Towards Combining the Sociological Theories of Norbert Elias and Anthony Giddens*

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Abstract

In order to explore new directions for sociological theory, I would like to make an attempt to combine the sociological theories of Norbert Elias and Anthony Giddens. In the field of contemporary sociological theory, it is said that Elias and Giddens are similar in that both have made endeavours to resolve the 'structure-agency' problem. It is true that Elias and Giddens have both tried to reconsider the problem of the Human Subject in sociological theories. Whereas Elias has not only anticipated some of the most important criticisms but also suggested correctives to some of the alternatives, Giddens has engaged a dominant paradigm that underlies both Marxist and structural-functional theories. Setting out from a critique and reformulation of Elias's figurational-process sociology and Giddens's structuration theory, I will develop a concept of habitus and emotion that attempts to restore human subjectivity to social actors in complex societies.

Introduction

A study of the theories of Norbert Elias and Anthony Giddens throws light on many contemporary debates in sociology. At its current stage, sociology is a highly fragmented discipline. It contains large numbers of competing paradigms, such as structural-functionalism, system theory, phenomenological sociology, symbolic interactionism, and ethnomethodology which, in different ways, are divided according to variations in the 'structure-agency' dilemma.

However, Elias and Giddens have tried to overcome this dichotomy between the individual and society in their own social theories. Elias, in his 'figurational-process sociology', advocates the use of the notion of 'figuration', which refers to the interdependent chains of individuals who constitute society. This is then linked to a historical analysis of the emergence of the modern idea of person as *homo clausus* (Elias 1978, 1994). With his 'structuration theory', Giddens makes the point that social relations are seen as structured in 'time and space' as the outcome of the operation of a *duality of structure* (Giddens 1984). Like Elias, Giddens is trying to break away from traditional dualistic approaches. But in so doing has engaged one of the dominant paradigms of sociology.

I think that in order to explore new directions for sociological theory, it is appropriate to combine the sociological theories of Elias and Giddens despite the fundamental differences in their viewpoints on emotion and the human subject. I would like to focus particular attention on the concept of 'habitus' that is set by historical and socially situated conditions. Starting with a critique and reformulation of Elias's figurational-process sociology and Giddens's structuration theory, this article attempts to develop a concept of habitus and emotion, or *emotional habitus*, which allows the articulation of new forms and actions in an ever-increasingly complex society.

For the sake of this project, I will start with the sociology of sport. Because, as Stuart Hall has suggested, "sport is a *social* phenomenon and situated squarely in the context of power and culture" (Hall 1986: xi). The sociology of sport takes on aspects of a proxy war between the approaches to structure and agency that have been the battlefield for Marxist and Sociological debates for a long time. It does this.
because, as Stephan G. Jones has so aptly pointed out, "sport in capitalist society was, and is, bounded by a dialectical relationship between socio-economic structure and human agency" (Jones 1988: 10). A thorough revisitation of the debate over the sociology of sport and leisure should, therefore, provide an excellent context for demonstrating the usefulness of combing the sociological theories of Elias and Giddens.

1. Revisiting the debate over the sociology of sport and leisure: Figurational-process sociology vs. 'alternative approaches'

In the sociology of sport, especially in Britain, a debate has continued between figurational-process sociologists such as Norbert Elias, Eric Dunning and their followers, and the 'alternative approaches', such as those taken by John Clarke, Chas Critcher, Richard Gruneau, and John Hargreaves.

Though the sociology of sport has used sociological theory to reinforce its own theoretical frameworks since the 1970s, nobody has chosen structural-functionalism (such as that detailed by Talcott Parsons) but has tended more towards 'critical approaches', such as phenomenological sociology, symbolic interactionism, or the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. In an alternating succession of trial and error, this basic theoretical framework has been steadily converging towards figurational-process sociology and structuration theory. These approaches are concerned with seeking a better way to handle the problems between structure and agency than has proved possible in the past. But, this process also created debate over 'legitimations' in the sociology of sport.

