ARTICLE

Culture and Cultural Policy in the Age of the Commissars: Bolshevism, the Arts, and the Future, 1917 - 85
- Part II, 1953 - 85

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LONG LIVE THE TYPICAL (1953-64)

Typicalness is the chief sphere in which the party spirit manifests itself in realistic art. The problem of the typical is always a political problem.

--Gyorgii Malenkov, Address to the 19th Congress of the CPSU (October 1952)

The typical was not a discovery of the Khrushchev era. The concept had figured in Engels' writing and had been stressed by A. I. Stetsky in his address to the First Writers Congress in 1934. But the term acquired a particular prominence in the years 1952-57, beginning with Malenkov's address to the Nineteenth Party Congress and continuing through an expository treatment in Kommunist in 1955 and a prominence in discussions at the Second All-Union Congress of Composers in 1957, and implicitly underpinned Khrushchev's thoughts about literature, film, jazz, and modern art. The latter two, indeed, were linked in Khrushchev's mind as parallel denials of the typical, in favor of the embrace of abstractionism, decadence, and, of course, formalism. Nor are these features unrelated to the evolving Soviet tempology, for, at least from the standpoint of Soviet Marxism, jazz and abstract art did not point to the future (since the future could only be unambiguous in Soviet teleology), or even to the present; in fact, they did not point at all. And as such, they were pointless, which is to say, worse than useless.

That Stalin's heir-apparent would take time in his keynote address at the party congress to dwell on the subject of the typical in art is, at the very least, indicative of the high priority that party leaders attached to the cultural sphere. It also serves to remind us that, for Soviet communism, atypicality was considered equivalent to art for art's sake, which is to say, anti-People and anti-democratic self-indulgence. In an important passage, Malenkov told the congress:

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In their creation of artistic images, our artists, writers and workers in the arts must constantly remember that the typical is not only what is encountered most frequently, but that which most fully and vividly expresses the essence of the given social force. In the Marxist-Leninist interpretation, the typical does not (at) all mean some statistical average. The typical should correspond to the essence of the given socio-historical phenomenon; it is not just the widespread, the frequently repeated, or the commonplace. Deliberate exaggeration which gives sharpness to an image does not make the image atypical but shows and stresses the typical more fully.

But what was the relationship between socialist realism and the typical? And what did they mean in terms of the limits to creative freedom? In the wake of the Congress, polemics flared at a session of the Department of Literature and Languages of the USSR Academy of Sciences concerning what was typical. Commenting on this row, Pravda offered the helpful suggestions that what is typical is what one frequently encounters, urging also a continued fight against lack of ideological content. With the passing of Stalin in 1953, the party began, albeit tentatively, to offer a more generous interpretation of the Stalinist strictures, albeit without renouncing them. Pravda (27 November 1953) set the tone for the early Khrushchev era by calling standardization one of the worst disasters for art and by suggesting, perhaps a bit optimistically, that socialist realism offers boundless vistas for the creative artist and the greater freedom for the expression of his personality, as well as for the development of diverse art genres, trends, and styles.

In a token of the new orientation, Gyorgii Aleksandrov, an old foe of Zhdanov, was appointed Minister of Culture.

Creative artists were quick to respond to the hint. Already in November 1953, Sovetskaia Muzyka carried an article by Khachaturian calling for an end to inordinate bureaucratic controls and more freedom for musicians. Khachaturian did not mince his words, but demanded, We must, once and for all, reject the worthless interference in musical composition as it is practised by musical establishments. Problems of composition cannot be solved by official bureaucratic methods. . . . The sensible planning and careful guidance of the country’s musical life must not be usurped by (bureaucratic) interference.

Shostakovich lent his support to this point of view in an article published in the same journal two months later. In my opinion, Shostakovich wrote there, the (Composers’) Union should not protect our composers against exploring the new, against independent movements along an unbeaten track in art. This is not the bold creative search for new paths but safe sliding into superficiality, dullness, and cliches, that must be fought.

Khachaturian and Shostakovich were the outstanding liberals in music, while Ivan Dzerzhinsky, a largely unsuccessful composer who had little to his name besides his 1935 opera, The Quiet Don, which had won Stalin’s favor, took to the battlements to defend vigilance and to fire volleys at formalism. Despite isolated voices of dissent, such relaxation as occurred at this stage was limited, derivative, and not programmatic.

Shostakovich’s Symphony No. 10 (premiered in Leningrad on 17 December 1953 and in Moscow 12 days later) struck all listeners as highly individual, defiant of formulae, and
arguably subjective; its performances gave rise to debate, culminating in a three-day conference of the Composers Union, 29/30 March and 5 April 1954. Even today, speculation continues to the effect that the short, frenetic second movement, which stops abruptly, after a dizzying display of ostensibly meaningless musical virtuosity, one might even say violently, was intended as a kind of musical portrait of Stalin.

Among writers of fiction, the thaw began more or less about the time that Surkov replaced Fadeyev as First Secretary of the Union of Soviet Writers (in October 1953). Shortly thereafter, at the Union’s Second Congress (the only previous congress having taken place in 1934!), the passage dealing with socialist realism in the final resolution was trimmed, eliminating the exhortation to writers to play a role in the task of ideologically remolding and training the laboring people in the spirit of socialism. This change encouraged hopes of liberalization. The journal Teatr tested the limits with an editorial arguing that artistic truth could only come from within the artist herself. One of the considerations which encouraged greater tolerance in literary policy was, as Evgenii Sergeev put it, that beginning in the mid-1950s, literary commissars began to admit to themselves that socialist-realist norms were vague at best, and that, in practice, they had no idea how to apply these norms to modern prose, poetry, and drama. This led directly to reinterpreting socialist realism as an open system... open to all the best of world experience, in the first place, of course, to modernism.

From 1954 to 1958, Soviet literature experienced tangibly more liberal conditions and some novels were able to take up issues relating to youth, issues of love and marriage, and even the bureaucratic nonsense of petty party officials! The most significant new works written during this brief period were Ilya Ehrenburg’s novel, The Thaw, Vladimir Dudintsev’s novel, Not By Bread Alone (1956), D. A. Granin’s novel, Opinion of One’s Own, short stories by V. V. Ovechkin and A. V. Kalinin, Leonid Zorin’s satirical play, The Guests, A. E. Korneichuk’s play, Wings, poems by Margarita Aliger, and some of the writings of V. F. Tendryakov. Even children’s literature became more exciting during these years. And it was at this point in time that Ivan Efremov’s Andromeda (1957) was published, marking a new departure in Soviet science fiction.

