Approaches to the Analysis of Civil Society and the State (First Draft)

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This paper presents a short methodological account of an analytical procedure for studying the concept of civil society and its appropriation in different theoretical and practical contexts. It was initially conceived as a briefing note for the joint ECPR/JPSA project on ‘civil society’ in Europe and Asia (especially Japan). It has since been elaborated for wider consumption but it still remains an essentially methodological note rather than a substantive contribution to the discussion of civil society. In this sense it may also serve readers interested in other concepts and theories in political science. In its present form the paper has four main parts: (a) a general analysis of modes of philosophical enquiry and their relevance to political theory; (b) an application of this model to the case of civil society; (c) a brief critique of possible meanings of civil society and their utility in social and political analysis; and (d) some recommendations for further work.

* Approaches to Political Theory

It is conventional to distinguish four modes of philosophical enquiry: ontology, epistemology, methodology, and deontological and/or consequential ethics. Ontology refers, of course, to the nature and properties of being or existence and the categorial structure of reality. A derivative meaning, more important for our purposes, is ‘the set of things whose existence is acknowledged by a particular theory or system of thought’ (Lowe). Epistemology in turn refers to the nature of knowledge (or belief), its very possibility, its defining features and scope, its substantive conditions and sources, and the limits of knowledge and its justification. Methodology can be defined for present purposes as being concerned with general rules for gaining and testing (scientific) knowledge, on the assumption that such knowledge is possible.

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In this sense, it is both more practical and technical in character than epistemology, being concerned with the logic of discovery and with methods of scientific inquiry. Nonetheless it should be distinguished from specific techniques of investigation in particular fields of inquiry. Finally, ethics concerns the nature of the good or right, that which should be. It can be divided into two main branches – deontological (concerned with the duties and obligations of individuals, focusing on will and intention without much regard, if any, to the consequences of good conduct) and consequential (which largely defines proper conduct in terms of its consequences rather than intentions). This fourfold set of distinctions can, of course, be elaborated further. But I am not so much interested here in general philosophical or metaphysical issues as in how they might apply to the analysis of political theory. Thus, adopting this fourfold typology and applying it roughly to political theory and political science, I now distinguish several approaches and sub-approaches to political questions.

Political Theory as Political Philosophy
In these terms one can pose four types of question about political theory from the viewpoint of (political) philosophy. First, there is the ontological question concerning politics. Thus one could enquire into the nature of politics, the nature of power, and the reasons for their existence. It is too simple and self-evident to note that writers working in different philosophical positions will provide different answers to such ontological questions. One should also note that different philosophical positions pose such questions in different – and often incommensurable – ways. Second, there is a set of epistemological questions. These revolve around the issue of the nature and forms of political knowledge: is (are) there specifically political form (s) of knowledge and/or types of political knowledge? What defines knowledge as political in form and/or content? What is involved in political calculation? And so on. Third, there is a set of methodological questions concerning the discovery or acquisition of political knowledge, including its implicit or explicit nature, whether it is reflexive or practical, etc. These issues could also be related to questions of political socialization and culture (concerned with the transmission of political knowledge) and of institutional design (e.g., what political institutions enhance political learning). And finally, there are ethical questions about the duties and obligations of political actors and/or about the best forms of political life, community, state and so on.

Political Theory as Political Science
Whereas the preceding modes of inquiry into politics are essentially philosophical, one could also interrogate political theory from the viewpoint of political science. This would involve considering political theory as an essentially scientific practice rather than as a branch of
philosophy and/or as a normative discipline. The corresponding four sets of questions from this perspective can be reformulated as follows. First, what are the forms of politics and what are their conditions of existence? Second, what are the relations between power and knowledge? Third, what modes of enquiry are appropriate to develop knowledge about the forms of politics, their conditions of existence, and their consequences? And, fourth, adopting the stance of Ideologie-kritik, what are the ideological implications of political science and, perhaps, how far can political science itself be self-reflexive and/or how far can one step outside political science in order to study its ideological implications? A related question here is, of course, the political responsibility of intellectuals and academicians.

The Meta-Philosophy of Political Theory as Philosophy
Having distinguished between political theorizing as political philosophy and as political science, I now suggest a meta-level analysis of these two modes of enquiry. For one can also examine political theorizing as a branch of philosophy from the viewpoint of its various philosophical assumptions and/or as a branch of political science from the viewpoint of its conditions of existence. Accordingly, one could ask the following four key (sets of) questions about the philosophical background and horizons of political theorizing. The notion of background refers here to the largely unthematized (taken-for-granted) problematics, paradigms, or sets of concepts, assumptions, and principles of explanation within and through which theorists interpret and, perhaps, seek to change, the world. These in turn limit the horizons of such interpretations and/or attempts to change the world insofar as they shape what can and cannot be seen or even imagined. First, what are the ontological horizons of political theories qua political philosophy? Second, what are their epistemological horizons? Third, what are their methodological horizons? And, fourth, what are their ethical horizons? At stake in each case is either external observation or self-observation of the philosophical problematic within which particular cases of political theorizing occur. This will typically involve more than a mere presentation of the declared axioms of a given political theory and extend to a critique of the self-understanding of these axioms. It thereby involves the attempt to reveal what political theorists qua philosophers cannot see about their own practices (on the assumption, emphasized by Luhmann, that ‘one cannot see what one cannot see’).