Elias and Dunning first started to study sport and leisure as a major sociological issue in the 1960s and have long been recognised as the authorities on the sociology of sport and leisure\(^1\). The figurational-process sociology that they espouse, accepts that sport is produced historically within structures of mutually oriented and dependent people, social bounding and webs of interdependence. In other words, 'sport' cannot be reduced to some a priori social or economic category, and premised by teleological explanation of the fate of the capitalist economic system. Rather, it is appropriate to view sport as bounded by the specific relations between people based on forms and degrees of power, whether economic, political and emotional. Thus, their approaches for sport moved well past classical Marxism and functionalist theory, and became the base for the alternative theories in the early stages of the sociology of sport and leisure.

On the other hand, the 'alternative approaches' have an affinity for Marxism, Neo-Marxism, and the form of Cultural Studies that the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) established. To define a general theory for sport and leisure, they have tended towards the structuration theory which Anthony Giddens developed in the late 70s.

In 1987, John Horne and David Jary came out with a paper entitled 'Figurational sociology of sport and leisure of Elias and Dunning: an exposition and a critique'. In this paper, Horne and Jary made an attempt to point out strengths and weaknesses of the figurational-process sociology and to estimate 'the alternative approaches' in sociology of sport and leisure. This paper has a great impact on the sociology of sport and leisure in particular, and also on sociological theory in general.

Though Horne and Jary conceded that Elias and Dunning gave a fruitful perspective for the sociology of sport, they were incredulous about the central methodological prescriptions of the figurational-process sociology, especially a tendency to "latent evolutionism and functionalism" (Horne and Jary 1987: 100). Definitely, the figurational-process sociology is to be welcomed for its historical emphasis, and also the way it suggests that human agents can intervene in social processes and transform them. Even so, it must be added that the ways in which individuals seek change are seen as essentially pluralistic. As Jones, Horne and Jary have criticised, the character and
dynamics of human figurations are reduced to power balances between groups of like-minded individuals, rather than circumscribed by the profound inequalities of capitalist society (Jones 1988: 6; Horne and Jary 1987: 101). There is an implicit functionalism in this point, at least in the focus on particular roles or functions of sport for people in figurations.

With regard to the alternatives, Horne and Jary praised Richard Gruneau’s critical sociology of sport as a synthesised model that derived from cultural and historical studies, the work of Giddens, and cultural studies influenced by Antonio Gramsci. Gruneau pointed out that “sports are distinctly social practices existing in, and constitutive of, historically shifting limits and possibilities that specify the range of powers available to human agents at different historical moments” (Gruneau 1999: 102). It seems to Gruneau and his fellows that figurational-process sociology are rarely connected directly to a broader theory and critique of domination in social life, especially in respect to the changing social organisation of capitalism.

In 1992, Dunning and Chris Rojek published a book called, Sport and Leisure in the Civilizing Process: Critique and Counter-Critique in reaction to the critique of the alternative approach. To advocate Elias and the figurational-process sociologists, Dunning criticises the alternative approaches influenced by Marxism and Neo-Marxism, especially Giddens’s structuration theory. However, Dunning’s response to alternative contention is lacking in persuasiveness. For instance, Dunning equivocates: “alternative approaches can now provide a fuller elaboration of the ‘duality’ of structure and agency than the figurational sociology has typically managed” (Horne and Jary 1987: 108-9, cited in Dunning 1992: 236).

Though Dunning could not fully refute structuration theory, he raised a crucial issue in the reconstruction of figurational-process sociology and contributed to the development of the ‘alternative approaches’. This issue is concerns emotion and pleasure. As noted by John Urry (1991), Dunning made an important when he said that, “Giddens’s concept of human agency is too rationalistic and does not pay due attention emotional life” (Dunning 1992: 240). When Elias and Dunning first started to study sport and leisure as a major issue in Sociology, they focussed on emotion and pleasure as a field in the context of fluid and diachronically changing ‘figurations’, or spatio-temporal interdependency chains and networks. Therefore, Elias and Dunning tried to reject dichotomies such as those between work and leisure, mind and body, seriousness and pleasure, and the ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’. That is, in terms of a pervasive Western tendency towards reductionist and dualistic Homo clausus thinking, sport tends to be perceived as a trivial, irrational, pleasure-orientated sphere of life which engages ‘the body’ rather than ‘the mind’ (Dunning 1999: 24). In order to get beyond this bias, Elias came up with a non-dualistic Homines aperti which attempted to synthesize elements of biology, psychology, sociology and history.

