world. However, “Being-in” as a moment of “Being-in-the-world” does not mean “inside” in the spatial sense or “within” in the sense that a constituted object lies within the world. In this case, the “Being-in” only expresses the modality in which Dasein relates to the world and the objects within it in the caring of use, and therefore the relation between Dasein and the world could be called intentional in the widest sense. In this sense, as we can see from the title of § 10 of his Being
“How the Analytic of Dasein is to be Distinguished from Anthropology, Psychology, and Biology” (SZ, 45 / BT, 71) —Heidegger warns that Dasein as Being-in-the-world should never be misinterpreted in terms of anthropological, psychological, or biological egos, and emphasizes that Dasein is not a mundane ego like these.

2. Assessment of Biemel’s and Ricoeur’s views of the relationship between constitution in Husserl and interpretation in Heidegger

Contrary to what is discussed in section 1 concerning the relationship between constitution in Husserl and interpretation in Heidegger, Biemel argues that it is only “as a favor to Husserl” that Heidegger uses the term “transcendental constitution” in his letter. According to Biemel, Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology has nothing to do with transcendental constitution, whereas Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology takes transcendental constitution as its main theme. Biemel therefore says the following:

“In Being and Time, as well as in his other writings, this term is not found because Heidegger looks on the constitution problematic as an idealistic residue that must be overcome.”

And the reason why Biemel takes such a negative attitude toward the concept of constitution in Husserl is because he misunderstands it. Biemel writes that “as Husserl says, every entity must be resolved in consciousness so that transcendental consciousness becomes quite simply being,” and here we can see that he understands constitution in Husserl simply as a process in which all the objects are dissolved in transcendental consciousness, or a process in which transcendental consciousness creates its objects out of nothingness at its own will. According to him, this is precisely the position of “transcendental idealism” that characterizes Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. He considers Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, as a transcendental idealism, to be a totally different type of philosophy than Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology, which he seems to consider to be a kind of philosophical realism.

If we survey a variety of scholarly investigations of Husserl to date, we can find many cases in which the concept of constitution in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is understood simply as an act of arbitrary creation of objects by the subject, and Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is thereby defined as a kind of mere idealism. One prominent example would be Paul Ricoeur, who also defines Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology as idealism and argues that transcendental phenomenology as a kind of idealism and hermeneutics as a kind of realism stand opposite to each other. He takes “constitution” to be the main theme of transcendental phenomenology as transcendental idealism in opposition to “interpretation”; moreover, he thinks that interpretation presupposes the existence of real objects and tries to
clarify their meaning, whereas constitution destroys the transcendence of the objects and creates them at its own will within the “immanence”\(^1\) of a consciousness having supremacy over against those objects.

Needless to say, both Biemel’s and Ricoeur’s expositions of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and its concept of constitution are problematic. The main reason why they give such expositions is because they did not understand the true meaning of transcendental constitution correctly. Contrary to their claims, constitution in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is not a process of creating the objects out of nothingness, but a process of endowing objects with meanings. If we take an object of outer perception as an example, it should be given in advance as something transcendent to consciousness so that it could be constituted by the process of endowing it with meaning. It should be noted that as the core concept in Husserl’s phenomenology, the notion of the intentionality of consciousness does not deny the existence of transcendent objects, but fully recognizes their transcendence; the concept of constitution based on such a concept of intentionality therefore harbors a thorough recognition of the existence of transcendent objects. In this sense, constitution in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology has nothing to do with an arbitrary “creation” of objects by subjects as Biemel and Ricoeur think. Constitution means the process of interpreting, of endowing a variety of objects with meanings on the basis of previous knowledge of the world-horizon. For this reason, transcendental phenomenology that takes constitution as its central theme is never an idealism as Biemel and Ricoeur might think, but a “hermeneutic of the life of consciousness”\(^2\) as Husserl claims it to be.\(^3\)

3. Assessment of Biemel’s view of Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity as worldless subject and Dasein as an entity disclosed to the world

Biemel argues that Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity is a worldless subjectivity, that is, a subjectivity having nothing to do with the world, whereas Dasein as Being-in-the-world is characterized by the disclosedness of the world. He therefore says that “while Husserl thus separates the transcendental ego from the world in order to keep it pure of everything worldly, for Heidegger Dasein is that entity which first discloses the world in that it brings—or forces—every entity into the realm of openness.”\(^4\)

