Foreign Debt:
Distorting Japan's ODA Diplomacy towards Myanmar

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Introduction

In September, after months of widespread and increasingly defiant public demonstrations brought about by years of economic hardship, the tatmadaw (Burmese Army) took to the streets and regained control. This brought an abrupt and violent end to the ‘democracy summer’ that had thrust this reclusive nation onto the very centre of the world stage. The response of the international community was almost universal condemnation and sanctions.

The Japanese government cut its aid/Official Development Assistance (ODA), along with other OECD donors, in September, and although ODA was ‘partially resumed’ in early, it has remained ‘suspended in principle’ since then. Prior to this, between and , Japan disbursed a total of $ billion in ODA to Burma, which included agreements for over ¥ billion in ODA loans (no new loan agreements were made after ) and over ¥ billion in grants. Despite the considerable Japanese ODA disbursals to Burma throughout the Cold War period, the Burmese economy went through a period of long-term decline. This decline culminated in when Burma received the UN categorisation of a ‘Least Developed Nation’, and in when the economic collapse triggered the popular demonstrations.

Nearly twenty years later and the renamed country of Myanmar is still at a crossroads, and the world community is deeply divided over how to assist the people of Myanmar to finally find peace, national reconciliation and pursue economic development. During the a whole spectrum of contrasting international and regional diplomatic efforts have been undertaken to assist in the domestic process. Japan has often been at the very centre of such efforts. While the EU and the US have followed the course of sanction, and while ASEAN, China and (more recently) India have followed the course of engagement, the Japanese approach has been somewhere in between, treading a fine line between sanction and engagement.

Japan’s constructive engagement or sunshine diplomacy towards Myanmar in the post-Cold War period has been termed a “carrot and stick” approach, using ODA disbursals as the “carrot” to encourage positive trends and using ODA suspensions as the “stick” to discourage negative trends. The following quote from the ODA Annual Report is evidence of this policy approach and identifies Myanmar as an example of ‘negative trends’
resulting in ODA suspension.

Japan actively expands its ODA to recipient countries which show positive trends in light of these principles of the ODA Charter, it calls the attention of, or reviews the aid policy toward recipient countries that show negative trends, comprehensively taking into account their economic and social conditions, their relations with Japan, etc. In the case of countries such as ... Myanmar ... where human rights are seriously violated or democratic process is reversed, Japan has suspended its ODA except those of emergency and humanitarian nature.

The ODA Charter

The ODA Charter was first approved by the cabinet in (it was revised in ), and has been ‘the foundation of Japan’s aid policy for more than ten years’. The Charter outlines the philosophy, basic policies and priorities, and the principles of Japan’s ODA. These principles, referred to in the previously quoted Annual Report, are: (i) environmental conservation; (ii) avoidance of any use of ODA for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts; (iii) observing trends in military expenditures, and (iv) the promotion of democratisation and introduction of a market-oriented economy, and the situation regarding basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country.

Importantly for our case study, the chaos in Burma in and the tatmadaw’s disregard of the election results, became important examples highlighting the changing environment that necessitated significant reform of Japanese ODA. These were two of the international events that shaped the consciousness of the decision-makers who formulated the ODA Charter. Other important events included, of course, the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War, the Tiananmen Square protests, and the Marcos Scandal that broke the consensus of domestic support for ODA. Importantly for our case study, the events in Burma in combined with the long history of significant Japanese ODA to Burma, has created a conspicuous and highly symbolic linkage between the ODA Charter and Myanmar. Indeed, as previously shown, Myanmar is often cited as an example of the implementation of the Charter, and this means that Japanese ODA policy towards Myanmar is a barometer with which to measure the implementation of the ODA Charter. Furthermore, it provides support for a premise of this study; such a politically sensitive issue as providing aid to a military dictatorship would necessitate an especially scrupulous interpretation of the ODA Charter. In line with the principles of the ODA Charter, the official policy of the Japanese government towards Myanmar throughout the post-Cold War period has been to encourage the government ‘to progress steadily toward democratisation and to improve human rights’.

