The Post-Western Turn in International Theory and the English School

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INTRODUCTION

For more than a decade, the discipline of International Relations (hereafter, IR) has been witnessing the increasing attention to the English School. The phenomena have had several prisms. For instance, in Britain, its theoretical aspect was debated between the pluralists and the solidarists (Wheeler; 2000; Jackson 2000), while historical exploration (Dunne 1998), comprehensive re-assessment (Linklater and Suganami 2006), and newly related projects (Clark 2004; 2007; Hurrell 2007) were developed. In Trans-Atlantic level, a synthesis was proposed under the heading of the English School Theory (Finnemore 2001; Buzan 2004). In global level, the English School was started to be ‘exported’ to areas where originally had not covered (Buzan and Gonzalez-Palaez 2009). And in East Asia, where heavily influenced by ‘American Social Science’ (Hoffmann, 1977/2000), the English School has been regarded as a leverage for paradigm shift.

It is then an interesting question to ask how the situation has been like in Japan. In short answer, it is a sort of ‘half-boom’. As commonly seen in other East Asian states, it is a boom, as an increasing number of titles and articles on the English Schools were translated and introduced (Bull 2000; Wight 2007; Butterfield and Wight 2010). Yet at the same time it still remains half, as there have not sufficient expertises critically engaging with the English School. Although some latest publications certainly imply further development (cf. Shinoda 2004; 2007; Oshimura 2010), it is still at the stage of import and intake.

The global widespread of the English School entails one paradox, which is the School itself has been criticised as West-centric. After all, its core of rationalist idea is based on Grotian/Lockian thought about law, contract, polity, society, and

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human being. It is of course not a wise way to reject all of these assumptions straightforward, as they are elements which non-Western world has attempted to realise. Nevertheless, as globalisation as a whole involves deep awareness of cultural diversity, the globalisation of the English School necessary has inquiries about non-Western world, which should be dealt with in a reasonable manner.

The purpose of this paper is to give one view to this task. As known, there are some literatures have already covered the English School’s West-centrism (Bull and Watson 1984; Gong 1984; Keene 2002; Suzuki 2009). On the other hand, we are currently witnessing an emerging trend of ‘non-’ or ‘post-’ Western international theory, whose aim is to de-centralise Western understandings about the world (Onuma 1998; Shani 2007; 2008; Buzan and Wæver 2009). What is common with them is their critical attitude towards existing IR, including the English School, which implies that there still remain rooms for intensive investigation. A further question therefore may arise whether one can go beyond the level of just criticism, and if positive, what kind of projects can be proposed next. The paper’s answer is ‘Cosmopolitan History of Ideas’¹, and it is presented here how a route from the English School can be possible.

The next section briefly views the background of the West-centricity question, while section three attempts to have some review for the English School’s (and relevant) writings. Section four moves the argument to develop the proposal of ‘Cosmopolitan History of Ideas’, with some comparison with similar projects.

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At the centre of the West-centricity question there occupies a certain nexus between the ideas of the West and of civilization.

It can be pointed out that the idea of the West has at least two different but interrelated meanings. Geographically, it is the location west to something, and there are some derivatives according to west to which. (a) One may use the West meaning ‘Hellene’ or ‘Greek’, whose counterpart is ‘Barbaroi/Barbaros’. (b) Also, ‘the West’ may be equated to ‘the Occident’, which covers the Mediterranean region and defined as a ‘stylized image of the West’ (Carrier 1993: 1), whose counterpart is ‘the Orient’. (c) Thirdly, ‘the West’ can be placed as ‘against the Indian’, i.e. the world between the West and East Indies. (d) Finally, ‘the West’ as

¹. The author somewhere expressed his view on the Cosmopolitan History of Ideas by comparing three preceding thinkers, namely Oswald Spengler, Arnold J. Toynbee, and Hajime Nakamura. For further details, see Ikeda (forthcoming).
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‘liberal capitalist’ side which had been frequently used against ‘communism’.

The West indicating geographical location is, however, not the primary concern within the West-centricity question. Rather it is cultural superiority which becomes more problematic. At its basis, there is a mixed foundation between Hebraism and Hellenism. Hebraism covers the relationship between the people and their God, and the world itself is already its product. At its centre there is a contract between Hebrew people and Yahweh, and it is the idea of selection that differentiates the Hebrastic tradition from others. Hellenism is more secular and philosophical, but two elements make their distinct mark: a shift from ‘mythos’ to ‘logos’; and ‘the discovery of mind’ (Snell 1953), which lead to the emergence of philosophy.