But some works produced in this period remained taboo. These works, such as the aforementioned novels by Dudintsev and Granin, were often characterized by deep pessimism, a sense of hopelessness, or the expression of unnegated ideas of an objectionable nature. Dudintsev’s novel, like that of Granin, seemed to suggest that the ethical code of those in high positions does not correspond to the ideal of socialist morality. In a similar fashion, Korneichuk’s Wings offered a realistic portrayal of bureaucratic methods of administration at a collective farm while Semyon Kirsanov’s poem, Seven Days of the Week, poked serious fun at the bureaucracy with a tale about its preference for people who are uncomplicated, convenient, capable of fulfilling every command. Particularly striking was Nicolai Pogodin’s play, Petrarch’s Sonnet, in which one of the characters declares,

I consider class hatred a sacred and noble feeling. But in reality we no longer have hostile classes. Who is there to hate? one asks. There are scoundrels, thieves, riff-raff. They perhaps deserve contempt, and sometimes even compassion. But I am now
speaking of great hatred. Whom in my country must I hate? Maybe it is time to learn to love. 139

In this atmosphere, selected works of Isaac Babel and Yuri Olesha were republished, satirical novels by Ilf and Petrov were reissued, and Russian audiences were allowed, for the first time, to see George Bernard Shaw’s Pygmalion, as well as plays by Jean-Paul Sartre and Lilian Hellman, the works of Agatha Christie, Fredric Knott’s Dial M for Murder, and Noel Coward’s Nude with Violin. Shakespeare’s Hamlet and Macbeth, which could not be staged in Stalin’s time, were also seen in the Soviet Union for the first time.140 Even jazz flourished under Khrushchev’s uncomprehending leadership, in spite of the Soviet leader’s comparison of jazz to having gas in his stomach,141 at least until Khrushchev issued his theses on jazz, which led to a closing of the Moscow Jazz Club and a general dampening of the scene. On 13 June 1959, for instance, Komsmol pravda argued that some jazz was acceptable -- a position restated by that paper on 25 December 1960. The first jazz club was established in Leningrad in 1958 by pianist-promoter Yuri Vikharev. Soon thereafter, another club sprang up at Leningrad University, and in the following years, further clubs were set up in Moscow, Yaroslavl, Kuibyshev, Gorky, Novosibirsk, Tashkent, Petrozavodsky, and Voronezh. A young poet named Yegeni Yevtushenko also broke into print at this time; Yevtushenko, together with fellow poets Andrei Voznesensky and Yevgeni Vinokurov, seemed to capture the spirit of the age.142 They, together with poet Bella Akhmadulina, writers Vassillii Aksyonov and Anatolii Gladilin, sculptor Ernst Neizvestny, and bards Bulat Okudzhava and Vladimir Vysotsky, constituted, collectively, the embodiment of the so-called beat generation.143 And it was also at this time that Soviet young people had their first exposure to rock music.

The Twentieth Party Congress (1956) only reinforced the general trend of liberalization. But in 1957, the party set a course to reaffirm the orthodox paradigm. The so-called Hungarian October cast a long shadow over Soviet politics, and the editors of Kommunist, the CPSU ideological organ, drew a clear conclusion: The events in Hungary have demonstrated the consequences of disregarding Leninist adherence to principle in questions of the guidance of literature and art.144 Writers and composers were thrown on the defensive. Kazakevich, Margarita Aliger, Bek, and Kirsanov engaged in the established Soviet ritual of self-criticism, admitting their errors and promising to revise their works. The Second All-Union Congress of Composers (which was convened in March 1957) reaffirmed the centrality of socialist realism, in spite of Shostakovich’s brave speech on that occasion calling for open discussions of problems and controversies -- a call that met with spontaneous applause. Gyorgii Khubov, in a major address to the congress, helped to elucidate problems of the typical, for, as he argued, the great danger in music was modernism (sometimes conflated with formalism), and modernism, as Khubov noted, quoting from The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, is characterized by the distortion of reality, the refusal to represent the typical, the confirmation of reactionary tendencies, anti-people, cosmopolitanism.145 It followed that to represent the typical was still the path to a progressive and pro-people stand. But for all that, and in spite of the prodigies of Union secretary Tikhon Khrennikov and of Khubov, the final resolution adopted by the
Congress included an assurance that there should be no room for any limitations, for any constraint of the freedom of creative search. All in all, the results of the Congress represented a compromise between liberals and hard-liners, rather than a victory for either grouping.

In the course of spring and summer 1957, Khrushchev delivered a series of speeches on literature and art, collected and published in August of that year under the title, For Close Ties Between Literature and Art and the Life of the People. These speeches constituted the semi-official guidelines in cultural policy until Khrushchev’s removal from power in October 1964. In the course of these speeches, Khrushchev referred to the conflict between socialist culture and bourgeois culture, maintaining that in this conflict there can be no neutrals.

In the wake of these speeches, party authorities sponsored the creation of an RSFSR Writers Association, hoping to use it as a conservative bridgehead against the more liberal Union of Soviet Writers. The ploy worked. By the time the Union of Soviet Writers held its Third Congress in May 1959, it had been tamed. The writers had been led back to the glorification of the typical.

The Pasternak affair had its incubation in summer 1946, when Boris Pasternak, a renowned poet and accomplished translator, began work on his novel Dr. Zhivago. Completed ten years later, in December 1955, excerpts of the novel first reached the public in Polish translation in the inaugural issue of the Polish quarterly, Opinie, in late summer 1957. Before the year was out, the novel was published in full, in Italian translation; the first printing of 6,000 copies sold out on the first day. A Russian printing had, in fact, already been authorized, or so Fleishman tells us. But now, given the intense interest that the novel was generating in the West, Soviet authorities aborted publication of the Russian edition and began fulminating against the book. But these moves only stimulated Western interest. So Moscow authorities switched to a tactic of total silence concerning Pasternak and Zhivago, even cancelling plans to issue an edition of his poetry. Some believe that the character of Dr. Zhivago was problematic for the 1950s, but the most fundamental issue which pitted the Soviet literary establishment against Pasternak was pure, unadulterated jealousy. Then, on 23 October 1958, Pasternak was informed that he had won the coveted Nobel Prize for literature. In response, meeting on 27 October, the Union of Soviet Writers, confirming the deep jealousy that gripped their number, expelled Pasternak from its ranks by unanimous vote, thereby depriving him of literary contracts, related income, and privileged access to scarce goods. A wave of indignation swept much of the world, but on 28 October, Pasternak cabled to decline the prize, citing (obliquely) pressure from the Writers Union. Remarkably, however, the phrasing of this declination only further enraged the Soviet literary establishment. By 31 October, Pasternak’s fellow Soviet writers passed a resolution by unanimous vote (nearly 800) to ask the Soviet government to deprive Pasternak of his Soviet citizenship and to deport him from the USSR. The text of the resolution was published in Literaturnaia gazeta on 1 November 1958. Meanwhile, Pasternak had drafted a reply of sorts, with the help of his wife, daughter, and two friends, in the form of an open letter to First Secretary Khrushchev and had rushed it to Pravda’s offices (thus appearing in Pravda on the same day that the Union’s resolution appeared in...
In the letter, he made no reference to guilt of any kind, noted he felt he had made a contribution to Soviet literature and said he could not imagine living outside Russia. The authorities decided, as a result of this letter, to allow Pasternak to remain in Russia and to retain the family dacha in Peredelkino, as well as his Moscow apartment, as well as to resume work translating Western works into Russian; in exchange, Pasternak was expected to provide a longer letter which, after much editing and censoring, was published on 6 November. In self-defense, he wrote a poem, published in The Daily Mail of London on 11 February 1959:

I am lost like a beast in an enclosure
Somewhere are people, freedom and light.
Behind me is the noise of pursuit,
And there is no way out.

As for Dr. Zhivago, it was finally published in Russia only 30 years later, when it was serialized in Novyi mir (in early 1988). After this episode, there was little surprise when, in 1960, KGB officials confiscated Vasilii Grossman’s novel, Life and Fate, which includes scenes of the respective wartime headquarters of Stalin and Hitler.

In music and film, however, the picture was more complicated. It is true enough that Shostakovich’s Symphony No. 11 (subtitled The Year 1905), which took almost all of its themes from old prison and revolutionary songs, and which was premiered in 1957, is a work of stylized socialist realism, and that Khrennikov’s opera, Mother, which premiered the same year, likewise embodied principles of socialist realism as generally applied in Soviet music; but, at the same time, the Central Committee adopted a resolution on 28 May 1958 admitting that the campaign of 1948 had perpetrated grave injustice to Shostakovich, Prokofiev, Khachaturian, Miaskovsky, and others. Moreover, Khrushchev granted first-time-ever permission for an American conductor to lead Soviet orchestras (for Leopold Stokowski in Moscow and Kiev, in June 1958) and allowed American composers Roger Sessions, Peter Mennin, Roy Harris, Ulysses Kay, and Aaron Copland to visit the USSR, with Soviet composers Khrennikov, Shostakovich, Kabalevsky, Konstantin Dankevich, and Fikret Amirov visiting the U.S. in reciprocation. And if there were some sour notes in the sphere of music -- such as Kabalevsky’s scornful dismissal of Alfred Schnittke’s oratorio Nagasaki as falsely tragic (in 1960) or Khrennikov’s chastisement of innovative Estonian composer Arvo Pärt at the Third All-Union Congress of Composers (in 1962) -- the premiere of Shostakovich’s Symphony No. 13 (in December 1962) to a deliriously enthusiastic audience, setting the text of Yevtushenko’s poem Babyi Yar to music, was a milestone in both musical history and Soviet political history.

The film sector more closely paralleled developments in music than those in literature, perhaps reflecting the higher priority assigned to literature (relative to the other cultural sectors) in the Khrushchev era. A number of important films were screened in Khrushchev’s years, including Grigorii Chukhrai’s The Forty First (1956), Mikhail Kalatozov’s The Cranes are Flying (1957), J osef H eifitz’s The Lady with a Little Dog (1960), Andrei Tarkovsky’s short film The Steamroller and the Violin (1961), and Mikhail Romm’s Nine Days in One Year (1961). Romm’s film gave rise to considerable controversy. Especially memorable was Elem Klimov’s feature-length comedy, Welcome
(1964). Set in a summer camp for young Pioneers, the film depicts the establishment as restrictive, obsessive, even lunatic, resulting in a totally madcap but politically provocative film.154

Toward the end of his years in office, Khrushchev, bowing to pressure exerted on him by certain figures in his entourage and realizing that certain uncontrolled currents had been given tacit encouragement, tried to put the genie back into the bottle. Emblematic of this doomed effort was a speech by Leonid Ilyichev, chair of the Ideological Commission of the Central Committee, on 17 December 1962. In this speech, Ilyichev warned dourly:

 nowrap="true">↑ Formalistic tendencies have unfortunately begun to spread not only in the representational arts but in music, literature, and the cinema as well.

 nowrap="true">↑ In music, for example, despite general progress, we observe an infatuation (among the young) with the outlandish yowlings of various foreign -- and not only foreign -- jazz bands. This refers not to jazz music in general but to the cacophony of sounds with which listeners are sometimes assailed and which is dignified with the name of music only through a misconception. . . . .

 nowrap="true">↑ Obviously, developments of this kind are not accidental. They bear witness that some comrades misunderstand the nature of the struggle against bourgeois ideology and sometimes lose sight of the irreconcilability of our ideological positions and the impossibility of compromise on them.

 nowrap="true">↑ We should remember as an immutable truth that art always has an ideological-political bent, that in some way or another it expresses and defends the interests of definite classes and social strata. And when we encounter this or that trend in art, the first question that naturally arises is: Whose interests does it serve, what does it call for, what social ideals does it affirm? 155

But the genie was already out of the bottle. Khrushchev could rail against modern art, as he did in a famous incident in 1962, or criticize jazz (which he was confusing with early rock- R-n-roll) for encouraging its enthusiasts to wiggle a certain section of the anatomy, 156 but what he could not do was to both reap the benefits of liberalism and retain the advantages of Stalinism.

I mentioned earlier that Khrushchev’s secret speech of 1956 had a shattering impact on the Soviet temporality (among other things). That was unavoidable. Stalin’s reign had premised its claim to historical legitimacy on the argument that the present as constituted and shaped by his policies was necessary in order to reach a fixed and predetermined future. Khrushchev, in essence, characterized Stalinism as a false present, and, given the nature of communism’s teleology, this contention could only be important if it entailed the further contention that Stalin’s false present had been pushing the USSR toward a false future. But this in turn threatened to undermine the legitimacy of Soviet rule altogether, unless Khrushchev and his comrades could make a case that they were restoring a prior past, what we might call the true past of Leninism. This, Khrushchev’s temporality was actually rather complicated:

Stalinist past——false future——Leninist past——true present——true future. Moreover, if Khrushchev and his comrades were able, as Stalin’s successors, to claim to be
in a position to put the USSR back on its proper historical track, then there had to have been also some positive aspects about the system that Stalin had built. It followed that cultural and political artifacts associated with the false aspects of the Stalinist past or with processes of building toward Stalin's false future were at risk of being delegitimated overnight.

