North Korean Domestic Situation 
and Its Impact on the Nuclear Crisis 

CHOI Jinwook

The North Korean nuclear crisis is often analyzed from perspectives of regional and global security and international relations, and the impact of the North Korean domestic situation on the nuclear crisis seems to be overlooked. Given North Korea’s economic difficulties, the United States wishes that North Korea give up its nuclear program in return for some economic assistance or economic pressure. However, North Korea has not shown a positive response to economic carrots or sticks. In this sense, North Korean domestic factors should be analyzed more carefully in explaining the nuclear crisis.

The purpose of this paper is to look at the North Korean nuclear crisis from a North Korean perspective. For North Korea, its nuclear program is the best leverage it has in order to receive attention, food, and assistance from the outside world. North Korea is also interested in nuclear weapons in order to cut its military spending. Above all, Pyongyang believes that the nuclear program may provide a security guarantee for the Kim Jong-il regime, which suffers from declining social and political stability. Lack of confidence in political stability of the Kim Jong-il regime is the major obstacle to Pyongyang’s attempt to implement reform policies in a committed fashion, if it has such an intention at all. Any policy based on the assumption that North Korea will abandon its nuclear program in return for economic carrots, or in response to economic pressures, will not work.
Exploring Ways of Enhancing
APEC’s Effectiveness

LIAO Shaolian

Since its establishment in 1989, APEC has helped stabilize relations and promote economic cooperation among its diverse members. However, APEC is confronted with a series of challenges in its implementation of the commitments in advancing free and open trade and investment and other areas of cooperation.

Increasing number of member economies are losing their interest in APEC process and shifting their attention to sub-regional/bilateral free trade arrangements. More emphasis has been put on trade and investment liberalization and facilitation (TILF) while economic and technical cooperation (ECOTECH) aspects have been on decline. Host economies make great efforts in producing new topics and initiatives while less discussion is carried out on concrete measures of implementation and monitoring.

With the aim of revitalizing APEC, a series of measures should be taken to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness. There should be a clearly defined long-term goal and road map accepted by all member economies. It is probably better for APEC leaders to concentrate more on the above-mentioned major issues instead of proposing new initiatives each year and discussing a very wide range of topics.

ECOTECH matters should receive more attention. It should ensure that a credible and effective monitoring and peer review process is kept in place so as to be able to strive for a solid record of achievement. Greater coordination of activities would make the APEC process more manageable and effective. Coordination between and within committees should be strengthened so as to improve the productivity of the process and avoid unnecessary meetings and duplication of effort. FTAs can be treated as “pathfinder” initiatives, but individual pairs of economies are encouraged to adhere to the “best practice” guidelines and follow these models as closely as possible in their individual bilateral FTAs.

In fact APEC has evolved and is as relevant now as it was in 1989. Many of the reasons that drove its creation remain valid today. With its reform, APEC will be better positioned to restore dynamism and confidence to the Asia Pacific region and remain an essential and effective part of the regional and international
architecture for economic cooperation.

The Bush National Security Strategy and the Middle East

Duncan L. CLARKE

Method and Motive in Contemporary Film Treatments of War

Robert C. KOEPP

第４回（2006年12月5日）

Class and space: social segregation in Japanese cities

Anthony J. FIELDING

The presentation was in three parts: (i) focusing on Osaka, the first section criticised one strongly expressed view on the nature of social segregation in Japanese cities (that no such segregation exists); (ii) the second section asked ‘are there reasons for thinking that Japanese cities should be fundamentally different from European and North American cities in their contemporary social geographies?’; (ii) the final section contained an empirical study of a Japanese city, this time Kyoto, in the form of an analysis of the degree and nature of social class segregation in that city.

Having described a detailed analysis of social segregation in Kyoto and Edinburgh, the main results of the research were reported to be: (i) that Japanese cities do have a distinctive social geography with clear patterns of social class segregation; (ii) that, despite this, good reasons exist for expecting that the degree of social segregation in Japanese cities will be less than in Western cities. These were listed under the following headings: employer payment of commuting costs in Japan; less inner/outer city contrasts in age of built-form in Japan; different social meaning of the home in Japan; the effects of the Japanese land use and development system; the lack of gentrification in Japan; the lower need to escape the multicultural inner city in Japan; and the generally lower degree of inequality in Japan for people of working age; (iii) that a comparison of social segregation between a Japanese city (Kyoto) and a UK city (Edinburgh) shows a) that the degree of social segregation is indeed less in the Japanese city, and b) that the spatial form of this segregation is also different (eg nothing equivalent to buraku districts in UK cities).