2. Emotion and human subject: The theoretical difference between Elias and Giddens.

Conventional sociological theory provides scant material for understanding the meaning of sport in complex social relations. In this sense, the sociology of sport is therefore useful in pointing out the theoretical dilemmas in sociology. Above all, as described in chapter one, Elias and Giddens share that all social action involves power and unintended consequences which must be rationally analysed for any satisfactory account of the reproduction of societies. But, they do not hold the same understanding about the ‘human subject’. Reading this point, Elias, rather than Giddens, has been concerned with how the human subject has been constituted under the long-term western civilizing process.

Long before Michel Foucault (especially, Foucault 1975), Elias examined affect control and the body as nexuses of power, and unequivocally related historical transformation in bodily appearance and self-discipline
to transformations in the social structure. In *The Civilizing Process* (1939=1994), which is his magnum opus, Elias focused the relation between European State formation and changes in individual patterns of behaviour and personality, including new forms of morality and individual self-control. In a detailed ‘sociogenetic’ study of manners, social stratification and state formation, Elias showed how new standards of decorum and repugnance came into existence.

Analyzing affect control and self-control in the civilizing process, Elias emphasised human beings’ interdependence with each other, or the fact that one can only become an individual human being within a web of social relationships and within a network of interdependence. Elias developed this point in part through his critique of what he called ‘homo clausus’, or a ‘closed personality’ image of humans. Elias argued for a replacement of this homo clausus conception with its emphasis on autonomy, freedom and interdependent agency, and introduced the concept of ‘Figuration’.

Elias regarded societies as basically “the processes and structure of interweaving, the figuration formed by the actions of interdependent people” (Elias 1978: 103). In 1969, on the occasion of republishing *The Civilizing Process*, to clarify his theoretical orientation, Elias added a long new introduction. In this introduction, Elias criticised Talcott Parsons and his sociological theory, especially Parsons’s concept of ‘social system’. It seemed nonsense to Elias that Parsons and all sociologists of same persuasion undoubtedly envisaged those things to which the concepts ‘individual’ and ‘society’ refer as existing separately. For Elias, structures are figurations and they can only be understood as being constituted by human beings.

Like Elias, Giddens also tried to situate human action in ‘time and space’ as a continuous flow of conduct, rather than treating purposes and reasons as somehow aggregated together. In former times, when Giddens started to elaborate a plan for structuration theory, Giddens’s ‘theory of subject’ involved what he called a ‘stratification model’ of personality. This model is organised in terms of three sets of relations: “the unconscious, practical consciousness, and discursive consciousness” (Giddens 1979: 2). Giddens regarded the notion of practical consciousness as a fundamental feature of structuration theory. On this point, Giddens formulated the stratification model of action and concentrated the concept of the ‘reflexive monitoring’ of conduct that refers to the intentional or purposive character of human behaviour; “it emphasises ‘intentionality’ as process”(Giddens 1979: 56). Specifically, Giddens developed this point through his concept of what he called the ‘duality of structure’ and ‘reflexivity’ (Giddens 1979, 1984).

Both Elias and Giddens tried to reject the contrast between voluntaristic and deterministic types of theory. Regarding this point, they wove in the social theory variants of the principle of the ubiquity of power in social relations (Elias 1978, Giddens 1984). For example, Giddens conjured up a massive weight of sociological tradition when he wrote, “there is no more elemental concept than that of power” (Giddens 1984: 283). However, Richard Kilminster, who is a British figurational sociologist, criticised that Giddens for “build[ing] in the tenet that both the unintended consequences of action, and agents’ knowledge of the mechanisms of system reproduction, can feed back into system reproduction” (Kilminster 1998: 131).

As pointed out by Kilminster, a number of critics have suggested that by stressing people’s knowledgeability and reflexive monitoring, structuration theory gets trapped into subjectivism'. This problem arises from the nature of structuration theory. In spite of his many criticisms of Parsons, Giddens stays in the shadow of ‘action theory’, which Parsons formulated in his structural-functionalism. In short, the starting point of Giddens is the bequeathed theoretical problem of how the actions of skilled actors continuously produce and reproduce the social system. After all, Giddens fails to reconstruct a human subject, who can create a degree of autonomy in social relations. Kilminster also criticises Giddens for “trying to deal with interdependence in
the language of interaction” (Kilminster 1998: 133).