However, the ultimate origin of Biemel’s argument is none other than Heidegger himself. In a seminar of September 6th, 1973, in Zähringen, Heidegger comments on the relationship between Husserl’s phenomenology and his own hermeneutic phenomenology, referring to Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity as the “domain of consciousness” and defining it as a windowless monad in Leibniz’s sense, that is, as “a kind of enclosed space”\(^5\):

“As far as that goes, the ego cogito is an enclosed space. The idea of ‘getting out of’ this closed
space is contradictory in itself. It is therefore necessary to begin from something different than the Ego cogito."

("Insofern ist das Ego cogito ein geschlossenes Raum. Die Vorstellung, ‘aus’ diesem geschlossenen Raum ‘herauszukommen,’ ist in sich widersprüchlich. Daher die Notwendigkeit, von etwas Anderem als dem Ego cogito auszugehen.")  

According to Heidegger, unlike Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity defined as “a kind of enclosed space,” Dasein as the central theme of his own hermeneutic phenomenology is not a self-enclosed subject, but a being that relates to the world, getting outside of the subject and reaching out to the world. He elaborate this as follows:

“What does the word ‘being’ mean when we speak of ‘being-There’? Contrary to the immanence in consciousness that the ‘being’ in being-conscious expresses, the ‘being’ in being-There designates the being-outside-of something.”

("Was sagt das Wort ‘sein’ jetzt, wenn vom Da-sein gesprochen wird? Im Gegensatz zur Immanenz im Bewusstsein, die ‘sein’ in Bewusst-sein ausdrückte, nennt ‘sein’ in Da-sein das Sein-ausserhalb-von [...].")  

However, Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity is not a worldless subject as Biemel, following Heidegger, suggests. As we can see in Husserl’s concept of intentionality—which is formulated in terms of a thorough criticism of representational theory—the world-consciousness that is the core element of transcendental subjectivity is not merely occasionally world-related, but is related to the world from the beginning, and is not trapped within the realm of representations severed from the world as the representational theory would argue; thus it should never be understood as an “enclosed space” or a monad in Leibniz’s sense as Heidegger argues.

Of course, Husserl was quite heavily influenced by Leibniz in many respects while he was developing his phenomenology. For example, in his later philosophy—under the influence of Leibniz—Husserl defines his transcendental subjectivity as a transcendental monad. However, we have to keep in mind that Husserl is not uncritically accepting Leibniz’s monadology. Above all, Husserl criticizes the metaphysical and speculative aspects of Leibniz’s monadology from his phenomenological perspectives, and in this way he develops his own transcendental monadology. Furthermore, the one thing that Husserl considers the most problematic in Leibniz’s monadology is the metaphysical construction of “windowless monads.” This is the reason why in developing his transcendental monadology, he defines transcendental monads not as “windowless monads” in Leibniz’s sense, but as “monads with windows” that are fundamentally open for others and the world through various ways of apprehending others. In this sense he writes the following in a manuscript of 1922: “Thus a monad has a window that could receive the influence of the other. This window is the window of the perception of the
However, it is Heidegger himself who knows better than anyone else that Husserl’s concept of intentionality is formulated by thoroughly criticizing representational theory, and that Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity is not a worldless subjectivity like a “windowless monad.” It should be noted that in his 1925 lecture course titled “Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time,” Heidegger highly praises the criticism of representational theory as a great achievement of Husserl’s theory of intentionality. Considering the fact that the early Heidegger rates the significance of the theory of intentionality in Husserl quite highly, it is very surprising to find that Heidegger defines Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity as a kind of “enclosed space” and takes a negative attitude toward it in his later years.

4. Assessment of von Herrmann’s view of Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity as a subjectivity equipped only with the intentionality directed toward objects

There are also cases in which scholars do not admit that there is a structural similarity between Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity and Heidegger’s Dasein even though they do emphasize that Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity should not be understood as an “enclosed space” or a “windowless monad.” They tend to think that Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity based on intentionality only relates to objects within the world, but not to the world itself, whereas Heidegger’s Dasein as Being-in-the-world always contains the element of “the world” as its fundamental moment. We can count von Herrmann among the prominent scholars advancing this kind of argument. Distinguishing Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity from Heidegger’s Dasein, he claims that Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity is “worldless, since it is intentionally related only to the lifeworldly objects and to the universal horizon of the totality of all possible objects of the lifeworld, that is, only to worldly things.”