The Meta-Science of Political Theory as Political Science
In the same vein, political theorizing qua branch of scientific inquiry can be analyzed from the viewpoint of its various scientific assumptions. In this context, our four key (sets of ) questions concern the scientific horizons of political theorizing. Thus one can ask, first, what is political
science? And what are its conditions of existence, i.e., under what conditions does political science develop and under what conditions can political science be conducted? Second, what forms of knowledge does political science create and how, if at all, are they applied in political practice? Third, what modes of enquiry does political science adopt and what effects do these have on the nature of scientific knowledge in this domain? And, fourth, what are the normative assumptions and implications of political science?

Approaching Civil Society from a Philosophical Viewpoint

I now apply these approaches to analyses of civil society. The first question thus becomes the nature of civil society and the reasons for its existence. At stake here is, of course, the relation between civil society and its other. For civil society is typically defined in opposition to at least one other domain of a social formation and, in many cases, the nature of this social formation is also defined in opposition to periods when civil society either had not yet emerged and/or will have been transcended or otherwise replaced. The relational nature of such definitions involves important ontological commitments on the part of different accounts of civil society, e.g., commitments about the nature of individuals and societies, about the nature and function of institutions, and about the nature and purposes of politics. It is also a major source of polyvalence in the use of the term. For some theorists, for example, civil society is one moment of a duality (e.g., civil society vs a people (ethnos) without political institutions; civil society and fanaticism; civil society vs the City of God; civil society vs the state of nature; state and civil society; political society and civil society); for others, it is one moment in a triadic relation (economy, civil society, state or, again, household, civil society, state). Likewise, the emergence of civil society can be contrasted with periods when a public sphere had not emerged (e.g., prior to the institutional separation of the market economy and modern constitutional state and the emergence of an autonomous sphere of free association), when it has been reabsorbed (e.g., through the colonization of that public sphere by the institutional logics of the market and/or the state), when it will have been replaced (e.g., by direct democracy, anarcho-communism, radical democracy, etc.).

For the purposes of our ECPR/J PSA analysis of civil society it would be particularly important in this regard to explore the ‘other’ of civil society as well as ‘civil society’ itself. In other words, with what is civil society being contrasted historically and/or synchronically? Does the concept of “civil society” function differently in different European and Asian contexts and is it easier to transfer some concepts of civil society rather than others from West to East Orthodox Comintern
analyses were transferred more or less unaltered from West to East (assuming that the Marxism-Leninism of Soviet Union can count as western in the regard) with the principal modification being the recognition of the specificity of the Emperor system as an ancien régime. At the other extreme we also find a liberal appropriation of the Enlightenment tradition and its deployment against ultra-nationalism. In contrast the self-styled ‘civil society’ school contrasts a desired civil society with ‘company society’, i.e., with a distinctive Japanese social formation in which the firm has become the dominant axis of societialization (see table 1 overleaf).

The second set of questions is epistemological. They revolve around the issue of the nature and forms of political knowledge: is (are) there specifically political form(s) of knowledge and/or types of political knowledge, what defines knowledge as political in form and/or content, what is involved in political calculation, etc.? Applied to civil society, this translates into questions about the forms of political knowledge associated with the existence of the state and civil society. Key issues here are, first, the nature of the political subjects who sustain civil society and their modes of political interpretation and calculation; and, second, the nature and forms of Staatsräson (ragione dello stato, raison d’état, reasons of state), statecraft, and governmentality (governmental rationality). Another line of inquiry could be the issue, following Schmitt and Weber, of decisionism versus deliberation.

Table 1. Japanese Views on Civil Society and its Others (as evidenced in school’s views of Japan and political tasks)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Most Negative</th>
<th>Ro-No ha (Labour-Farmer)</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
<th>Most Positive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key</td>
<td>Hirano, Yamada</td>
<td>Inomate, Kushida</td>
<td>Ucida, Hirata</td>
<td>Maruyama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figures</td>
<td>(Takahashi on Transitions)</td>
<td>Sakisaka, Yamakawa (Uno on capitalism)</td>
<td>Modernists Post-Communism Liberalism, Humanism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>Comintern Communism Marxism-Leninism</td>
<td>Dissident, then ex-JCP, socialism Marxism sans Lenin</td>
<td>Developing civil society Build modern, ethical ‘civil society’ in permanence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bias</td>
<td>Economicist</td>
<td>Economicist</td>
<td>Cultural/political</td>
<td>Enlightenment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of Japan</td>
<td>Japanese capitalist in feudal, ancien régime</td>
<td>post-Meiji Japan converging with Western capitalism</td>
<td>‘company society’ not ‘civil society’. Feudal residues.</td>
<td>Liberal Critique aimed at ultranationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political task</td>
<td>Bourgeois Revolution as immediate task but then bürgertliche</td>
<td>Socialist Revolution as immediate task and replace existing</td>
<td>Develop civil society in a war of position and maintain it</td>
<td>Build modern, ethical ‘civil society’ in permanence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Third, there is a set of methodological questions concerning the acquisition of political knowledge or statecraft. Of particular interest here are the discourses, practices, and institutions concerned involved in inculcating statecraft -- discourses such as the ‘mirror of princes’ literature (e.g., Machiavelli) or the classic texts of political philosophy (e.g., Lock, Rousseau, Hegel), practices such as those involved in the emerging public sphere with its coffee houses, free press, and public debates, and institutions such as parliament, the party system, and the mass media. There is a rich set of questions here for our ECPR/JPSA project concerning the mechanisms for the acquisition of political knowledge likely to sustain civil society.