On this foundation there are some experiences which make the West unique. While the birth and death of Jesus Christ brought a transition from traditional Hebraism to Christianity, thereby historicise the whole development of the world in one time-line, the official recognition of Christianity in 386 AD made Christianity the religion of the Roman Empire, and not the one for the weak ordinary. The ‘thirteenth century revolution’ (van Steenberghen 1955) was the turning point at which Christianity and Aristotelian philosophy became integrated. Colonization was an event which integrated, or the Thomist, idea of Christianity became a part of powerful foundation on which the colonial expansion was made possible. The West had prescriptive meanings besides its descriptive sense, which then linked with another term, civilization.

The concept of civilization has its roots in Latin word *civis*. This implies that civilization in concept has a close relationship with Roman culture, in three senses. First of all, it reflected a dimension of city that is distinct from other parts of the Empire. Secondly, it included an aspect of sophistication that Roman citizens were expected to have, which is often represented by linguistic ability in Latin. Finally, since the Empire’s adoption of Christianity, civilization obtained another aspect, the meaning of being a Christian. Importantly, they anticipate those who do not qualify: those who live outside of Rome or the Empire, who are unable to use Latin, and who are not Christian. Thus a demarcation line between the ‘civilized’ and the ‘uncivilized’ emerges here, and civilization itself becomes a criteria for categorizing people into two. It is on this line that civilization acquires prescriptive and evaluative meaning. Another point to note is that this prescriptive definition has allowed room for progress, thereby even the ‘uncivilized’ can qualify as ‘civilized’. Later linked with the idea of paternalism or trusteeship, the prescriptive meaning of civilization brought the asymmetrical
relationship between two types of peoples.

In international life, the term civilization has been used, and perhaps over-
used, in such a prescriptive sense. A typical example, though not within the
discipline of IR proper, can be found in James Lorimer’s work on the Law of
Nations (Lorimer 1883-1884/1980), where he differentiated the world into three,
and then concentrated his priority on the first world – the West. Another case can
be found in Alfred Zimmern’s book on the Greek Commonwealth, which regards
the prescriptive meaning of civilization as the ideal of the future world (Zimmern
1915). Though again different in their use of the term, they have in common
seeing civilization as a type of cultural sophistication with special value.

It is interesting that such West-civilization nexus presented here is little
problematised in the discipline of IR. Probably the very reason rests on the fact
Western style of state system has been required as vital basis of international
politics. Indeed, sovereign states and sovereignty itself have remained the
essential standard of reference, even one claims its ‘retreat’ (Strange 1996), or fall
into ‘quasi-’ position (Jackson 1993).

However, it is also arguable that increasing number of writings now face
squarely at the question of West-centricity, and begins to seek good alternatives to
existing traditions. One point to note with this trend is, nevertheless, such
movement does not intend to abolish all conventional perspectives because they
are Western. Rather, it is a project to broaden the vista of international theory by
taking into non-western standpoints. At this point where so-called ‘non-Western’
international theory is born, and considerable efforts have been made². The
problem with ‘non-Western’ movement is that the West-centricity question cannot
always solved by extending its theoretical reach towards non-Western world, or by
just emphasising the uniqueness of particular areas or states. Thus it creates
rooms to go further than ‘non-Western’ approach. Being instead called as ‘post-
Western’ (Shani 2008), it now includes critical scrutiny of the very process of
theorisation, often with the help from postcolonial, postmodern, and gender
studies. Post-Western turn in international theory makes a significant mark, as it
de-essentialises the hegemony of Western theorisation about the world. However,
the writings remain to have a difficulty not to ‘ending up reproducing the very
hegemony they set out to critique’ (Shani 2008: 723).

². For detailed account about ‘non-Western’ IR, see Acharya and Buzan (2009), Chen (2011),
and Ikeda (forthcoming).
As Edward Keene argued, criticising the English School’s West-centricity has much broader meaning (Keene 2002: 1). As long as the essence of the English School rests on its ‘rationalist’ doctrine, the criticism necessary includes the one towards rationalism itself. Meanwhile, it is the first step of a wider project of post-Western IR as well, clarifying what kind of views towards non-Western world had appeared by whom. In this section several arguments will be explored and reviewed, and it is maintained that the English School had been in a gradual move from concentrating the order among European sovereign states to a wider global picture, though incomplete.