**PRESERVING THE EPHEMERAL**

— My ship is a creation of able hands
— My course is a total disaster.
— But just let the wind pick up
— And everything around will change,
— Including the idiot who thinks otherwise!
— But no one believes that
— There's no wind on earth,
— Even if they've banned the wind.

— Time Machine, rock band (1978)

Time Machine was only one of a number of rock bands to point to significant changes taking place in the Brezhnev era, changes that were irresistible, regardless of regime preference. There was even an underground Leningrad band which took the name Winds of Change. The group remained out of favor with the authorities, however. For the authorities wanted, indeed, to band the wind, to hold onto (or rather revive) the slippery and already partially superseded legacy of Stalinism (and in fact, not even Stalinism itself, but rather, the Brezhnevites' reconstruction of it), to preserve that which was essentially ephemeral. This orientation was clearly signaled already at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU (1966). The Tenth Resolution adopted at that congress sounded the call:

— The Congress attaches great importance to developing the literature and art of socialist realism. The Party expects from creative workers new and important works that will impress by the depth and truthfulness of their reflection of life, by the strength of their ideological inspiration, and by their high level of artistic mastery, that will actively assist in molding the spiritual outlook of the builder of Communism, and that will foster in Soviet people lofty moral qualities, devotion to Communist ideals, a sense of civic duty, Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism.

But what the Brezhnev regime wanted was a soft version of socialist realism. This was made clear in an editorial published in Pravda more than a year earlier. Signed by the paper's new editor-in-chief, Aleksei Rumyantsev, the editorial noted, inter alia, that the party demanded, in the literary and cultural realm, the existence of different schools and trends, different styles and genres competing with one another. Even if socialist realism was still held up as the standard, this was not merely a restatement or even just an expansion of Stalin's old dictum, socialist in content, national in form.
in fact set for careful liberalization. Already in 1965, thus, the Leningrad Philharmonic made so bold as to revive Shostakovich’s Symphony No. 3, which had not been performed in the USSR for more than 30 years because of charges that it was formalistic.

Certainly, the Brezhnev regime professed to be preserving and maintaining socialist realism as the ruling doctrine of the arts, but, as I have already suggested, this was largely illusory. Already in the early post-Khrushchev years, despite the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel and a certain mood of retrenchment, novelists and poets increasingly tested the limits of the permissible, while Soviet literary scholarship began to display more independence, and hence, more integrity. There was, quite simply, no way of going back to the old days; even if the Brezhnev regime sponsored a rock group called “Happy Guys,” reviving the title of the 1934 film directed by G. V. Aleksandrov, the cultural sphere was moving inexorably forward.

Yuri Trifonov (1927-81) is illustrative of fiction-writing in the Brezhnev era. His House on the Embankment (1976) held up to full view the widespread corruption and low morale of the period of high Stalinism, as well as the blatant opportunism of party careerists in the 1930s. While censors allowed Embankment to be published, they balked at approving the same author’s Disappearance (published posthumously in 1987). In this latter novel, Trifonov recounts how a schoolboy won first prize in a contest involving the memorization of Pushkin; his prize was a plastic statuette of “Young Comrade Stalin Reading Pushkin.”

His colleague Andrei Bitov faced even more severe obstruction from the bureaucracy, being essentially blacklisted by Soviet publishers for a decade (1975-85). Bitov’s offense was to ignore socially relevant themes and focus on private mental and emotional states. His Pushkin House, a 400-page novel with frequent overt and covert allusions to Dostoyevsky, Leo Tolstoy, Nabokov, Proust, Joyce, Hemingway, and other writers, could not be published until after the advent of perestroika.

The Brezhnev regime found itself confronted with a growing disparity between what it thought it wanted and what writers were willing to write. The fact that Daniil Granin (b. 1918) and I. Grekova (Elena Ventsel, b. 1907) saw fit to dig into Stalin-era excesses, and that Gyorgii Semyonov (1931-92) was content to dwell at length on ostensibly purely colorific but otherwise meaningless episodes (as in A Play of Fancy, 1979) conjuring at most an occasion for melancholia (as in The Collection, 1985) was scarcely satisfying to Khrushchev’s successors.

Although the Brezhnev regime embargoed much of the more critical literature that was being written, some satire found its way into print. One of the most remarkable examples of this genre is Vladimir Voinovich’s The Life and Extraordinary Adventures of Private Ivan Chonkin, published in Paris in 1976. The novel’s main character, Chonkin, bears a comparison to Jaroslav Hasek’s Good Soldier Švejk. Both men are dim-witted, naïve, literal-minded, and apt to undermine procedures and orders in the very act of adhering to them. Thus, Voinovich has Chonkin ask, during a political education session, whether Comrade Stalin had two wives (at once) and, in battle action, defends his plan against NKVD troops whom he, inevitably, mistakes for Germans. Nor does Stalin fare well in Voinovich’s flight of fancy, where he appears to Chonkin, in a dream, dressed as a woman and carrying an unloaded rifle -- in a rather transparent comment on Stalin’s sexual
potency (and thereby providing an indirect answer to Chonkin’s question about Stalin’s conjugal status). Throughout this novel, Voinovich holds up rather compromising aspects of Soviet reality to view. In Voinovich’s account, sexual fantasies are contrary to military regulation and party officials derive feelings of reassurance bordering on rapture simply by repeating the word “comrades” over and over. As for the system’s faithful, one of their exemplars is a scientist named Gladyshev, an NKVD informant who is inspired by the progressive teachings of Michurin and Lysenko, who had by then fallen into disrepute even in the USSR. Gladyshev comes up with a logical way of cutting the Gordian knot of Soviet agriculture. Since, as he observes, dung is the fertilizer which starts food growing, and since all good, having been digested, returns to the state of dung, one could simplify the natural cycle and do away with the need for agriculture by living on dung alone.

But Voinovich was an exception. Many other works such as A Book of the Blockade by Daniil Granin and Aleksei Adamovich, War’s Unwomanly Face by Svetlana Aleksieievich, Vasiili Grossman’s Life and Fate, Boris Yampol’skii’s Moscow Street, and Yuri Dombrovskii’s The Department of Unnecessary Things had to wait until Brezhnev was dead before they could obtain an audience. On the other hand, so-called village prose continued to be able to find its way into print. Emerging in the 1950s, village prose is characterized by nostalgia for rural Russia and anxiety concerning its transformation. Probably the best known among village writers is Valentin Rasputin (b. 1937) whose Farewell to Matyora (1976) figures as a protest against those who are destroying the environment and uprooting families from homesteads passed for centuries from father to son.