And, finally, there are ethical questions about the duties and obligations of political actors, about the best forms of political life, community, state, about the best ways to reconcile the individual and the social, private interests and public ethics, egoism and altruism, individual passions and public reason, and so on. Thus Adam Seligman (…) sees ‘the core component of the classical theory of civil society as an ethical vision of social life’ (…). He also suggests that

‘Despite these differing theoretical perspectives and political agendas, what nevertheless makes the idea of civil society so attractive to so many social thinkers is its assumed synthesis of private and public “good” and of individual and social desiderate. The idea of civil society thus embodies for many an ethical ideal of the social order, one that, if not overcomes at least harmonized, the conflicting demands of individual interest and social good’ (Seligman…”.
In this context, John Keane (…) offers an interesting history of the ethico-political deployment of the idea of civil society. Thus he notes how the conceptual distinction between state and civil society has developed through four overlapping stages: (a) a sovereign, centralized constitutional state standing over subjects versus a series of independent societies which can check the state’s authoritarian potential; (b) a belief that a strengthened civil society can check the state in the interests of justice, equality and liberty; (c) a strong state is needed to check the paralysis, conflict, and anarchy of civil society; and (d) an emphasis on the pluralist self-organization of civil society as a means of resisting the encroachment or colonization of society by the state. In the same vein, Jean Cohen has recently added that contemporary debates over civil society regard it as utopia that involves a self-limiting, radical politics rather than a totalistic utopia. As a self-limiting utopia it ‘calls for a plurality of democratic form, a complex set of social, civil, and political rights compatible with a highly differentiated society. It also calls for what I label a self-limiting, radical politics’ (Cohen …). Likewise, Adam Seligman notes the cynical use of ‘civil society’ in Eastern and Central Europe in the opposition to communism and in order to legitimate new post-socialist regimes (Seligman …). Obviously, these analyses apply to the West (including here Eastern and Central Europe in the 1980s and 1990s) rather than to the East. Thus it will be important to consider the use of civil society discourses in Japan and other Asian societies. In the Japanese case, for example, discourses of civil society have been deployed in opposition to company society and ultra-nationalism (i.e., opposition to another mode of societalization) as well as to the traditional Emperor system of the ancien régime (see table …).

Approaching Civil Society from a Scientific Viewpoint

The first set of questions to be addressed to political scientific analyses of civil society concern the forms of civil society and their conditions of existence. Under what conditions does civil society emerge and what sustains it? Answers to such questions will depend in part, of course, on views about the ‘other’ of civil society (see above). But they will also depend on the periodization of state and civil society formation and/or the typologies of states and political regimes adopted by particular theories of civil society. Of particular interest here are analyses that go beyond the simple opposition of state and civil society as this emerges during the historical and formal constitution of the modern state and that offer instead a more differentiated account of the differential articulation of state and civil society (or of state, economy, and civil society). Relevant examples here would include comparative institutional analyses (e.g., Badie and Birnbaum …, Rokkan …, de Tocqueville …); ‘critical and effective histories’ of the genealogy of civil society and the state (e.g., Dean …); discourse-
theoretical analyses of the internal demarcation of the social formation into a private and public sphere and/or state and society (e.g., Melossi; Mitchell; the historical semantics of the state and civil society (e.g., Luhmann; Kocka); and recent work on democratization in Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America, and Southern Europe (e.g., Stepan et al.).

A second set of questions concern the relations between power and knowledge in the analysis of civil society. Recent work on the conditions for civil society is particularly interesting in this regard - and continues the tradition of authors such as de Tocqueville (e.g., Puttnam, Fukuyama, Etzioni). Thus we could ask how knowledge about the conditions of existence of civil society is used. Third, what modes of enquiry are appropriate to develop knowledge about the forms of politics and civil society and their conditions of existence? There is a long history of comparative politics to be written here, beginning with Aristotle onwards; but there are also many other modes of inquiry, some of them far more recent (e.g., discourse analysis; historical semantics; critical and effective histories à la Foucault; and so on). And, fourth, adopting the stance of Ideologiekritik, what are the ideological implications of political science and, perhaps, how far can students of civil society be self-reflexive and/or can one step outside work on civil society in order to study its ideological implications? In this context one could also inquire into the social bases of civil society theorizing, the social and political functions of civil society theories, and the political responsibilities assumed (or rejected) by students of civil society.

Meta-Philosophy of Civil Society Theories as Philosophy

Whereas an investigation of political theorizing about civil society qua political science is less germane to the ECPR/JPSA project (hence the limited space devoted to it above), it is important to consider critically the philosophical background and horizons of theories of civil society. First, almost all modern theories of civil society, whether primarily philosophical or scientific, involve an ontological commitment to the institutional separation of state and civil society. Indeed it is difficult to envisage a modern theory of civil society that does not, in some way or another, start out from the actual existence and/or desirability of such a separation. This situation can be contrasted with earlier accounts of civil society, where the state and civil society tend to be fused and opposed to the household (oikos) and/or to barbarian (or ethnic) societies without political institutions (cf. Colas). In this sense, the historical basis of modern civil society theories is the emergence of the state as a distinct institutional ensemble and its separation from other institutional orders, most notably from the economy and religion. But the taken-for-grantedness of this analytical distinction (even if it is taken-for-granted more as a utopian ideal than as
actually existing) involves reifying the distinctions between state and society, state and market, state and religion, etc.

But this background distinction can be questioned from more discourse-theoretical, Foucauldian, historical semantics, or constructivist theoretical viewpoints. In these terms, for example, Tim Mitchell writes:

‘[t]he state should be addressed as an effect of detailed processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance, which create the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society. The essence of modern politics is not policies formed on one side of this division being applied to or shaped by the other, but the producing and reproducing of this line of difference’ (Mitchell...)

