Where is Death?:
A Paper to Consider Death and Community through Heidegger and Lingis

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Introduction

The problem of death is nearly always present in arguments about community. Naturally enough, death in these arguments means not only destroying one's relationship with the other, but also restoring the bond with the other as community. Indeed, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Luc Nancy, Maurice Blanchot, and Alphonso Lingis thought that death was a possible element in constructing relationships with others. More or less, their arguments about death and community have been thoroughly worked out by critically accepting Heidegger's insistence of death as mine. On the other hand, Nancy, Blanchot, and Lingis changed the focus of their arguments from community based on Heidegger's death as mine to one based on the death of the other. However, still, it is hard to say that these arguments have been completely resolved.

In *Being and Time* [*Sein und Zeit*] (hereafter *BT*),[1] Heidegger explored the idea of a basic community. Basic community precedes the community resulting from the assembly of persons. According to Heidegger, basic community is the foundation for the addition of people. Because his definition of basic community finally became "people [Volk]" (*BT*, 436) and because he assisted the NSDAP in 1930s, his community as people has been considered likely to be a totalitarian one. On the other hand, Nancy, Blanchot, and Lingis intended to find community at a level that does not fall into totalitarian and rational community by seriously addressing the death of the other.

Based on the above, the themes addressed in this paper are as follows. I will survey the claim of Heidegger's death as mine and community in *Being and Time* and his 1934 lecture course *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache* [*Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*] (hereafter *LWS*).[2] Next, I will address the association between "common death" (*CW*, 13) and community, which Lingis proposed in

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his work, *The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common* （hereafter *CW*）[3], revisiting the question of whether death fundamentally comes from the self or others. What is common death? In defining Lingis's radical suggestion, I will clarify Heidegger's thoughts about death and community in this paper. Then, I will identify Lingis's concept of common death as the essential matter with respect to thinking about community that does not fall into totalitarian and rational categories.

I have organized this paper as follows:

1. I will survey Heidegger's argument about death as "mineness [Jemeinigkeit]" （*BT*, 68） and "Being-with [Mitsein]" （*BT*, 157） and clarify their inseparable relationship. Then, I will take up Heidegger's point about the authentic We and death as mine in order to address common death.

2. I will survey Lingis's basic thoughts on community, and confirm the primordiality of Lingis's other community, which emerges by encountering the other as the intruder.

3. I will elucidate the meaning of common death by Lingis. Finally, I will show that his concept of common death is the most important, indispensable, and promotable subject for thinking about community.

Death, by no means, is resigned to either the self or the other. I think death is what fixes the boundary between the self and the other. If death plays an essential role in the way we discover basic community, would it be possible for us to call such death common death even though it divides us? Where does death lie in respect to constructing basic community?

1. Death as Mein, Authentic Being-with and We by Heidegger

Dasein can refer to the "possible ways", and Heidegger defined these was as "existence [Existenz]" （*BT*, 67）. Then, Being Dasein is individual for each person, which is why Being includes mineness. The concepts of existence and mineness are essential determination of Dasein, so its analysis should center on their two determinations as far as *Being and Time* ends with an analysis about Being of Dasein. On the other hand, in Being of Dasein, one's relationship with others has already been included essentially. Heidegger stated the following with regard to Dasein: "Dasein has the essential structure of Being-with" （*BT*, 157）. Therefore, Dasein already implies Being-with the other. Basically, Dasein is being with mineness as Being-with the others.

It is generally accepted that Heidegger's concept of Dasein's authenticity is closely linked to the "anticipation of possibility [Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit]" （*BT*, 306-307）. Furthermore, Dasein's authentic possibility is the possibility of death. In this way, Dasein

exists in "Being toward death [Sein zum Tode]" (*BT*, 277). Insofar as such death can be understood as Dasein's most extreme possibility, Heidegger says that: "death lays claim to it [Dasein] as an individual Dasein" (*BT*, 308).