Martin Wight has been a famous icon of the English School and he produced various influential articles, but from the point of the post-Western view, it is his attention to the systems of sovereign states itself which clearly embodies his attitude of West-centricity. Basically his approach is historical, which can be bifurcated further. One is the history of ideas, appearing in his article on western values of international relations (Wight 1966). In this article he points out four types of conceptions which had been typical to Western context, namely (i) international society; (ii) balance of power; (iii) intervention; and (iv) international morality. His ‘western value’ article is important, for it expresses the essential idea of his view about international theory, later systematised as ‘three-Rs’ (Wight 1991). Another approach has more sociological nuances, which appeared in three papers (Wight 1977a; 1977b; 1977c). The first article ‘De Systematibus Civitatum’, originally written in 1967, is an attempt to delineate the sovereign state system from the point of its member (i.e. states) and of the interaction between them. Here one sees his famous comparison with suzerain state system, and his rejection of it, as well as the exclusion of Chinese monarchy, Byzantium Empire, and British Raj in India. Another distinction is made between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ states systems, whose distinguishing criterion is on whether the system is made solely by sovereign states or not. In the second and third papers, written at the very end of his life 1971, focus on the origins of Western state system from geographical and chronological angles. They deal with a question when sovereign states systems were born, and provide an answer tracing back to fifteenth century. While the ‘geographical’ paper considers the its extent, the ‘chronological’ paper points out six points unique to Western state systems. Listing up the characters particularly to the West is seen in other papers, and it can be said that they are in a sense extension of his ‘Western value’ paper.
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As Hedley Bull once mentioned, ‘Wight’s approach is based on the comparative study of states-systems (Bull 1977b: 16)’. However, Wight did not deny the asymmetrical relationship between the West and the rest. This is important because it is this view on which his follower relied on to build a consolidated account about the expansion of international society, and which simultaneously has been a matter of debate. Thus it is a good idea to look back a powerful counterargument by Charles Henry Alexandrowicz. His detailed analyses between Europe and the East Indies (Alexandrowicz 1967) as well as the African states (Alexandrowicz 1973) present that there had been indeed more equal relationship between the West and the non-West. The point of debate is primarily about whether one accept his counter theses or not, which Wight himself clearly rejected (Wight 1977b: 119-123). A Milder position was shown by Bull and Adam Watson (Bull and Watson 1984: 6-7), though the very basic attitude had been unchanged. Even so, Bull and Watson’s collaborative effort, together with other 21 scholars, was still epoch-making, not only in a point that they had a thorough treatment to the development of international society, but also it was the first comprehensive attempt to focus on another aspect of world order between the West and the rest.

In Bull – Watson book, three types of West-rest relationship are presented: expansion; revolt; and multi-culturality. It is primarily the idea of expansion throughout which underlies the whole structure of the book. It presupposes the ‘European international society’ as a prototype of international collective life, and asks how it had turned into universal. The attitude of West-centricity is apparent when Bull says that ‘the role of the Europeans in shaping an international society of worldwide dimension has been a special one (Bull 1984a: 123)’. Although there also seems their consideration reflecting Alexandrowicz’s argument, as well as contemporary view from the point of the non-West (Gong 1984), an ending of the book is the completion of international society anyway. What is new is the rejection of mere ‘success story’. Bull’s argument on the ‘Revolt against the West’ created the second strand of account (Bull 1984b), and the whole section III of the book is devoted to present different views. Here Bull mentions five points constituting the ‘revolt’. While four of which are about catching-up issues, the final point of ‘cultural liberation’ has a different character. Later Bull certainly covered the first four by engaging himself with his last project on international justice (Bull 1984c/2000), yet the last issue on culture remained untouched.

Having mentioned so, one crucial exception was on the same book, a chapter by Adda Bozeman. Rejecting Bull’s ‘revolt’ view and Ronald Dore’s argument on
the world culture (Bozeman 1984: 391), her argument provided the third stream of multi-culturalism. Yet what should be noted is that Bozeman’s vision was originally based on her claim about the world which lacks common language or communication among cultures (Bozeman 1970). Thus her multi-culturalism in fact describes the plurality of cultures, which are often incommensurable.

