International conflict and co-operation: Identity in the work of Lebow

Robert Ó'MóCHAIN *

Abstract

In recent years, the work of Richard Ned Lebow has become influential within the field of International Relations theory, and he has been identified as a key proponent both of Constructivism and of Classical Realism.

This paper first delineates Lebow’s account of causality, empathy, and identity and his challenge to the notion of essential national identity or of static narratives of the national self. The condition of “Modernity” is marked, Lebow argues, by the working out of four main overarching strategies of identity. These strategies lead to the unfolding of contrasting political projects such as utopianism, totalitarianism, and liberalism. These political projects also involve the construction of meanings for signifiers such as “fairness” and “equality” leading to myriad combinations of approximation and of distancing between states in the international system. The work of other scholars who complement Lebow’s treatment of identity are also treated in this paper.

Keywords: Cultural Theory; identity; spirit; Modernity; transformation; international system

Introduction

After the end of the Cold War in the late 1980’s, Fukuyama(1992) foresaw a world in which old affiliations would wither away and conflicts would have minimal impact, essentially because people would have nothing to die for, meaning that no great causes would exist to elicit the passion required for sustained military conflicts. More recent history, with the dominance of romanticist nationalism, authoritarian government, fundamentalist religion, and related terrorist networks, has shown that these prognostications were misled, as Fukuyama himself has accepted

* Associate Professor, College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University

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to a large extent (note for example the acknowledgement of the influence of negative affect: “Norm-following behavior is usually grounded not in reason but in emotions like pride, guilt, anger, and shame" (Fukuyama, 2014).

Alternative theories have been sought to explain history in the early 21st century, when the notion of the “triumph of the West” has come to seem almost risible. One of the most insightful responses to the challenge of articulating a coherent vocabulary of present conditions and of the human underpinnings of international relations has been provided in the work of Richard Ned Lebow, a prominent IR scholar who can be classified as both a Classical Realist and a Constructivist theorist. In his work on cultural theories of international relations, Lebow (2008, 2014) expounds a classical account of human nature, yet one that is not essentialist. The vocabularies of ancient authors help us to develop a richer understanding of human society as do the vocabularies of Enlightenment authors, and those of contemporary theorists of social, political, and psychological phenomena. With this eclectic vision, Lebow posits the existence of four fundamental motives underpinning human behavior: appetite (for the fulfillment of physiological needs, avoidance of pain, and sensuous pleasure); fear (that the physical self or moral self might be wounded or annihilated); reason (not as a supreme, disembodied attribute of humanity but as a key, community-based facet of personality that allows for the (contextualized) calculation of “interest”); and, finally, spirit (which demands that personal and national identities be recognized and honored, with the thirst for “honor” often going far beyond the demands of rationality). It is perhaps this latter assertion of the role of spirit that many will find the most challenging, either because it contradicts a materialist psychological framework or because it undermines the dominant, neo-liberal anthropology of today in which the calculating, rational, economic subject calculates (what are essentially self-evident) interests that are vital for survival. Lebow disagrees by asserting that spirit may, and often does trump cold rationality in economic and social affairs, and perhaps even more so in international affairs, where the identification of the self with the national or group interest often leads to non-rational behaviors. This comprehensive perspective of human behavior is helpful for analysis of a world where nationalism and extreme religious identifications still determine much of interstate relationships.

It should be clarified at the outset that Lebow does not claim to provide answers to the question of causation regarding international conflict and co-operation. His ontological and epistemological commitments are those of Hume, Russel, and Weber where concepts of causality, while reassuring, do not provide metaphysical certainty and do not provide the ideal methodological objective of research in the
physical or the social sciences. There are no social laws at work that would allow for definitive recognition of determination. Moreover factors never coalesce in quite the same way so as to cause or “re-cause” any single event, so that every event is unique, and undetermined. Nevertheless, he feels that it makes sense to give an account of the social world that makes use of the concept of causality without trying to employ it in the formulation of universal laws. It is important to grapple with the question at hand, and he believes that some IR Constructivist accounts do a better job than competing theories in explaining the decisions and behaviors of foreign policy protagonists. This paper delineates Lebow’s understanding of causality and identity in international relations and includes my own reflections on concepts that may complement Lebow’s approach. As Lebow has taught in notable tertiary level institutions for over fifty years whilst publishing over 15 academic books with prominent publishing houses that have been well received in the global scholarly community, it is fair to say that his work has made a significant contribution to IR’s understanding of a wide range of issues, especially the causes of international conflict and co-operation, and his work merits closer examination.

