

COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING IN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE APPROACHES

“Forum” as a new organizational form

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Abstract

In the 1980s, the institutions governing the economy — i.e., state intervention, neocorporatist associations, and so on — were sentenced to death by some social scientists and neoliberal politicians. They were said not to be able to survive in, or be functional for, the emerging “new economy”, which was more internationalized and undergoing rapid changes. In this paper, I examine the response given by the governance approach, which argues that the institutions governing the economy are not disappearing in the face of the free market, but are changing in order to be functional with post-Fordism and the increasing technological base of the economy. I identify the institutional approach and Jessop’s approach as the two main theories of economic governance. From their comparison I construct a model of the governance of innovation, and introduce the concept of “forum”, which is central for explaining cooperation in a flexible context. However, I also emphasize the weak points of a real governance model.

Keywords

Collective decision-making, forum, governance, industrial innovation, social complexity.

Contents

I Introduction. II Institutional approach to the governance of the economy. III Jessop’s governance approach. IV Comparison of the governance approaches. V Governance of industrial innovation and “forums”. VI Conclusions. References.

I Introduction

Industrial change implies the introduction of new technologies, realization of investments, new training of personnel, production and commercialization of new products, and so on. All these imply the actions of different actors, public and private. As long as the government tries to promote the change, it must obtain information, knowledge, and cooperation from industry. This is the topic of this paper. In short, I shall attempt to analyze how the increasing scientific base

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of industry affects the form in which collective decisions are taken in a society.

This is the continuation of an analysis of the discussion of neocorporatism viability in a previous paper (Valls, 2000). The theory of neocorporatism considered neocorporatism as an efficient inter-organizational structure in which business, labor, and government improve their capacity to negotiate and manage conflicts that arise in economic activity. The European states tried to manage with neocorporatism the labor conflicts generated by the oil crisis and the industrial restructuring this provoked. But the results became unsatisfactory. However, industrial sector-level inter-business and business-government negotiations developed by trade associations became an effective tool for industrial policy-making. Also, in Japan, trade associations have been considered as a central element for economic growth (Yonekura, 1999), and for an effective response to the oil crisis (Dore, 1986).

However, the favorable effects of neocorporatism have been questioned by different authors. Even neocorporatist authors in moments of frustration in the face of the growing liberalized international economy—for example, Crouch and Streeck, 1997—have questioned the very possibility of neocorporatism.

Yet, new alternatives to the theory of neocorporatism, which respond to the neoliberal approach, have been developing since the 1980s. These theories can be grouped under the rubric of the “governance approach”. They consider that the globalization of the economy and technological change have led, not to a domination by the market, but to new forms of social coordination of economic activities. The governance approach poses the challenge of combining two, *a priori* contradictory, elements: social coordination of the economy with flexibility in actors’ engagements.

This process is related to a transition in the growth model of capitalism, from Fordism to post-Fordism. Fordism is characterized by rather rigid mass production and consumption of uniform goods, with slow technical change and competition based on price. On the other hand, post-Fordism is characterized by flexible production and consumption of diversified goods for smaller markets, with competition more based in quality and innovation rather than price. These require new forms of cooperation between firms, labor and capital, the public and private sector, industry and academia. Because of this, new forms of collective decision-making are supposed to appear.

In this paper, after analyzing the two main approaches to the governance of the economy, I shall consider governance in the case of industrial innovation, and the new organizational form of “forum” as central for this. I shall conclude that governance is a new form in which different interests interact. But it also has another face, it can divide between included and excluded, and lacks capacity to manage issues with high conflict between different interests.

II Institutional approach to the governance of the economy

II. 1 Governance as coordination of decisions on transactions

This approach was originated in the mid-80s¹ from the analysis of business associative action, which realized the existence of different forms of associative action between business companies in addition to formal business associations.² The aims of this approach have been to construct a framework to analyze which institutions coordinate each economic sector, to discover and explain the differences between countries and industrial sectors in their institutional composition, to analyze their evolution through time, and to discover their economic effects. This framework appears as an alternative to neoclassical economics, which considers the market and the private hierarchy as the only efficient mechanisms of economic governance. Thus, the institutional approach has an especial interest in the institutions that differ from the market and private hierarchy, and in their effect on economic performance. In addition, these authors try to show that the alternative models to the market and private hierarchy can be economically more efficient.

The departing point of this approach is that the exchanges between economic actors in an industrial sector, and between sectors, are coordinated not only by the rules of the market nor by managerial authority in private hierarchies, but by many different institutional arrangements which collectively coordinate economic exchanges between firms and their environments:

governance refers broadly to the full range of institutional possibilities for deriving collective decisions in an economy. [...] [S]everal institutional mechanisms through which firms as complex organizations have come to deal with other organizations or actors in response to problems of resource scarcity (uncertainty with respect to the availability of capital, raw materials, human resources) and information complexity (uncertainty with respect to competition, products, markets, technology and government regulations). Specifically, governance in regard to various sectors addresses the following type of questions: what are the mechanisms by which prices are set and demand stabilized, production levels determined, the activities of production and distributing units coordinated, relations with labor managed, product innovation and development occur, capital is allocated, information about product quality is disseminated, and norms of fair competition and product standards are generated.

(Hollingsworth and Lindberg, 1985: 221-222)

This definition puts the topic of the economic exchange on the sociological agenda instead of the economics agenda, since it considers economic exchanges are coordinated by many different social arrangements with a logic different from the market logic. "Economic action is a special case of social action" (Hollingsworth et al., 1994: 5), thus the economic exchange is considered as problematic, neither conflict-free nor automatically efficient, since the exchange implies

problems of resource scarcity and information complexity, which are the driving element in the development of mechanisms of governance.

The central actor in the institutional approach is the business firm. It is the firm that faces problems of resource scarcity and information complexity and takes the initiative in the construction of governance mechanisms in order to face such problems. It is also the firm's choices that are constrained, but at the same time made possible, by the existing institutions. Therefore, this approach is society-centered. The object of inquiry is not the state capacity, but the types of governance mechanisms (including the state), their emergence, characteristics, how they affect the transactions between the firm and its organizational environment, and their effects on economic performance


II. 2 Institutions governing economic transactions

The mix of mechanisms of governance (institutions), understood as *rules and rule making-agents* that govern transactions in and across an industrial sector, is the governance system of that sector. The governance system of a sector facilitates and constrains actors' action and will: "in contrast to the logic of the neoclassical (economic) paradigm, we argue that economic coordinating mechanisms place severe constraints on the definition of needs, preferences, and choices of economic actors" (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997: 3). Consequently, actors in a market-governed system are freer to act according to their maximizing logic of self-interest, but less free to engage in cooperative action that implies postponing the realization of self-interest.