Heidegger thought of death as a possibility of mineness and existence in which Dasein would no longer be able to exist in the world. Such a possibility is not arbitrarily chosen and removable; it is a necessary possibility that one can never avoid. When we are about to grasp such death, what is the most proper approach? It is the death of the self that Heidegger considered when he attempted to describe death. In this case, death indicates one's own death, not the death of the other. If we could arrive at a definition of what death is and how it affects us based on the mediation of the death of the other, we could absorb another's death in our Being as an experience. Moreover, if we adopted such a course of project, we could think of death as taking the place of the other; in other words, we could regard death as "representability" (*BT*, 283) in Dasein's inauthenticity. It is likely that we can act as a substitute for the other in most routine and everyday works. Such works do not necessarily impose themselves only on the self; that is, someone else can carry them out. The locations of such works are controlled by anonymous nature of Dasein.

However, it is only in the case of death that we cannot take the place of the other. My death becomes never the other's death, and the opposite is also true. Specifically, the possibility of death is not consistent with Dasein's representability within everyday works; that is, it is what fixes the boundary between the possibilities that anyone has the ability to do and those that can only be achieved by the self.

Certainly, under specific circumstances, it would be possible for us to experience another's death. For instance, there could be some cases where I am present with others who are dead, where I accompany one who is dying, or where I make a scapegoat of others. However, as a matter of course, in such cases I cannot become those who died or those who are dying. Moreover, even if I gave my life to someone temporarily by my self-sacrifice, it would not rid him or her of the possibility of death. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the above-mentioned experiences with other's deaths can give us the true concept of death. Furthermore, we cannot conclude that self-sacrifice would totally remove the possibility of death from another's life. Based on these arguments, Heidegger says that: "the dying of Others is not something which we experience in a genuine sense" (*BT*, 282), and that: "no one can take the Other's dying away from him" (*BT*, 284). This is because, if one were able to experience another's death completely in a strict sense, they would pass away with the other. This would simply result in the loss of community or bond with the other. In this argument, the anticipation of one's own death does not mean that they kill themselves; it means that they understand death as the only possibility in which others are never able to represent them. Therefore, when we truly grasp death in our own

life as an extreme possibility, not as a realization of death, we will not be able to help but think of death as mine. "Death is in every case mine, in so far as it 'is' at all" (*BT*, 284). Therefore, because anticipation of the possibility of death as mine means that no one can essentially take my place in death, the other's death is unnecessary. Likewise, the possibility of death not being present in the world would mean the possibility of the destruction of relationships with others. This is why, in *anticipation* of possibility of death as mine, "all Being-with Others will fail us" (*BT*, 308).

However, the anticipation of death never makes Dasein a singular experience in which Dasein's essential structure of Being-with is perfectly broken. This is because just after Heidegger said that all Being-with Others will fail us, he stated the following attention.

> But if concern and solicitude fail us, this does not signify at all that these ways of Dasein have been cut off from its authentically Being-its-Self. [...] Dasein is authentically itself only to the extent that, as concernful Being-alongside and solicitous Bring-with, it projects itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being rather than upon the possibility of the they-self. (*BT*, 308)

According to this reference, death as mineness does not completely wipe out Being-with from the structure of Being in Dasein. Rather, the project that I first of all view death as mineness is directly linked to restoring and renewing Being-with in the world even though death means the failure of Being-with others at the same time. In other words, death as mine leads to the failure of Being-with, but at the same time, it revitalizes Being-with. Therefore, we can say that death as mine, insofar as it is one's own possibility, makes it possible to reduce Dasein to Being as singular and lets Dasein begin again as Being-with others. It is clear that there is a particular movement involving the loss and restoration of the bond with others toward the authenticity of Dasein. In such a movement, anticipation of death as mine, authentic existence, brings about authentic Being-with others.

