

INTENTIONAL, UNINTENTIONAL, VOLUNTARY, INVOLUNTARY

立命館大学間文化現象学研究センター
立命館大学人文科学研究所

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1/21 (月) 講演：イシュトバン・ザルダイ

立命館大学衣笠キャンパス

(DR. ISTVAN ZOLTAN ZARDAI)

末川記念会館 第3会議室

慶應義塾大学

16:30～18:00

2017.11～JSPS ポスドク研究員

ABSTRACT

A LARGE NUMBER OF PHILOSOPHERS WORKING ON ACTIONS, MIND AND ETHICS HAVE ACCEPTED SINCE DONALD DAVIDSON'S 'AGENCY' THAT ALL ACTIONS ARE INTENTIONAL UNDER AT LEAST ONE OF THEIR DESCRIPTIONS. ALL SUCH ACTIONS ARE RATIONAL IN THE SENSE THAT THE AGENT PERFORMS THEM FOR A REASON. THEY MAKE SENSE TO THE AGENT AND WE CAN UNDERSTAND WHY THE AGENT DOES THEM. I ARGUE AGAINST THIS CLAIM, AND EXPLORE VIEWS, INSPIRED BY ARISTOTLE'S AND AQUINAS'S POSITIONS, WHICH DENY THAT ALL ACTION IS INTENTIONAL UNDER AT LEAST ONE OF ITS DESCRIPTIONS. ENGAGING WITH THE WORK OF ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, RICHARD TEICHMAN, JOHN HYMAN, AND HONG YU WONG, I ARGUE THAT THERE ARE BOTH INTENTIONAL AND UNINTENTIONAL ACTIONS, AS WELL AS NON-INTENTIONAL ACTIONS. FURTHERMORE, ACTIONS CAN BE UNINTENTIONAL AND ALSO VOLUNTARY OR INVOLUNTARY. AND THERE IS ALSO A CATEGORY OF NON-VOLUNTARY, ARATIONAL ACTIONS. MANY AUTOMATIC MOVEMENTS BELONG INTO THIS LAST CATEGORY. HENCE, WHAT COUNTS AS ACTION IS MUCH BROADER THAN WHAT WE DO FOR A REASON, AND AS SUCH, WHAT IS RATIONAL.

★講演は英語で行なわれます。 ★当日は講演原稿を配付いたします。

お問合せ



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