The ODA Charter has been much criticised because of its inherent, and perhaps intended, ambiguity, an example of which is the diminishment of the ‘four key principles’ by the following.

Taking into account comprehensively each recipient country’s requests, its socio-economic conditions, and Japan’s bilateral relations with the recipient country, Japan’s ODA will be provided in accordance with the principles of the United


Nations Charter (especially sovereign equality and non-intervention in domestic matters)."

This inevitably means that the four principles are not in fact principles, but are just one set of considerations to be taken into account. This provides very real and concrete evidence for the institutional framework that manifests itself as the ‘policy of ambiguity’ or a ‘policy deficit’, a criticism often raised against Japanese foreign policy/diplomacy. It should be noted however, that this policy of ambiguity provides maximum manoeuvrability, and should not be mistaken with either a lack of decision-making or a deficient decision-making process.

Regardless of the criticisms, the Charter does represent the aspirations of many within Japan’s political economy to realign ODA policy and practice to better effect in the post-Cold War environment. It is widely recognised that not only was the system of Japanese ODA during the Cold War little more than a government subsidy for the overseas operations of Japanese businesses, but did indeed constitute a financial resource largely under the control of a certain number of Japanese companies. This inevitably means that the implementation of the Charter reflects the struggle between the reformers and the conservatives that seems to characterise many aspects of Japan’s contemporary political economy. Furthermore, despite the ODA Charter, it is inevitable that some relics will remain of the Cold War system of ODA in which Japanese businesses dominated.

Notwithstanding the ‘suspension in principle’ and the implementation of the ODA Charter, according to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, new ODA disbursals to Myanmar, based on the Exchange of Notes, in the thirteen-year period from 1989 to 2002 totalled over ¥ 9 billion (about US$ 970 million). In addition to this, Japan also continued to disburse ODA for some projects that had been started before 1989. Significantly, and the key point for this study, during the same thirteen-year period, Japanese debt relief to Myanmar totalled approximately ¥ 9 billion (about US$ 970 million), equal to about 26% of the total new disbursals. Whether or not, and if so, the extent to which, this debt relief was integrated into Japan’s ODA diplomacy towards Myanmar is a central question of this study. To answer this question it is first necessary to examine how it is that Myanmar accumulated such a sizable debt to Japan. This key issue goes to the very core of the bilateral relationship during the Cold War and highlights this case study as an example of failed Japanese foreign economic policy. Equally, the legacy of this failure inevitably frames the relationship during the post-Cold War and therefore provides an especially pertinent test case of ODA reforms.

**The accumulation of Myanmar’s Foreign Debt**

A Burmese Mission arrived in Japan on 23 August and, just three months later, on 3 November, an agreement was signed in Rangoon by the Japanese Foreign Minister and the Burmese Industries Minister. The reparations agreement comprised a total of ¥ 99 billion ($ 1.3 billion) in reparations, plus ¥ 99 billion ($ 1.3 billion) in private loans. Importantly, Burma was the first country to conclude a reparations agreement with Japan, and this obviously influenced other Southeast Asian countries to also conclude agreements.

(1989) 1992

(1989) 1992
At this time, Japan was having considerable difficulties in its negotiations with other Southeast Asian countries, and so the conclusion of the agreement with Burma obviously gave considerable impetus to the imperative of Japan’s economic ‘re-entry’ into Asia. It has often been said that Burma’s willingness to swiftly conclude a reparations agreement, their cooperation in recovering the remains of Japanese soldiers killed during the war, combined with the support that Japan gave to the Burmese independence movement, provided the basis for a ‘special relationship’ to develop between the two countries. However, regardless of the later development of a ‘special relationship’, the reparations payments were basically integrated into Japan’s development policies, in that, once it was accepted that Japan must pay, the most important point was to pay in a manner that would be beneficial to Japan. This is clearly summarised in the following quote from Prime Minister Yoshida,

“Although the Burmans called it reparations, for us it was an investment. Through our investment Burma would develop and it would become our market from which our investment would return.”