In this respect, as Karl Löwith criticized, the I as the first person is not prescribed by the You as the second person, and mutuality is not taken into consideration.[4] Surely, Heidegger does not fix Dasein in accordance with the others as the second person. On this point, I agree with Löwith's criticism; however, I think that Löwith probably overlooks the reason why Heidegger did not focus on the second person when considering death. As stated above, Heidegger considered death as mineness, which creates the absolute impossibility of representability when prescribing the I from the You. Moreover, insofar as it is true, it is only in death that we can discern the difference between the I and You, even

though we are usually equal in ends, works, and possibilities. Therefore, death shows us the distinct differences between ourselves, so it has important meaning in Heidegger's thoughts about death. Moreover, regarding the idea of anticipation of death making Dasein emerge as Being-with, we can say that Heidegger thought about Being-with as a kind of mutuality that Löwith did not.

Therefore, if death as mine leads to the failure of Being-with, at the same time, it restores the relationship with the other as authentic Being-with. In this case, Being-with is not referred to in the first person, but in the first plural person, that is, the authentic We. In *Being and Time*, there is not an investigation of the We. However, in his 1934 lecture course *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache*, Heidegger thoroughly addresses the authentic We.

In his lecture, Heidegger expands the range of the concept of Self from the first person to the first plural person and forbids reducing the Self to the I that has superiority over others (*LWS*, 37-38/45). According to Heidegger, reducing the Self to the I results in the I being an observed or used object. In such case, the We becomes the sum total of the I. Heidegger denies this way of thinking about the We as a collective I. Furthermore, he asserts that the authentic We emerges from decision. "We are authentic We only in the decision, and what is more, each individualizes" (*LWS*, 58).

We can regard such a decision as "Resoluteness" (*BT,* 343) in *Being and Time*. Resoluteness "pushes it [the Self] into solicitous Bing with Others" (*BT*, 344). Though individualizing gives rise to the project for death as mine, it is clear in this lecture that such individualizing with the first person is directly linked to authentic We as the first plural person. In *Being and Time*, investigation of the We is completely lacking in spite of the suggestion of authentic Being-with. Therefore, it is possible to regard the argument of the authentic We in this lecture as supplement of authentic Being-with in *Being and Time*. In addition, in the lecture Heidegger addresses death to some extent within the context of my Being and Being "With-each-other [Miteinander]" or "For-each-other [Füreinander]" as follows.

> >Dasein is in each case mine< just means that my Being is assigned to With-each-other and For-each-other. [...] It is not chance that the highest and sharpest individualizing of Being-Self towards the in each case proper Dasein occurs in relation with death. (*LWS*, 164)

As a result, it makes sense that individualizing via death as mine causes Dasein, both only authentic Self and authentic Being-with, and then such authentic Being-with emerges as the authentic We. This type of authentic We is not community formed by

fusion of the I and the You. Only after individualizing via death and becoming the authentic Self the authentic We can emerge; therefore, we can say that in this individualizing each Dasein is separated, becoming singular with respect to possibility. However, such a state means that one is never in entire isolation and separation from their relationship with the other. On the contrary, even if Dasein disconnects each other, its disconnection to the possibility of death brings about a connection with the other.[5]

In conclusion, we can say that Heidegger's death is the disconnecting and connecting death of each Dasein. It is death that makes Dasein individualized and lead to a consonance of Dasein as authentic Being-with as We. However, is it death as mineness that causes Dasein to disconnect and connect with others? Heidegger's way of thinking about authentic Being-with and We is guaranteed by death as mine; that is, death in the first person. In the case of thinking about death from the aspect of the person and authentic Being-with as We, is it possible that death depends only on me? If death is a passage into authentic Being-with as We, does the dying person remain in the first person? Of course, Heidegger never mentions death as ours. However, on the subject of authentic Being-with as We, does death, which constructs a bridge among us, go beyond the first person?

On the other hand, if Being of Dasein is possibility, and if the anticipation of death is possibly the anticipation of "prime-possibility [Ur-Möglichkeit]" as Wolfgang Müller-Lauter said,[6] we could say that all of Dasein's possibilities of mineness is related to the Being exposed by death as prime-possibility. They should be based on the possibility of death as the prime-possibility of Self, and they are fundamentally based on prime-possibility, which could make it possible that my Being, Being-with, and everdayness are such possibilities. Also, like Jean-François Courtine,[7] when we think that Heidegger's assertion about the thought of death as destroying Descartes certainty of cogito, death becomes a possible condition of the I and the We. Does death as prime-possibility make the first person and the first plural person possible? These questions remain unclear in Heidegger's discussion. When the focus is shifted to the person, where is does Heidegger say death exists? Heidegger insists that death is perfectly covered by the mineness of the first person. However, I think that it exceeds the first person because death as mine is given as a possible condition for arriving at the authentic We.