Although in different studies different mechanisms of governance are defined, it seems that certain consensus has appeared around a classification including six categories. These six categories are defined according to two dimensions: the mode of coordination and the motive guiding an actor's action (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997: 6-19) (Figure 1).

The mode of coordination can be horizontal or vertical according to the distribution of power. In the horizontal mode, coordination takes place among relatively equally powerful agents, thus they do not impose their decisions on each other. In the vertical mode, there is a hierarchical relation in the decision-making between actors with different power.

On the other hand, according to the action-motive dimension, in some institutional contexts economic actors' actions are guided by the search of their self-interest for economic benefits. But, when institutions limit actors' choice to behave in a self-interested way, their actions become guided by *obligation and compliance with social rules*. Although both types of logic always guide actors' actions, one of them can be dominant depending on the existing social institutions (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997). This dimension mixes the neoinstitutional economics approach with the institutional approach in sociology. The former emphasizes rational economic actors taking decisions in order to maximize their preferences, and designing efficient institutions to manage collective action problems and reduce transaction costs. The later emphasizes the effects of institutions on economic actors' preferences and decisions, and power struggles in the definition of institutions.

Figure 1 Modes of governance

Source: Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997)

Crossing of the two dimensions, the institutional authors create four squares (Figure 1). In the self-interest/horizontal coordination area the mechanism of governance is the classic “market”, in which individuals are free to decide whether or not to exchange, according only to their own interest, and the decisions taken are reinforced by contracts. In the self-interest/vertical coordination the mechanism of governance is the “private hierarchy”; the decisions on exchanges are taken top-down according to the hierarchical distribution of authority, with the right of sanction in the vertically integrated company. In the obligational/horizontal coordination the mechanism of coordination is the “community”, in which a group of units maintains mutual exchanges regulated by shared values and high levels of trust. And in the obligational/vertical area the governance mechanism is the “state”, which coordinates exchanges between economic actors through top-down decisions, reinforced by public authority. “Networks” and “associations” are sited in the center, overlapping with the four models, but in the case of neocorporatism and private-interest governments (PIG)³ they are placed in the obligational/vertical coordination area. Exchanges in networks are guided by resource interdependencies rather than shared values, and are regulated through negotiations. Associations likewise regulate economic exchanges through negotiations, but also have certain capacity to decide and reinforce decisions on their members from above, especially in neocorporatism.

In short, each mechanism of governance is characterized by a set of rules and norms that establish the form in which decisions for transactions must be taken, and how the compliance of subjects with them and with the decisions taken must be enforced. The obsession of the institutional approach is to explain how institutions different from the market and the private hierarchy constrain economic actors' actions, imposing social obligations that reduce the influence of the self-interest logic in the economic actors' decisions. Institutional authors eagerly argue that such obligational institutions, rather than more self-interest-oriented institutions, produce a higher economic performance, for obligations like the compliance to collaborate, to engage in long-term relations, and so on, create pressure and the possibility for improvement and innovativeness in industry.

II. 3 Sectorialization of the economy, social systems of production, and embeddedness

An industrial sector is defined as “a matrix of interdependent social exchange relationships, or transactions that must occur among organizations, either individually or collectively, in order for them to develop, produce, and market goods or services” (Lindberg et al., 1991: 6). This definition emphasizes the vertical integration of the production process, and consequently considers the coordination problems among the different units in the production process.

On the other hand, an industrial sector is also defined as a “decision arena limited by a subgroup of products that are in fact rivals, or that can substitute each other” (Schmitter, 1990: 13) or “a number of production units with identical or similar products” (Schmitter and Streeck, 1981: 241). This definition focuses on the horizontal dimension of the sector, hence emphasizing the relationships among competitors. Instead of problems of coordination in the production process, here there are problems of coordination of collective action in the face of a common “problem”, be it public regulations, labor action, or competition, and also cases of supply cooperation, cooperative R&D, and so on.

Of course, both dimensions are related, since producers of the same products face similar vertical relations with their providers and clients, and the whole vertical sector is affected by problems the final producers face. Thus, both dimensions form an industrial sector. The system of governance coordinates transactions in both dimensions, and at the same time both dimensions affect the system of governance of the sector.

Institutional authors consider that each industrial sector has its specific system of governance, which is in part a rational answer to the requirements posed by the sector's technical and economic characteristics. These characteristics are, in broad terms, the type of competition (quality or price), the volume of production, and the speed of market and technology change. However, institutions have been formed along the history, are resistant to change, and are the result of struggles among actors promoting different governance models (Lindberg et al, 1991).

In the transition to post-Fordism, quality production, customized production, and rapidly changing technologies are the sector technical and economic characteristics that are becoming

dominant. This poses pressure on the mechanisms of governance, since not all mechanisms of governance are suitable for promoting and managing the institutional requirements posed by these sectoral characteristics. Institutional authors call these institutional requirements a social system of production (SSP). A social system of production is composed of many different institutions: the system of training, financial markets, structure of firms, relations between firms, state structure, conception of fairness, values, customs, and so on (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997). Then, sectors with a post-Fordist production system require an SSP in which economic actors trust each other, there is permanent training, the labor force is qualified, companies combine competition with cooperation, production is flexible enough to adapt to market quantitative and qualitative changes, and so on. This is called a social system of flexible production, and contrasted with the Fordist social system of mass production (Hollingsworth and Streeck, 1994: 273; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997: 21-23).

However, the institutions forming part of an SSP are embedded with each other, and with the systems of governance. Consequently, a change in one institution, or mechanism of governance, must occur together with changes in the others, thus avoiding contradictions. Because of this, institutional change is supposed to be very slow (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997, 19-24). Because of this, countries where obligational systems of governance are dominant, and the other institutions in the SSP favor flexible systems of production, are supposed to perform better amid international competition in sectors with technological characteristics that make flexible production appropriate.

III Jessop's economic governance approach

III. 1 Governance as “self-steering”


For Jessop, in a broad sense governance refers to the coordination of interdependent activities. In this sense he distinguishes three types of coordination: “organizational hierarchy”, “anarchy of exchange” (the market), and “self-organizing heterarchy”. Hierarchy consists, at the economic level, of the vertically integrated firm, in which top-down authority is exercised. This coordinates different actors and activities (managers and workers; different sections like production, marketing, research, and commercial activities; different moments of the production process) in the autonomous space that the firm constitutes. At the political level, the top-down regulative authority is exercised by the state, internally as a hierarchical organization, and externally by means of its policies and “monopoly of violence”.

