

The Age of Globalization: The Democratic Theory of C.B. Macpherson

Frank CUNNINGHAM

In 1965 the Canadian political philosopher, C.B. Macpherson published his national radio lectures, delivered the year before at the University of Toronto, entitled *The Real World of Democracy*.¹⁾ This work followed his first major publication, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*,²⁾ in which he described reflections in the theories of British philosophers from Hobbes to Locke of a culture that in subsequent centuries was to permeate both scholarly thinking about democracy and popular culture. The key components of this culture are: self-centredness, fixation on private ownership, consumerism, and greed. These attitudes, when they are dominant, describe the culture of a “market society.”

Being self-centred means pursuing one’s own interests if possible without making accommodations for others. In a market society people place a very high value on possessing and respecting private property, in particular on its feature that people have a right to exclude others from the use of their property and a presumptive right to dispose of it as they please. This value becomes a fixation when the market value of a good is regarded as its most important characteristic and when virtually everything is thought of as a commodity or a potential commodity. This includes people themselves where one’s sense of self-worth is tied up with how much he or she privately owns and where among the things that people regard as their property are themselves. As Hobbes, in what Macpherson saw as a seminal idea for him, put it: “The value or worth of a man

is, as of all other things, his price.”³⁾

Consumerism is taken by Macpherson in the ordinary sense that people put an excessively high priority on acquiring consumer goods, but it takes on the further meaning for him of a thirst for indefinite, indeed infinite, consumption, thus shading into greed. There are limits on how many consumer goods one can use. It is doubtful that Imelda Marcos had even tried on all of the several thousand pairs of shoes she possessed. Indefinite consumption of goods is an unrealistic goal, but when combined with an attitude that sees things primarily in terms of their money value, the thirst for unlimited possession becomes an actual motivation in the form of greed for wealth. (When asked how much more wealth would be enough for him, J. D. Rockefeller is reported to have responded: “Just a bit more.”)

The next major work of political theory by Macpherson was *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval*,⁴⁾ in which he expanded on themes from *Possessive Individualism* to address some new topics, the principal one concerning the “retrieval” of certain aspects of the liberal-democratic tradition. Macpherson saw this tradition as containing two very different and incommensurate conceptions of human nature each part of a general social and political philosophy, or what he called an “ontology.” On one conception humans are thought of as packages of self-regarding desires the satisfaction of which they try to maximize. Democracy in this conception is as expressed by the so-called “realist” school associated with the Austrian economist, Joseph Schumpeter and subsequently pursued by the power-political theorists contemporary with Macpherson. For them, democracy is no more than a matter of political leaders competing with one another for the popular vote. Coexisting with this ontology is a view to be found in some liberal-democratic thinkers, notably John Stuart Mill and John Dewey, where humans aim to develop their

“truly human potentials” to the fullest, and democracy is achieved to the extent that all are able to do so. Since one of the human potentials is involvement in shaping and directing the society one shares with others, active political participation beyond mere voting is an essential part of democracy in this conception.

Macpherson did not define “truly human potentials,” instead giving examples. He lists the potentials “for rational understanding, for moral judgement and action, for aesthetic creation or contemplation, for the emotional activities of friendship and love, and, sometimes, for religious experience.”⁵⁾ Macpherson’s reason for not defining the term is that he saw this list as open-ended. What the potentials have in common is that their achievement by some people does not mean they cannot be achieved by other people. When lack of resources is an impediment for some (for instance, it is hard to develop friendships when one is obliged to work long and hard hours) this is seen as a social problem capable of being addressed rather than as people being perpetually locked into zero-sum games.

The ideal of democracy in this second ontology was called by Macpherson “developmental democracy,” to be distinguished from the narrow and competitive form of democracy (sometimes called by him “utility-maximizing”), which he saw as both bred by and reinforcing possessive individualism. The subtitle of his book, “Essays in Retrieval,” was meant to indicate that, contrary to many radical democrats, one need not jettison liberal democracy *per se* and replace it with an entirely new, liberating form of democracy, such as in Anarchist and Marxist (or at least Leninist) thinking. Rather, one can mine the history of liberal-democratic theory and practice to find elements of developmental democracy and rescue (retrieve) them from the possessive individualist theory and practice that had come to dominate liberal-democratic

societies.