2. Community from the Death of the Other by Lingis

In contrast to Heidegger's arguments about death and community, Nancy and Branchot believe community stems from death of the other rather than death as mine. Although arguments by Nancy and Blanchot about death and community are important,

they are beyond the scope of this paper.[8] In a similar vein, Lingis's assertions about community can also be applied. His example of community consists of one who is dying and one who accompanies him or her. The focus of his argument about death tends to favor death for the others rather than death as mine. In order to examine death and community according to Lingis, we must survey his argument.

When one reads Lingis's argument, one must understand that he follows Levinas's view that "face-to-face [le face-à-face]" experience with the other is the greatest source of community, and seeing the "face [visage]" of the other forces their "vulnerability [vulnérable]" upon me.[9] According to Levinas, the experience of meeting with the other is the "ultimate situation [situation ultime]" from the point of view that it is not able to be "irreducible to totality".[10] Levinas's Other is never made to be included in the I and is a complete Other in the strictest sense.

Lingis also regards meeting with others as primordiality; however, his thought is unique in that he thinks community exists with those who impose vulnerability and mortality upon us. I believe Lingis's other is not completely outside of the self, but shares a similar space. This is because I think he does not completely affirm Levinas's very extreme Other that is situated entirely outside of the self. What kind of fundamental community can we observe in Lingis's thought? It seems that the place where we stay with dying one is where Lingis believes community exists.

> I had many hours to think of the necessity, among the existing, to accompany those who are dying. Not only is this true of […] the one who goes to stay with dying one to the end and who stays when there is no longer any healing possible-who knows in his or her heart he or she has to stay. […] one will stay when, […] there is someone one never knew, dying alone. (*CW*, IX)

In this reference, there is two points that we must focus on. First, Lingis's community comprises a dying one and an accompanying one who is not dying yet. Second, the act of accompanying is a necessity. Therefore, such a community is not one that comes from sharing something with others; community emerges from the dying of the other, which is the possibility that they will no longer be with me in the world and share things with me. In this situation, there is no way to heal the dying one. The only way for the dying to remain with the living is to nurse them; therefore, we have to accompany the dying one. This obligation is essential for the formation of Lingis's community. Without this obligation, there would be no connection with others. If there were no such obligation, we can assume that we would be parallel Beings, each of us living for our own purpose.

It is said that Lingis's community is situated beneath the rational community.

> Before the rational community, there was the encounter with the other, the intruder. The encounter begins with the one who exposes himself to the demands and contestation of the other. Beneath the rational community, ［...］ is another community, the community that demands that the one ［...］ expose himself to the one with whom he has nothing in common, the stranger.（*CW*, 10）

Rational community contrives that anyone can be accepted and it produces anonymous discourse. By practicing such reason and anonymous discourse in the world, rational community is created. For example, if I want to hold a meeting, I devise various appropriate, useful motivations and reasons for myself and others to attend. Then, I announce the information that the meeting will cover including any meaningful and understood content for every participant using a common language. If the participants understand this content and attend the meeting, the meeting will be finished as meeting, that is to say, as finished work. Similarly, rational community depends on members of the community having a common language and the ability to share the same reasons, motivations, and meanings. The others in this case are those who share these same attributes with me. Therefore, in a rational community, we can encounter nothing but ourselves and "we find nothing alien to us, foreign, and impervious to our understanding" （*CW*, 6）. It is another community and encounter with the other as the intruder mentioned by Lingis lie beneath such a rational community. For Nancy, such a community is defined by his expression that "community cannot arise from the domain of **work**, or it is the experience of finitude".[11] According to Nancy, basic community is not constructed as planned work, but "community is given to us with being and as being, well in advance of all our projects, desires, and undertakings".[12]

As mentioned above, Lingis accepts Levinas's point regarding the experience of the other. The primordiality of another community and encounters with others as intruders is guaranteed by positively accepting it as Levinas's experience of the other. The others as intruders who are dying are outside of rational community, which is constructed by finished work. By encountering these others, another community emerges. Moreover, this other community is not derived from the rational community; it is an original community situated outside of the rational one. This original community supports the rational community.