In the narrow sense, Jessop defines governance as “the complex art of steering multiple agencies, institutions and systems which are both operationally autonomous from one another and structurally coupled through various forms of reciprocal interdependence” (Jessop, 1997c: 96). Governance refers to the specific mode of co-ordination consisting of “self-organizing heterarchy” (1998: 29). This amounts to a different means of coordination among different actors' actions, which neither consists of the aggregation of independent decisions (like the

market), nor the centralized, top-down authoritative imposition by the state or by the managerial authority in the firm. Thus, it consists of self-organization, negotiation, and shared decision-making and implementation - in a word, the self-steering of a collectivity. Governance defined in this way is shown by public-private partnerships, and the broad range of possible networks among firms and other actors, which cannot be reduced to a marked relationship or to vertical top-down authority. This pattern of regulation is appropriate for self-regulation of a kind of social relationship that Jessop calls “heterarchy”. This is a “pattern of reciprocal interdependence across multiple boundaries with their basic resistance to hierarchical [and market] coordination” (1997c: 101).⁴ And, due to the increasing social complexity in modern societies, heterarchic governance is a more efficient model of governance than hierarchy and anarchy.

What has led to the appearance of heterarchic governance forms is increasingly unstructured social complexity. There may be a high grade of uncertainty in a desired social event, because this event depends on other actors' actions, actors who are structurally interdependent. But at the same time, different actors have the capacity to decide their behavior by themselves because they are functionally autonomous, thus there is a tendency not to coordinate. Then, the desired social event can become very difficult to achieve. Figure 2 represents the relationship between autonomy (dimension X), interdependence (dimension Y), and unstructured complexity (the resulting area). When autonomy and interdependence increase, unstructured complexity also increases. The square $O, Y_1, X_1 Y_1, X_1$ has an area A, which represents the degree of unstructured complexity. If interdependence and autonomy increase, forming the square $O, Y_2, X_3 Y_2, X_3$, with the area B, the level of unstructured complexity becomes higher.

Figure 2 Social complexity



Interdependence is difficult to reduce, since it is structural, dependent on the imperatives of the production process. So, when unstructured complexity increases, actors can only structure this (reduce uncertainty) if they are able to reach collective decisions, jointly deciding aims and action strategies. Since actors are functionally autonomous, they can only coordinate through negotiations. Thus, actors suffering the high levels of complexity in the square $O, Y_2, X_3 Y_2, X_3$ can engage in negotiations in order to collectively decide aims and strategies to achieve them. This means they voluntarily reduce some of their autonomy, however always keeping the possibility to act autonomously again. Thus, the actors in our example could negotiate, moving their respective autonomy from the point X_3 to X_2 . Then we have a new square $O, Y_2, X_2 Y_2, X_2$, with an area C smaller than the area B . With this collective coordination actors have been able to reduce uncertainty (or structure complexity) through negotiations.

According to Jessop, there have been three main factors that have increased unstructured social complexity since the 1970s, affecting state capacity to govern and the ways international economic competitiveness is achieved. The first factor is the loss of state power in managing the economy due to the liberalization of capital and international trade (Jessop et al., 1993).⁵ This loss of state capacity and increased interdependencies between economic actors at different spatial levels produce an increase in uncertainty in the evolution of trade, technology, prices, and so on.

The second factor is the characteristics and role in the economy of new core technologies, such as micro-electronics, telecommunications, data processing, biotechnology and new materials, which are becoming more important in the process of production and in the products themselves, and as the basis for economic expansion. Since these technologies are highly knowledge- and capital-intensive they require cooperation among a wide range of interests, including different companies, sources of finance, universities, and public agencies, which can also exist in different parts of the world. When cooperation is reached it reduces uncertainties and promotes diffusion of technology (Jessop et al., 1993).⁶

Finally, the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism as a dominant model of development implies a change in the growth model from mass production to flexible production. Flexible production requires cooperation (interdependence) between companies, thus autonomous agencies, which have complementary capacities, in order to respond to market changes have to coordinate their actions. Flexible production also requires cooperation among workers, and labor and capital, in order to adapt to market changes and constantly improve the production process and innovation in products.⁷

III. 2 Interaction as mechanism of governance and its levels

Differently from the institutional approach, for Jessop mechanisms of self-organizing heterarchic governance are not institutions but kinds of interactions. These consist of negotiations among different units in order to find common aims and develop common strategies and identities. For Jessop, the organizational structure that supports these negotiations is the

network among different actors.

Jessop distinguishes three levels in which the economy is embedded, and so influenced by social factors. At the lowest level, economic actors are embedded in different networks of personal relations. Because of this, economic exchanges are affected by identities, values and so on, shared by individuals. As long as a network widens the problem of trust among different members will exist. To deal with this, the developed mechanisms of governance consist of selective formalization of interpersonal networks, through an imagined community of interests, orientation to the future, and the use of selective memories to reinforce trust (Jessop, 1998: 36). This concept seems equivalent to the concept of community as defined by the institutional approach.

At a higher level, economic action is embedded in inter-organizational networks ("institutional embeddedness"). These networks can be composed of all kinds of organizations, which are autonomous from each other, but interdependent in order to achieve their aims. Thus, to realize their objectives they need to coordinate their actions. The mechanisms of governance developed in the interactions between organizations are formalized interpersonal networks, inter-organizational communication and "positive coordination". The later consists of negotiation ("negotiated inter-organizational coordination") between organizations in order to reach a joint outcome. The consecution of a common long-term objective depends on the realization of shorter-term objectives and compliance with emerging inter-organizational expectations and rules. It requires "resource synergy" and the construction of "inter-organizational capacities" to communicate and negotiate (Jessop, 1998).

The highest level is that of inter-systemic networks ("societal embeddedness"). This means that different systems in a society, such as the economic system, education system, research system, and political system, are interrelated. Consequently, the evolution of each system and the achievement of the aims of the organizations and actors in each system are "contingently dependent" on the actions of actors in other systems. Attempts at inter-systemic coordination have to face the problem that they are different institutional orders that operate with their own distinct logics. The form of governance is "de-centered context-mediated inter-systemic steering". It is "an attempt to facilitate mutual understanding and co-evolution of different institutional orders to secure agreed societal objectives" (Jessop, 1998: 36).⁸ It is de-centered because no central authority has the capacity to impose coordination, and it is mediated by negotiations. The mechanisms of governance are formalized interpersonal networks, inter-organizational communication and positive coordination, "noise reduction", and "negative co-ordination". Noise reduction consists of a mutual understanding by dialog between units of different systems, instead of the imposition of the logic of one system on the other. Negative coordination consists of the mutual coordination among systems in order to avoid mutual negative effects of systems' activities on other systems. These mechanisms may lead to an inter-systemic consensus around visions or missions, which becomes the basis for specific inter-organizational arrangements (Jessop, 1997c, 1998).