As to just how developmental democracy has expressed itself and can be retrieved, this is entirely a matter of context for Macpherson. Unlike the “realists” for whom voting (plus, for some of them, certain constitutionally guaranteed rights) is the universal form that democracy takes, Macpherson argued that democracy can be achieved and institutionalized in a variety of fashions, depending upon existing political, cultural, economic, and institutional conditions and histories, which will vary from society from society. This stance is especially important for the undertaking of *The Real World of Democracy*.

This work itself needs to be seen in its historical context. In the first part of the 1960's the Cold War was still in full force in North America and was built around a virulent form of Anti-Sovietism. Meanwhile, national liberation struggles were intensifying in the developing world. To the extent that these often involved an element of socialism, they were also subject to cold-war attack (and not a few popular leaders were deposed by Western powers). In addition, the colonial mentality still lingered with its suspicion of nationalist sentiment in the former colonies and belief that they were unsuited to democratic government. Macpherson meant to counter all these attitudes in his lectures. Their title refers to what were then labeled the first, second, and third “worlds,” respectively: the liberal-democratic, industrialized countries; the Communist countries; and the newly emerging countries of the formerly colonized, developing world. Macpherson addressed each of these worlds from the point of view of its potential for enhancing democracy in his robust sense of the term. In each case he saw both advantages and disadvantages.

The main advantage of the second world resided in its egalitarian economic structure. Even taking account of special treatment given themselves by corrupt government officials (the extent of which was not generally known in the West

when Macpherson was writing), gaps in wealth in such countries as the Soviet Union or (at that time) China were very small compared to any capitalist country, and they also maintained programs for universal education and literacy, child care, health, and other social services more extensive than all but a few of the social-democratic liberal democracies. Macpherson saw these things as essential preconditions for people being able equally to develop their potentials and hence as vital for democracy. The major disadvantage was the absence of effective political rights, which supported the autocratic governments that shut people out of democratic participation.

The advantages and disadvantages Macpherson saw in the first world were the reverse of those in the second. Liberal freedoms provided essential preconditions for democratic participation, but the fact that these freedoms were largely formal meant that economic inequalities and weak universal social services effectively foreclosed widespread democratic participation and the equal development of human potentials. In addition, the possessive-individualist culture of a market society conditioned people to accept inequality as an unavoidable fact of life. The economic situation was even worse in the third world, where, despite relative economic equality, brute poverty impeded both citizen political involvement in the affairs of state and full development of people's potentials. The democratic advantage Macpherson saw in the developing world, absent for the most part in the first and second worlds, was the sense of community which grew out of being involved in nation building and national liberation.

As to prospects for democratic progress, Macpherson was optimistic. The main political institution of the second and third worlds was the single-party state. Unlike his Western political-scientific colleagues, Macpherson did not think that this institution needed to be undone to make advances in democracy

in the countries of these worlds, provided their parties were both open to any citizen and internally democratic. Both these conditions were at the time absent, but Macpherson predicted that as economic hardship was overcome discontent with the absence of political equality on the part of citizens who already enjoyed substantial economic equality would force the democratization of these parties. Regarding the first world, Macpherson predicted that the examples of socialist equality gave them a “moral advantage” which people in capitalist countries would recognize. Though it is only implicit in the *Real World* lectures, I think that Macpherson meant by this not just that people in capitalist countries would come to be ashamed of persisting poverty in the midst of plenty in their countries, but that they would see the developmental democracy as both possible and desirable and begin to challenge possessive-individualist values and assumptions.

Turning now to the current epoch, which in this session is labeled the age of globalization, it is evident that the intervening forty years have not been kind to Macpherson’s predictions. Of the major Communist countries, the Soviet Union no longer exists, and China has found a way to combine the worst aspects of political authoritarianism and economic capitalism. North Korea is both anti-democratic and poor, and it remains to be seen whether Vietnam will go the way of China or if Cuba can survive as a socialist country after Castro’s death. Little of the community feeling Macpherson admired in the third world is still to be found partly due to increased inequalities spawned and maintained by government corruption and brutality. Far from rejecting possessive individualism, the first world has witnessed a resurgence of 19th Century style neoliberalism sustained by the capitalist market culture decried by Macpherson. As a result, some see Macpherson’s views simply disconfirmed.