According to above arguments, the other community is not formed by the same kinds of people. The fundamental moment that the original community is formed is when foreign others are encountered as intruders. According to Lingis's claims, the most typical example of such intruders is a dying other.

Where is Death?

> The surfaces of others, surfaces of suffering, that face me appeal to me and make demands on me. In them, an alien imperative weights on me. (*CW*, 32)

An alien imperative from outside the rational community weighs on me when we are face-to-face. What does this imperative demand of me? Like Levinas, Lingis's way of approaching others involves sensitivity, not perception (*CW,* 31). Levinas uses the word "sensitivity [sensibilité]" in a negative context that includes selfish states and allowing oneself to become involved in unfulfilling relationships with others.[13] However, unlike Levinas, Lingis finds out in sensitivity the primordiality of encountering others. In a word, accepting Levinas's experience of the other, Lingis drags it down to the place of sensitivity. With this sensitivity, the self senses the other's vulnerability. Its vulnerability appeals to the self with an "alien imperative" from an outside position. When others present vulnerability, they also present their "mortality" (*CW*, 12). Hence, another community emerges only by sensing the other's mortality, which appeals to the self and burdens one with the imperative of sensitivity. When we sense a dying other, we sense an obligation of responsibility from them to accompany them and stay with them while they die. Insofar as my accompanying is a response to the imperative of the dying one, that death constructs another original community.

When we recognize this other community, we understand that death is separate for each other and is only given to each proper Being. In doing so, we consider the meaning of death or dying, which contributes to the creation of another community. Here, Lingis suggests a very dangerous and stimulating idea in the point that his concept tends to generalize proper death for each other. It is just a common death.

> In the midst of the work of rational community, there forms the community of those who have nothing in common, of those who have nothingness, death, their mortality, in common. But is the death that isolates each one a common death? (*CW*, 13)

In the above quote, common death is cautiously mentioned in a question. Neither positive nor negative answers are given for now. The idea of common death is abandoned in the middle of a distressed expression that we want to affirm, but it is impossible to do so. Now, it is easy to refute Lingis's idea of common death at this point; however, I think that it may be productive for us to think more deeply on its meaning and the idea, which Heidegger, Nancy, and Blanchot never mentioned in their contexts about community. As mentioned above, death isolates and separates each other. Nevertheless, despite such separation, if we can argue about community by and through death, the expression of common death is a very significant suggestion. If we think about community in relationship with death, we

must consider the dangerous expression of common death. Accordingly, we do not need to dissolve common death by asserting that each death is individual, rather we need to investigate how we can discuss common death. Where can we look to address this idea of common death?

3. Beyond Death for the Self and Others?

Let us put the argument in order. First, according to Heidegger, death is for the self. The death as mine needs to be strictly understood. Heidegger's death is a fundamental condition as the prime-possibility of the I and We as the person. The unclear point of Heidegger is how the death of the self directly connects with the authentic We. If death was the fundamental condition of being a person, it would have the condition of the We. The place of death is my Being. Hence, at least focusing on death and the person (the singular person or the singular plural person), the scope death in the authentic We is not my death, but our death. Next, Lingis addresses other's death, dying ones, and conceives of a community formed by others who are dying and those that accompany the dying. In Lingis's thought, death fundamentally belongs to others, not to the self. However, strictly speaking, I think that Lingis's definition of death expands from the person to the non-person via his idea of common death. If this is so, the place of death is the places where one is born and where one will pass away. If Lingis's common death is true in some meaning, I think probably that the place of death is our place, although it is not possessed as possession or property in the rational community and totalitarian one by us.