Now Bozeman’s argument poses a question whether radically different cultures are able to find common paths to develop. Bozeman herself put negative answer to it, and it is at this point where post-Western international theory should deal with. Yet before moving to this question, it is useful to have a quick look at another answer which seemingly supports the plurality, but is very different from Bozeman: C.A.W. Manning’s essay on Apartheid (Manning 1964). His article, as its title ‘In defence of Apartheid’ presents, is very provocative in the context of 1960s, when the whole world castigated South African racist policy. Manning here argues that it is necessary to know the philosophy of the Apartheid, and he identifies the idea of ‘separate development’ as its core. What he does not intend to say here is that the Apartheid is the policy by the white discriminating the black; rather it is the respect of diverse peoples within South Africa. He emphasises ‘the nationalism of the Afrikaner folks (ibid.: 140, emphasis original)’, and expresses his ‘rejection of the fallacy that whatever a single system of government is in operation, there do the governed compose a single people (ibid.: 148)’. It is still under exploration what was the crux in his defence of the Apartheid, and some literature may be useful here (Suganami 2001; Wilson 2008).

Yet what may be emphasised here is the fact that Manning used the logic of plurality in order to defence the counter-ethical policy of the Apartheid. Of course it may be claimed that it is not the idea of ‘separate development’ per se which should not be condemned but the reality of oppression by the white African, but this does not exempt one from asking further question of whether we can really rely on the idea of plurality, and if positive, to what extent.

FROM INTERNATIONAL THEORY
TO COSMOPOLITAN HISTORY OF IDEAS

Traditionally culture has been one topic which the English School has not well covered. Plurality had been used in a very different sense: the position ‘pluralism’ in the English School means sovereign states keeping their very basic doctrine of being mutually independent. It is commonly known that Bull was the person who firstly formulated this ‘pluralism’ (Bull 1966), but what the short review on
Manning tells us is that the ‘pluralism’ in Bullian sense had partially been expressed, in a very upsetting language of ‘separate development’, in Manning’s writing. In addition, taking his analogy between international society and his own country (Manning 1964: 148), as well as another claim that the plurality is made against the ‘single system’ by ‘single people’, it can be the position purporting the single community which he seems to oppose. Probably it is a big jump to identify this opponent with Revolutionism immediately, but it may still be said that the coincidence between Bull and Manning can lead us to one question, to what extent we can expect and admit plurality. This is a question of human solidarity as well, since it is the other side of the same coin. In addition, they seem to be the questions which consider the meaning of ‘pluralism’ and ‘solidarism’ more to the original sense, because they can be derived from Tönnies’ conceptions of ‘Gemeinschaft’ and ‘Gesellschaft’, which both Bull and Manning relied on.

When one brings cultural elements into the ‘pluralism-solidarism’ divide, a different route can be created, apart from the well-known formation (Wheeler 2000; Jackson 2000). On the one hand, pluralism here means cultural plurality, which emphasises the significance of values of particular regions, areas, and communities. On the other hand, solidarism means the existence of common cultural ties and sharable values (one may recall here that it is this common culture on which international society can be established, apart from mere international system, as Bull and Wight argue, and certainly European international society is considered as a product). In the West-centricity question, each of these positions seems to have some supporters.

From the view of stressing cultural plurality, one can now see rapid development of ‘non-Western’ international theories. Against the domination of Western IR for Western people, this position aims to ‘democratise’ (Chen 2010), the intellectual picture of IR. Recent literatures propose both regional and states-based subject, such as ‘Asian’ (Chan et al. 2001), ‘African’ (Dun and Shaw 2001), ‘Chinese’ (Qin 2007), ‘Indian’ (Behera 2007), and ‘Japanese’ (Inoguchi 2007; Shimizu 2009). Often calling themselves as ‘schools’ they are all intentional projects to differentiate from the mainstream IR, respecting own cultural and logical standpoints. The problem with this tendency is they incline to show their superiority in the name of uniqueness. Such fallacy includes not only the position emphasising own cultures, but also the roles which particular countries seems to play. Typical case can be seen in the writings of Japanese IR. Mainly based the

3. More detailed argument on ‘solidarism’ and ‘pluralism’ is seen in Bull (1966) and Manning (1962).
Kyoto Schools of Philosophy (Goto-Jones 2005) or its self-recognition of ‘in-between’ position (Ikeda 2008), Japanese IR had developed either as an imperialist discourse justifying colonial rule over East Asia, as an internationalist discourse with clear post-war purpose of ‘occupying an honoured position in international society’ (Preamble, The Constitution of Japan), or as a pacifist discourse pursuing the abolishment of nuclear weapons. Indeed, all of them have mixed reputations, but they are in common to share the sentiment of uniqueness on the country’s cultural background or its international role. Though it is a hasty evaluation to criticise simply because of their directions, it is also necessary to note that either localised or nationalised IR can only be meaningful as long as it relativises the whole discipline. In this sense, post-Western international theory avoids the fallacy of uniqueness by de-essentialising Western way of theorisation, not the West itself. Yet one problem with this position is it often entails the culture of iterative criticisms, which marks one central pillar in Western political idea (Wight 1966: 128). By emphasising the role of ‘the political’, post-Western international theory can turn back to a tradition which it sets out to criticise.