Burma did become dependent on Japanese goods, services and capital, but it never became an important market for Japanese companies. However, the reparations agreement was important because it created the system that would later evolve into Japan’s ODA. Japanese businesses were intensively involved in the reparations negotiations, and their interests were reflected in the implementation procedures. It is here that the beginnings of Japanese neo-mercantilism are to be found.

The Agreement on Economic and Technical Co-operation was jointly signed on March 1950. It was based on the original reparations agreement of 1945, which stipulated that Japan will re-examine the reparations agreement with Burma when all other reparations agreements have been concluded. This quasi-reparations agreement was therefore a response to the reparations agreements concluded with the Philippines in 1949, Indonesia in 1950, and South Vietnam in 1951. The final agreement reached was for ¥ 100 billion (US$ 580 million) over a twelve-year period, beginning in April 1950. Although it was never called reparations, much of the wording of the document and all the systems of implementation were exactly the same as the previous reparations agreement.

Just a year prior to the signing of the Agreement, General Ne Win and the tatmadaw staged a military coup and took over the government of Burma, instituted state socialism under the policy of the “Burmese Way to Socialism”, and deliberately withdrew from the world, what Steinberg termed, ‘political inversion’. Of course, this was in response to the realities of the Cold War, but, importantly, as Burma became a ‘hermit’ nation, Japan was left as almost the sole foreign partner. The World Bank withdrew in 1953, and US aid was terminated in 1955. Even China, with whom the Burmese had concluded an economic cooperation agreement in 1945, withdrew all assistance following the anti-Chinese riots of 1952. Some UN agencies maintained a minor presence, although large-scale development aid was non-existent, except for the Japanese reparations and quasi-reparations. The Burmese Way to Socialism was based on Burma’s colonial experience and basically emphasised the prevention of any foreign control of the domestic economy. Because of this, foreign direct investment in Burma was prohibited, which meant...
that only those involved in ODA could operate in Burma. With hindsight it seems glaringly obvious that the Burmese Way to Socialism and Japanese neomercantilism were fundamentally incompatible. Japanese neomercantilism was intended to pursue exactly those policies that the Burmese Way to Socialism was intended to prevent, i.e. foreign control of resources and domestic markets. This resulted firstly, in a relationship that became increasingly and excessively dependent on its ODA component, and consequentially, in failure and dire repercussions for both countries.

By the early 1980s the Ne Win regime began to realise that economic reforms were necessary, and in 1983 the World Bank started its first new loan to Burma (at the request of the Burmese government)\(^1\). Because of the continuation of its reparations disbursals, and since the Burmese Way to Socialism had stifled other foreign competitors, Japan was in the prime position to benefit from the new ‘limited-Open Door’ economic policy of the early 1980s. Japan began disbursing ODA for resource-related projects, commodity loans, as well as more funding for projects originally financed by reparations and quasi-reparations. This reform agenda picked up speed when the Burmese government accepted the recommendations of the World Bank’s Burma Aid Consultative Group\(^2\), which had its first meeting in Tokyo in November 1985. ODA, that was less than $100 million a year at the beginning of the 1980s, rose to $300 million a year by the late 1980s (although FDI in Burma remained virtually zero). While all OECD countries as well as International Financial Institutions began giving ODA to Burma, Japan was the main force behind the creation of this group, and it coincided with the introduction of the Fukuda Doctrine, which called for an increase in aid to Southeast Asian countries. Of the nearly $1.3 billion bilateral ODA to Burma in the twelve years from 1976-1987, 80% came from Japan (the second biggest donor was West Germany with just under 12%). ODA financed capital investment in resource-development, power generation and industry, although, of the ¥1.8 billion in ODA loans between 1976 and 1987, ¥1.2 billion, or 66%, were in the form of Commodity loans. In that fateful year of 1988, when Burma descended into chaos, Japan disbursed US$300 million in ODA\(^3\).