Lingis situates death at the level of "element",[14] which threatens and supports our lives as human beings. Such death is called "the shadow of death that advances" as one of the elements like the sun, sky, and desert (*CW*, 118). Death is what advances us independent of our intentions and will. In this way, none of us can help being passive against death, and as mortals we are given death. Within such an element, human beings must ask others for assistance in order to maintain their own lives. Human beings "have to appeal to others to make ourselves at home" (*CW*, 118). Contrary to Levinas, Lingis puts the self and others on the elemental level. So, Lingis's others are symmetrical with respect to mortality, as opposed to non-symmetrical in Levinas's extreme argument about the other. However, Lingis does not propose equal communication with others. We as mortals are exposed to death as element, which cannot be confined in rationality and work. The most important point is that we as anonymous individuals are mortal and others are dying as well. It is essential that the self responds to the dying other's appeal within the element of death, and this creates fundamental community.

Lingis says that what others appeal to is "the contact and accompaniment" (*CW*,

132). This is why the existing one is forced to accompany dying one. This demand or imperative of accompaniment does not require the receipt of advantage. Even if I do not possess the ability to relieve the dying other's suffering, pain, and death, the dying one demands gratis accompaniment from me. When I respond to the imperative of accompaniment issued from a dying one, I encounter the other's limit as death and then recognize keenly that the other is not me.

> The touch of consolation opens the path, in the time of endurance and suffering, to an accompaniment in dying and find brotherhood with the other in the last limit of his or her destitution. (*CW*, 178-179)

In the last moments of the other's death, we can find discover another community—"brotherhood".[15] Those who are dying are others, not the self. The self still exists, and at this point, the self and the other are put in a situation where it is impossible to represent each other. But when representation is impossible, that is, the limit of our ability to encounter others as such, what kind of community exists? Can this be called community? If death opens an absolute abyss between the existing and the dying, and if in such an abyss, a certain community emerges, as the moment death arrives for the dying, does the existing one experience death as well? Does it become our death? If such a death gives us an original community, we experience a cracked community beneath the rational community.

I think that Lingis is irresolute regarding whether such death can be called common death or not. If community occurs between the existing one and the dying one, it is necessary that I take the place of the dying other in accompanying them, although I do not open myself to the possibility of my own death.

> The one becomes the brother of the other when he puts himself wholly in the place of the death that gapes open for the other. (*CW*, 157)

This quote suggests that I am both sensitive to the dying one and that I will undertake the imperative of accompaniment that they imposed on me. If we can assume that there is a common death in constructing community, it seems to be in the place that I would have to accompany the dying one when I put myself in the place of the other's death. Common death can only be said to exist after I situate myself in the other's death as their limit. Common death means that the self is situated as accompaniment in the place of the other's death—the other's limit and finale.

Where do the dying one and I go? Is the place where we are bound for the

straightforward place to die? If so, Lingis's thought of common death and accompaniment would mean committing suicide together. In the examination of this problem, we must focus on the present participle dying and the meaning of putting oneself in the place of the other's death. Dying does not mean the realization of death or having already passed away; it means that one is on their way to death. Therefore, when the existing one accompanies the dying one, who still exists but is going to die, community occurs. This does not mean that realizing and carrying out death together results in double suicide, even if we are bound for a place to die where it is meaningless to talk about the construction of community.

On the other hand, it is with respect to fulfilling the request for accompaniment that putting oneself in the place of another's death has meaning as such. The dying one fundamentally demands this accompaniment, and it is possible only based on the concept of the death of the other. This is why the dying of others initiates my response of accompaniment. Putting oneself in the place of another's death at their request is directly connected to accompaniment. The end result allows us to exist with others as such in their place of death.

Thus, we can understand that the place of death of the other can accommodate my accompaniment. First, it is possible that a dying other can demand accompaniment of me. This is because the place of death for others exists as a place that is, in some ways, open to all. That is to say, another's place of death can be open for me. Death never shuts itself out, whether it depends on the self or the other.

