A Study of Kant's "*Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*"（4）
——A Study of Chapter 2（2）——

by

Hiroyuki Kitao

This paper is the fourth paper of a series which aims at presenting a comprehensive study of *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*（*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*）, one of Kant's major works on ethics. These papers present some commentaries and a new interpretation grounded on thoroughgoing examinations in order to clear away difficulties and misunderstandings which Kant's beginners and critics often have. My new interpretation is that the style of demonstration of the second chapter of this work is not a regressive and analytic style（as many interpreters think）, but a progressive and synthetic style.

This paper treats the middle part of the chapter 2 of the work and makes four points clear.（1）Kant's aim of presenting the formula of "the law of nature" is to make the image of the basic formula of the categorical imperative clear by featuring the side of universality because the basic formura is too abstract.（2）His exemplifications of the perfect and imperfect duties also aim this clarification, thus he suspends the judgment whether or not these examples are really duties.（3）Kant's aim of presenting the formula of "the end in itself" is also to make the image of the basic formula clear by featuring the side of individuality.（4）The categorical imperative is a principle a priori not as process of acquirement but in a sense of preceding experience structurally, and is a subjective and objective principle at the same time. Thereby the new interpretation mentioned above is reinforced.

Apology, Repair, and Lasting Commitment

by

Toshihiko Ise

This paper considers the problem of setting past wrongs right, in the aftermath of mass scale conflicts like wars and revolutions. I begin with some odd bits of texts from early modern British philosophers: Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, all of whom must have had in view the problem of reestablishing the political order after revolutions and civil wars. I attempt at finding in them a picture of human social practices continuing through conflicts, by connecting their ideas to Hannah Arendt's account of promising and forgiving. The latter half of the paper attempts at dealing with contemporary questions about moral repair in the aftermath of mass scale violations of human rights, like genocides and sexual slaveries. The traditional picture of the public sphere shared by thinkers from Hobbes through Arendt is insufficient to cover these cases, because it presupposes that participants in the public sphere are equal individuals. We have to take into account initially unequal relationships between offenders and victims, and search for ways of changing them to more equal and fairer ones. The main resource of this part of discussion is Margaret Urban Walker's idea of reparative justice. Walker derives some of her key concepts from Peter Strawson's discussion of participants in moral relations. Comparing their ideas with those of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Arendt, in my opinion, provides a broader understanding of human social practices, without having recourse to any metaphysical or theological groundings.

Wild Perception, Brute Perception:
A Phase of Perceptual Experience in the Working Notes of Merleau-Ponty in His Later Period

by

Takashi Kakuni

In this paper, I considered the notion of "wild perception" in the working notes of Merleau-Ponty. In his later ontology, the adjectives "wild" and "brute" are frequently used. When these are used as adjectives of the word "perception," what meanings do they have?

Merleau-Ponty put emphasis on perception as a radical experience, and took the return to the "phenomenal field" as a starting point of his philosophy. On the other hand, the problem of language held an important place in his philosophy, so the relation between perception and language, or perception and culture became a problem.

In a working note of October 22, 1959, included in *The Visible and the Invisible*, Merleau-Ponty submits a notion of "Wild perception" and took it into consideration in contrast with "Cultural perception." While he accepted that culture does contribute to the forming of perception, he asserted that such perception cannot be acquired from learning, and that it is a perception founded on "Being in the World（In der Welt Sein）."

I examined the notion of "Wild perception" with his critique on Egon Brunswick's "geometrical pregnancy," and showed that "Wild perception," which precedes cultural perception, is referred to as an imperception—which is a form of forgetting—in perceptual experience, and shed light on Merleau-Ponty's ideas regarding the reason why "Wild perception" can be defined as an original perception. "Wild perception" is not a denial of cultural perception ; rather, it offers cultural perception its ontological basis.

Derrida's Theory of "Experience"

by

Daisuke Kamei

Philosophy always concerns "experience." It is understood that one purpose of philosophy is to investigate the condition of possibility, or the structure and genesis of "experience," in our everyday lives. However, without a doubt, experience also includes philosophizing, thinking, and describing using language. Therefore, the relationship between philosophy and experience is deeply complicated and should constantly be interrogated.

Indeed, experience has been one of the main topics in contemporary philosophy. Among others, twentieth century French philosopher Jacques Derrida is surely the one who questioned "experience." The aim of this paper is to elucidate a relationship between philosophy and experience by rediscovering the theory of experience that was derived from Derrida's thinking.

First, I will outline his thoughts on experience by focusing on two meanings of experience, namely *Erlebnis* and *Erfahrung*. Second, after having demonstrated his philosophical background, I will explain his theory of experience, particularly as it pertains to the experience of language.