Despite the huge inflows of foreign capital, the Burmese economy did not show any significant improvement. A number of factors dragged down the Burmese economy: the ideology of the centrally planned economy, the inefficient State Economic Enterprises, the huge black market, the financial drain of continuing to fight the insurgency, and the drop in world market prices for Burma’s main exports. Indeed, it is often argued that the inflow of Japanese capital was the only reason the economy did not collapse earlier\(^4\). In other words, were it not for the willingness of the Japanese government to provide considerable financial assistance, the Burmese leadership would have had to have made extensive and genuine economic reforms at an earlier date. While this does imply some Japanese responsibility, the level of domestic economic mismanagement undoubtedly posits the blame on the Burmese government. However, it may well be that the lack of political oversight in the form of ODA policy and review allowed Japanese companies to continue to harness state resources (in the form of ODA) regardless of the decline in the Burmese economy.

As an indication of the slide in the Burmese economy, Burma’s debt service ratio,
while only 6% in 1977 rose to 10% by the time of the economic collapse in 1989. More importantly for our study, while only 3% of Burma’s external debt was owed to Japan in 1977 by the end of the 1980s, it is estimated that this figure had risen to about one-third. Burma was a recipient of Japanese debt relief as early as 1985 and received debt relief all through the 1990s, culminating in a ¥1 trillion debt relief grant in that tragic year of 1997. This debt relief grant was the first instalment of ¥1 trillion of Burma’s outstanding debt that Japan announced it was converting into grants, and this was a consequence of Burma’s recent acquisition of UN-designation as a Least Developed Nation. It covered all the still-outstanding debts from the period up to 1977 as was stipulated by a resolution of the Trade and Development Board (TDB) of UNCTAD.

Japanese ODA diplomacy in the 1990s

Japan’s constructive engagement policy was built on the premise that the Japanese government had some influence over the Myanmar military government. Since the reparations agreement of the 1990s, both sides have continually stressed their ‘close relationship’, and it seems plausible that the long history of Japanese economic assistance to the reclusive Burma did place Japan in a position of pre-eminent influence. However, even assuming that Japan did maintain a ‘special relationship’ with Burma, this alone was certainly not the “pay-off” for their investment that Yoshida had predicted back in the 1950s. Yoshida expected Burma to become a market for Japanese products, and this was the reason for reparations and ODA disbursals. Conversely, were the reparations and ODA disbursals merely the cost of forging a ‘close relationship’? Although the cost seems disproportionately high, even assuming that ODA to Burma was the cost of building friendships, then this has also not paid-off for Japan. After almost twenty years of diplomacy, the only conclusion to draw is that such a relationship, regardless of whether it actually existed or not, has not resulted in the Japanese government being able to score the political points that would inevitably come from having a positive influence over the Myanmar government.

Here are just a few examples of the constructive engagement/ “carrot and stick” policy as it developed after 1990. In February 1990 Burmese officials announced that elections would be held in 1990 and Japan responded with formal recognition of the new government and an announcement that aid projects frozen the previous September would be resumed on a case-by-case basis. No new aid was approved in 1990. In response to the Tatmadaw’s refusal to accept the results of the 1990 election,

“Japan has been conveying to the Government of Myanmar at every opportunity the importance of indicating a specific schedule for transferring power based on the result of the general election. Meanwhile, the Government of Japan is gradually resuming the economic cooperation that had been disrupted following the political chaos in starting from feasible projects.”

This seems to be an example of a negative trend (the refusal to accept the results of the 1990 election) being either ignored or even rewarded with the continuing gradual resumption of economic cooperation. However, this was before the creation of the ODA
Charter and the engagement policy was in its infancy. The ceasefire agreement between the government and the Kachin Independence Organisation (an ethnic insurgent group that had been fighting the government since 1961), and the release of political prisoners and Aung San Suu Kyi in July were rewarded with a small grant for the Institute of Nursing in Yangon and with a much larger debt relief grant. Japan supported Myanmar’s ascension to ASEAN and disbursed a loan (that had been suspended since 1990) for upgrading Yangon International Airport in June. In June, the Japanese government changed the emphasis of its diplomacy and tried a new approach when Prime Minister Obuchi promised to assist Myanmar with economic reforms and set up the ‘Japan-Myanmar Cooperation Programme for Structural Adjustment of the Myanmar Economy’ in June. In January as part of the UN-sponsored dialogue between the government and the opposition, a number of political prisoners were released and in April, Japan announced that it would provide some humanitarian aid to Myanmar to support the dialogue process. Then in June, more detainees were released. A considerable ODA grant for the renovation of Baluchaung Power Station in 2001 was said to be to support the dialogue between the government and Aung San Suu Kyi.