That such a limit is open to one at the point of another's limit enables one to discover the other as such. At the same time, the area of death's boundary for the other can place me at the limit of the other. This event brings community into existence in a limited space. Certainly, such a space is the place of death for other, but it is a place opened to me through the giving of the imperative. By placing me in such a space, another community emerges. Insofar as we understand the place and death of the other in this setting, it is possible to say that I inhabit the space of the dying one at their limit, and they permit me invade the irreplaceable place of others and gift another community distinguished from rational community and community as work to me. Such community takes place in the death of the other; however, at the point of the other's limit, common death implies the emergence of a shared space.[16]

Of course, common death does not make us fuse in the same death. The word common does not indicate a simple union and common property. Furthermore, as Heidegger said, the self will not fully be able to experience the dying of the other in a genuine sense, and Lingis must be able to affirm that. We cannot experience death in common. However, based on such a problem of death, according to the discussion above, I

think that Lingis uses the word common in a secondary sense. First, it indicates a place where I cannot cross the border of death for the other. Second, the other's death places me on that border and discloses another community that is separate from rational community or community as work. Accordingly, the range where common death emerges also is a common place in which I can sense the limit of the other. Furthermore, in this space the limit of the other appeals to me for my accompaniment or my response. Death brings about a shift between the I and the You until they no longer completely fall into a specific person. If we think about community and death, we would have to seek the place of common death out of rational community as work, the person, and the possession. The idea of common death by Lingis presents an essential subject for considering the relationship between community and death, although it is a very dangerous suggestion. In the remarkable place where another's death places me at their limit, death is never able to fall into our hands. The place of death and community is not our possession, and makes us be suspect in the middle of last limit. However, if such death has a function of connecting among us, although it makes an abyss between the I and You, we could call its death common death. So to speak, we are gifted separation and bond as community by common death. Such death in which community takes place must be beyond us because it could not perfectly fall into our hands. Of course, various issues and criticisms will be submited to Lingis's common death. However, it will continue to assign us the place where we take a question about community and impose very important subject on us after this.

Conclusion

Although Heidegger arrived at the authentic We from my death, Lingis found out a way to achieve community from the dying other. In this case, Lingis's contribution was the question of common death. This is because Heidegger's death does not flee from mineness; it excludes the subject of common death in spite of being considered a connection between death and community. Lingis, taking over Heidegger's argument about death from the point of the impossibility of representing one another, thought about community by focusing on the death of the other and arrived at what he called common death.

Heidegger's authentic relationship with others is "leaping forth and liberating [vorspringend-befreiend]" (*BT*, 159) via anticipation of death as mine, which creates a connection allowing the others to be (*BT*, 344). On the other hand, Lingis thought about community in death by regarding "the birth of each deathbound other" as the origin of what I authenticity ought to be;[17] furthermore, he converted Heidegger's argument about relationships with others and focused it on our relationship with dying others. That is to

say, according to Lingis's thought, death as mine does not create an authentic relationship with the other. On the contrary, the death of another preceding my death guarantees my own life and death. The death of the other reveals to me the boundary drawn by the other's death and places me at that limit, accompanying the death of the other. By placing me in such a space, community emerges. This function of death is what Lingis could not help but express as common death. There are many critics of Lingis's idea of common death. However, if we have to think about community with respect to death, not totalitarian or rational community as work, it would not be meaningless to secure common death as an idea that rested upon one key concept. Even if work to define the concept of common death more clearly still remains, Lingis's suggestion offers us a new model for thinking about community and death.

From here, is it possible to develop Heidegger's Being-with based on Lingis's common death? If we discuss death and community, and such death is not absorbed within the community as absolute immanence, the connection between Being-with and common death is a very important subject. If a death that rejects completely fusing one with another can bring community into existence, the concept of common death can have very significant meaning for studies of community. Moreover, it seems that future works projecting Being-with from common death are sufficiently possible and will provide significant discussion.

Notes

1) Martin Heidegger（2008）*Being and Time*, trans. by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Harper Perennial Modern Thought. All quotations and references to this paper will be from this translation. Regarding the original text, I referred to: Martin Heidegger（2001）*Sein und Zeit*, Max Niemeyer, 18. Aufl..