Other discourse-analytic studies begin from the position that the state (and hence civil society) do not exist. Instead they are the illusory products of the political imaginary. The state appears on the political scene because political forces orient their actions towards the ‘state’, acting as if it existed and so giving it the appearance of solidity. Because there is no common discourse of the state (at most there is a dominant or hegemonic discourse) and different political forces orient their action at different times to different ideas of the state, the state is at best a polyvalent, polycontextual phenomenon. It changes shape and appearance with the political forces acting towards it and the circumstances in which they do so. This analysis has been advanced from various theoretical or analytical viewpoints. Analogous arguments can clearly be made about civil society, especially in relation to the increasingly dominant conceptual couplet of ‘state-civil society.’

A similar argument is proposed by Jens Bartelson in his interesting and important analysis of the concept of sovereignty. Bartelson proposes a genealogy of political knowledge about sovereignty oriented to the historically open, contingent, and unstable relationship between discursive formations and statements about the state and its various ‘others’. He argues this relationship is best understood in terms of the parergonal function of sovereignty in political discourse. This concept is like a picture-frame (parergon): being neither part of the picture nor the environment, it is a composite of inside and outside, enabling the viewer to distinguish one from the other. The interest is in how the boundary is drawn and its effects rather than in the boundary itself as an autonomous object of analysis. In this context Bartelson presents a
threefold periodization of discursive formations on sovereignty, their differential implications for knowledge about the state and practices of statecraft, and their parergonal role in organizing relations between the state and its environment (Bartelson). Thus, instead of posing the question, “what is sovereignty?”, Bartelson asks how it has been spoken of and known at different periods of time and what the effects of these discourses have been during these different periods, with their epistemic discontinuities. In this sense, he explores the ‘truth effects’ of discourses about sovereignty rather than the truth of its existence. A similar analysis could clearly be adopted in relation to the periodization of discourses about ‘civil society’ and their truth effects.

Second, following on from the critique of the ontological commitments of theories of civil society, one can inquire into their epistemological horizons. There appear to be four main alternatives here: empiricism, critical realism, idealism, and constructivism. Empiricism is particularly associated with pluralist accounts of civil society and the state. These proceed from the existence of (atomized) individuals with empirical (revealed) preferences that can be inferred from actors’ behaviour and/or from their declared intentions (on the assumption that actors know their own interests). In this context civil society is interpreted in terms of the empirical existence (or the ethical desirability) of an independent sphere where individuals can articulate their interests and engage in a pluralistic politics of difference. In contrast to the naturalization of political actors in pluralism, the Marxist critique of civil society sees political actors as historically specific and as having real (objective) interests of which they may be ignorant. It is in this context that Marx himself developed his Ideologiekritik of Hegel’s views on the relationship between state and civil society and also argued that:

where the political state has attained its true development, man — not only in thought, in consciousness, but in reality, in life — leads a twofold life, a heavenly and an earthly life: life in the political community, in which he considers himself a communal being, and life in civil society, in which he acts as a private individual, regarding men as a means, degrades himself into a means and becomes a plaything of alien powers (Marx, On the Jewish Question).

On this basis, of course, Marx also regards civil society as a realm of alien and alienated politics (cf. Thomas) and therefore looks forward to a period when the distinction between state and civil society is transcended through the development of man’s emancipation from economic exploitation and political domination by the state. Thus he concludes On the Jewish Question with the claim that:
Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as an individual human being has become a species-being in his everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular situation, only when man has recognized and organized his “forces propres” as social forces, and consequently no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of political power, only then will human emancipation have been accomplished (Marx).

In contrast to pluralist and marxist accounts, with their empiricist and critical realist epistemologies respectively, there are also utopian views of civil society based on an idealist philosophical anthropology. These can be seen in part as a continuation of the Scottish Enlightenment tradition of Ferguson and Smith, with their strong emphasis on ‘moral sentiments’ and the capacity for reasoned argument as essential features of mankind. Marx had already noted the problem with this sort of philosophical anthropology (as well as its anachronism in a fully developed bourgeois society) but it still survives both in this guise and in more sociological and phenomenological forms in contemporary views. One of the most sophisticated advocates of such an approach, still working within the Enlightenment tradition, is, of course, Jürgen Habermas, with his commitment to a public sphere based on undistorted communication between citizens within the national state (or, more recently, and appropriate post-national political framework).

Finally, we can identify a constructivist epistemology in recent discourse-theoretical analyses of civil society and radical democracy. From this viewpoint, political actors are seen as discursively-constructed subjects (Vide the role of interpellation and other discursive mechanisms) and their interests are seen as actual (subjective) interests, i.e., interests associated with specific subject positions rather than as real (objective) interests inscribed in particular objective social relations. It is on this basis that the problematic of civil society becomes one of instituting a radical democracy in which different subject positions can be articulated around a radical democratic project that modifies each position whilst preserving it in a politics of difference (cf. Laclau and Mouffe Mouffe, Mouffe).