It remains to say a few words about Aleksandr Zinoviev, whose major novels of the Brezhnev-era were all published by L’Age d’Homme Press in Lausanne, Switzerland (in Russian). Three novels concern us here: Yawning Heights (published in 1976), The Radiant Future (published in 1978), and The Madhouse (published in 1980). These novels come as close to being the opposite of socialist realism as one can imagine, seeing through the claims of Soviet apologists and depicting Soviet reality for what it was. In Yawning Heights, for example, Zinoviev portrays Soviet society as permeated by hypocrisy, oppression, corruption, waste, irresponsibility (individual and collective), shoddy work, boorishness, idleness, disinformation, deceitfulness, drabness, [and] bureaucratic privilege, and suggests that such a syndrome coexists with a distorted evaluation of personality -- nonentities are elevated to great heights, exceptional people are debased. One need think only of the treatment meted out to Pilniak, Zoshchenko, Akhmatova, Zamiatin, Pasternak, Shostakovich, Prokofiev, Miaskovsky, Khachaturian, Eisenstein, and others to see the point. In Radiant Future, Zinoviev suggests that most Soviet liberals chose that posture out of career opportunism, while Madhouse shows protagonist JRF rhapsodizing about the alleged advantages enjoyed by the Soviet man: in not having to have any opinions, emotions, aspirations, or principles. That Soviet reality crushes the spirit of the individual is clearly indicated in Zinoviev’s comment, in Madhouse:

[Soviet man] is only a functional component of a more complex whole -- the collective
-- but a component which reflects all the qualities of that whole . . . They, that is Soviet man and our collective, are born and exist as an integral, inseparable entity.170

In the film sector, the reaction against the relative freedom of the Khrushchev years gained momentum, reaching high tide in 1968, a year characterized, in Fomin’s words, by pogroms in the cinematic sector.171 The tone had been set in August of the preceding year in a report drafted by V. Shauro, head of the Cultural Department of the CPSU Central Committee, which alleged that various kinds of social disorders and the shady sides of life were being given an inordinate amount of attention in Soviet films.172 By the 1970s, a new formula had been worked out for the film sector:

This was a return to Stalinist aesthetic norms -- of course, without their extremes. You were allowed to excite, to amuse, to elicit pensiveness, but under no circumstances to disturb the audience.173 Films had to be safe.

The age was dominated by Filipp Ermash, who served as head of Goskino from 1972 to 1986. Ermash was interested in maximizing attendance at Soviet films and maximizing profits for the Soviet film industry. This meant that a balance had to be struck between satisfying public demand and upholding socialist values. Perhaps the most successful expression of this balancing was the 1980 film, Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears, which starred Vera Alentova as the dedicated factory worker who rises through the ranks to become manager, and Andrei Batalov, as the dignified, proud worker who is knowledgeable about the sciences and humanities. Saccharine in places, the film paints an endearing portrait of the two lovers and succeeds as a romantic story, even while presenting a rosette picture of factory life, the countryside, and Soviet life in general.

Where political disengagement had been treated as hostility in the Stalin era, apolitical films were not only made now, but stood a chance at box-office success. Examples are Ironies of Fate, or Have a Good Sauna (1975) and An Office Romance (1978). More complex was Sergei Mikaelian’s The Bonus (1975), which cast a brigade leader as the hero and the party managers as villains.174 Moreover, satire, which was becoming more explicit during these years, was starting to make its presence felt in films of the Brezhnev era. In a marvelously ironic moment, Garage (1980), a film by Eldar Ryazanov and Emil Braginsky, has one of its characters, upon learning that his conversation-partner is a scholar researching satire, say, You have an odd profession. You are studying a subject which does not exist.175

Arguably the most profound film director working during the Brezhnev years was Andrei Tarkovsky, whose films Andrei Rublev (1969), Solaris (1972), Mirror, and Stalker (1980) had a poetic character. Tarkovsky understood his art in tempological terms, describing the mission of film as art in victory over time.176 In Tarkovsky’s concept, it was the rhythm of the film which disclosed the movement of time, which, in turn, was reflected in the psychological development of the central character or characters. Tarkovsky eventually fell out of favor with Soviet officialdom. He ended his life in exile and his last two films were made abroad.177
In the film sector as in the literary sphere, as already noted, the Brezhnev government wanted films that were safe. But Brezhnev, unlike Stalin, was not willing to play an active part in the drafting of the script and the actual filming. The result was that the regime's wishes were expressed not so much in actual interference in the creative process as in determining what might and might not be seen in Soviet theaters. Thus, Nikita Mikhalkov's 1975 film, At Home Among Strangers, A Stranger at Home, a Soviet-style spaghetti Western, complete with duster coat and cowboy hat, set against the backdrop of the Russian Civil War, was judged appropriate for Soviet audiences, as were Gyorgii Danielia's Autumn Marathon (1980) and Sergei Yutkevich's Lenin in Paris (1981).

Meanwhile, Andrei Rublev, though completed in 1969, was only released two years later, due to reservations on the part of the authorities, and after it had already been scheduled to be shown at the 1971 Belgrade Film Festival, the Soviet authorities pulled the film at the last minute on grounds that it does not correspond to historical truth. On the other hand, Mikhalkov-Konchalovsky's The Story of Asya Klyachkina, Who Fell in Love But Never Married (1966) and Elem Klimov's The Adventures of a Dentist (1967) were too much for the Brezhnev-era censors, who refused to authorize a public screening of either film. The problem with Asya Klyachkina lay in its realistic depiction of the bleakness of rural life in Russia, while Dentist was deemed unacceptable because of the depiction of mediocrities envying a talented dentist. Similarly, Gleb Panfilov's 1979 film, Theme, which took up the subject of Jewish emigration, was not shown to Soviet audiences until 1986, while Elem Klimov's Rasputin (completed 1975), which offered a sympathetic portrait of Tsar Nicholas II, could not be publicly shown until 1984. Simplicity was clearly a ticket to favor with officialdom in the Brezhnev years, as Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears demonstrated. Thus, when director Aleksei German put together his Trial on the Road in 1971, which traced the transformation of a Nazi collaborator into a courageous Soviet hero, the unmistakable departure from the dictates of Soviet optimism was too much for the censors, who held the film up for 15 years. Nor surprisingly, as the Brezhnev era drew to a close, there was a backlog of films waiting to be seen. These began to reach the screen already during the brief secretaryships of Andropov and Chernenko, and were experienced, by the time Gorbachev was in power, as a kind of flood.