2) Martin Heidegger（1998）*Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache*, Vittorio Klostermann, Gesamtausgabe Band 38.

3) Alphonso Lingis（1994）*The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common*, Indiana University Press.

4) Karl Löwith（1981）*Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen*（in *Mensch und Menschenwelt*）, Stuttgart, Sämtliche Schriften1, S. 96f.

5) In this point, I can agree with Vogel's claim that Heidegger's authentic Being-with in *Being and Time* is a "fragile we"（Lawrence Vogel（1994）*The Fragile "We" Ethical Iimplications of Heidegger's "Being and Time*," Northwestern University Press, p. 79）.

6) According to studies by Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Heidegger insists that the possibility of death is the Ur-Möglichkeit of Dasein（Wolfgang Müller-Lauter（1960）*Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit bei Martin Heidegger*, Walter de Gruyter & co, S. 25）. This is because the possibility of death is not a possibility that we can and should carry out or finish in our usual work—it is the most high-level and

unrealized possibility. In accordance with this definition, death is the most original possibility of the self.

7) Jean-François Courtine（1990）"Voix de la conscience et vocation de la l'être"（*Heidegger et la phénoménologie*）, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, p. 302.

8) According to theme of this paper, through I can't discuss in this paper, Nancy's argument about death and community is very important. In particular, refer to the following.

> Community is revealed in the death of others; hence it is always revealed to others. Community is what takes place always through others and for others. It is not the space of the **egos**-subjects and substances that are at bottom immoral-but of **I's** who are always **others**（or else are nothing）. If community is revealed in the death of others it is because death itself is the true community **I's** that are not **egos**. It is not a communion that fuses the **egos** into **Ego** or a higher **We**. It is the community of **others**. The genuine community of mortal beings, or death as community, or death as community, establishes their impossible communion（Jean-Luc Nancy （1991）*The Inoperative Community*, trans. by Peter Connor and Lisa Garbus, University of Minnesota Press, p. 15）.

About his original text, I referred to: Jean-Luc Nancy（1999）*La Communauté Desœuvrée*, Christian Bourgois. For more on Blanchot, refer to his work: Maurice Blanchot（1983）*La Communauté Negative*, Editions de Minuit, p. 20.

9) Emanuel Levinas（1991）*Totality and Infinity,* trans. Alphonso Lingis, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 79-81. About his original text, I referred to: Emanuel Levinas（1961）*Totalité et Infini*, Kluwer Acadenic Publishers. Also, Levinas states the faces of others are what can't be collected; he believes they exist completely outside of the self as opposed to others within me（ibid., p. 50）. What the faces of others show me are vulnerability and mortality（ibid., p. 259）.

10) Emanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, pp. 79-81.

11) Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, p. 31.

12) Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, p. 35.

13) Emanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, p. 135.

14) Lingis connect this element to elemental by Levinas.

> These nonthings in which things form are what Emmanuel Levinas has thematized as the elemental（*CW*, 122）.

With regard to Levinas's arguments concerning the elemental, please see the following.

> The medium from which they come to me lies escheat, a common fund or terrain, essentially non-possessable, "nobody's" [...] Every relation or possession is situated within the non-possessable which envelops or contains without being able to be contained or enveloped. We shall call it the elemental（Emanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, p. 131）.

15) Lingis also refers to another form of basic relationship with others as trust or courage "when one faces death"（Alphonso Lingis（2003）*Trust*, University of Minnesota Press, X）.

16）I would like to point out that death for others by Lingis connotes "the death of all the future generations", therefore bond or relationship which he argues refers to the relationship between existing individuals and the unborn（Alphonso Lingis（1989）*Deathbound Subjectivity*, Indiana University Press, p. 177）. In this time, Human beings were exposed to the possibility of extinction by violence and great changes in nature. This is why we cannot always help thinking of future others' deaths in relation to ourselves（ibid., pp. 176-177）. Therefore, the point that we must focus on is that the range of common death in Lingis can be expanded from the existing self and dying other at present to existing self and dying others who have been born yet.

17）Alphonso Lingis, *Deathbound Subjectivity*, pp. 183-184.