As stated above, both Elias and Giddens emphasised a variant of the principle of the ubiquity of power in social relations. For Elias and Giddens, introducing the concept of power makes clear of the contrast between voluntaristic and deterministic types of theory, and tries to address that a human subject could constitute his/her own autonomy in social relations. Though Giddens is clearly aware of this issue, he has remained to reconstruct the human subject according to the ‘action theory’. For Elias and the Figurationalists, structuration theory still falls into a pit of dichotomies, and Giddens’ human subject is nothing short of Homo clausus. On the contrary, when Elias brought up a non-dualistic human subject such as Homines aperti, he appealed to a Freudian psychoanalysis. From my point of view on the differences between Figurational-process sociology and Structuration theory, Elias and Giddens take different theoretical stances on Freud’s sociological works.

Stjepan G. Meštrović who has criticised Giddens’s sociological theory charged that “Giddens did not pay attention to Freud’s disciplines and misread Freud because he refuse to read him on his own terms or on the terms of Freud’s cultural milieu” (Meštrović, 1998: 79, especially ch. 4). Though Giddens criticised Freud’s stratification model of personality (id, ego, and super-ego), he admitted the achievement of psychoanalytic theory, which suggests an internal hierarchy of its own in motivation and argued that a conception of the unconscious is essential to social theory. If anything, Giddens submitted that “the unconscious could only be explored in relation to the conscious: to the reflexive monitoring and rationalisation of conduct, grounded in practical consciousness” (Giddens 1979: 58). In other words, Giddens avoided the pitfall of classical Freudian views, which fails to allow sufficient play to autonomous social forces.

On the contrary, Elias made positive efforts to use Freud’s frameworks. Zygmunt Bauman, who reviewed Elias’s text in the past, estimated Elias’ interpretation of Freud’s psychoanalysis. In short, Elias could make it appear that “the successful culmination of process consists of the historical episode of suppression being forgotten, pseudo-rational legitimations being supplied for newly introduced patterns and the whole historical form of life being ‘naturalized’” (Bauman 1987: 114). Elias tried to show how changes in behaviour and power are reflected in changes in personality structure and habitus. It is here that there are theoretical differences between Elias and Giddens.

3. The connection between Elias and Giddens via emotional habitus

As Kilminster and Meštrović suggested, because Giddens is denying that people have emotions, structuration theory is too rationalistic. In other words, Chris Rojek declared that “the structuration theory inclines rather too much to a rational view of human conduct in which knowledge means rational understanding and capability means the rational, intentional power to realize one’s will” (Rojek 1992: 11). While this is an issue about which Giddens is clearly aware, he does not follow through with it in his theory. Since the 1990s, Giddens has attempted a synthesis of theories of modernity that also embrace recent thinking on body and emotionality, linking these with a general account of new forms of politics, such as life politics*. From this, it is obvious that Giddens has started to reconsider his own approach towards the human subject.

As opposed to Giddens, from the beginning, Elias has analysed life politics: the changing social regulation of pleasure, desire and aggression through shame, embarrassment and revulsion in the western civilisation process. In other words, as Kilminster suggested, “Elias has tried to address the emotional ‘constitution of society’” (Kilminster 1998: 137). As stated above, Elias arrived at certain conclusions by studying sport and leisure. And so, in this chapter, in order to create a bridge between theories of Elias and Giddens, I would
like to focus my discussion on the concept of habitus, and to demonstrate the concept of emotional habitus.

In contemporary sociological theory, habitus is best known as Pierre Bourdieu's concept. Introducing the concept of habitus here, it is necessary to know that, like Elias and Giddens, Bourdieu also tried to overcome the deep-seated opposition between the two apparently antithetical theoretical stances of objectivism and subjectivism. For Bourdieu, habitus designated the system of durable and transposable dispositions through which we perceive, judge, and act in the world. In this way, habitus is an effective concept for the reconsideration of sociological theory. But, long before Bourdieu, Elias had strongly emphasized the importance of habitus.