III. 3 Governance as process, and meta-governance

Objects of governance are not previous to governance, but are constructed in the same process of governance. In addition, the structure of the governance network and the participants are also self-selected during the process of governance. A specific mechanism of governance is constructed through negotiation among different actors, and can be re-defined or disappear when the object of governance changes or the actors taking part struggle to change it (Jessop, 1997c).

Governance mechanisms are constructed when interacting actors realize some of their interdependences. Then, they can engage in processes of communication and negotiation, with which they are able to create common aims. In this process trust and mutual understanding increase, which can lead to deeper collaborations. However, the existence of heterarchic relationships does not imply by itself that governance mechanisms will be spontaneously constructed in order to manage them. Also, different actors have different capacity to take part in governance, since the structure of the economic and political systems distribute capacities in an unequal way. In addition, the diversity of issues, territorial and sector levels at which mechanisms of governance are developed, pose problems of coordination and compatibility among different mechanism (Jessop, 1998).

For Jessop, such factors endanger the construction of effective mechanisms of inter-organizational and inter-systemic governance, which are necessary in order to manage the increasing social complexity in the world economy, and the necessity of the state to coordinate them in a form that avoids contradictions and reassures the coherence and integrity of the national state. Because of these, he considers that the state uses its capacity to provide the basic rules for governance, its knowledge and information capacities, acts as a court for disputes “within and over” governance, and so on. With this the state exercises the specific activities of creating linkages among organizations, sponsoring new organizations, generating common cosmovisions to facilitate self-organization, providing mechanisms for collective feed-back and learning about the functional linkages, and promoting coherence among diverse objectives, spatial and temporal horizons. This is what Jessop calls meta-governance, which is concerned with the “overall organization and balancing of the different forms of coordination of complex reciprocal interdependence” (Jessop, 1996). Although the state has lost its capacity to manage the economy, its policies can affect the mechanisms by which society self-organize and manage the economy. However, in governance and meta-governance the state is just one actor among others, since its capacity to impose, and the efficiency of imposition, have been eroded. Then the state must get legitimacy and persuade the other actors by strategically using the above-mentioned state capacities and negotiating.

Specific mechanisms of governance and mechanisms of meta-governance are only efficient for specific objects and times. There are no governance solutions forever or for everything. And the relations between actors must be flexible enough to respond to turbulence in their environment and to change the mechanisms of governance when they become dysfunctional and

fail (Jessop, 1998).

IV Comparison of the governance approaches

Both approaches explain economic action as a kind of social action, which is embedded in and coordinated by society. In the broad sense of the term “governance” they share the same meaning, but the institutional approach works with several categories while Jessop’s approach focus only on networks. Also, both approaches consider that the situations in which “socialized” forms of governance (different from the market and the private hierarchy) are more efficient than market and private hierarchies are increasing, due to the internationalization of the economy, changes in technology, and the transition to post-Fordism. This is because these forms of governance are efficient for promoting X-efficiency, or structural competitiveness, oriented to improvement and innovation in the economy.

IV. 1 Complexity, governance, and neocorporatism

For Jessop, increased complexity is the cause of hierarchy and state failure. The structuration of complexity requires relations of horizontal power, with voluntary cooperation and exchange of information among a wide range of different actors, and different systems, in order to generate common aims, strategies and identities, but retaining the capacity for change.

The institutional approach does not explicitly consider the problem of complexity. Still, it considers that the flexible social system of production requires forms of collective decision, including state intervention, company networks, neocorporatist associations and private-interest governments, to coordinate actors’ actions. Since the institutional approach subsumes the theory of neocorporatism, it assumes that corporatist systems organize and reduce the complexity due to pluralized interests. According to the theory of neocorporatism, the cause of complexity is the existence of different interests, which are conflicting and can engage in a mutually disruptive collective action. Neocorporatist systems organize negotiations between them, and between them and the state. Through a hierarchical organization and a rather top-down authority the associational structure is able to reduce such complexity (Schmitter and Streeck, 1981).

If we follow Jessop and consider that neo-corporatist structures are too hierarchical to be able to coordinate units that preserve their own autonomy, then it becomes necessary to consider the differences between the complexity structured by neocorporatism and the complexity structured by governance. This problem can be analyzed considering the complexity that neo-corporatism has managed. I argue that neocorporatism and governance differ in the diversity and categories of actors involved, the type of conflicts managed through arrangements, the type of political outputs, and the role of the state.

In the case of macro-neocorporatist coordination between labor and capital, the aim of coordination is the control of inflation and unemployment. The collective decisions are on salaries, prices, work conditions, welfare policies, and the like. The negotiating actors are the

state, and the peak associations representing employers and labor. Negotiation is centralized, and the agreements are applied to the totality of workers and companies. Through the corporatist arrangements, the decisions of labor, capital, and state policy become collective, and their implementation is possible due to the hierarchical neocorporatist structures and state authority.

In the case of sector neocorporatism, the aim of coordination is to protect, promote, or introduce changes in an industrial sector. The collective decisions are basically on industrial and commercial policies, and regulations. The negotiating actors are peak associations of industrial sectors and state agencies. Their negotiation power is based on their capacity to mutually damage their aims, but also on their knowledge of industrial and commercial issues and possession of information. However, outside collective action organized by associations, actors are weak, thus they are dependent on their associations. In the case that individual actors are independent from their associations, it is considered pluralism, and consequently the associational system does not have the capacity to regulate the activities of economic actors, which act in competition in order to maximize their own interests. Thus, the lack of resolution of sectoral conflicts and of cooperation prevents the actors from achieving a strategy oriented to the improvement of the whole industrial sector. Efficient management of the sector depends on the hierarchical structure of neocorporatism.