**Identity and Empathy in Modernity**

Regarding the key concept of identity, Lebow also employs a constructivist, non-essentialist approach. He argues that the concept of identity is as important for IR Constructivists as is the concept of “Power” or “Security” for IR Realists. However, he disagrees with IR Constructivists who are tied to the notion of identity as something essential or monolithic. Some scholars argue that a state constructs a national identity and that this abides over time. State leaders are rewarded when they make decisions that are consonant with national identity and are punished when they do the opposite. Lebow disagrees, seeing this view as essentialist and static. He assumes that there is no consistent, unitary ego; social subjects make self-identifications and there are identifications that are made by others. That is all. Repetitions of these identifications lead to a sense of an inner-self (the ‘I’ or reflexive voice of interiority) and of a social self (the ‘me’ in George Herbert Mead’s (1934) terminology).

A key trigger in the newfound prominence of identity in Western culture from the eighteenth-century onward was that a sense of empathy became more diffused after the Renaissance period. The word *empathy* is important here in that it is distinguished from religious discourses of *compassion* and *charity*. Such concepts had long shaped behaviors in European societies, but within a theocentric
framework where Providence can be relied upon to see that justice is done. Confidence in the execution of divine justice is greatly weakened as we advance into the Modern era. After the Protestant Reformation in Europe, more and more people became literate. But they started to read secular accounts of the world such as political tracts that made them aware of evils such as slavery and torture. At a later point, the writings of Rousseau, in particular, cast doubt on western European certainty in its own superiority over all “uncivilized” societies. These narratives would have a powerful effect. They would sow seeds of self-doubt of the wisdom of the established order both religious and social.

The U.S. historian, Lynn Hunt (2007) argues that fictional publications such as epistolary novels which allow people to identify with heroes and heroines in an intense and personal way, played an even more decisive role. Hunt shares Rorty’s (2006) view that works of literature such as those of Charles Dickens in nineteenth-century England, played a decisive role in the achievement of social transformation, specifically by promoting the notion that “natural rights” or “the rights of man” are self-evident. Identification with characters from novels by Rousseau, Richardson, and others, and from other works of fiction gave these assertions a force that had been lacking previously. Hunt (p. 29) concludes that, “Autonomy and empathy did not materialize out of thin air in the eighteenth-century; they had deep roots …[they] are cultural practices, not just ideas.”

The Modern Period: Reflexivity and the Inner Self

Lebow identifies links between modernity, political formations, and identity (or more correctly, identity construction as identity is only instantiated in the moments in which identifications are made.) He identifies four overarching identity strategies that are played out on a micro level on the level of the psyche and on a macro level in the establishment of long-term goals for political regimes.

These strategies respond to the “condition of Modernity,” the inner tension and alienation that is implicit in modern social life. In pre-Modern societies, social subjects were offered one social role to internalize and this became, in effect, one’s “inner self.” For example, in a feudal, patriarchal cultural space, a biological female was given the role of the “normal woman” to instantiate according to age and marital status: being a “good (obedient) girl; being a dutiful daughter, willing spouse, devoted mother, mournful spouse,” and so on. Similarly, men and boys were given one idealized construction of the “normal man” as ones destined “true self.” Modernity changes things, however, because it offers an array of possible
selves, a range of options regarding choices to be made about how one is to achieve a meaningful life with fulfillment, happiness, and success in the world. Under these circumstances, social subjects lose the certainties and sense of wholeness of pre-Modern eras. Increased levels of leisure time allow for reflection on one’s condition, and this reflexivity intensifies the sense of alienation, as does the fact that new technologies bring a deluge of information and images, making us ever more aware of the complexity of human problems. We experience ourselves as multiple, fragmented, and conflicted. Lebow summarizes this phenomenon as a sense of tension or struggle between the social self and the inner self.