We can take this analysis further by noting some additional aspects of the intellectual horizons of pluralism, Marxism, and radical democracy. This analysis is necessarily schematic at this stage and is intended merely to indicate one route that the ECPR/JPSA team may follow in its comparative analysis of theories of civil society. In this spirit, then, I suggest that the intellectual horizons of pluralist accounts can be characterized as follows: first, they are
grounded in the experience of what Badie and Birnbaum (2006) would describe as societies with a political center but no state (e.g., England, Scotland, the USA) and in a concern with exchange relations and/or the sphere of circulation. The political field within which a pluralist civil society is expected to operate is constituted by a political society framed by the Staatsnation. Within this context pluralism tends to naturalize civil and political actors as dualistic citoyen-bourgeois individuals and it focuses on their mutual, horizontal relations (rather than on the vertical dimension of political domination). Likewise, the political problem that pluralism addresses is that of e pluribus unum, i.e., how can political unity be created out of a plurality of competing interests? The ideal pluralist solution to this problem is a circulating polyarchy that competes for votes from a plurality of different interests, is responsive to their needs, but nonetheless exercises political leadership once elected, thereby lending some coherence to the government. The latter should be de-centred, however, and subsidiaritarian in its form (in this sense, it would still lack the form of a unified, centralised, authoritarian state). In turn, the typical political pathologies that pluralism identifies are (a) atomization, egoism, parochialism, etc., among non-elites and (b) closed, inaccessible elites, especially where the latter seek to dominate the former through authoritarian or totalitarian means (cf. Kornhauser 2006).

Orthodox Marxist analyses of civil society and state relations are typically grounded in intellectual horizons shaped by the experience of North Western Europe and thus in the experience of the historical and formal process of modern state formation, with or without a centre. In this sense, orthodox Marxist analyses are premised on the conjoint existence of state and civil society – albeit with quite different weights and strengths attached to each across different societies and periods. In addition, Marxist analysis are significantly oriented to the relations of production rather than just to exchange relations (although there are certainly échangiste tendencies in some work on civil society) and they are also more oriented to the vertical than the horizontal dimension of power relations. Political actors are historically specific rather than naturalized so that different actors have different identities, interests, etc.; and their interests are seen as real (objective) interests implicated in specific objective social relations (e.g., capital-wage labour). It follows that Marxist analyses operate against the background of an analytical paradigm concerned with the politics of class. In this context, the political field within which civil society is embedded is understood in terms of the institutional separation between the capitalist market and the bourgeois state and the primary political problem is that of reconciling class and nation. The ‘ideal’ solution identified by Marxists in this latter regard is an inclusive hegemony, either bourgeois or socialist, in which the ruling class, its organic intellectuals, or a political party is able to articulate a hegemonic national-popular
project. There are, of course, different accounts and strategies of hegemony within the Marxist analysis. The political pathologies associated with orthodox Marxism are the mutual ruin of the contending classes (a ‘catastrophic equilibrium’) and various forms of despotism or dictatorship, where coercion predominates over consent.

Finally, radical democracy can be seen as a variant form of populism. The latter is intellectually grounded in the experience of Latin Europe and Latin America and thus in the experience of a weak state and weak center and/or attempts to address these through dictatorship. Political actors are seen as discursively-constructed subjects and their interests are seen as actual (subjective) interests (see above). This leads to a far more complex field of actually existing authentic political subjects than either pluralism or marxism recognizes - with pluralism privileging individuals and marxism privileging classes. The political paradigm within which radical democracy operates is a duality based on a politics of difference and a politics of equivalence within a political field shaped by the existence of ‘political society’ + civil society’. The market economy is not seen as distinctive - it is merely one more site on which subjects pursue discursively-constituted interests and is no more (or less) antagonistic than other sites of power relations. the primary division that radical democratic politics (and populism more

### Table 2. An Eclectic Account of Horizons of Thought

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pluralism</th>
<th>Marxism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continent: USA (England) (CH?)</td>
<td>Continent: (North West) Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateform: no State, (no) Centre</td>
<td>Stateform: State(s), (no) Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grounding: exchange relations</td>
<td>Grounding: relations of production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political actors: naturalized</td>
<td>Political actors: historically specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary dimension: Horizontal</td>
<td>Primary dimension: vertical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interests: empirical (revealed)</td>
<td>Interests: real (objective) interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paradigm: politics of difference</td>
<td>Paradigm: politics of class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political field: political society/Staatsnation</td>
<td>Political field: economy + state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political problem: e pluribus unum</td>
<td>Political problem: class and nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideal solution: circulating polyarchy</td>
<td>Ideal solution: inclusive hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– de-centred, subsidiaritarian</td>
<td>– bourgeois or socialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathologies: atomism, closed elites</td>
<td>Pathologies: mutual ruin, dictatorsip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causality: constant conjunction</td>
<td>Causality: natural necessities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power: evidenced in its exercise</td>
<td>Power: structured capacities to act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemology: positivism (empiricism)</td>
<td>Epist’y: critical realism (rationalism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method: methodological individualism</td>
<td>Method: structuralist holism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>methodological risk: behavioralism</td>
<td>methodological risk: reductionism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
generally) seeks to transcend is that of the people vs the ‘power’ bloc. The ‘ideal solution to this problem is, of course, radical democracy; and the associated pathologies are mob rule and a populist power elite.