Finally, in the case of Jessop's governance, actors are interdependent in the process of production. There is not a sequential relation between them, but feedback and the participation of several different actors (companies, researchers, employees, public agencies, and so on) is necessary to improve structural competitiveness. Actors cannot be reduced to categories of actors that are represented, and regulated, by a couple of associations. Instead, actors keep their autonomy, making necessary the establishment of mechanisms for communication and negotiation. Because of this, actors engage in a coordination of activities on voluntary bases, because they perceive their interdependencies. Then they engage in dialog, which conduces them to perceive and interpret their mutual inter-relationships, and find common aims and strategies. This must be quite a voluntary process since actors' autonomy resists imposed compliance structures. This also implies that actors will collaborate as long as their interests can be met through collaboration. The actors and issues implied should not carry a high risk of free-riding and the prisoner's dilemma; rather, they should have self-interest in the collective decision due to their interdependencies.

In the case of free-riding, an actor can receive the same benefits resulting from collective action as other actors, but without collaborating in the collective action, thus without incurring the costs implied by collaboration that other actors must. In the case of the prisoner's dilemma, the intensity of the conflict between actors makes it difficult for them to believe each other will not cheat and will keep the terms of a mutually beneficial agreement. When a neocorporatist structure of associations exists, the association's bureaucracy has hierarchical power to identify and exclude from the benefits the free-riders, and to identify and "punish" the actors that break the agreements reached by the associations. In a governance structure, the lack of such

hierarchical power implies that the members taking part in the governance relationship themselves exercise control over each other. In such a case, the activities of every member have to be clearly visible to the whole group, in order that they can “punish” or exclude non-committed participants.

This means that issues that are the object of strong conflict, like industrial relations, may be resistant to the management by governance. But relations which, rather than taking the form of head-on conflict, are beset by a lack of mutual knowledge, a lack of knowledge of interdependencies, a lack of incentive for collaboration, a lack of communication channels, and so on, would be manageable by governance arrangements.

In addition, the increase of social interdependencies implies the need to coordinate different systems. Neocorporatist structures are basically concerned with the coordination of different categories of actors (labor and capital) in the economic system, or coordinate different subsystems (industrial sectors) in the economic system. They are also concerned with the coordination of the political system and the economic system through economic policy. However, governance is concerned with coordination of more systems. So, in heterarchies the number of industrial sectors implied in an issue is wider, and the economic system needs more and more coordination, not only with the political system, but also with the science system, education system, and so on. Even more, every system becomes more de-centralized and defined at different levels (regional, national, supranational). This implies that actors must be able to establish new channels for collective decision with new and wider categories of actors, creating common languages and mutual areas of understanding (Jessop, 1997a,b).

Finally, while neocorporatism considers that the actors without capacity to disrupt the production process are excluded from participation in the collective decision-making, Jessop's governance approach considers that interdependencies make necessary, for a governance mechanism to be efficient, the participation of all categories of stakeholders, even if they do not have the resources required to be able to participate. Because of this the state, exercising meta-governance, must empower them to take part in the governance process (Jessop, 1996).

IV. 2 Institutional embeddedness and change

For the institutional approach, systems of governance and social systems of production (SSP) are embedded in a wider institutional context, which includes political institutions, other systems (education, science and research, and so on), and the values and culture shared by the wider society in which they are constructed. Because of these, changes in the system of governance and in the social system of production are coupled not only to each other, but are constrained by the wider institutional context. Because of this, the authors argue the difficulty of developing the biotechnology sector in Japan, due to the lack of creativity promotion resulting from the Japanese education system, a university structure oriented to the creation of consensus, the weakness of basic research, and a scarcity of venture capital (Hollingsworth, 1997: 284).

Table 1. Comparison of the governance approaches

	Institutional approach	Jessop's approach
Area of application	Economy, and economic policy	Economy and policy in general
Object of analysis	Institutions (rules and organizations) that coordinate economic actions	Types of interactions between units (subjects, organizations, systems) in networks
Level of analysis	Especially sectoral level, but also spatial levels	Inter-personal networks, inter-organizational networks, and inter-systemic networks, at different spatial levels
Focus	Society-centered	State-centered
Implicit aim	Analysis, but also advocate for intermediate institutions	Analysis
Definition of governance	Coordination of economic exchanges	Self-steering of interdependent but autonomous units
Mechanisms of governance	Market, private hierarchies, communities, networks, associations, state	Formalization of inter-personal networks, inter-organizational communication, positive coordination, noise reduction, negative coordination
Object of governance	Collective decisions	
Factors leading to the growth of governance	Post-Fordism, economic globalization, technological changes	
Relation of governance and economic performance	Intermediate mechanisms of governance produce X-efficiency (structural competitiveness) necessary for competition in the global, post-Fordist economy	
Concept of embeddedness	Economy is embedded with social institutions. Social institutions are embedded with each other	
Consideration of neo-corporatism	A mechanism of governance Positive for coordination	Not governance but hierarchy Considered as blocking flexibility
Conception of institutional change	Institutional embeddedness can prevent systems adaptation	Systems can be coordinated with inter-systemic governance
Mechanism to reach cooperation	Rules and norms that impose commitment Emphasis on the regulative and normative dimension of institutions	Understanding of interdependencies (evolutionary orientation) and common cosmovision Emphasis on the cognitive dimension of institutions
Role of the state	State is an important actor coordinating actors' actions	Meta-governance

This institutional embeddedness is the same as the systems coupling in Jessop's theory. However, Jessop emphasizes the possibility of inter-systemic governance — and considers it as the type of governance that most strongly affects the whole society — by which systems can coordinate their co-evolution in a mutually beneficial manner. Then, we can expect, for example, that Japanese business, academia, and state agencies participating in different committees, like the “Council for the foundation of the Bioindustry State of the 21st. Century” and the “Committee for Bioindustry Technology Strategy”,⁹ will contribute to redefining research, education, finance, and SME policies, and promote organizational and value changes in order to improve the research system.

IV. 3 Analytical framework

The institutional approach considers governance as all the possible institutional forms for reaching exchange decisions in the economy, and emphasizes the regulative and normative aspect of the institutions. It considers that the coercion that rules, and the reciprocal expectations that social norms pose on economic actors, determine the kinds of interactions among economic actors. On the other hand, Jessop instead of the institutions considers the interaction among actors — negotiations in order to exchange information and mutually coordinate, in networks, especially between different systems. In every system there are different institutional sets. For this, he considers that in order to coordinate different systems, organizations and individuals in the different systems should be able to understand each other and reach shared cosmovisions. Thus, Jessop considers the cognitive dimension of institutions.¹⁰ These basic differences lead both approaches to the different consideration of the possibility of coordination between systems of their evolution, and the different consideration of the possibilities of neocorporatist structures to exercise governance.