Then the question coming next is what kind of approach one may take, when emphasising the solidarity-side instead. Yet it is warned that such solidarist position should avoid views just transcending particular claims, or ‘thick’ universalist approach. Thus it can of course be proposed some ‘thinner’ universalism. In the discipline of IR, Andrew Linklater’s proposal for triple transformation based on the discourse ethics may be a powerful candidate (Linklater 1998). His account certainly deals with the inquiry pursuing the cosmopolitanism reflecting cultural diversity, but the very foundation of discourse ethics is already representing one typical Western quality of procedural fairness. It is typical among ‘thin’ universalists to shift the essence of universality from certain substantive character to the process of making the universality itself. The presumption shared here is the impossibility, or inadequacy, of substantial universal value covering the globe. Yet ‘thin’ universalism unnecessary rejects the view of another type of universalism. It on the one hand shares with other existing arguments that there are some common values among different cultural traditions and peoples. On the other hand, it differentiates from them by saying that the universality of universalism comes through various routes, some \textit{a priori}, some constructed, and some translated. If this is true, the next task for cultivating another universalism is to develop an account to show how some have been shared as \textit{a priori}, while others have been constructed, or translated. After all, such account should be the one describing the historical process of making a
variety of universal values.

In neighbouring academic field, one similar project has already been developed, which is called the history of ideas (Lovejoy 1936/1960). Its central focus is on the ways of thinking on which certain ideas, conceptions, and the whole philosophy can be made. Hajime Nakamura’s project of comparative study of ideas (or Hikaku Shisou-ron in Japanese) shares the significance of historical development of ideas (Nakamura 1992). Yet both Lovejoy and Nakamura’s projects are broad in its coverage, thus for the post-Western international theory, it is necessary to make it appropriate to fit into global political life. Here some preceding studies may give guidance. For instance, Fred Dallmyar’s writings on ‘comparative political theory’ aim to develop a multi-eyed account for some of the important ideas in politics (Dallmyar 2010). Similarly, Antony Black’s historical studies give comprehensive treatments for political ideas among different cultures, in particular between the West and Islam (Black 2008; 2009). Especially focusing on the international realm, again Wight’s ‘Western Value’ essay will still be of a standard reference. Having stated, all of these literatures provide a foundation on which further academic project can be made. It will cover conceptions particularly related to world politics, which Nakamura, Dallmyar and Black do not. Also, it will expand the geographical scope much broader, which Lovejoy and Wight limited themselves within the Western context.

In short, further project can be called as ‘Cosmopolitan History of Ideas’: it is cosmopolitan as weighing common aspects among the different; it is historical as focusing on the developmental process of certain categories of ideas; and finally it is based on ideas as stressing ideational power to construct and reconstruct worldwide social reality (Ikeda forthcoming). It is also inter-civilizational in its scale, recognising civilizations as the realm where particular ideas related to world political life have been developed, transferred and (re) interpreted, accepted, reformulated, and abolished. And the ideas concerned in this project include:

1. On human groups or collectivity; particularly (but not limited to) political community.
2. On the general environment surrounding human beings; particularly (but not limited to) political environment.
3. On the life-cycles of particular human groups.
4. On the dynamics of those human groups, including conflict and cooperation, disintegration and integration, exclusion and inclusion.
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(5) On the change of the general environment.

They are still interim list, and it will be modified as appropriate. Also, though they are related to global political life, it is certainly the case that these ideas must have links with more basic conceptions about the member of particular groups, or more frankly, the ideas about human being itself. Another point to note is that this project especially stresses on the parallel development of certain conceptions among civilizations. For instance, the idea of ‘world state’, which may belong to category (1) above, can be seen across civilizations. While ancient China had developed the idea of ‘World State’ through the language of Tienxia, it was expressed as Cosmopolis (Greek) or Civitas Maxima (Roman and mediaeval Christian world) in Europe. There may or may not be connections among different routes of development about certain ideas, and some of them can have stories of transferring, inheriting, and accepting the ideas. It will be the task for Cosmopolitan History of Ideas to present the ubiquity of particular conceptions on global political life, and where possible, to clarify the historical linkage of different conceptions among civilizations. And the central aim of the project is to show how certain ideas have been sharable and recurrent (if not timeless), regardless of any culture.