For a long time, the concept of habitus, which as indicated by Elias, had been lost in oblivion. Above all, the significance of this notion in Elias's work is usually lost to his non-German reading audience. In The Civilizing Process (1939, the original German edition), Elias used the term 'psychical habitus' or simply 'habitus'. But, Jonathan Fletcher, who wrote the introductory text for Elias' sociological theories, suggested that "habitus is misleadingly rendered as 'psychological make-up', 'make-up', 'social make-up', 'habits' or even simply 'personality', but never as 'habitus' in the English translations" (Fletcher 1997: 10). In a later publication, The Society of Individuals, Elias makes a greater use of the term habitus and provides a more differentiated application of the concept.

For Elias, individuals have little free choice in relation to their own group identity and social habitus: "these thing cannot be simply changed like clothes" (Elias 1991: 224-5). Furthermore, Elias regarded habitus as 'second nature' or 'an automatic, blindly functioning apparatus of self-control' (Elias 1994: 113, 446). As stated above, the dynamics of figurations are also dependent on the formation of a shared social habitus that constitutes the collective basis of individual human conduct. Diametrically, habitus itself is formed and continues to be molded in social situations, marked by specific power differentials, where those situations are, in turn, embedded in larger social structures that change over time. In particular, Elias emphasized that emotional controls move toward "diminishing contrasts and increasing varieties" (Elias 1994: 460). Stephan Mennell and Johan Goudsblom, who are central figures of figurational-process sociologists, summarized this phrase as follows:

The phrase ‘diminishing contrasts and increasing varieties’ points to the observation that with reduced inequalities between social groups certain extreme forms of behaviour, such as those freely expressing complete contempt or humiliation, are no longer allowed, while a far wider range of forms of conduct has become possible and permissible in an increasing variety of highly differentiated social setting (Mennell and Goudsblom 1998: 21).

From this, it becomes obvious that the social habitus is expressed in an individual's codes of feeling and behaviour, the social standard of which change over generations. Additionally, by studying modern sport and leisure with Dunning, Elias spotted a new type of self-control and which he clarified as a 'highly controlled decontrolling of emotional controls' (Elias and Dunning 1986: 44, 49). It is here that there is an issue about an emotional habitus. For addressing the concept of emotional habitus, I would like to use the theoretical frameworks of the Dutch sociologist Cas Wouters in his Informalization and third nature.

The 1960s and 1970s - the time when Wouters began to analyse the behavioural codes in the Netherlands - are often regarded as involving an increase in permissiveness, together with growing leniency in codes of conduct. Many modes of conduct that had formerly been forbidden were then permitted (particularly in sexual matters) but there was also less formal regulation in written and spoken language, clothing, music, dancing, and hairstyles. In an earlier contribution to these discussions, Wouters explained the increasing
permissiveness in terms of a theory of informalization process. Wouters interpreted the developments in the direction of informalization in terms of Elias's theory of civilizing process as increased varieties or nuances in the codes of conduct. In his earlier analysis of informalization, Wouters attempted to show how the different pattern of self-restraints that came into being demanded not only greater sensitivity to varieties and greater flexibility in social conduct, but also a higher level of self-control. In other words, Wouters tried to demonstrate that the new informal standards of conduct in the relationship between superiors and subordinates implied a lesser use of constraints exercised by others (external constraints) and stronger use of constraints exercised by oneself (self-restraints).

But, in the 1980s, the informalization process seemed to have come to a halt, and a process of formalization had once again come into effect. Indeed, as Wouters suggested, after the sexual revolution and a 'permissive society', there was renewed respect for discipline, and for law and order to help people orient themselves towards these values, or so it seemed from the new etiquette books that were being published. That is, many modes of conduct became to be (re)formalized. But this was not simply a return to the old ways of the past.

Through the analysis of (re)formalization in the 1980s, Wouters suggested that there has been a slight decline in the upward line of the informalization process, but without the process having changed its long-term direction: “This long-term informalization process is not over yet” (Wouters 1987: 425). On this point, Wouters paid attention to the transformation of self-restraint and emphasized as below:

There has been a rise in Mutually Expected Self-restraint, a growing expectation that people should no longer constrain their 'petty' and dangerous feeling in accordance with the old formal patterns, but should be capable of subtly restraining or channeling them, depending on the situation and the relations between persons involved: controlled decontrolling of emotional controls (Wouters 1987: 422).