As in literature and film, so too in the sphere of music. Here there were six broad genres of music. The most innocent of these were traditional folk music (narodnaia muzyka) and estrada (the Soviet equivalent of much of the material recorded in the U.S. at that time or just a bit earlier by Petula Clark and Andy Williams, as well as almost everything recorded by Tom Jones). Concerning these two subgenres, the Soviet regime of the late 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s scarcely needed to reflect. The other four genres -- classical music, bard music, jazz, and rock -- were infinitely more complex from a political standpoint. Where narodnaia muzyka and estrada clearly offered no challenge to the status quo, one had to make a much more differentiating judgment where individual artifacts of these other genres were concerned.

After Khrushchev's fall, Ilyichev was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and flexibility became the keynote of the Brezhnev era. Increasingly, it became possible to discuss esoteric music in the pages of Sovetskaia Muzyka, without referring everything to
socialist realism. Shostakovich’s striking public defense, in this period, of the use of any musical devices, including 12-tone, when justified . . . by the idea of the composition, could not have taken place even in the Khrushchev era, let alone under Stalin. Shostakovich was able to work finally without harassment from officialdom, and 1969 saw the premiere of his Symphony No. 14, Opus 135. The work is sorrowful, ranging from a sense of restrained concentration to one of furious and frenzied tragedy. In his Quartet No. 12, Opus 133, which had premiered the year before, Shostakovich blends 12-tone rows with tonality, defying musical conventions, which had prescribed that one should opt for either atonalism or tonality, but not both at once. It was also in the Brezhnev era that composers Shnittke and Pärt, the former lauded among other things for his Symphony No. 1 (1972) and his Faust Cantata (1983), and the latter highly regarded for his Miserere, among other works, emerged from obscurity onto the world stage.

The bards -- Bulat Okudzhava, Vladimir Vysotsky, and Aleksandr Galich (real name Aleksandr Arkadievich Ginzburg) -- were another matter. Accompanying themselves on the guitar, they sang of the everyday concerns of Russians, being perhaps in some way comparable to the American folk singers Bob Dylan, Simon and Garfunkel, and (at least before their revival) Peter, Paul, and Mary. Guitar poetry, as their performance is sometimes called, arose in Russia in the 1950s and, with time, became so familiar that it almost seemed typical of Russia. As Gerald Smith notes, the guitar poetry of the Russian bards was an expression of dissent from officially promoted and accepted forms, themes, and style. All of them experienced some problems at the hands of the authorities. Okudzhava, who began his career as a poet in 1946, built up a following by the late 1950s. The authorities did not appreciate Okudzhava’s style, however, and he soon found himself under attack in the official press. In spring 1972, he was summoned before the Union of Soviet Writers after some of his poetry had been published abroad, and in June of that year, was expelled from the Communist Party for anti-Party behavior. Vysotsky was subjected to public attack in the party press, where he was accused of slandering Soviet reality, of failing to acknowledge the heroism of the Soviet public during World War Two, and of reveling in our shortcomings and making fun of what the Soviet people is right to feel proud of. At one point, Vysotsky was even reprimanded by the authorities, though he continued to sing, as if unintimidated. As for Galich, he started in vaudeville in 1948, reaching his peak as an official Soviet writer in the late 1950s. His career with officialdom suffered a reversal in 1958 when a play he had written was banned on the very eve of opening night. But his work continued to obtain an airing in the Soviet media until 1967. Galich’s style was strident and explicit. In his song The Night Watch, Galich warned that nothing essential had changed in the Soviet system since Stalin. The warning, Smith recounts, is conveyed through a nightmare vision in which the thousands of discarded statues of The Genius of All Times and Peoples come to life and make a moonlit march on Red Square, there to review a parade of monsters. Then morning comes, and

The bronze statues go back where they came from,
But the alabaster ones lie hidden away.
Maybe they be crippled for the time being,
But even their dust retains its shape,  
These alabaster ones just need some human flesh,  
And once more they’ll acquire their greatness!  
And the drums will beat!  
The drums will beat,  
Beat, beat, beat!  

Eventually, the authorities had their fill of Galich and on 29 December 1971, he was expelled from the Union of Soviet Writers, and soon thereafter, from the Union of Cinematographic Workers, depriving him of literary earnings and ending his privileged access to scarce material goods. But, for Galich, it is not the Soviet Union which set the moral standards for humanity or which constituted the measure of truth as such. This is hinted at in Galich’s song, “Islands”:

They say there are some islands somewhere,  
Where on the shore grows the grass of oblivion,  
It cures pride, and grief, and baseness, and sickness,  
That’s the kind of island there are on earth!

They say there are some islands somewhere,  
Where twice two doesn’t always make four,  
Count as much as you like, it’s all a mist,  
Only what suits your heart is right, that alone.  
That’s the kind of island there is on earth!

They say there are some islands,  
Where untruth is not truth,  
Where there’s no idleness, no poverty,  
And no pale of settlement, nor ever was.  
That’s the kind of islands I’ve imagined.

Of the two remaining genres, jazz was clearly the more innocent. To begin with, few jazz musicians adopted the kind of provocative names fashionable among rockers, decked themselves out in message-laden garb, or emphasized shock as part of the performance itself. Moreover, Brezhnev’s Prime Minister, Aleksei Kosygin, was reliably reported to have been a fan of cool jazz. As early as May 1965, Izvestiia published a favorable article about Soviet jazz by the well-known jazz historian A. Medvedev. Medvedev told his readers, “Jazz is a complex, multifaceted, controversial phenomenon whose essence and artistic principles are difficult to contain in a simple formula.” This set the tone for years to come. Jazz was not merely rehabilitated but actually encouraged -- for example by calls in Komsomol’skaia pravda for more jazz concerts and by a broadcast on Moscow Television of a contest for jazz ensembles. And if, by the early 1980s, there were some strange things being perpetrated by groups such as Sergei Kuryokhin’s jazz-rock band, Popular...
As we have seen, rock music had barely penetrated Russia by the end of the Khrushchev era. It was, thus, only in the Brezhnev era that the authorities were forced to come to grips with rock as a mass phenomenon. As early as 1966, there were dozens of groups in the major Soviet cities. A listing of Moscow bands circa 1968 hinted at a problem, with names such as Hairy Glass, Little Red Demons, Witchcraft, Fugitives from Hell, Young Comanches, Purple Catastrophe, and Nasty Dogs. These names did not suggest the kind of optimistic and dedicated young people that the Soviet authorities hoped to raise. The inevitable solution was that Soviet officialdom entered the rock business, establishing a clean-cut group of optimists called Happy Guys in 1968, involving the KGB in the creation of a beat club at Moscow’s Melody and Rhythm Café in 1969, and even sponsoring, via the local Komsomol organization, a rock festival in Gorky in 1971. In the mid-1970s, the Komsomol established its own network of disco clubs, in which it supervised the musical fare. Authorities also drew up lists of groups categorizing them as either approved (i.e., sponsored and censored) or unapproved (i.e., unsponsored, but still subject to scrutiny). The authorities were not stingy about advice either, and, for example, called in Yuri Shevchuk, leader of the Leningrad band DDT, to advise him to write lyrics that showed an appreciation of official policies. The official group Samotsvety (later renamed Plamya) showed how to please the authorities with their 1970s official hit, “Our Address is the Soviet Union:"