How does all of this play out in the political sphere? Lebow identifies four social and cultural movements that lead to different types of political regimes. Two movements are broadly supportive of the inner self, rather than the social self while the other two movements are broadly contrarian for the inner self. These latter movements for identity construction are denoted as “religious utopianism” and “secular utopianism.” Lebow notes than one can gain a sense of the levels of optimism and of pessimism in a society at any given time based on the appearance and popularity of works that detail utopian visions or alternatively the works that portray a dystopia that resonates in the popular imaginary. Lebow notes that Orwell (1948) wrote for a totalitarian society that relies on brute force and the control of information with heavy-handed propaganda to maintain the regime; Huxley’s vision is, perhaps, much more relevant to the present-day situation in many late-Capitalist, hyper-consumerist zones and his dystopia could be read as a dramatization of the nightmarish possibilities outlined by Gramsci (1971) in his work on hegemony in the Prison Notebooks.

When these movements are realized in actual administrations, the state tells its citizens: “Do not listen to that inner voice that tempts you to a wayward path. We offer you the possibility to realize your true self through complete integration into the established super-structure.” One thinks here of religious utopianism among adherents of the terrorist organization known as ISIS who seek the restoration of the caliphate in the Middle East, an idealized locale where Islam can be realized to the highest levels of perfection. The power of “morality police” in Iran and Saudi Arabia point in similar directions.

Secular utopianism, in contrast, seeks the establishment of a society where the future dominates the social imaginary rather than the past. Totalitarian regimes such as those of Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s Soviet Union, Pol Pot’s Kampuchea, or the North Korea of the “Beloved Leader” may all serve as relevant examples. In such societies, we see the pervasive presence of a national project, whether of a
religious or a secular nature, or whether with an orientation toward the past (restoration of a “Golden Age” or social conservatism) or toward the future (“establishment of a “City on the Hill” or a “City of God”). In all cases, the national project totalizes all spheres of life and all citizens who are exhorted, cajoled, or intimidated into acceptance of the goals of the ruling regime where communal values are paramount. The problem of the tension between inner self and social self is solved here with brutal logic; there is only one social self on offer, the inner self is too insignificant in comparison to the sublime work of utopianism, the possibility of conflict between an inner self and a social self, quite illusory.

In sum, Lebow identifies various projects of identity in the Modern age. One is totalitarian in nature. It says in effect: “You don’t need to worry about your inner-self; you have a social self, you are part of a greater reality, we are all essentially the same because we share the same social/religious/national identity.” The totalitarian approach attempts to solve the problem of inner self versus social self in that way. And yet, there are voices that reject this logic, that speak of an intractable tension between social and inner selves. Both principal stances contrast with the two already outlined as they embrace the inner self to varying degrees. Lebow identifies the individualistic Romanticist movement as that which embraces the cause of the inner voice most stridently. The works of Rousseau, Goethe, and others posit a baneful influence from societal forces. Something precious is lost when we are incorporated into modern society with all of its greed, jealousies, and artificial practices. We need more contact with Nature, with the life of the spirit, so that the voice of interiority can speak freely, no matter how much it may jar with the clamor of modern society. Unless we struggle against this influence, we are destined to remain incomplete. For Kant and Hegel, Lebow argues, the struggle to forge self is indispensable in the effort to become an authentic, autonomous, true self. When mapped onto political life, this impulse found expression in movements for national self-determination, a veritable rejoicing in the conflict with other nations or great empires, to realize the spirit of the nation, (the reflexive voice of interiority). Kant and Hegel note that the modern age demands greater reflexivity, reflection by the inner self about itself, its own goodness and worth. In a more secular world, reflexivity can lead to a level of cognitive dissonance never previously known in feudal or semi-feudal societies. There is reflexivity and alienation from self to some degree. One cannot rely on Divine Providence to reward the good and punish the evil. Hence a greater impetus exists to achieve an end to human suffering. Moreover, increased mobility and literacy in newly industrialized locales meant there was a greater awareness of difference and diversity. A “moral imperative” to act becomes
more and more keenly felt. (Lebow points out the value of reflexivity in allowing the individual to distance themselves from burdensome norms and obligations that society endeavors to impose. This is especially important for stigmatized groups who are in danger of internalizing stereotypes, or those who are labeled as “deviant.”