In addition, the different approaches lead to different research strategies. The institutional approach analyzes the different organizational structures regulating transactions in a sector. Then abstracts from these the institutional rules governing the sector. And finally studies their past evolution. On the other hand, research based on Jessop's approach should focus the interactions of different actors in relation to an issue, their strategies, how they undertake functions previously had been monopoly of the state, and how the state tries to influence governance arrangements, and their consequences. So, Jessop's approach is more suitable for the analysis of strategies actively taken by economic actors in order to adapt to economic and technological changes. However, Jessop does not analyze the organizational support of the governance. He considers that governance is realized in networks, but he does not consider their characteristics, and ignores the internal characteristics of the units taking part in networks.

I consider both approaches can supplement each other. A combination of both can interrelate the types of interactions considered by Jessop with organizational structures considered in the institutional approach. In this case, the design of specific organizations and inter-organizational relations should be analyzed taking account of the types of interdependences they govern.

V Governance of industrial innovation and “forums”

V. 1 Characteristics of the governance model

From the previous analysis of Jessop's approach, I consider that a system of collective decision-making and implementation in industrial innovation, which adopts the governance model, should have the following characteristics.

1) The actors engaged in negotiations belong to a wide range of categories, and to different systems. Thus, companies from different industrial sectors, public and private researchers,

Table 2. Characteristics of the governance model, and its problems

Dimensions	Characteristics	Problems
Organizational structure	Forums and networks	Decision-making and accountability controls can become difficult
Actors	Pluralized actors	Exclusion of dependent actors Avoidance of conflict
Object of governance	Negotiation itself. Objects of governance are constructed through negotiation	Inequalities due to different information-processing capacities Avoidance of conflict
Way of achieving commitment	Long-term self-interest. Constant re-negotiation	Compliance only with minimum common interests

public administration, consumers, and all actors that could feel they are stakeholders in a specific issue should be able to participate in the negotiation process. This participation is required by the combination of interdependence and autonomy of the different actors. Participation is a voluntary action, the fruit of the recognition of the existing interdependent interests. However, actors that have a conflictive position, and actors that hold a dependent rather than interdependent position, could be excluded from the governance process.

2) The object of regulation is socially constructed through the process of negotiation. This object is, rather than the existence of conflicting interests, the creation of channels of information, and ways of improving mutual trust for promoting information exchange, that lead to the discovery of synergies among different actors. These synergies are oriented to the development of common projects beneficial for the interests of different actors. However, this excludes the management of conflictive issues, and can lead to inequalities due to the actors' inequality in information-managing capacities.

3) Rather than the hierarchical authority that neocorporatism implies, governance would promote the commitment of different actors through the realization of their interdependencies. Thus, actors comply with the negotiated agreements because they consider it maximizes their interests. When agreements stop being perceived as beneficial, they should be revised. Thus, governance is a process of permanent negotiation, implementation, evaluation, and re-negotiation. But, this introduces the doubt that governance can manage anything else than minimum common interests. In addition, the state, which is one more actor, tries to coordinate different governance arrangements, through negotiations with the other actors.

4) Organizationally, governance is developed in networks and "forums". Highly formalized neocorporatist associations would not be considered as governance. Thus, the aim of associative action is, rather than to establish an organization that holds authority over its members, to create forums, where different actors can interact. These forums should have widely defined aims, in the range of which different actors can define collectively negotiated narrower aims.

Since networks are quite informal, problems of lack of accountability can appear. Also, if the participation level is high, decision-making can become difficult. Then, the organization of a more formal organization, the forum, can support networks formation and their performance.

V. 2 The organizational form of “forum”

Here I define the organizational form of forum and the characteristics that distinguish it from other intermediate (between hierarchy and market) mechanisms of governance (networks and associations).

The mechanisms of governance defined by the institutional approach are at the same time sets of rules and norms, and organizational forms. Following the institutional approach (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; Lindberg et al, 1991), I consider that “networks”, as institution, imply the rules that exchange is voluntary and oriented to shared interests of the participants, due to resource interdependence, but not interests beyond those. The motive for the construction of the network is to jointly self-provide certain activities (for example, the development and production of a new product). Although the exchange is voluntary, members expect certain continuity along the time. Since they do not construct a formal organization, the means of compliance are trust in personal relations, contracts and resource dependence. As organization, a network¹¹ is a group of independent organizations that exchange resources for a period of time, with certain stability.

On the other hand, “associations”, as institutions, are formal organizations, in which direction organs undertake the association’s task in place of their members, following processes established in statutes; much of the association’s activity is oriented to represent their members’ common interest in front of the state; and the association’s bureaucracy has some degree of authority on its members. In addition, as long as they try to influence public policy they need to get legitimacy from the state or other social groups, which reinforces their negotiating capacity. As organization, they are formal organizations with government organs representing the membership, written statutes, and have explicit aims.

What I understand here for forum is not an institution, but just a form of organization.¹² The institutional rules that govern the forum are those of the network and the association. On the one hand, forum is influenced by the institutional rule, of “network”, of voluntary exchange with certain stability along time, and the search for mutually beneficial interests of the members. On the other hand, the institution of “association”, which implies the construction of certain degree of formal organization, with representation organs and explicit statutes, and the need to get public legitimacy, also influences the form of the forum. This mix of institutional rules should produce an organization able to combine the flexibility and self-provision of activities of networks, with the capacity of associations to provide certain degree of accountability according to formal rules, engage in agreements with state agencies in order to promote public interests, and to promote the participation of a wide range of members.