As stated above, the term 'second nature' refers to a conscience and self-regulation that function automatically to a high degree. By introducing the term "third nature"(Wouters 1998: 139), Wouters can draw attention to the development of a more reflexive and flexible self-regulation. The term refers to a level of consciousness and calculation in which all types of constraints and possibilities are taken into account (Wouters 1999: 424). It marks a rise to new level of reflexive civilization, reaching a higher floor on "the spiral staircase of consciousness", which Elias has pointed out (Elias 1991: 103). In addition, under the framework of Wouters, the term 'habitus' will acquire a new dimension. In short, shifting from the term 'habitus' to the term 'emotional habitus', 'habitus' has not simply veered in the direction of more self-control in the civilizing process, but has involved complex changes in the pattern of controls via 'Informalization'.

Emotional habitus follows historical constellations that arise, grow, change shape, and sometimes wane or perish, over time. In this regard, emotional habitus has a degree of autonomy, which is the capacity it has gained, in the course of its development, to insulate itself from external influences and to uphold its own criteria of evaluation. In other words, every human figuring is the site of an ongoing clash between those who defend 'autonomous principles of judgement' (formalization) proper to that situation and those who seek to address 'heteronomous standards' (informalization) because they need the support of external forces to improve their dominated position in it. Just as the emotional habitus and third nature enable us to acquire an individual emotional repertoires in the complex human figurations. Therefore, in place of the naive relation between the individual and society, I would like to substitute the constitutive relationship of emotional habitus in human figurations.
Conclusion

As stated above, Giddens shares Elias’s goal of overcoming theoretical dichotomies in social theory, especially the individual-society dualism. Elias and Giddens share that all social action involves power and unintended consequences, which must be rationally analysed for satisfactory account of the reproduction of societies. However, Giddens’s theory has many differences from that of Elias. This is particularly evident in the way that Giddens defines sociology’s distinctive subject matter as the analysis of the institutions of modernity. In other words, Giddens rejects Elias’s postulate of a close connection between ‘psychogenesis and sociogenesis’. In opposition to Giddens, Elias and his followers argue against the disciplinary separation of psychology, sociology and history. From my point of view, for Giddens, Elias’s approach downplays the reflexive capacities of all people, and Elias does not grant sufficient weight to the autonomous actions of the reflexive individual, who actively reproduces society through social practices.

On the other hand, for the sake of formulating his own ‘human sciences’, Elias challenged the deep-seated opposition in sociological theory between objectivism and subjectivism. For Elias, this dichotomy was not realistic, and was nothing short of reductionist and dualistic Homo Clausus thinking. This is why he came up with the non-dualistic, Homines aperti which orientated his sociological theory and his attempt to synthesise element of biology, psychology, sociology and history. In regard to this point, it can be said that Elias was able to overcome the traditional theoretical frameworks. While Giddens has been caught up in the traditional dichotomy and trapped into subjectivism even though he emphasized the concept of ‘reflexivity’ and ‘duality of structure’. In other words, Giddens failed to grasp humankind as a whole.

And so, in order to form a bridge between Elias and Giddens, it is necessary to free the concept of ‘reflexivity’ from a spell of subjectivism. If the hegemonic relationship and the degree of autonomy from the dominant economic and political structure is focused upon, this degree of autonomy may provide a key to reconstruct the human subject. In other words, the concept of emotional habitus and third nature could provide a starting point for a socio-genetic account that could inform the creation of a more adequate and realistic synthesis of complex social relations.

Notes

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1 In 1992, Dunning established the Centre for Research into Sport and Society (CRSS) in Leicester and organised the extensive study about sport and leisure.

2 Adding their commentary, Jary and Home shaped the debate between the Figurational Sociology and the ‘alternative approaches’ (Jary and Home 1994: 69-70, especially Table 4).

3 In this book, a mixture of authors whose theoretical stands were figurationalist and non-figurationalist such as Jennifer Hargreaves, Allen Guttmann, John Wilson and Alan Clarke contributed to a fruitful discussion of the sociology of sport. For all that, this book took close aim at the alternative approaches, and demonstrated the theoretical notability of figurationalists in the sociology of sport. Especially, Dunning presented very long ‘concluding remarks’ to preserve the figurationalist’s honour (Dunning 1992: 221-84).


7 In the new edition of The civilizing process (2000), ‘Personality make-up’ was modified at length.

8 Summarising Wouters’s theoretical frameworks, I make reference to Wouters’s text (Wouters 1977, 1986).

References