It is not the intent of this paper to pursue the question of how damaging the

failures of Macpherson's predictions are to his overall theory. In addition to this exercise requiring contested social-scientific methodological premises about how to link philosophical and normative views to empirical facts, it would face the problem confronted by all historians that human history is made up of series of unique events that do repeat themselves. Hence, historical explanation involves much counter-factual speculation. In the case of Macpherson's predictions, one might ask what would have happened if the Gorbochov reforms had succeeded. The effort they represented were in the direction of what Macpherson thought would happen, reflecting as they did pressure for governmental openness and defense of some civic and political rights.

Evidently, hostility to socialism was too strong in the Soviet Union for Gorbochov to withstand, but unless someone is wedded to a theory that collapse of Communism was inevitable – itself as tenuous as the earlier claim that its victory was inevitable – it must be allowed that under different and not unimaginable circumstances (for instance, coming earlier and with a different leadership in the United States, which under the Reagan administration was trying to bankrupt the Soviet Union by means of the arms race) the reforms would have contributed to progress toward democratic socialism in the Soviet Union. Since these circumstances did not exist and the Union did collapse, we cannot know whether this would have happened.

Had the reforms succeeded, it is not implausible that this would have had significant effects on the first and third worlds as well. Collapse of the Soviet Union with the concomitant discrediting of egalitarian policies generally in the public mind certainly strengthened the hand of neoliberals and accelerated the weakening of welfare states. Whether for reasons of genuine fraternalism or of geopolitics, the Soviet Union had been a major supporter of national liberation movements. Its demise exacerbated economic problems in the developing world

and weakened egalitarian commitments in ways that facilitated internal strife and government corruption.

Be these speculations as they may, the attraction to many (including myself) of Macpherson's views have not been as predictive political science, but as the wedding of political-economic and political-cultural theory to identify and critique the anti-democratic culture of possessive individualism and to articulate the developmental-democratic alternative. In the rest of the paper I shall suggest ways that these views in the background of *The Real World of Democracy* apply in the age of globalization. My comments will be narrowed to just one part of the world, namely the developed capitalist liberal democracies. Macpherson's approach of dividing the world into categories according to democratic challenges and opportunities can be applied to today's world, but with different (and in some respects overlapping) categories. It seems to me that these are: the developed liberal-democracies; the still underdeveloped regions locked into poverty, most notably large parts of Africa; and the Islamic world, which is torn between democratic and theocratic regimes and contests. India almost fits into the first category, though it includes very poor regions, and China is an admittedly significant anomaly.

Macpherson concluded *The Real World of Democracy* with a plea for the wealthy nations of the world to provide massive aid to its poor regions. It is now clear that aid programs need to be integrated with ones that confront corruption. More than one international agency has been grappling with this problem, but it remains to be seen whether aid beyond trivial percentages of the wealthy countries' potentials will be forthcoming. From a democratic point of view, it is obvious that internal democracy sufficient to hold government leaders and officials accountable would play an important and likely necessary role in controlling corruption. I do not see specifically Macphersonian tools as directly

pertinent to this challenge. Nor are they directly pertinent to the main democratic challenge in the Islamic world, which is to combat theocracy; though those democrats within Islamic societies who argue for nurturing pro-democratic elements in Islamic religious traditions rather than attacking them in total might be seen as pursuing a “retrievalist” strategy analogous to that of Macpherson.

A further narrowing of focus concerns the breadth of globalization. In its most general sense the term should refer to the pervasive and deepening ways that all of economic, political, environmental, and cultural features in any one part of the world are intertwined with those in all the other parts. In most current discussions, the notion is confined to economic matters and political responses to them, such as those concerned with greatly shrunken *de facto* national sovereignty in the face of global markets and deliberate reduction of *de jure* sovereignty, as in the transfer of what had been matters of national jurisdiction to transnational government bodies, like the European Union, or to international economic agencies such as the World Trade Organization. Since political economy is also the terrain of Macpherson’s work, I shall limit the subsequent discussion to this terrain.⁶⁾

Theorists of globalization are divided on the question of whether capitalism now completely transcends national boundaries or whether the largest capitalist enterprises still require national bases. For present purposes, this debate need not be entered into, since all agree that the ability of firms easily to move around the world and draw upon the cheapest labour and raw materials available anywhere makes them very difficult to control within any one nation state. Another question is about the interaction of transnational organizations and capitalist markets. Nearly all developed capitalist countries have moved in the direction favoured by neoliberals of freeing their internal markets from regulatory and other constraints. Further in accord with neoliberal thinking,

international trade has been greatly freed from protectionist constraints from within the trading firms host states. However, they have not been freed from regulations of international agencies. Perhaps there is room for popular pressure on such agencies to reign in the negative effects of free markets (I take it this is a guiding question in Professor Ougaard's contribution to this session)⁷⁾, but at present it looks to me that the presumptive baseline for economic transactions within and between states is a capitalist market.