An overlap can be found between these themes and the Fascist ideology of the German Nazi state in the 1930’s and 1940’s. It should be remembered, though, that for Lebow, the key distinction is the attitude towards the inner self. This self is unique and essentially free of all external constraint in the Nietzschean and Sartrean projects, for example. In the secular utopianism of Nazi ideology, the trajectory of interiority is already pre-programmed. One gives times to reflexivity, nature, the life of the mind, only as a means towards the strengthening of the national project. This logic demands a totalitarian regime as nothing less is necessary to offer one social self and one alone to each citizen of the state. To permit a social superstructure that allows for choices about who we are to become is to return to the morass of modernity. Lebow’s framework proves helpful, then, in understanding how the work of Nietzsche could be conscripted towards the achievement of Nazi political ends, but with certain distortions and falsehoods required to extinguish the possibility of an open-ended journey of interiority. One understands also why a philosopher like Heidegger could consciously lend support to a regime of secular utopianism. No matter how sympathetic he may have felt to the voice of the unique, free individual, he concedes the vital point that the inner self must ultimately submit to the demands of history and the single social self that is offered by the state for the establishment of authenticity.

Lebow (2014) clarifies that social practices of Identification-making did not pose a particular problem for people in pre-eighteenth century Europe. However, as time passed, identity took on a much more critical role in national and international life, for a wide range of reasons. Many factors led to high levels of doubt by the ‘I’ on its own meaningfulness. A close reading of Lebow’s text prompts the following reflections which serve as a summary of his key thoughts on identity and modernity.

The social self is not important but rather the inner self, and the work of self-fashioning. This is part of the Romanticist movement of the late 1700’s onward, the anti-Enlightenment strain of Rousseau and Romanticists, and in a more modern form, the post-Structuralist movement. For all of these, society is negative, a totalizing, homogenizing force that seeks to hamper individual identity. One must reject society, turn inward or turn to Nature, become one’s true self; (of course for
Post-Structuralists, there is no “true self,” but that notion is evident in Romanticism). The dilemma that is involved in the tension between the demands of a project that vaunts the social self at the expense of the inner self is also evident in the experience of the noted social theorist and philosopher, Richard Rorty (2006) who adverts to this ideological tendency when he writes of his adolescence growing up with Marxist parents. He felt a strong commitment to Marxism at the time but, without exactly knowing why, he could sense that his parents and their Marxist friends would not approve of his love of orchids and his eagerness to devote time and resources to the aesthetic appreciation of these exotic flowers.

Hegel and Kant also offer the belief of the necessity of rejection of society, doing battle against “the Other” so that the antithesis stage is succeeded by the thesis stage on an individual level. Lebow argues that there is no evidence to support the notion that to create the self, one needs a negative “other.” On the contrary, becoming a “healthy self” involves drawing closer to self in a dialectical relationship noted by many child psychologists. In a cycle of dependence, integration, separation, one fashions the self, and the healthy self is one that realizes one is the same but also separate and different from others. People only become preoccupied with the negative other, the scapegoat, when there is keen competition in society over scarce resources. It seems foolish to Lebow, also, to seek a sense of identity in politics because there is no such thing as identity, only identifications.

It can also be seen in the Anglo-American tradition of Liberalism (e.g., Hume, and Franklin). One feels a tension between the inner and social selves and this is a positive thing. One takes, tastes, experiments with perspectives offered by society and one creates a personal pastiche; this is how one achieves an individual sense of self in the unique way one synthesizes the range that is available from your social environment. Conservatism and totalitarianism are anti-Modern vaunting the social self as more important than the individual self. Liberalism and Anarchism vaunt the Modern. Lebow returns to this theme in his treatment of four major discursive responses to the dilemmas of identity in the Modern era).

Modernity also incites a sense of alienation here as it multiplies the social roles one plays across a range of social sites. Reflexivity and the multiplicity of social roles lead to a sense of crisis of self and a craving for narratives that reassure us of a coherent, stable, unitary self, namely an identity. Composition of such narrative depends on memory and memory can be unreliable. This helps explain Lebow’s concern about the persistent tendency of citizens in many states to seek in domestic and international politics a “bedrock” of identity. Political leaders are constantly engaged in negotiations and compromises that will satisfy as many interest groups
as possible. They can and will alter narratives of “national interest” “national identity” and “who we are” depending on changing circumstances. Why then, do citizens continue to seek reassurances of essential identity in such unreliable sources? The following section seeks to explore this question by making reference to a range of authors who also shed light on identity, modernity, and international political arrangements.