*The heart is aching, the heart is caring.
The postal cargo is being packed.
Our address is not a house or a street.
Our address is the Soviet Union....

*We are with the guys who are sensible.
We are where the posters say, Ahead!
Where the toiling country
Sings the good, new songs.*

But it was one thing to create a sector of the rock scene that one could control. It was quite another matter to control the rock scene as such. Groups such as Alisa, Aquarium, Bravo, Cement, Kino, DDT, DK, Nautilius Pompilius, Strange Games, and Time Machine built their reputations and their followings on the basis of a combination of parody and social satire. Cement, for example, recycled primitive socialist realist songs from the 1930s and early 1940s, set them to a rock beat, and thereby created insanely farcical parodies of the socialist message. In spite of these groups’s sundry provocations, the Brezhnev regime’s response was, when compared with either Stalin’s way of handling things he did not like or even with the modus operandi of the Andropov/Chernenko transition, limp. Only with the death of Brezhnev in 1982 and the accession of Andropov did vigilance once again become the watchword. Konstantin Chernenko, then chief of ideology, delivered a blistering attack on rock music in August 1983 and the following year, with Chernenko by then at the helm, Komsomol commandos were raiding centers for...
black marketeering in banned recordings and, in 1985, undertook musical raids to weed out low-grade music from discos and rock clubs. In addition, a commission was set up to review professional (approved) groups, leading to the dissolution of up to half of the professional groups, and an order went out that 80 percent of the songs performed at concerts had to be the work of members of the Union of Soviet Composers. Efforts to contain rock gradually collapsed, along with everything else, in the era of glasnost and perestroika.

We have seen that the early Bolsheviks had a clear, if highly opinionated, sense of the historicity of their political experiment and that this sense, embedded in a specific tempology, was reflected in the cultural artifacts of the age. We have seen, further, that the focus on the future was profoundly important in Soviet politics and culture during the years 1917-56, and, in a revised format, even after 1956 (remember Khrushchev’s pledges to bury the West!). But with the Brezhnev era, one perceives a fading of the sense of historicity, and a shelving of the future -- quite literally, as reflected in the Brezhnev-era abandonment of the Leninist concept of the withering away of the state and the invention of the concept of the all-people’s state. It is, thus, also the relationship to the future which became occluded in this period. Indeed, in aesthetic terms, one may say that with the years, the Brezhnev regime gradually lost any concept of the future at all, with the result that the notion of a cultural policy attuned to the needs of realizing and assuring a specific future slipped from consciousness. In this sense, the term stagnation, which came in Gorbachev’s days to be generally applied to the Brezhnev era, was also appropriate in highlighting the loss of temporality and teleology which had once permeated and infused the cultural sphere.

EPILOGUE: THE FUTURE IS NOW . . . OR WAS IT YESTERDAY?

The cultural sphere is the domain of aesthetic reflection on the meaning of human action. But, as has been stated above, any understanding of the meaning of human action presumes and requires a temporal topology or tempology. Arthur N. Prior and Richard G. Swinburne, among others, favor what has been called the standard topology for time, i.e., a construal of time as boundless, continuous, linear, and non-branching. It is only a tempology which can indicate whether the meaning of present actions is to be sought primarily in the distant future, the near future, merely the present, or even in the past (whether remote or proximate), and it is in the nature of a tempology, by virtue of what has already been said of it, to provide a model of the structure of time or -- if one prefers -- to structure time. It follows that the cultural sphere presumes and depends upon a specific tempology and, further, that changes in the tempology are reflected in tangible changes in the cultural sphere.

The communists were the most conscious of this interconnection between cultural sphere and tempology in their earliest years in power. It was in those years that their tempology was characterized by a strong future, i.e., the belief that there is only one possible future which could emanate from their actions. Over time, the Bolshevik concept of the future weakened so that, by the time one reaches the Gorbachev era, one can justly speak
of the USSR having a dominant tempology characterized by a weak future. Pushed to the point of extreme weakness (as occurred during and after Gorbachev’s term of office), such a tempological feature forecasts no actual future but only a number of alternative possible futures.

Upon accession to the General Secretaryship in 1985, following the brief terms of Andropov (1982-84) and Chernenko (1984-85), Gorbachev set about to change certain elements in the Soviet political formula, while holding the others steady. It was only about two years into his term of office that he realized, first, that the component elements of the Soviet political formula were so interconnected that one could not change the elements he proposed to change without changing much more besides, and second, that the accumulated pressures for change which had been building already since Stalin's death and which had been first adumbrated in the cultural sphere, were no more to be resisted. By the time Gorbachev realized these things, it was too late to retrace his steps, too late to rewind the clock to 1985, too late to alter the significance of glasnost and perestroika. Gorbachev was forced to confront the fact, stealing a line from David Lewis's essay, "The Paradoxes of Time Travel," that you cannot change a present or future event from what it was originally to what it is after you change it. What you can do is to change the present or the future from the unactualized way they would have been without some actions of yours to the way they actually are. But worse, once the Soviet future had been killed, as it were, the only Soviet future that remained was the future of lore, the future of which the early Bolsheviks and Futurists had dreamt. The future, it seems, was yesterday.