Finally, it may be useful for this new proposal to make further comparison with closer academic project: Linklater’s ongoing study on global civilizing process (Linklater 2009a; 2009b; 2010). The aim of his project is to draw a grand historical account of how human has gradually developed certain moral principles whose aim is to avoid unnecessary harms among strangers. It is on the one hand historical sociology and on the other hand sociological psychology, both of which get together constitute one ‘civilizing process’. Though it is based on the Western writings such as Norbert Elias, Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx, Linklater clearly denies that the global civilizing process never aims to show the superiority of particular cultures (especially Western) over others. Rather it is based on the notion that ‘all societies have civilizing process that (...) enable their members to coexist without injuring, demeaning and in other ways harming each other (Linklater 2010: 157, citing Elias)’.

One clear difference between Linklater’s account and Cosmopolitan History of Ideas is that the former is more specific than the latter: Linklater primarily focuses on ‘harm conventions’ through which different people may agree not to inflict unnecessary damages, whilst Cosmopolitan History of Ideas may cover wider range of conceptions, such as community, sovereignty, worlds states, rule of
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In addition, it seems to be the process of development that Linklater pays more attention, while it is the process of interpretation, acceptance, and rejection besides development which the present project intends to see. In particular the act of translation among civilization seems to be important, as it often reflects how one civilization sees certain conceptions which comes from outside.

Nevertheless, these two have some commonality as well. In the first place, they both endorse ‘grand narratives’. Cosmopolitan History of Ideas is inspired by Nakamura’s comparative approach which has temporal reach over two millennia. Global civilizing process is a project which ‘combines investigations of long-term directions with an emancipatory interest (Linklater 2010: 158)’. And probably they may share some interests with global history (e.g. McNeill and McNeill 2005). Secondly, their view is cosmopolitan, in supposing that there will be sharable elements which even radically different people may agree with. Although Linklater seems to pay more attention to its ‘conventional’ side, which Cosmopolitan History of Idea does not deny a priori conception, they still argue for the ubiquity of particular values and ideas among cultures. Finally, they recognise the power of ideas to reality: Cosmopolitan History of Ideas assumes mutual construction between ideas and social reality, and Linklater makes further case on ‘the interrelations between the material, ideational and emotional dimensions of human experience’ (Linklater 2009b: 481). Their emphasis on non-material factors can be contrasted to a similar project which contrary focused on more material dimension (Buzan and Little 2000).

CONCLUSION

In 1966, Wight asked one question of why there was no international theory (Wight 1966b). Some 40 years after, Amitav Acharya and Buzan asked similar question of why there was no non-Western international theory (Acharya and Buzan 2007; 2009). These are, however, qualitatively different. What Wight had (paradoxically) presented is the possibility of international theory. Acharya and Buzan also envisaged the possibility of non-Western international theory. Again they are different. The difference between Wight and Acharya – Buzan is not simply the fact that the former is Western while the latter is not. Nor is it the contrast that there had already been ‘international theory’, while ‘non-Western international theory’ will be of future product. Rather, it is the difference between

4. The importance of translation is also expressed in Nakamura (1992) and Delanty (2009).
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a theory concerning international political life, and an international theory concerning cultural difference. According to Wight, politics itself was a hallmark of Western culture, so it was enough for him to see only the West in order to develop his ‘international theory’. The result was his exclusive concern, despite his mention of other civilizations, of sovereign state systems. On the contrary, what Acharya and Buzan focus on was the cultural interpretation of such international theory. Thus their primary inquiry is either to what extent the English School Theory can be applicable to culturally different context, or whether there is any system of theories which is apart from the West. Their fruit was, accordingly, either the transplantation of the English School Theory or the regionalisation/nationalisation of international theory.

What this paper has been endeavouring is neither of them. Cosmopolitan History of Ideas is interested in the possibility of sharable ideas about politics. It is based not only on an assumption that the world is not homogeneous, but also on that this does not exclude sharable ideas about politics in the world. As its name suggests, Cosmopolitan History of Ideas then entails historical turn, since it includes the historical development of political ideas. However, it still belongs to a theory concerning global political life. Running together similar projects of global civilizing process or global history, it may form a third type of account, apart from both Wight, Buzan and Little. As a conclusion, it may be tempting to ask which of these three would be the most appropriate, but so far this is not a question; more to the point in this context is that the English School has been a reflection of West-centricity, as well as a source to overcome it.

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