The Meta-Science of State and Civil Society Theory as Political Science

This section pursues, more briefly, the same sort of meta-level analysis of political theorizing but considers it as science rather than political philosophy. In this context, the key questions to pose are the following. First, why did political scientists’ interest in civil society emerge when it did, where it did? What accounts for the fluctuations in interest in civil society? What has sustained theoretical interest in civil society? Second, what sort of knowledge has been generated about civil society? How has it been applied? In this context, there are some interesting and important discussions of the emergence of the various social science disciplines and processes of state formation in different societies (e.g., Wagner, Wittrock, Wallerstein). As far as I am aware, there is no comparable research on the development of the social sciences in Japan and it would be worth looking at this issue in comparative terms. The recent resurgence of social science interest in civil society (along with analogous notions such as global civil society, good governance, etc.) is closely tied in many cases (especially in relation to state-funded research) to

Populism

Continent: Latin America/Latin Europe
Stateform: weak state, weak centre
Grounding: separation of economic/political

Political Actors: discursively constructed
Primary dimension: diagonal
Interests: actual ‘subjective’ interests
Political paradigm: politics of equivalence
Political field: political society + civil society
Problem: People and power bloc
Ideal solution: radical democracy
Pathologies: mob, populist power elite

Causality: contingent conjunctions
Power: evidenced in hegemonic articulations
Epistemology: constructivism (idealism)
Method: Articulation of Elements/Moments
methodological risk: epistemic fallacy

Source: own readings of different accounts of state, civil society, and power
the political interests of states. But there is also a growing set of linkages between civil society movements and NGOs and research into civil society that would merit further investigation. Third, we can ask how civil society is investigated and with what effects? I have already touched briefly on these issues above and neither the time nor the space currently available to me permits a more extended discussion here. But our comparative project could well benefit from considering different styles and modes of research into civil society in different social contexts. Finally, one could subject political science work on civil society to an Ideologiekritik. Two issues not yet mentioned but highly important for political theory qua political philosophy as well as qua political science are the gender bias and the particularistic vs universalistic values inscribed within the concept of civil society, its discourses, and practices. There is already a well-developed and quite varied set of feminist critiques of political theory and political science addressing these issues and, more recently, there is an emerging body of literature criticizing the attempt to universalize western values in and through the discourses of global civil society, global governance, and human rights (references to follow).

Concluding Remarks

This paper has been primarily concerned to develop an analytical schema for the analysis of political theorizing civil society as political philosophy and as political science. It has introduced four different aspects of such theorizing: (a) ontological commitments and horizons; (b) epistemologies and horizons; (c) the logic of discovery and methodologies associated with different theories, and (d) the ethical commitments and ideological functions (discursive effects, truth effects, etc.) of work on civil society. Beyond this modest ambition, the paper has also offered some very preliminary comments on different approaches to civil society. These represent to more than some initial thoughts and working hypotheses for subsequent elaboration and testing. In this sense the value of the paper, if any, consists in its provocation to others to pursue the same approach or to critique it.

Endnote

Cohen argues in favour of a tripartite model as follows:

'it allows us to differentiate between the task of establishing or maintaining viable market economies (whatever the forms of property ) and the project of strengthening civil society vis-à-vis the state and the liberated market forces. So only a concept of civil society differentiated from the economy could become the center of a critical theory in societies where the market economy has already developed is own autonomous logic or is in the process of doing so. Second, the three-part model also helps us to
counter conservative conceptions of the social life. It allows us to see that the defense of civil society does not have to entail a traditionalistic hierarchy as opposed to a modern (egalitarian) life world. If civil society can take many forms, then it can also be a target of democratization. The politics of civil society can try to change the institutions of civil society in a direction away from hierarchical, inegalitarian, patriarchal, nationalist, racist versions toward egalitarian, horizontal, non-sexist, open versions based on the principles of individual rights and democratic participation in associations, and public’.

References


Reitzes, Maxine (2000) 'Civil Society, the Public Sphere and the State: reflections on classical and Contemporary Discourses', Theoria.


Appendix: Six Meanings of Civil Society

A Unified Social Sphere
The public space of communicative rationality, ideal speech acts, and undistorted communication oriented to the public interest. This concept adopts unrealistic assumptions and leaves much out of the analysis of civil society. It nonetheless serves important ethico-political functions for the reconstruction of the Enlightenment project.

A Residual Category
Civil society is the residual other of whatever the primary object of analysis. This is an uninteresting theoretical category from the viewpoint of an observer.

An Essentially Contested Concept
Civil society is the locus of disagreements among social scientists and political theorists about its nature. This approach is useful and necessary for the history of social science but does not advance the analysis of actually existing civil society unless it is articulated with one or more of the following views.

An Horizon of Action
Civil society can be seen as an ensemble of social relations that are not immediately or directly integrated into specific functional or institutional orders but cross-cut them (e.g., gender, race, nation, stage in the life-course, citizenship, human rights, or the environment). It thus comprises an horizon of different social forces, different institutional logics, etc. As such, it offers infinite possibilities (though restricted by time); it differs from position to position (relational to social space); and, of course, what is horizon to me is foreground to you (strategic-relational). In this way civil society determines structure, conjuncture, strategic context, differs with perspective, etc.

Site Of Resistance
Civil society or lifeworld can serve as a site of resistance to institutional logics (e.g., commodification,
juridification, statization).

A Space for Hegemonic Struggles
Civil society can also be seen as an ensemble of elements, identities, and interests available for articulation into a hegemonic project. As such, pace Habermas, this is not a symmetrical playing field but strategically selective, i.e., it is easier to articulate some projects than others. It serves as a possible site where the dominant axis of societalization emerges and is imposed/hegemonized. It is a heterogeneous, not an homogeneous space.