Today's world of globalized capitalist markets lends itself to Macpherson's views *better* than did the advanced capitalist societies of his time. Macpherson was writing when the welfare state, modeled after Keynesian thinking, was strong. Contemporary theorists appropriately challenged Macpherson on the grounds that welfare economic guarantees and state provision of social services like affordable education and health care freed people to develop their potentials in the way Macpherson favoured. Macpherson's criticism of Keynesianism for providing window dressing for essentially pernicious market societies, had an "hypothesis saving" aura about it. Today possessive individualism stares us in the face at every turn, and it is not specific to particular countries due to the integration of national economies into a global market. However, if this aspect of globalization has provided the perspective of Macpherson with an obviously real target, it also poses special problems.

One challenge concerns economic markets themselves. Large-scale economies admit of two generic mechanisms for establishing the prices of goods and services: central command and individual market exchanges. Soviet plannification was an ambitious version of the first mechanism. Among its failings was that even the best intentioned planners had to make unreliable estimates of consumer demand, or else political authorities tried to force the populace to conform to the goods made available to them. The alternative mechanism is the

market, where consumers signal preferences by their willingness to pay varying amounts for alternative goods. The result is that, while by no means perfect, the availability and costs of goods are more efficient than in the planned economy. If, then, the failure of Soviet-style economic planning has shown that competitive markets are indispensable for an efficient modern economy, Macpherson's hostility to markets must be tempered in a way that does not undercut his thesis about the connection of such markets to possessive individualism.

Another challenge is that the globalization of capitalist markets makes it very difficult to combat their negative dimensions at the level of one's nation. The reason for this is not that capitalist enterprises no longer exist in national spaces, as some argue,⁸⁾ but that attempts to improve the salaries and working conditions of employees or to protect or retrieve public services downsized or eliminated by tax-cutting neoliberal governments faces the threat of outsourcing of jobs or capital flight abroad or of retaliation by international trade agencies, such as tribunals of the WTO or, in my part of the world, of the North American Free Trade Agreement. One might, of course, say that world-wide revolution is the solution, but this was not a realistic option even when the idea of socialist revolution was more popular than today.

The germ of a solution to the problem posed by the apparent unavoidability of economic markets is a distinction, first made by Karl Polanyi and accepted by Macpherson, between a market economy and a market society.⁹⁾ An economy with a substantial role for market transactions is not by itself pernicious. It becomes so when it engenders a market society, which for Macpherson meant a society the culture of which is possessive individualist. The crucial question to ask, then, is whether market economies must create market societies, as Macpherson appears to have assumed. I do not, however, think that he needed

this assumption. The feature of market economies that makes them turn into market societies is, I speculate,¹⁰⁾ insecurity. Self-centred behaviour is not unexpected on the part of people who must fear that there are no social resources to help them in time of need. Regarding a fixation on property, the possibility of dramatic rent hikes or eviction for tenants leads them to see the security of home ownership, for example, attractive. Owning one's own business is frequently motivated by a desire for control over one's economic fortunes. Self-ownership at least allows someone to walk away from an oppressive employer.

Regarding consumerism or greed, in an economy where one is never sure whether the resources required to satisfy needs will be forthcoming, resting easy with what one has can be risky. An hypothesis directly appropriated from Macpherson is that people are greedy and consumerists by default. The insecurities of a market economy impede seeking or leading a meaningful life in the sense of people being empowered to make full use of the ensemble of their talents. In this situation a dream of riches supplants meaningful activity as the goal of life. Think of students who are following narrowly practical courses of studies but who would rather be studying humanities, social sciences or the arts. I have the impression that many of them begin grudgingly accepting this constraint as an unfortunate necessity, which subsequently turns into a virtue in their eyes as the accumulation of goods one can show off and play with comes to be seen as a meaning-conferring goal.