I analyze the organizational characteristics of the forum with the example of the Kinki Bioindustry Promotion Council (KBPC).¹³

KBPC was created in 1985 as a volunteer association. It has its formal statutes and established representation and execution organs. Members annually pay a “one-year membership” fee, which enables them to participate in the different organs and activities of the

Table 3. Comparison of the organizational characteristics of networks, forums and associations

	Networks	Forums	Associations
Formalization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Low formalization - No own resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Medium degree of formalization - Own resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - High degree of formalization - Own resources
Membership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Only mutually accepted members are admitted - Easy exit - The range of membership can be wide depending on the network aim 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Wide range of membership, including industry, administration and academia - Easy entrance and exit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Only certain categories of members are admitted - In neocorporatism, membership is “semi-compulsory”
Functions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Development of a specific project - Negotiations to develop new projects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Collection and exchange of information - Think tank and open discussion in search of new activities and projects - Promotion of networks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Representation of the group interests in front of other organizations - Interests intermediation - Provision of services
Interaction among members	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Direct negotiations - Horizontal power relations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organs of representation and direction undertake negotiations in some cases - Direct interactions assisted by those organs - Horizontal power relations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organs of representation and direction undertake negotiations, especially in neocorporatism - In neocorporatism, vertical power relations
Macro-level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Competition with other networks in the pursuit of private interest - No official legitimization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mix of public and private interests. Officially legitimated - Coordination with other organizations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mix of private and public interests. In neocorporatism, associations are officially legitimated - In neocorporatism, coordination with other organizations. In pluralism, competition with other organizations

association, and get its services. But, differently from usual trade associations, its membership is highly diverse, including members from industry, administration, and academia. There are 68 company members from the chemical, pharmaceutical, food, electronics, environmental cleaning, finance and other service industries. In addition there are 20 individual researchers and 20 officials from the local administration and other business associations,¹⁴ who are special members (they do not pay fees, but take part in the different organs). In addition, entrance and exit is voluntary and easy. Also members do not have compulsory activities, and they commit with the council's activities as much as they want.

The main original aim of the association is the collection and exchange of information, and think-tank activity. This distinguishes KBPC from networks, which have original aims oriented to a specific project; and from usual industry associations, which are more oriented to represent business interests in the policy-making process, and include only members from the same industry.

In addition, in 1999 KBPC reshaped its organization and created a “coordination committee”, which assumed two new specific functions. One function is the coordination of biotechnology industrialization. This consists, in addition to diverse services for small and

medium enterprises (SME) and venture companies, on the one hand, on the support for the matching of technological seeds and industrial needs through the organization of technological seeds disclosure conferences and the use of the committee's members' personal networks. On the other hand, it consists on the support for the creation of research projects among members. The second activity consists on the guidance for the creation of R&D projects undertaken in the areas that KBPC has selected as preferential, and search for public finance for them.¹⁵ In addition KBPC itself undertakes public research projects under contract that are proposed by government agencies, and members develop them¹⁶.

These two activities distinguish KBPC from networks. While network's members interact directly without creating representation organs, in KBPC the committees that represent its members exercise a coordinating function on the members. The coordination committee promotes the creation of networks inside the association with the purpose of realizing R&D projects. In this case KBPC also acts as a coordinator (councilor and active mediator) in case of conflicts among the participants, for example in conflicts concerning property rights. These functions also distinguish KBPC from associations because rather than functions of representation of the membership as a group in front of the public administration, they are oriented to the networking inside the association for the promotion of R&D.

Also, different from networks, the participation of public administration in KBPC and the official recognition of this organization as a basic organization promoting the industrialization of biotechnology in the Kinki region¹⁷ provide the organization with public legitimacy. This means that differently from private networks or pluralist associations, KBPC activity promotes also public interests. For example, together with the Japan Asia Investment Company, KBPC is organizing a fund for venture companies. This will be provided with two billion yens by the business community in the region and METI (Kansai Electric Power Co. Inc., 2000: 6).

Finally, at the macro-level, KBPC connects with other organizations promoting the industrialization of biotechnology, in order to mutually coordinate their activities.¹⁸ This also distinguishes KBPC from company networks that compete with other networks in the national market.

VI Conclusions

I have examined the institutional approach and Jessop's approach to the governance of the economy. I have chosen these two approaches because both base their explanations on the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, and both share the proposition that in the international economy firms need to compete through quality and innovation. This, rather than allocative efficiency, requires that such firms' social environment promotes cooperation and trust among economic actors in order to use their capacities together, joining resources to produce new capacities (structural efficiency).

However, the two approaches have some important divergences. The institutional approach

considers governance as all kinds of mechanisms that coordinate economic exchanges. It tries to demonstrate how institutions that impose social obligations on economic actors lead to higher economic performance than institutions that leave the actor freer to maximize her/his immediate self-interests. The institutional approach is based on the rules and norms that constrain actors' actions. On the other hand, Jessop's approach considers governance as one specific form of coordination, which consists of self-organization of the different actors related to an issue. This form is characterized by the horizontal distribution of power among participants, who cannot be governed from above by a hierarchy, nor left to spontaneous market equilibrium, because it fails. Thus, they can only engage in collective self-organization and negotiations in order to understand their interdependencies, create a common cosmovision, and mutually coordinate

I have combined both approaches in order to supplement Jessop's focus on the interactions with the institutional structures considered in the institutional approach. From this combination, and considering the example of the Kinki Bioindustry Promotion Council, I have proposed the concept of forum, and I have reached the following conclusions.

1) Comparing governance with neocorporatism, I have shown how in industrial innovation the actors implied, the kind and degree of the unstructured complexity, the type of problems to solve, and so on, instead of hierarchical structures, require networks and "forums" where actors can interact and search for synergies. In these forums, rather than "compulsive" corporatist structures, the key for effective coordination is the capacity to manage information in order to engage in a process of synergy searching and the construction of trust. This would give place to specific cooperation and promote R&D networks.

2) However, this implies that the lower level of personal networks is preeminent, and the institutional level and the systemic level depend more on the personal level. This would produce networks that have narrow interests in developing certain products, in which scientists and companies can form coalitions to maximize their immediate interests, converting science more and more to a private good, and becoming guided by the economic, instead of the social, benefit. Nevertheless, the forum-type organizations would create more institutionalized relations and could make these relations more accountable and oriented to the public good.

3) Also, governance in industrial organizations may have two faces. One is that in which researchers, companies, and public organizations interact. In this area, all actors share the aim of developing new technologies, and have valuable resources for each other. The questions in this area are whether or not academia becomes dependent on industry, whether or not the participation of public institutions in the relationships makes the collaborative research more accountable and oriented to public interests, whether or not a specific organizational form of "forum" is efficient, how conflicts on intellectual property and patents are solved, whether or not participation of different actors in policy-making can be organized to improve the coordination between the economy, and science and research policies, education, and the like.

In the second area, there are issues affecting the relationship between society in general

and the industrial-scientific community. In this area citizens and consumers may be excluded from the governance of scientific and technological production, and of the industrialization of new technologies.