While Japanese ODA to Myanmar was ‘suspended in principle’, and new aid was limited to projects that were of an ‘emergency and humanitarian nature’, Japan continued to disburse some loan aid for agreements that had been signed prior to 1990. For example, according to the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) the following ODA was disbursed to Myanmar as loans: in 1990 ¥ 41 billion; in 1991 ¥ 10 billion; in 1992 ¥ 41 billion; in 1993 ¥ 41 billion, and in 1994 ¥ 41 billion. This means that, between 1990 and 1994, the Japanese government disbursed a total of ¥ 146 billion in yen loans to Myanmar (about US$ 1.5 billion).

Even though ¥ 146 billion may seem like a high figure considering that aid was supposed to be suspended in principle, this amount is dwarfed by the ¥ 715 billion (US$ 7.15 billion) in debt relief that Japan disbursed to Myanmar during the period 1990-1994. As previously stated, this means that debt relief accounted for 94% of new Japanese ODA to Myanmar during this period. Japan followed a policy of converting debt repayments made by Myanmar into grants and returning to the government of Myanmar. This meant that in the 1990s, Myanmar made no debt repayments to Japan, and this was based on the UN resolution. One reason for this high amount of debt relief was, of course, the steadily increasing amount of debt owed by Myanmar to Japan. According to the IMF, in 1990, Myanmar’s total outstanding and disbursed debt to Japan was $ 16.1 billion, of which $ 10.3 billion was in arrears by the end of fiscal 1991. In 1991, Japan disbursed ¥ 150 billion in debt relief, and in 1992 ¥ 110 billion, which were presumably attempts by the Japanese government to both prevent Myanmar from defaulting and to support the faltering reconciliation process. In 1992, according to the ADB, Myanmar suspended payments to all multilateral and bilateral creditors, and this meant that by 1993 Myanmar was $ 9.6 billion in arrears. According to World Bank figures, in 1993, Myanmar’s total debt stood at $ 12.3 billion, $ 6.2 billion of which was owed to bilateral donors.
Debt undermining Diplomacy

A major, if not the major instrument of Japanese diplomacy is ODA. This is especially true in the case of ODA to Myanmar during the 1990s where ODA has been used to encourage positive trends, which specifically refers to democratisation and improvements in the human rights situation. However, while ODA has been the cornerstone of Japanese diplomacy to Myanmar during the 1990s, the issue of Myanmar’s debt has seriously undermined diplomatic efforts. The reason for this is that, while the Japanese government tried to use their ODA as a “carrot” to encourage positive trends, they were also trying to prevent Myanmar from defaulting on its debt repayments. As we have seen, the official ODA rewards for positive trends have been very minimal, a small grant here and there. About 90% of new ODA during the 1990s was for debt relief, and therefore, much of the new ODA disbursed during this period was to some extent independent of political developments. This debt relief was disbursed according to the system of turning debt repayments into grants and returning to the Myanmar government, or according to the imperative of preventing Myanmar from defaulting, both of which may be completely independent of any positive trends.