The conclusion is that life and work in market economies should be freed from at least the worst forms of insecurity. I see no reason why this cannot be accepted consistently with the overall approach of Macpherson. The only adjustment required in his thinking would be to temper his reluctance to endorse the welfare state. One would thus have to construe Macpherson's thinking in a more social-democratic direction than he himself favoured. I

believe this is defensible provided that the form of social democracy in question is of the strong variety – a moderation of “second-way” (that is socialistic) thinking as opposed to the putative “third-way” approach which, as in Blair’s Britain, has been seen to be a moderation of the capitalistic “first-way.” It should be emphasized that this does not mean that one should accede to the *universality* of markets. To take the most pressing current example, preservation of an environment capable of sustaining continued human life requires severe constraints on relevant market behaviour.

The social-democratic solution confronts the problem that implementing effective welfare state measures is made difficult by the freedom globalization affords capitalist firms. In my view exercise of this freedom to constrain state activities of the kind that would be required to alleviate insecurity is best seen as a form of extortion or blackmail. To threaten to outsource jobs unless significant wage cuts are accepted, to relocate in another part of the world altogether unless freed from taxation pressures, to call on transnational financial agencies to have a country’s credit rating changed if it tries to implement confining regulations, to challenge in international trade tribunals measures to protect local manufacturing, to impose price controls, or to enhance state provision of social services – all these things are on a par with ordinary extortion: Agree to my terms or I’ll see to it that bad things happen to you. One response is to try nationalizing a country’s industries. This response is rarely available, if for no other reason than that almost no country’s economy can be self-sufficient (though perhaps policies in Bolivia by Hugo Chavez are an attempt, made possible, if it is possible, by his country’s rich oil reserves).

Another reaction to extortionists is to dare them to carry through with their threats, or as is said in card games like poker to “call their bluff.” The problem with this strategy is that the largest firms are not bluffing, but are quite prepared

to carry out their threats and often do. So a country would have to be prepared suffer the economic consequences. As in the “Battle of Britain” during World War II when the German military was surprised at the determination of British people to endure large-scale bombing destruction rather than surrender, a population would have to be prepared to reduce its living standards rather than give in to internal and external economic threats. The question now becomes one of how realistic it is to expect this. Some might think that nationalism could be counted on (and this was likely a factor in the British war-time case). However, in addition to the fact that nationalism is a two-edged sword with its own negative potentialities, it happens in today’s world that nationalistic political leaders are almost always on the pro-capitalist political right and thus on the side of the extortionists.

While there probably is no easy or decisive way to confront this problem, Macpherson’s theories offer one part of a solution. This has already been alluded to in the claim that to the extent that people adopt possessive-individualist life styles, this is by default due to lacking opportunities for leading meaningful lives in the sense Macpherson tried to retrieve from some dimensions of liberal-democratic traditions. Unlike a life guided by possessive-individualist aspirations, a life consonant with developmental democracy is not expensive, and its rewards are intrinsic to the talent-developing activities themselves rather than residing in the consumer goods one can accumulate. Hence, developmental democracy has the potential to reduce costs of living without people having to make undue sacrifices, and indeed leading preferable lives to those associated with self-centred consumerism and greed.

It also offers part of a solution to what should now be apparent as the chicken-and-egg problem that standing up to extortionistic threats requires a populace that enjoys the security provided by policies that the threats are meant to

prevent. Chicken-egg problems (where solutions are required as means to themselves) are usually easier to address in practice than in theory. This is because most actual processes are of a spiral nature, such that small changes at the beginning can lead to larger ones in a self-building (or self-destructive) way. Thus one can imagine initially modest, and hence affordable, ventures on the part of governments, local businesses, unions, religious organizations, schools, citizen groups, and so on, aimed at providing opportunities for people to develop the sorts of potentials Macpherson wrote of with the aim of gradually building popular attraction for such non-possessive individualist pursuits, thus increasingly making it possible for political leaders (if, of course, the right ones are elected) to stand up to intimidation.

Anticipating scepticism about such a scenario for being unrealistically idealistic, I conclude my remarks by asking what the alternative is. Of course, if neoliberal philosophy is right, there is no problem here to be addressed. Utopian neoliberals will see the invisible hand of the market resolving any problems, and Social-Darwinist neoliberals will not be distressed if those who cannot triumph in a global market suffer for it. Or, from another direction, optimistic cosmopolitans might think that the need for international regulation of global markets will call into being trans-state organizations whose leaders are committed to taming markets for the betterment of humanity in general and who will be successful at doing so. Macpherson set himself against the neoliberals of his time (the power-political “realists”), and he would surely have seen the second tack as requiring popular support motivated by the sorts of values he espoused.