International Academic Exchange Meeting 'Globalization of the Civil Society and Public Space'
と、国家論、国家に関する理論研究者との関の違いであります。私は常に後者に属しています。国家に関する理論研究者であると自分自身を規定してまいりました。もっとも他の方々から一時的に政治理論を論ぜよと頼まれたことはありましたが、自分自身、政治理論を専業とするものを見なしたことは一度もございません。私の見解では、両者の違いは次の点にあると考えています。後者の国家理論の方は、主として現存する国家、およびその働きや機能に関心を持つ。また国家を離れたとしても、現存する市民社会に関心を持ち、そのさまざまな機能に関心を払うことが後者の立場、関心の特徴であります。これに対して政治理論を追究する論者にとっては、規範的な議論、哲学的な議論が重要になります。この違いがある。私は後者に属する人間だということをまず明確にしておきたいと思います。

このような区別を前提にして申しますと、国家を論じる場合、当然のことながら国家論の研究者、国家理論の研究者であることは極めて容易なことです。もっぱらそれに専念すればいい。しかし研究対象が市民社会となりますと、国家論、国家理論の研究者であるだけでは難しい問題がいろいろ出てまいります。そもそも市民社会は多義的、多価のものでありまして、いろいろな側面を持った概念だからです。これについては、哲学的な観点から、言葉を変えれば、政治理論の観点からの研究がなされてきました。もちろん国家論の観点からの研究もなされてきておりますが、市民社会というものを研究対象に取り上げるためには、国家論の研究と政治理論の研究との間の区別について、改めてよく考えることが求められることになります。

私が事前に皆様にお届けしましたペーパーでは、市民社会が持っている二元性を、今、申しましたような、政治理論の観点からと、国家論の観点から採っています。同じ二重の考察をさらにまたより抽象度の高いものですが、メタ科学、メタ哲学のレベルでもう一度再現する手続きを踏んでいます。そもそもペーパーで私が狙いとしたことは、市民社会論というものについて、より内省的、自省的な理解を促進するというところにございます。

それではこれに続きまして、皆様にお配りしましたペーパーの全体の内容を、3パラグラフほどで極めて簡潔に要約し、提示したいと思います。その後に私の追加分の話をメモに基づいてご披露したいと考えます。

まず最初に、どのような対象物、あるいは政治現象である、それを考察する際に適用できる4つの哲学的な考察の様式を列挙しておきます。一つ目は存在論の観点、次が認識論の観点、3番目が方法論の観点、4番目が義務論の観点。この4つの観点をそれぞれ用いることが可能であろうと思います。

4つの観点を用いて、いろいろの問いを提示していくことが可能です。それを市民社会にあてはめて考えることができるわけで、その場合でも、政治哲学の観点から市民社会を論ずることも可能ですし、政治学的観点から市民社会を論ずることも可能です。また市民社会というものを持ってい性質、性格について、いろいろな考察を進めることも可能です。

ご覧の図式の中で市民社会の分析を行うことを口頭でお話しする時間がありませんので、ペーパーをごご覧ください。次の2番の項目、政治哲学としての政治理論。ここでは我々が提起しうる問いが
どのようなものがあるかについて説明しています。
また市民社会とは何かという考察をここで行っていますが、その際にも市民社会に対峙される他者の実態は何であるか、それが国家である場合、市場経済である場合など、それぞれの場合について考察をしております。
そしてまた市民社会を成り立たせる政治的主体としてどのようなものが考えられるのか。またどのような性質をもっているのか、持つべきだと考えられるのかという議論もこの中に入っています。先ほどのムフ先生の報告の中で、「闘争的（アゴニスティック）な」市民という存在が想定され、それが自己限定を含めてさまざまな役割を発揮することで初めて市民社会が維持されるというお話がありましたが、そうした内容もここに含まれるわけであります。
続いて認識論の観点からの考察ですが、ムフ先生が提示された闘争的市民となるためにはどのようにしたらいいのか。それに必要なさまざまなスキルを身に付けるためにはどのようにしたらいいのかが問題になります。これについては、これまでにユルゲン・ハバーマスが公共空間の概念を「社会を構成する市民にとってのトレーニング場」と考え、そこでさまざまなスキルや能力を身につけると論じておりますが、そうした問いがここに入ることであります。
そして４番目の義務論。倫理の観点からの考察です。従来から闘争的市民を持つべき権利について語られていますが、それと同時にそういう市民が負うべき義務についてもここで論じようとしています。ムフ先生は非常に道徳主義的な立場のリベラリズムがもたらしうる危険を論じられ、それに対抗する代替としてラディカル・デモクラシーの倫理を提示されましたが、これから私のペーパーの４に入ります。
この政治理論の関心、メタ理論の観点から見た市民社会、国家論及びそのメタ理論の観点から見た市民社会、それぞれについては、さらに多くのことを語ることが可能ですでありますし、時間の制約がありますので、詳細についてはペーパーをご覧いただければと思います。
それでは私が追加で作成いたしましたグローバリゼーションと市民社会の関係についてのお話をさせていただきます。
今、ご覧の提示は、私のペーパーでも付表として入っていますが、立命館の先生方、大学院生にとって、内容的にはお楽しみのものだろうと思います。4年前、立命館でお話させていただきました時、この中１，２，３の各項目は、私の報告の中で市民社会に対する否定的な評価という観点から提示した内容であります。4，5，6に関しては、逆に市民社会が持っている肯定的な契機に着目し、それが日本をはじめとして他の国々でどのように適応しうるかを探ろうとしたものをとりまとめた一覧となっております。
立命館の関係者の皆様にとっては、少なくともこの図式が意味するところはお馴染みだと思いま
すので、さらにここで展開することはいたしません。むしろこれに関連する別の問いをここで発したいと思います。それはこれまでの市民社会をめぐる議論というのは、基本的には国民国家のレベルで成り立つ市民社会を前提にしていたと思われますが、今度はグローバリゼーションという状況のもとで国民国家の枠からはみ出した場合、どんな問題が出てくるか。どんなことがいいうかと
「生活世界」というものは、そもそも経験に根ざして作られている概念でありますが、実際に我々が今日まで経験してきているのは、個々の国、地域に限定された社会、経験であり、真にグローバルな意味での「生活世界」の経験はまだ持っていないという点であります。