Why was it so important for the Japanese government to prevent the Myanmar government from going into arrears on its debt? First of all, there is the UN resolution which stipulates the cancelling of repayments on all outstanding pre-1990 loans. Secondly, there is the resulting recognition of the failure of Japanese economic cooperation with Burma/Myanmar that would be implicit if Myanmar became unable to repay its debt. Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, was the link between debt and new ODA loans. The Japanese government were using the promise of the complete resumption of large-scale ODA loans as the reward for significant, concrete and lasting positive trends in Myanmar. The promise of these ODA loans, the relatively cheap financing for large-scale infrastructure projects, was therefore the key element of Japan’s engagement policy. However, the Japanese Ministry of Finance cannot forward new loans while the recipient is in arrears, and this meant that, regardless of positive or negative trends, the Japanese government were dependent on continuing to disburse significant levels of debt relief just to maintain the viability of their own diplomatic policy. Importantly, after Myanmar went into arrears on its debt to Japan, the promise of new ODA loans could no longer be included in Japan’s diplomatic policy towards Myanmar. Therefore, the Japanese government could not offer new ODA loans until the debt issue was resolved, which cannot be resolved until the Myanmar government makes significant moves towards democratic transition. The resolution of the debt issue is therefore very closely linked to political change in Myanmar. As of October, according to the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, Myanmar’s outstanding debt to Japan totalled ¥23.32 billion (which is equal to about US$2 billion). This means that about one-third of Myanmar’s total external debt is public debt owed to Japan, and of Myanmar’s total bilateral debt, about two-thirds is owed to the Japanese government.
Conclusion

Japanese diplomacy to Myanmar during the post-Cold War period was officially one of encouraging the democratisation process, and Myanmar has been held up as an example of the utilisation and implementation of the ODA Charter. However, while the Japanese government is under considerable external pressure (particularly from the US) to sanction Myanmar, it is also under substantial pressure to support ASEAN engagement (thus also countering the ever increasing Chinese influence in Myanmar). Furthermore, Japanese businesses with ODA-related economic interests in Myanmar inevitably continue to exert influence over the decision-making process in Tokyo, and while the overwhelming US pressure is a factor that has prevented the full resumption in Japanese ODA to Myanmar, there are other important factors. Officially, and according to the application of the ODA Charter, the main factor preventing new ODA disbursals is the lack of positive trends in Myanmar. It must be recognised that the unflattering aversion of the tatmadaw to democratic transition makes it extremely difficult for the Japanese ODA policy of encouraging democratisation to result in success. However, while Japanese ODA diplomacy to Myanmar has been largely unsuccessful at encouraging positive trends, this diplomacy has been seriously undermined by the issue of Myanmar’s debt to Japan. Indeed, debt relief payments to Myanmar far outweigh other ODA disbursals and have been largely independent of any positive or negative trends. Even though these debt relief payments have been independent of ODA diplomacy to Myanmar (in terms of encouraging democratisation), this diplomacy was conversely entirely dependent on the debt relief. The key to Japanese diplomatic efforts was the promise of large-scale ODA loans, and such a promise could only be maintained if Myanmar did not go into arrears on its debt repayments. This meant that an important characteristic of Japanese ODA diplomacy towards Myanmar was Japanese dependence on disbursing debt relief just to keep its own constructive engagement policy alive. Once Myanmar went into arrears in 1970, Japanese ODA diplomacy was largely dead in the water. The Japanese government could not offer any significant enticement until the Myanmar government demonstrated positive trends. Consequently, the Myanmar government had little incentive to demonstrate positive trends. The policy was therefore stuck in a ‘Catch-22 situation. It is for this reason that, at the end of the 1980s, Japanese policy towards Myanmar, while continuing to officially encourage democratisation, shifted to attempts at assisting in economic reforms.

In effect, Myanmar’s debt to Japan meant that the legacy of the failure of Japanese ODA policy towards Burma during the Cold War was the most significant constraint on Japanese ODA diplomacy/constructive engagement policy towards Myanmar in the post-Cold War. While Yoshida predicted that the investment of reparations would “pay-off” for Japan (in terms of an economic reward), in actuality, the reparations agreement set in motion a course of events that would do exactly the opposite of what Yoshida had predicted. While Burma was supposed to develop economically and become dependent on Japanese capital, goods and expertise, and while Japan was supposed to reap some economic benefit, in fact, Japan became dependent on paying for its past mistakes, and this undermined its own policy effectiveness.
1 Burma was renamed Myanmar in 1989. The author will follow the line of the United Nations and use ‘Burma’ for the years preceding 1989 and for the years thereafter, ‘Myanmar’.