This means that political efforts to gain policies that advance developmental-democratic goals must be combined with political-cultural efforts to defend these values. I do not think that this perspective is in disagreement with Professor Ougaard’s conclusion regarding attempts by non-governmental

organizations to influence global government networks that statements of “ideological, moral or political principles have little impact” unlike opinions based on facts and detailed knowledge,¹¹⁾ unless he means (which I doubt) that the moral views and political principles of populations affected by global governance networks and from whom the NGOs at least claim to be drawing their support are irrelevant. Assuming that it is important what popular-level values are, and assuming that such values do not automatically seize populations, then there is work to be done in articulating, justifying, and publicizing them.

Four aspects of Macpherson’s approach uniquely suit it to this work. (1) He does not just advocate that people lead less costly or extravagant lives, but he depicts this as a consequence of an attractive mode of life unlike the fear-ridden possessive-individualist alternative. (2) In his treatment of the history of ideas, he offers reasons to believe that possessive individualism is not an essential part of human nature but has been constructed. This is important for countering the fatalistic belief that one flies in the face of human nature in challenging possessive individualism and policies catering to it. (3) The vision he projects is secular and, in appealing to individual development, individualistic; therefore it is consistent with these aspects of liberalism. This distinguishes his entreaties from ones that require religious beliefs or that appeal to communitarian standards (such as nationalism). At the same time, thanks to the complementarity of “truly human potentials” the view is individualistic in a way that invites cooperation. (4) His approach links resistance to possessive individualism and embrace of developmentalism to his articulation of a specifically democratic ideal – the equal development of people’s human potentials. Considerations 3 and 4 together mean that a Macphersonian solution to the problem at hand is consistent with liberal-democratic values.

In his lifetime Macpherson had a measure of success in persuasively

publicizing his ideas. This was primarily in his capacity as a teacher, whose students were inspired and motivated by exposure to his ideas. He was also a public intellectual. *The Real World of Democracy* lectures were given over live national radio in Canada in a widely listened to series of public broadcasts. In his work life, he put many of his ideas into practice. He was one of the founders (in 1967) of an ecumenical and interdisciplinary Canadian Society for Socialist Studies, which has preserved the sorts of ideals he defended during the enduring 40 years (a rarely achieved longevity for organizations of the Canadian or any other left). He also played the leading role in transforming the curriculum of the University of Toronto to one much more conducive to developmental-democratic principles than before, both in the content of courses and in democratization of curriculum policy to give students a major voice.

As to how the political-cultural charge Macpherson gave to himself might be carried out today, one would have to consult people whose special talents and institutional resources are supposed to well place them to influence the cultures of their societies. (Are not we at this session supposed to be just such people?)

Notes

- 1) C.B. Macpherson, *The Real World of Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965).
- 2) C.B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (Oxford University Press, 1962).
- 3) Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1929) 67 (typography modified from the original).
- 4) *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973). Subsequent books include *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) and *The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
- 5) *Democratic Theory*, 4.
- 6) Toward the end of his life, Macpherson made references to environmental challenges, mainly to identify ecological citizen action, along with those of other new

social movements, as a potential agent for social change (as opposed to a revolutionary working class, for which he saw little prospect in North America), but he never directly addressed environmental challenges themselves. Similarly, though he listed the potential for “religious experience” as one of the truly human ones, Macpherson never concerned himself with religion, nationalism, and ethnic conflict. If his views have application to these major features of the age of globalization they would be by way of his recommendations about a developmental-democratic lifestyle as discussed later in this paper. In my *The Real World of Democracy Revisited* (Humanities Press, 1994) chapters 6 and 8 bear on these topics. An appendix to its chapter 1 is an interview with Macpherson where he makes the comments about environmental movements. The book is available in Japanese translation.

- 7) Morten Ougaard, “Civil Society and Democratic Governance,” prepared for the same session as this paper.
- 8) This opinion is argued by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in *Empire* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2000).
- 9) Karl Polanyi, *The Livelihood of Man* (New York: Academic Press, 1977, posthumously published, from essays written between 1954 and 1964), 9. Though Macpherson made few references to Polanyi, I see the use of “market society” language, especially in essay one of *Democratic Theory*, as a deliberate echo of this concept, which, with the contrast to a market economy, was in wide currency among progressive scholars at the time.
- 10) I explain and defend this speculation in “Market Economies and Market Societies,” *Journal of Social Philosophy*, Vol. 36 No. 2, Summer 2005, 129-142.
- 11) Ougaard, *op. cit.*, 11.