今日の状況を見てみますと、空間と時間の関係が一方では非常に圧縮され、近づいている面があります。他方では非常に距離が開いているという両方の面があり、これが問題を非常に錯綜させておりはないかと思います。我々の周りを見渡しますと、グローバリゼーションののかわりでは、実にさまざまな対応を行っている人たちが存在します。一部には確かにグローバルな世界市民と言うべき存在があります。他方で、極めて戦闘的な国家主義者、民族主義者の勢力もあります。またある特定の問題を取りあげると、それを使って国境を超えた結びつきをつくります。そして地球的な規模に広がった文化的な消費者として登場する個々人、この人たちの多くはグローバルに広がった消費文化についてそれほど不満ももなく嬉々として受け入れる傾向が見られるようです。そうした存在もある。地球上の人間がさまざまな形でグローバリゼーションのなかで交流しているのが現状だと思います。こうした異なる経験というものに立脚して、果たして一つのグローバル市民社会を構想することができるだろうかという問いに帰結します。もう一つはハーマス問題、こちらは我々
がいかにすれば「社会統合」をグローバルなスケールで果たすことができるかということを問うて
います。

これらの問題に対して主として3つの解答が提唱されていると考えます。一つは世界国家を作ら
うという考えです。二つ目がグローバル・ガバナンスの提唱です。3つ目がグローバル市民社会の
提唱です。

まず世界国家のカテゴリーですが、これについてもさらに二つの見方が存在します。先程、ムフ
先生が言われました新自由主義的なアプローチ、いわば現代版の夜警国家とでもいうものです。そ
こではグローバルな範囲で確かに国家が組織されるが、その役割は限定されていて、最大限の自由、
自由空間を市場に明け渡すという国家であります。もう一つの世界国家のモデルは、対極にある
るもので、強力なグローバル国家を想定する。そこではグローバルな市場に対して極めて強い制限
が課せられます。

二つ目の大きなカテゴリーは、グローバル・ガバナンスです。この立場の提唱者からは、国際法、
それに基づく規範を多層的に張りめぐらせ、組織していくことで、地球レベルのガバナンスのための
国際的なさまざまな仕組み、レジームを作っていくことが推奨されます。

3つ目のグローバル市民社会の提唱。私は、単一のグローバルな市民社会が成立し、機能するこ
とを想定するのは、ユートピア的な考えであると思っています。

またグローバル市民社会を経済とか国家とかを抜き去った後に残る「残余」の範囲として理解す
るなれば、あまり意味のある議論にならないのではないかと考えます。むしろさまざまな勢力が力
を競い合う「闘争的（コンテストド）な」カテゴリーとしてとらえることができるならば、それなりの
意味は持つのではないかと考えます。ムフ先生が使われた「闘争的（アゴニスティック）なラ
ディカル・デモクラシー」、これは意味深いものです。我々がグローバルな規模で「闘争的なラディ
カル・デモクラシー」を考えることはできるのだろう。そのためにどんな条件が必要なのかということ
をめぐって議論することは有益ではないかと思われます。

ここで議論は4、5、6の3つの項目に移ります。以前、立命館に伺った時に提出した論点に戻
ってくるわです。グローバル市民社会とのかかわりで見ますと、4、5、6は一定の有効性を持
ているように私は考えます。4は、行動のホライゾン、地平線、水平線と名付けたものです。この
それはおそらくグローバルな規模で活動する世界市民的な存在としては意味のあるものだと思いま
す。ある特定の課題を追求している人々にとっても一定の意味を持つかもしれない。しかし他方
で非常に戦闘的な民族主義、国家主義の運動をしている人々にとっては、あるいは世界的に流して
いる消費文化を満ち足りた気持ちで受け止めている個々の消費者の観点からは意味のないカテゴリー
になるようと思います。

また以前にWTOの大会会場になったシアトルで起こったことから想起できるように、グローバル
市民社会はある種の抵抗の拠り所、それが展開される場面、それを行う主体とイメージすること
でもできます。

また抵抗の主体、拠り所ということだけではなく、さまざまなヘゲモニーをめぐる闘いのための
潜在的空間としても考えられるかもしれません。しかしながら私自身でいえばグローバルな市民社会については未解決の問題が残っています。ここでは主として二つの問題を出して、私の報告を締めくくりたいと思います。こういう未解決な問題を抱えているからこそ、私が持参したベ－パーにもグローバル市民社会という文言が前面には出されていないわけではない。私自身、残念ながらまだ答えを持っていない問題であるからです。未解決な二つの問題のうちの一つは、仮にグローバルな市民社会が成立するとして、それぞれ誰に対して、その市民社会の側が要求をつけるべきか。その要求をつけるべき相手とは一体誰なのかという問題であります。

第一に、未解決の問題は誰に対して要求をつけるべきかを明らかにすること。第二に、ムフ先生の説明に戻りますが、あのベ－パーで敵とは区別される「対抗者（アドヴァサリー）」ということを明確にする必要があるということです。しかし、私は、現在のところ明確な答えを提出できないというのが現状であります。

以上で私の報告を終わらせていただきます。あとは私の議論を深めていただければ幸いです。

山口　ありがとうございました。最初の挨拶の中で、今日のテーマを若干変更し、もとのテーマはフロアとの議論で展開していただきたいとお願いしたのですが、お話の中で見事に問題提起をしていただきましたので、再びもとのテーマに変えさせていただくことを感謝の気持ちを持って申し上げたいと思います。