However, here too the ultimate origin of this kind of argument is Heidegger himself. In his 1963 essay “My Way to Phenomenology” (“Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie”), Heidegger defines the true matters of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology as “consciousness and its objectivity” (das Bewusstsein und seine Gegenständlichkeit), but on the contrary defines the true matters of his own hermeneutic phenomenology as “the Being of beings in its unconcealment and concealment” (das Sein des Seienden in seiner Unverborgenheit und Verbergung). Thus he emphasizes that there exists an essential difference between the matters that these two different types of phenomenology each deal with. As we can clearly see here, Heidegger argues that Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity is simply identical with consciousness; therefore Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology can only deal with transcendental subjectivity as a mere consciousness and with objects as its intentional correlates, but it cannot deal with Dasein’s understanding of Being/disclosedness of the world or with the problems of...
Being/the world at all.

This kind of argument is but a consequence of not understanding that Husserl's concept of intentionality in *Logical Investigations* is radically modified in his later philosophy. The concept of intentionality in Husserl's later phenomenology is not restricted to the consciousness of individual objects in the traditional philosophical sense as Heidegger might think, but includes the consciousness of the world as the foundation for the constitution of individual objects, and therefore for the very consciousness of individual objects. Here the consciousness of the world is not the consciousness of "the totality of things or the totality of realities" as Gethmann thinks, but the consciousness of the world as the horizon in which the individual objects can emerge for us at all. Unlike what von Herrmann argues, then, Husserl tries to think "the lifeworld and the lifeworldly objects" with respect to "the ontological difference between the world and the inner-worldly beings"; he never thought the lifeworld as a totality-object similar to the lifeworldly object itself.

Nevertheless, scholars with critical attitudes toward Husserl's transcendental phenomenology such as von Herrmann or Gethmann might wish to stick to the idea that Husserl's transcendental subjectivity is essentially different from Heidegger's Dasein, even though it retains the consciousness of the world. In this case, they would argue that in Husserl, world-consciousness is nothing but a kind of objectifying intentionality (as the word "consciousness" in the concept of "world-consciousness" indicates), and therefore it cannot be the same thing as the disclosedness of the world in Heidegger. To put it more concretely, they would possibly argue that whereas "mood" (Stimmung) as "state-of-mind" (Befindlichkeit, SZ, 13ff. / BT, 172ff.) serves as an important element of the disclosedness of the world for Heidegger, mood cannot be a moment of the world-consciousness in the intellectualist Husserl. In fact, given that Husserl calls transcendental subjectivity's relation to the world "world-consciousness" and still defines it as a kind of "consciousness," one might indeed suspect that Husserl does define world-consciousness as a kind of objectifying intentionality from his own intellectualist proclivity.

However, it is actually Heidegger himself who critically perceives Husserl's phenomenology with such suspicion. In his 1925 "Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time," Heidegger comments on Husserl's *Logical Investigations* as follows:

“These ‘Logical Investigations,’ as fundamental as they are, do not bring us any in-depth knowledge for the mastery of emotional needs and the like. Rather, they deal with very special and arid problems: with object, concept, truth, proposition, fact, law.”

("Diese Logische Untersuchungen, so fundamental sie sind, bringen nun nicht irgendwelche tiefe Erkenntnis zur Bewältigung von Gemütsbedürfnissen und dergleichen, sondern bewegen sich in ganz speziellen und trockenen Problemen; sie handeln von Gegenstand, Begriff, Wahrheit, Satz, Tatsache, Gesetz.")
As Heidegger points out here, in his *Logical Investigations* Husserl only delves into theoretical acts in order to clarify the structure of logical objects, but Heidegger himself presents “Care” (*Sorge*) as the fundamental structure of the Being of Dasein in his lectures and delves into the structure of fundamental mood as a moment of Care; furthermore, he carries out an analysis of the structure of mood not only in *Being and Time*, but also in many other works.\(^{27}\) Thus we might have the impression that there exists an unbridgeable gulf between Heidegger’s Dasein and Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity.