2 MOFA, 1992 Gaiko Seisho [Diplomatic Bluebook]. Chapter 3 Section 2

3 Based on the Exchange of Notes, from MOFA statistics at
   http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/shiryo/isseki/kuni/j__before.htm, visited on 28 February 1999


5 MOFA, “Japan’s ODA Annual Report 1992”,

6 MOFA, Revision of Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter 1992

7 MOFA, “Japan’s position regarding the situation in Myanmar”, March 1999

8 MOFA, Japan’s ODA Annual Report 1992 Chapter 3 refers to the ‘four key principles for the implementation of aid’,

9 MOFA, 1992 Gaiko Seisho [Diplomatic Bluebook]. Chapter 3 Section 1

10 See, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/shiryo/isseki/kuni/j__before.htm, and

11 Whether or not this special relationship was anything more than just close elite connections is a contentious issue. Certainly General Ne Win himself was close to Japan and continued to visit Japan regularly. It is also true that many soldiers who served in Burma during the war later went on to become highly influential, and often vocal proponents of economic cooperation with Burma.

See, for example SUDO, Sueo. The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN: New Dimensions in J apan ese Foreign Policy. (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore), 140 p. 39 Also, YANAGA, Chitoshi. Big Business in J apan ese Politics (Yale University Press, New Haven), 235 p. 81

While ODA was one component of the J apan ese economic policy of protecting and supporting domestic industry, it is of course the case that all donor countries tie some percentage of their ODA even now. Tied Aid is aid that is tied to the purchase of goods or services from the donor country.

Article V, “The Treaty of Peace between the Union of Burma and J apan” was signed in Rangoon on 23 November 1947. See, UN Treaty Series, No. 1410.


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Comprising Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Japan, United States, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Finland, Norway, Switzerland, the European Economic Community, the ADB, the UNDP, the IMF and the World Bank.

OECD Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, various years.


MOFA, 1991 Gaiko Seisho [Diplomatic Bluebook], Chapter I, Section 1, p. 3


JBIC, Nenji Hokokusho [Annual Reports], p. 1.


JBIC, Nenji Hokokusho [Annual Reports], p. 1.


In Manila, at the first Japan-Myanmar Summit in 1994, PM Obuchi met General Than Swe and promised Japanese assistance for Myanmar’s economic reforms.

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ミャンマーに対する日本ODAの歪曲

1990年ごろにビルマで起こった出来事は、ビルマに対する日本の大幅なODA供与の長い歴史と相まって、ODA大綱とミャンマーの顕著かつ大変象徴的な関連性を生み出した。そして、ポスト冷戦時代を通じて、ミャンマーは、ODA大綱の運用成功例として公式に公表され続けてきた。

そのため、本研究のひとつ目の目的は、ポスト冷戦時代のミャンマーに対する日本のODA供与を日本のODA大綱の運用事例として取り扱う。

ODA大綱の原則に従うと、日本の対ミャンマー政策は、建設的関与というキャッチフレー
ズのもと、民主主義への移行と人権状況の改善を促してきた。しかしながら、このような外交努力は、冷戦時代の日本対ビルマの経済協力の失敗の後遺症により、著しく損なわれてきた。

この失敗は、ビルマの経済における長期低迷のみならず、日本への債務の蓄積を生じた。この債務の問題が日本のODA政策を著しく損なったのである。なぜなら、日本は独自の外交努力の実現性を維持するために、多額の債務救済の支払いに依存するようになったからである。

1988年にミャンマーが支払いが滞ったとき、日本の外交は、建設的関与政策の土台であった魅力（大規模なODA貸付金の見込み）を失った。20世紀、ミャンマーの対日本債務、そしてミャンマーの政策変更の2つの問題は表裏一体となった。このようにして、冷戦時代の日本の对外経済政策の失敗という後遺症が、ポスト冷戦時代の日本の外交努力を抑制してきた。

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