The Social Self

In his synthesis of psychoanalytic work, cognitive science, and social psychology literature, U.S. scholar Mark Bracher (2006, xiv) concludes that “Identity maintenance is the ultimate motive for all behavior and identities.” Gilligan (1996, p. 97) echoes this notion when he asserts that, “People will sacrifice anything to prevent the death and disintegration of their individual or group identity” and Alcorn (2003, p. 18) reflects on critical situations in which individuals risk biological death so as to avoid “ideological death.” We often experience “identity vulnerability” and identity damage can be produced through some form of national trauma (cf. Bracher, 2006, xii) in a very intense way. In a very fundamental way, Modern identity also entails a need for recognition; they become two sides of the same coin. Todorov (2001, p. 15) reflects the understanding of Adam Smith, Rousseau, and Hegel when he concludes that “There is no price we are not prepared to obtain [identity recognition] … the need to be acknowledged is not just one human motivation among others; it is the truth behind all other needs.” From this perspective, it becomes clear, then, that if states have identities they also have an overriding “national interest” in having their identities recognized by other states. This leads to the theme of narratives of self and narratives of the national self.

We tend to construct stories that glorify our past. In Europe, for example, fourteen societies claim to have been founded by the Trojans, incited, no doubt by the “fact” that the Trojans founded the great Roman Empire (itself a construction from the work of Virgil.) We can be highly selective about what we remember and what we forget, without ever being aware of what we are doing both on a personal and on a social level (Žižek, 1989). In addition, identifications on the social level involve claims or bids. A teacher may think she deserves to play the role of stern authority figure and find that her students do not accept her claim to that role. Similarly, states may claim a role that is rejected by fellow states. As Foreign Secretary, Madeline Albright was wont to advert to the U.S. as the “essential nation.” The U.S. would like to claim the role of hegemon on the world stage, but few
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states accept that claim wholeheartedly. States have to accept certain constraints on their ability to impose their claims. States that seem to play outside the rules of the game of seeking foreign recognition within an accepted framework, may be characterized as “deviants.” France in the late 1700’s was deviant, as was the Soviet Union in the 1920’s, and Iran in the 1980’s and 1990’s. The subsequent acceptance of these states by many other states as non-deviant or even exemplary reinforces the assertion that international identities are in fact identifications that are co-constructed and that change over time. It is also worth noting that when state leaders fail to satisfy citizens’ needs for identity bolstering, or when the state is still recovering from some national trauma, ordinary citizens may turn to more reliable if extreme sources to bolster their sense of identity. This consideration seems relevant in the current analysis of the rise of extremist terrorist organizations such as ISIS in the Middle East and populist, neo-Fascist groupings in Europe and the United States.

**Principles of International Identity Recognition**

There are also various principles that states must take into account in their endeavors to play their desired role on the world stage. The two most important are “Fairness” and “Equality.” The former means that states must act according to the established hierarchy (e.g., the United Nations Security Council accords membership and authority in proportion to power), and/or that those who need the most should receive the most. The latter – equality – is the defining principle of the Modern era for Lebow. This principle demands that we share social rewards on an equal basis, or that people can compete from a level playing-field. (e.g. all states are equal in the U.N. General Assembly, at least in terms of voting power). There is always a tension between these two principles (e.g., states that want a seat on the Security Council have to justify this ambition before their peers as it seems to contravene the principle of equality). It is worth noting, also, that Hunt (2007) whom we saw in an earlier section as identifying epistolary novels as playing a critical role in the development of human rights discourses, entitles her opening chapter, “Torrents of Emotion: Reading Novels and *Imagining Equality.*” (emphasis mine). From this perspective, then, the identifications by social subjects with other social subjects brought on by the consumption of popular fiction, led not only to a more keenly felt sense of empathy and promotion of natural rights (denoted at a later point in history as “human rights,”) but also contributed to a more prevalent sense of equality as a foundational principle of social order in modern societies. For
Lebow, all identities – local, national, regional, and trans-national – are intimately involved with politics on all those levels in such a way that a significant change at one level affects all levels, including the original cause of change. We are dealing, then, with highly complex processes.

