Remedial Language Education and Citizenship: Examining the JSL Classroom as an Ethnic Project.

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Public schools play a key role in training children for their futures as adult citizens by providing not only human and cultural capital, but also by informing children’s sense of membership in the larger national body. In Japanese public schools, this project of citizen-building occurs in a classroom setting that emphasizes the equality of all students, and a strong sense of collectivity and mutual interdependence. Professional norms in Japanese education further dictate that schools must provide all students with similar education until they enter high school, at which time students are sorted into academic and vocational schools with differing curricular emphases and degrees of prestige.

Some Japanese public schools must also prepare the children of immigrants for their futures in Japan, and have responded by creating separate Japanese as a second language (JSL) classrooms for immigrant students who require remedial language training. Instead of having all students complete the same lessons together, these classrooms pull the lowest-performing immigrant students out of their homeroom classes for remedial lessons. The success or failure of this approach likely foretells the JSL students’ future academic attainment and their lives as adults in Japan, since school is the primary site where Japan’s immigrant children learn to read and write the language. Success could enable the children to be mainstreamed into their homeroom classes. However, failure could isolate the children in the JSL classroom, limiting their ability to improve their command of the Japanese language. Such a project would prepare immigrant children not for integration into Japanese society, but for life on the social and economic margins.

I analyze the homeroom and the JSL classroom as competing ethnic projects that reflect particular conceptualizations of the children’s future lives as members of Japanese society. These projects represent group dynamics in ethnic terms and redistribute resources along particular ethnic lines. This analysis foregrounds the classroom’s role in the construction of Japanese citizenship and the co-construction of Japan’s ethnic others, and the processes of inclusion and marginalization of Japan’s new immigrant minority.

My research site is a public school in central Japan that has more than 50 immigrant students. My ethnographic data indicate that the JSL program systematically denies educational resources to low-performing immigrant students, and simultaneously explains this dynamic on the basis of the challenges of being foreign in Japan. In particular, teachers refer to immigrant students’ supposed need not for
specialized instruction, but for relaxation as a break from the difficulties of learning Japanese.

This analysis serves as a cautionary tale of the risks of failing to educate Japan’s immigrant children. As these immigrant families permanently settle in Japan, it is likely that some of the children will choose, as adults, to acquire Japanese citizenship to gain the rights such a status would confer. However, this research reveals that citizenship alone will not be enough to move them out of the margins of Japanese society. Such mobility will require Japanese human and cultural capital, and the primary source of that capital is the very Japanese public school system that is failing these immigrant children.

**ABSTRACT:**

Despite the stern admonishments of the prominent Extractive Industry Review in 2003, the World Bank Group (WBG) has continued to promote the expansion of mining activities in resource-rich client-countries. While keeping in line with its traditional mantra on the economic benefits of the sector in cash-strapped countries, poverty reduction and environmental sustainability have become in recent years, the new porté-éstandard to justify the need for the WBG to remain actively involved in the sector. Building on the cases of the Philippines, Papua New Guinea and Lao PDR, three of Asia’s richest countries in terms of mineral endowment, this paper analyses this new social and environmental narrative in conjunction with the highly political nature of the role played by the WBG in the mining sector of its country-clients over time. The cases suggest that the WBG has played a key role in influencing a wave of new mining regimes in the region. It is argued that these new regimes, which comprises multilateral social and environmental safeguards, circumscribes the risks faced by industry, rather than by local populations. While
successful in stimulating foreign direct investments in the sector, these regimes might also prove to be ineffective in taming local and national resentment against mining activities. Crucially, the engineering of mining regimes and norm-settings in multilateral arenas brings forth concerns relating to the legitimacy of the transformations of the roles and responsibilities assigned to local mining stakeholders, as well as the possible subsequent contraction of local political spaces.

**KEY WORDS:** Extractive industry, investment risk, Lao PDR, mining, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, World Bank Group

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The Doha Round Negotiations of the World Trade Organization: Free or Managed Trade?

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The Doha Round was launched by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in November 2001. Since then, negotiations on different issues including agriculture, non-agriculture market access, trade in services, intellectual property rights, trade facilitation, WTO rules, implementation, and other issues are ongoing. Ten years have already passed; the negotiations have not yet been completed. Why hasn’t the Doha Round been completed, yet? What are the problems that have hindered the Doha Round to mark its success? The paper explaining the nature of the negotiations and their possible consequences offers some perspectives to the questions.