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- 1 This approach has been mainly developed by Hollingsworth and Lindberg, 1985; Streeck and Schmitter, 1985; Schmitter, 1989; Campbell, Hollingsworth and Lindberg (Ed.), 1991; Hollingsworth, Schmitter and Streeck (Ed.), 1994; and Hollingsworth and Boyer (Ed.), 1997.
- 2 In addition to the theory of neocorporatism, the institutional approach to economic governance has combined contributions from transaction-cost economics, different literature on collective action, and different sociological and political literature on the shaping of firms' performance by their socioeconomic environment (Hollingsworth et al., 1994: 13).
- 3 PIG is a case where an association has got, from the state, authority to implement certain public policies as if it were a public agency (Schmitter and Streeck, 1985).
- 4 Jessop does not qualify the pattern of relationships that are easily coordinated by the hierarchy or the market. I consider that "dependent" would be adequate for the former, and "independent" or "autonomous" for the latter.
- 5 But at the same time there is a re-organization of state capacities at supranational and regional-local levels. This is an attempt at coordinating (governing) economic actors' action on new levels. Jessop calls this process "de-nationalization" of the state (Jessop et al., 1993, Jessop, 1995a, 1997a,b).
- 6 Many actors different from the state possess the necessary resources for the development and industrialization of the new technologies, the state becoming less involved in economic policy. However, private actors collectively coordinate in different ways (governance) in place of the state. This process is what Jessop calls "de-statization" of the state (Jessop et al., 1993, Jessop, 1995a, 1997a,b).
- 7 These processes, together with the "de-nationalization" and "de-statization" of the state, are related to

- what Jessop calls transformation from the “Keynesian welfare state” to the “Schumpeterian workfare regime” (Jessop, 1995a, 1997a,b).
- 8 Jessop bases his conception of systems on Luhman's theory of social systems (Luhman, 1984).
 - 9 The “Council for the foundation of the Bioindustry State of the 21st. Century” (21 世紀バイオ産業立国懇談会) and the “Committee for Bioindustry Technology Strategy” (バイオ産業技術戦略委員会), have joined together representatives from the main industries, business associations, universities, public research centers, and state officials from different ministries, becoming the main ad-hoc advisory bodies for the Japanese policy for the promotion of bioindustry in the second half of the 1990s.
 - 10 From his analysis of the institutional approaches in politics, economics, and sociology, Scott establishes that different approaches in every discipline can be classified according to the emphasis they have on one of the three “pillars” of institutions: the regulative, the normative, or the cognitive pillar (Scott, W.R., 2001).
 - 11 Network frequently is a residual analytical category in which, without describing its characteristics, any organizational form that can not be defined as hierarchy, market, or association is included.
 - 12 This means they have explicit rules and aims, a distribution of authority, and some degree of own resources.
 - 13 近畿バイオインダストリー振興会議。This analysis is based on the data from an interview with the General Secretary of the Council.
 - 14 The Federation of Economic Associations of Kansai (関西経済連合会), the Japan Association of Bioindustry ((財) バイオインダストリー協会), the Senri Corporation for the Promotion of Life Science (千里ライフサイエンス振興財団), and Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry (大阪商工会議所).
 - 15 These areas are environment, medical treatment, health and food, and measuring and evaluation technology. One example is a research on production of fuel from used oil, and production of alcohol from old paper, that KBPC has undertaken with a subvention from the New Energy and Industrial Development Organization (NEDO), of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI),
 - 16 In this case, since the character of volunteer association of KBPC does not qualify it to make contracts, the organization formally making the contract is the Osaka Science and Technology Center (a public foundation).
 - 17 The official entitlement with which the branch in Kinki of the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry has provided to the Council is “baio bunya chukaku shien kikan” (バイオ分野中核支援機関).
 - 18 In addition to the associations member of KBPC, the Resources Recycle System Center and KBPC promote together research and new business in the environment sector, KBPC takes part in the National Exchange Council of Biogroups, and, together with the other bio-promotion organizations in Kinki, KBPC organizes the “Biobusiness Compe Japan” (a contest in order to promote R&D projects), and exchanges information with them and with other organizations outside Kinki and broad.

経済ガバナンス論における集団決定の考察 新たな組織としての「フォーラム」

ユイス・バコス*

要約：本稿では市場主義の主張に反対しながら集団決定の新しい形を提供しているガバナンス論について分析することをテーマとする。その上で、この新しい理論に依拠しながら、現代の新たな先端産業部門のひとつであるバイオ産業に焦点をあて、そこでのガバナンスの特長を見ていくものである。この議論のなかで、技術開発のガバナンス・モデルと、その特徴及び問題点を明らかにしていくことも、この論文の目的となる。

さて、経済ガバナンス論における主なアプローチには二つある。すなわち制度ガバナンス論（IGA）とJessopのガバナンス論（JGA）である。IGAは、アクターの自己利益を抑えるための制度の組織的な構造とそこでの規則を産業が高い競争力をもつための重要な基盤と見なしている。他方、JGAはネットワークにおける交渉的な自己統治を産業競争力の基盤と見なしている。つまり、IGAは組織構造を強調するが、JGAは機能を強調する、といってもいい。なお、JGAのいうネットワークとは、IGAのコミュニティー、（水平的である場合）ネットワークや、（ネオ・コーポラティズム的ではない場合）団体と重なる。つまり、水平的なアソシエーティブな行動の場合は両アプローチの対象は重なる。しかし、ネオ・コーポラティズム論にとって、アソシエーショナル・システムは、それがヒエラーキを伴うネオ・コーポラティズム的なシステムではない場合、アクター間の競争を高め、協力を妨害するプルラリスムのシステムだと理解されている。

本稿では、このようなJGAのガバナンス論に依拠しているが、しかし、JGAはガバナンス・システムにおける組織構造をはっきりと考察しているわけではない。したがって、JGAのガバナンス論を現実分析に生かすためには、われわれはネオ・コーポラティズム的ではないにもかかわらず調整において重要な役割を果たすアソシエーションの特徴を考察しなければならない。

これに対して、「フォーラム」という概念を提起したい。「フォーラム」とは公的討論の場である。これは、アソシエーションと異なり、参加するアクターは限定されず、決定課題と関連しているアクター全員が参加する仕組みである。また、その課題は決定課程の中で共同的に編成されていくことが特長である。そして、参加するアクターの決定への服従はヒエラルキー的な権威によってでなく、アクター相互の管理、または自発によるものである。さらに、ネットワークと異なり集団決定の目標はフォーラムのなかで編成され、目標を達成した場合フォーラムのなかでの議論を通じて新しい目標を決め、フォーラムのなかで目標ごとのネットワークが生み出されてもいく。また、フォーラムのなかで社会諸制度のメンバーが参加して制度転換の調整も可能である。

キーワード：ガバナンス論，集団決定，社会的なコンプレキシティー，フォーラム，産業イノベーション。

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