**Multiple Identities in the Modern Era**

How are local, domestic, regional, and international identities interwoven together? By means of the identifications we make, especially through the foreign policy decisions of governments. One can think of fractals, a set of dynamics that are the same at every level of magnitude and there is self-similarity at a range of scales. Once you go past the *ego* level, however, the I disappears. Or one can think of national identity as a refrigerator (understood here not as a physically substantial entity but as a blank space that can bear varying inscriptions, just as the nation-building project constitutes a space in which varying narratives compete to become the “story of our nation.”) Diverse family members compete to plant their own magnets on the fridge, the “politics of the family.” Similarly for national politics to define “Who we are,” foreign relations involve non-family members competing to slap a magnet on the surface of the fridge to say “Who we are.” The analogy between individual identity and national identity is also justified because of the physical aspect. For the individual to say “I am my body” is experienced as true. It is very difficult to imagine oneself in the body of the other gender, or a disabled body, or an old body, etc. Similarly, states define themselves in terms of their geography: island nation, landlocked, maritime, rugged, etc. Thus, national identifications are very important in explaining international relations. But remember, there is no stable, unitary self on the individual level. Neither is there a stable identity on the national level. States do not have an I or a tension between an inner self and a social self. This is why some constructivists err when they speak of the need for “ontological security” by states. There is no enduring set of characteristics among the Japanese, the Egyptians, the Mexicans, the Americans, that determine how their foreign policy plays out. Leaders are not punished if they “betray” the state’s sense of core identity. Identity does not determine policies in this way. People are always changing with the tides of time. Yes, many narratives of national identity try to promote the notion of an essential national identity, but that does not make them real. Every state is made of competing groups with diverse interest, each hoping to affect policy according to their hopes and desires. The winning group gets to tell the national narrative called “This is who we are.” Foreign policies are
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intertwined with domestic policies. The kinds of conflicts that are played out within national borders are also reflected quite clearly in international conflicts. For example, the question of accepting migrants from the civil war in Syria (2014 following) reflects ontological insecurities and culture wars at play in European societies. On an individual level, we want to feel different from others and in some way “special.” We want to play a role that is respected, that garners esteem. Similarly, states want to be identified in a way that resonates with the national narrative of self, the foundational stories of the nation. When states are acknowledged as special by other states, individual citizens feel a certain ego boost. Why? Because they have made identifications with the state, just as sports fans do with their favorite sports teams. Modernity also involves technologies by which citizens identify with the wins and losses of the state. This is more important than providing wealth and security (in spite of what IR Realists and IR Liberals would tell us cf. Lebow Cultural Theory (2008). For Bracher (2006), individuals would rather cease to exist on a physical level than to endure the existential realization “I am not a force that matters in the world/cosmos.” IR needs to be more aware of the fact that individuals ask for meaningful identity from the state more than they do anything else. We cannot understand foreign policies comprehensively otherwise. For example, in the Middle East, the state that establishes itself as the main regional power will have much greater legitimacy among its citizens.

Conclusion

An objective overall assessment of the work of Lebow makes a significant contribution to the field with his cultural theory of international relations. While some may have difficulty accepting his assertion of spirit as a key component in the explanation of human behavior, none can deny the persuasive power of detailed extrapolations offered by the author to support his perspective on the key underpinnings of relations between states, relations that are always, in the final analysis, human relations. It can also be argued that Lebow is not imposing a discourse of spirit upon the discipline. He takes up the vocabulary of authors both ancient and modern in order to flesh out a comprehensive psychology of identity. His notion of identity is dynamic rather than fixed and he mounts an impressive challenge against IR Realist theorists who posit an essentially fixed pattern of human behavior which makes the character of international relations ... “universal, timeless, and unchanging.” (Lebow, 2008, p. 2). It seems reasonable to argue that Lebow’s classic yet constructivist account of the human in international relations will
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continue to have considerable explanatory power as human history continues to unfold.

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