However, we should never conclude that Husserl’s phenomenology does not deal with the problems of emotion and sentiment due to some inherent and essential limitation. Unlike Heidegger argues, the problems of emotion and sentiment are among the central themes of Husserl’s phenomenology. Even though Heidegger never mentions it, Husserl does deal with the problems of emotion and sentiment in about 10 pages in § 15 of the 5\(^{th}\) *Logical Investigation*; moreover, he left many manuscripts on these problems written after the publication of his *Logical Investigations*.\(^{28}\) And in examining these manuscripts, we can recognize that Husserl is not defining world-consciousness simply as a kind of objectifying intentionality as Heidegger worries. Just as Heidegger considers mood as one important moment of the disclosedness of the world, together with understanding (*Verstehen*) and discourse (*Rede*),\(^{29}\) Husserl also considers mood as an important element of world-consciousness.\(^{30}\)

In fact, Husserl does actually develop a phenomenology of mood in a number of unpublished manuscripts; prominent instances would be manuscript M III 3 II 1 (presumably written in 1900–1914), manuscript A VI 26 (written in 1921–1931), manuscript A VI 34 (written in 1931), etc. Looking at Husserl’s analyses of the phenomenon of mood in these manuscripts, we can recognize that Husserl’s understanding of the phenomenon of mood is quite similar to Heidegger’s. For example, in addressing the phenomenon of mood, Husserl says, “If I have a good mood, it spreads out easily, if it is not broken by its anti-tendency, by the mood that is opposed to it. [...] In this case, the mood always contains ‘intentionality’. [...] The mood is a unity of feeling that imparts all the appearing objects a tone, a unified tone, a light of delight, a unified tone of sadness.”\(^{31}\)

Here he is comparing mood not only to a tone we are attuned to, but to a sort of light. Similarly, in discussing Dasein’s disclosedness of the world in *Being and Time*, Heidegger says, “[o]nly for an entity which is existentially cleared in this way does that which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark,”\(^{32}\) and thus he too compares the disclosedness of the world to a sort of light. It should be noted here that for Heidegger, one moment of the disclosedness of the world is nothing other than mood. We can therefore recognize that Heidegger also compares mood to a sort of light enlightening the world, and in this sense Husserl’s understanding of the phenomenon of mood and Heidegger’s understanding are almost identical with each other.

As we can see from the dates when the manuscripts on the phenomenon of mood were written, the manuscripts M III 3 II 1, among others, were written at least ten years earlier than
Heidegger’s lectures “Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time” in 1925 and the publication of *Being and Time* in 1927. As we can clearly see here, Husserl’s phenomenology of mood was not influenced by Heidegger. As I have discussed in detail elsewhere, it is certainly possible that it is the other way around: even though Heidegger himself is not explicit on this, he might have been influenced by Husserl as he was developing his own phenomenology of mood. Moreover, even though the manuscripts M III 3 II 1 were not available to the general public at that time, it is highly probable that Heidegger actually read these manuscripts courtesy of Husserl. And we also need to pay attention to Heidegger’s homage to Husserl and his thanks to the latter, “der den Verf. während seiner Freiburger Lehrjahre durch eindringliche persönliche Leitung und durch freieste überlassung unveröffentlichter Untersuchungen mit den verschiedensten Gebieten der phänomenologischen Forschung vertraut macht.” At this point, we think that the original manuscript of M III 3 II 1 is very likely to be among the manuscripts that Husserl “freely” handed to Heidegger at that time.

Husserl’s phenomenology of mood can serve as one example demonstrating that there is a structural similarity on a fundamental level between Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity and Heidegger’s Dasein. In this regard we need to point out that just as Heidegger calls the Being of Dasein “Care” (*Sorge*, SZ, 192 / BT, 237), Husserl also uses a concept like Care as he analyzes the structure of transcendental subjectivity. For Heidegger, the unitary structure of the Being of Dasein as the bearer of “Being-in” as well as of various interpretive activities based on it is nothing other than “Care,” and therefore Care can be called a universal unity of various interests of Dasein directed toward the world and the inner-worldly beings. In a word, “Care” is not to be thought of apart from interest, and the world as the correlate of Care can also be understood as the world of interests. But Husserl also defines the world as the “world of interests” and attempts to locate the essential constitution of transcendental subjectivity nowhere else than in interest itself. Furthermore, in a late manuscript of 1931, he analyzes “mood” as a moment of world-consciousness taken as universal interest, and here he uses concepts like “care” and “care for life” (*Lebenssorge*). This is quite an interesting fact concerning the structural similarity between transcendental subjectivity and Dasein.