The paper explains that the Doha Round is mired with three fundamental problems. First, it has applied a faulty methodology for managing the contesting concepts and interests that are under negotiations. Second, it has been a victim of the key players’ reluctance to liberalize trade further. Third, it is trying to legitimize a widespread departure from its original mission and legal framework. As a result, there seem three possible consequences: an unfortunate death of the Doha Round,
partial conclusion, and conclusion with pervasive divergences, derogations, and fragmentation. All these three possible consequences will bring the WTO on protectionist pressures. Nevertheless, the paper argues that the WTO will be able to defend multilateralism, especially due to the significant role played by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSU) of the WTO. However, multilateralism will face a serious challenge by the increasing inclination and reliance of countries towards free trade area agreements (FTAs) or regional trade agreements (RTAs). On the positive side, the FTAs or RTAs might help liberalize regional trading regimes. Also, it seems unlikely to the WTO member countries to slip backwards from their existing level of trade liberalizations already institutionalized at the domestic levels. Thus, by maintaining the existing level of trade liberalization, the WTO Members will continue respecting the multilateral trading system.

Along with the methodological gap in the Doha Round, the paper also points out the theoretical crisis, especially reflected in the Doha Round. The Doha Round with its pervasive efforts to legitimize exceptions, fragmentation, divergences, and derogations from the idea of trade liberalization has evidenced that the WTO is not an institution for free trade but an institution for managed trade. The unresolved theoretical dilemma between managed and free trade has deeply aggravated complexities in the Doha Round. In its true nature, the idea of managed trade as espoused by the Doha Round is on the edged of turning around the side of trade restrictions leaning towards protectionism. Premised on the outcomes, the Doha Round has achieved until, it is clearly demonstrating that the Doha Round is moving towards the side of trade restrictions allowing protectionism in the forefront.

The paper offers a model of welfare-frontier-grundnorm (WFG) to address underlying methodological and theoretical gaps in trade negotiations, especially in the Doha Round. The Doha Round is mainly fraught with its inability to harmonize the contesting negotiating concepts, which is the fundamental reason for Doha Round’s helplessness to liberalize trade in a desirable direction. The WFG provides a methodology for harmonizing contesting concepts. The WFG also offers a theoretical framework for trade liberalization premised on the idea of generating global equity and welfare by expanding the welfare of key stakeholders -- producers, consumers, and governments -- as a mechanism of fair trade.
Much Ado about Nothing? Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation and East Asian Exchange Rate Cooperation

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The paper asks why the creation by the ASEAN+3 countries (APT) of a common reserve pool of 120bn US dollars for financial assistance to East Asian nations in case of financial crisis, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) of 2010, has not brought about a breakthrough towards regional exchange-rate cooperation. In response to the global financial crisis undermining relative regional exchange rate stability centred on the US dollar, it was hoped that APT would quickly move towards a regional zone of monetary stability to facilitate regional trade and investment. CMIM was expected to serve as institutional stepping stone for decoupling East Asia from US monetary hegemony and as a vehicle for moving towards regional currency cooperation, especially between China and Japan. Technocratic-bureaucratic optimists, especially in the Asian Development Bank, envisaged that the shares of the Japan yen and the Chinese RMB, dominating the CMIM reserve pool, would determine the two countries shares in a future Asian Currency Unit (ACU), a common currency basket at the centre of regional exchange rate stabilisation. Furthermore, strong CMIM self-governing structures were expected to serve as the blueprint for a future Asian Monetary Fund-style institution which would facilitate technocratic currency cooperation, overcoming the problem of Sino-Japanese rivalry. However, such an essentially neo-functional spill-over from CMIM to currency regionalism has not taken place. CMIM is institutionally weak, de facto governed by the US-dominated IMF, and no moves towards currency cooperation have occurred.

This paper analysis the disappointing outcome of CMIM by criticising the neo-functionalist optimistic view on the prospects for Sino-Japanese currency cooperation from a realist and liberal intergovernmentalist perspective. As realists points out, China and Japan are involved in a strategic game for regional influence, using CMIM cooperation for ‘high politics’ purposes: winning over regional allies to strengthen their hand against each other in a regional balance-of-power struggle. From this perspective the chances for exchange rate cooperation between the two countries, which would increase mutual vulnerability, are de facto nil.

The realist ‘high politics’ explanations have to be complemented by the complex low politics analysis of liberal intergovernmentalism. In this view the two countries’ diverging regional economic policy preferences are rooted in different domestic political-economic structures and interests. Because of fundamental domestic structural differences Japan and China are both reluctant to constrain their domestic monetary policy
autonomy by stabilising the exchange rate vis-à-vis the other power’s currency. Entering into such commitments would risk that the other power might impose its domestically-driven policy preferences, constraining the own monetary policymaking room-for-maneouvure. This means that Japanese and Chinese policymakers would only commit to meaningful regional monetary cooperation if it were dominated by their own currency, enabling them to enforce their domestically-rooted preferences across the region. Thus, at the centre of Sino-Japanese rivalry is not just great power competition but currency competition: the struggle for securing the highest degree possible of domestic monetary policy-making autonomy by locking in the dominance of the national currency in any move towards a regional regime of exchange rate stability. The paper concludes that political economy analysts, criticising arguments by economist-technocrats for a neo-functional dynamics towards deeper integration, have to take account not only of realist, but also liberal intergovernmentalist approaches which point at incompatible domestic economic policy-making regimes as a key reason for lack of progress.