It was during Gorbachev’s term of office that Andrei Platonov’s novel Chevengur, completed sixty years earlier, was finally published (in 1988). The novel is a brilliant parody of Bolshevik revolutionary utopianism, mocking Stalin’s slogan of socialism in one country by depicting the farcical efforts of the residents of the town of Chevengur to achieve socialism in one town. In a sense, the belated publication of Platonov’s novel provides a fitting epitaph to the communist era in Russian literature and culture. In this novel, the Chevengurians come under the illusion that they have escaped the vicissitudes of history, that they are no longer subject to the ravages of fatigue, decay, or disintegration; one might even say that, in their view, time itself had been abolished. They declare, almost gaily, the end to all of world history. But their illusions eventually result in the demise of the Chevengurian utopic experiment. In this way, Platonov may even be credited with having prophesied the eventual collapse of the Soviet system.

The Gorbachev era was, to be sure, a time of restless soul-searching, of intense political creativity, a time in which the preexisting political paradigms were scuttled even before new paradigms had been designed or embraced. Where Stalin had tried to isolate the USSR from the world outside, inspiring Churchill’s apt metaphor of an iron curtain, Gorbachev sought to reintegrate the USSR in what he called our common European home. And the cultural sphere was, for its part, a component in that aspiration. But in his rush to bank everything on my friend, Ron, and in his naively willingness to cut loose from 70 years of state-building and culture-building, Gorbachev -- who had never read Machiavelli’s warnings about autocracies which embrace rapid reform, and who even
refused, haughtily, to read Machiavelli\textsuperscript{207} -- sealed the fate of the Soviet\textsuperscript{2} future. In so doing, he unconsciously spited Heidegger\textsuperscript{2} admonition that the fundamental phenomenon of time is the future.\textsuperscript{208} Lose one\textsuperscript{2} topological construct of the future, and one loses one\textsuperscript{2} bearings.

Post-Gorbachev Russia, buffeted by mafias, nationalists, religious hegemonists, and other forces out of control, is thus a Russia not only lacking a sense of direction, but lacking any figment of unity. No longer does Russia speak with one voice, march\textsuperscript{2} iron-willed\textsuperscript{2} with eyes fixed on a certain future. No longer is Russian time frozen, predetermined, planned, and charted in advance. Russian time is now branching time, full of uncertainty, unpredictable. And no longer can Russian poets pen something akin to Demyan Bedny\textsuperscript{2} Civil War-era poem,\textsuperscript{209} The Highway, which ends with the words, March! March!

The bourgeois state is a rubbish heap
The proletariat has taken over the Government
Interfere not!

\textbf{NOTES}

\textsuperscript{122} I am grateful to Viktor Gaiduk for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article and to Mary Reichert who read the Russian-language materials cited herein.


\textsuperscript{123} A. I. Stetsky, Under the Flag of the Soviets, under the Flag of Socialism, in Soviet Writers Congress 1934, p. 267.


\textsuperscript{126} Quoted in Schwarz, Music and Musical Life, p. 273.

\textsuperscript{127} Quoted in Ibid., p. 275.

\textsuperscript{128} Quoted in Ibid., p. 276.

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{130} Quoted in Swayne, Political Control, p. 113.

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{132} Evgenii Sergeev, Neskol ko zastarelykh voprosov, in E.A. Dobrenko (ed.), Izbavlenie ot mirazhei: Soetskii pisatel\textsuperscript{2}, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{133} Dmitrii Urnov, Iskusstvo istoricheskogo optimizma, ili tridsatlet spustia, in Dobrenko (ed.), Izbavlenie, pp. 103-104.


\textsuperscript{135} George Gibian, Soviet Literature during the Thaw, in Hayward and Labedz (eds.), Literature and Revolution, pp. 135-136.

\textsuperscript{136} Swayne, Political Control, p. 165.

139. Quoted in Swayze, Political Control, p. 176.
140. Francois de Liencourt, The Repertoire of the Fifties, in Hayward and Labedz (eds.), Literature and Revolution, pp. 160-162. The plays by Sartre and Hellman were subjected to the usual rewriting, before being staged.
141. Starr, Red and Hot, pp. 261-270.
144. Quoted in Swayze, Political Control, p. 188.
145. Quoted in Schwarz, Music and Musical Life, pp. 303-304, my emphasis.
146. Quoted in Ibid., p. 305.
147. Quoted in Ibid., p. 308.
149. Quoted in Ibid., p. 303.
154. Ibid., pp. 36-37.
157. Khrushchev, of course, knew from the beginning that criticizing a maximalist system could only be vastly complicated.
163. Ibid., pp. 38-44.
166. Ibid., pp. 151, 152. For further discussion of Voinovich, see Wolfgang Kasack, "Vladimir Voinovich and His Undesirable Satires," in Henrik Birnbaum and Thomas Eekman (eds.), Fiction and Drama in Eastern and Southeastern Europe (Columbus, Ohio: Slavica Publishers, 1980), pp. 259-276.
167. Hosking, Beyond Socialist Realism, pp. 84-85.
168. Quoted in Kirkwood, Alexander Zinoviev, p. 68.
169. Ibid., pp. 102, 130-131.
170. Quoted in Ibid., p. 131.
172. Quoted in Ibid., p. 12.
175. Quoted in Ibid., p. 15.
178. Quoted in Vronskaya, Young Soviet Film Makers, p. 35.
179. Ibid., pp. 36-38.
183. Ibid., pp. 71-72.
188. Quoted in Smith, Songs to Seven Strings, p. 117.
190. For further discussion of Vysotsky's career, see Christopher Lazarski, Vladimir Vysotsky and His Cult, in The Russian Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 (January 1992). Regarding Vysotsky's views concerning his guitar poetry, see Vladimir Vysotskii, Chetyre chetverti puti, ed. A. E. Krylov (Moscow: Fizkul'tura i sport, 1988), pp. 119, 135.
191. Quoted in Smith, Songs to Seven Strings, p. 199.
193. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 203-204.
199. Related to me by Viktor Gaiduk, once a close confidante of Gorbachev's, who had tried, in vain, to persuade the then-party leader of Stavropol (in the early 1970s, on the occasion of a visit to Niccolo Machiavelli's house in Italy), to read Machiavelli's The Prince and Discourses. -- Conversation with V. Gaiduk, Bergen, Norway, 28 May 1997.
203. Prior, Recent Advances in Tense Logic, p. 5.
204. Ibid., p. 5, emphasis added.
207. Related to me by Viktor Gaiduk, once a close confidante of Gorbachev's, who had tried, in vain, to persuade the then-party leader of Stavropol (in the early 1970s, on the occasion of a visit to Niccolo Machiavelli's house in Italy), to read Machiavelli's The Prince and Discourses. -- Conversation with V. Gaiduk, Bergen, Norway, 28 May 1997.