5. Concluding remarks

Through our discussions so far, we have recognized that there is a structural similarity between Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity and Heidegger’s Dasein. However, in order to show that our argument is actually legitimate, we need to examine some other issues concerning the relationship between Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity and Heidegger’s Dasein. The most important issue concerns problems of transcendental-phenomenological reduction. For Husserl, the problems of transcendental subjectivity cannot be separated from the problems of transcendental-phenomenological reduction, and if there actually exists a
structural similarity between Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity and Heidegger’s Dasein, there should also exist a parallel transcendental-phenomenological reduction, in the Husserlian sense, in Heidegger. If we cannot discover something similar to Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological reduction in Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology, or if we cannot show that Heidegger even tacitly employs the transcendental-phenomenological reduction in developing his hermeneutic phenomenology, our argument for a structural similarity between transcendental subjectivity and Dasein would be considerably weakened. If this were the case, Heidegger’s Dasein would simply be a type of mundane subjectivity as Husserl argues. In my view, even though Heidegger does not mention it, he too needs the transcendental reduction and implicitly adopts it in developing his hermeneutic phenomenology of Dasein. It is one of my future tasks concerning the relationship between Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity and Heidegger’s Dasein to show that Heidegger does indeed employ—even if implicitly—the method of transcendental reduction in order to develop his phenomenology of Dasein. In this regard, I would like to point out that Heidegger proclaims in Being and Time, “[i]f no Dasein exists, no world is ‘there’ either.” It should be noted that the fact that “[i]f no Dasein exists, no world is ‘there’ either” is something that could only be disclosed through the method of the transcendental reduction.

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Notes
1) E. Husserl, Hua I, 131 / Cartesian Meditations, 101 (translation modified).
4) E. Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden, 56.
6) See SZ, 54ff. / BT, 79ff.
9) W. Biemel, "Husserl’s Encyclopedia Britannica Article," 300.
13) Of course, Husserl considers his transcendental phenomenology to be a transcendental-phenomenological idealism, but the latter is totally different from the idealism that Biemel and Ricoeur have in mind when they claim that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is
(transcendental) idealism. We cannot deal with this issue in this paper.

15) M. Heidegger, Vier Seminare, 121.
16) M. Heidegger, Vier Seminare, 121.
17) M. Heidegger, Vier Seminare, 121.
18) E. Husserl, Hua XIV, 295.
19) M. Heidegger, GA 20, 41ff. / History of the Concept of Time, 32ff.
20) F.-W. von Herrmann, Subjekt und Dasein, 95.
26) M. Heidegger, GA 20, 31 / History of the Concept of Time, 25.
27) See, for example, M. Heidegger, GA 9; GA 29/30; GA 39; GA 52; GA 65.
28) See, for example, E. Husserl, Manuscript M III 3 II 1, presumably written in 1900–1914; Manuscript A VI 26, written in 1921–1931; and Manuscript A VI 34, written in 1931, to which I will return.
29) SZ, 134ff. / BT, 172ff.
30) See N.-I. Lee, “Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology of Mood.”
31) E. Husserl, Manuscript M III 3 II 1, 29–30.
32) SZ, 133 / BT, 171.
33) See N.-I. Lee, “Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology of Mood.”
34) SZ, 38. This passage is missing in the English translation of J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson.
35) E. Husserl, Hua XXXIX, 597.
36) E. Husserl, Manuscript A VI 34, 23.
37) SZ, 365 / BT, 417. With respect to this, Heidegger also adds: “[t]his prior ‘how’ as a whole is itself relative to human Dasein”—GA 9, 143 / Pathmarks, 112.

References


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———. Manuscript M III 3 II 1 (1900–1914); Manuscript A VI 26 (1921–1931); Manuscript A VI 34 (1931).


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