Reason for Acting on the Principles of Justice:
Some Problems about Moral Motivation in Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*, Chapter VIII

by

Yoshinori Hayashi

In chapter VIII of *A Theory of Justice*, John Rawls presents a psychological explanation on the process of moral development, which finally leads to the acquisition of 'a sense of justice'—a normally effective desire to act as the principles of justice require. The present paper examines this psychological process and investigates his view on moral motivation. After providing an overview of this psychological process of moral development, I raise some possible questions surrounding his view on moral motivation and discuss how to respond to them within the Rawlsian conception of justice as fairness. The discussion will reveal the two points, which characterize Rawls's distinctive view on moral motivation. Firstly, citizens' reasons for acting on the principles of justice are constituted by their understanding of the conception of justice as fairness and its fair distribution of their interests. This means that a sense of justice is a desire 'motivated by' that understanding. Secondly, for the purpose of confirming stability of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness, the question whether a sense of justice is an enlarged fellow feeling or a newly created desire can be set aside, insofar as it can be assured that the majority of citizens in a well-ordered society of justice as fairness have a tendency to acquire a sense of justice.

The Experience of Aging—The Gaze of Montaigne and Jankélévitch—

by

Wataru Wada

This article considers how Montaigne and Jankélévitch perceived the expereince of aging and with what attitude they tried to approach the experience of aging. Although Montaigne thought that aging is unavoidably linked with the natural process of decline, he also thought that nature is a pillar for humans as beings uniting body and soul and that the act of fully enjoying one's existence in appreciation of nature's grace is the ultimate joy. Jankélévitch stressed the fact that we exist thanks to the generation of life, and emphasized the joy of living to the full while developing a deep understanding of the singleness of the process of aging that is one aspect of the generation of life. The message that both thinkers aimed at their readers and audiences was that the joy of life is "living well even when old." Their writings exhibit a matureness that develops with senescent decline.

On Time and Space in Husserl's Phenomenology
— Dedicated to commemorate the retirement of Prof. Toru Tani —

by

Shinji Hamauzu

In my scientific exchange with Prof. Tani during more than 30 years I think that we in the almost same generation cultivated each other through friendly rivalry and we developed each other by sharing the common interest and keeping ourselves at a distance. Without such an accompanying co-researcher I don't know whether I can be what I am now.

Prof. Tani was one of Japanese translators of Klaus Held's *Lebendige Gegenwart*. I myself was influenced not only by Klaus Held's research on Husserl's phenomenology of time, but also by Urlich Claesges' research on Husserl's phenomenology of space. Therefore I wanted to be engaged with phenomenological research on time and space in relationship to phenomenology of intersubjectivity. After Husserl distinguished the fundamental difference between "real" and "ideal" in the first volume of *Logical Investigations*, he began to analyze how the "real" and the "ideal" are related in "expression and meaning" in the first investigation of the second volume. With "real" Husserl understood what is limited in time and space, whereas with "ideal" he understood what is not the case.

From such background Husserl was engaged with what time and space are and how time and space appear to us or me, several times in his life. In these investigations on time and space Husserl tried to discuss how the objective space is constituted from the phenomenological space, and how the objective time is constituted from the phenomenological time, by analogical investigation between time and space.

In the last part of my paper I discussed the so called "controversy between Tani and Yamaguchi" on the double intentionality of retention, namely "horizontal intentionality" (Längsintentionalität) and "transverse intentionality" (Querintentionalität). Their controversy was in my opinion caused by Japanese translation to 1) "ordinate" and "abscissa" in mathematical coordinates, 2) "Längs-" and "Quer-" in Husserl's terminology, and 3) "horizontal" and "vertical".

At the end I would like to suggest a parallel investigation of phenomenology of time and phenomenology of space between Längsintentionalität / Querintentionalität and Abstand / Entfernung. This would be discussed in my next paper.

Paul Cézanne and Phenomenology

by

Takeshi Utsumi

In this paper, the author made a philosophical consideration on Paul Cézanne, a great French painter, from the viewpoint of phenomenology. After a long struggle in his youth, Cézanne, through the edification by Camille Pissarro, found impressionism as a method to draw, but this invention was not entirely satisfactory for him to express his furious sensation. Destructing the convention of the traditional art world, the impressionists reduced painting to what was reflected on their eyes. In particular, Claude Monet succeeded to present the mere phenomenon by reducing the drawing to his retinal images, obviating his self into the phenomenon itself. Then appeared dancing colors without shape on his canvas. However, Cézanne was not satisfied with mere phenomenon drawn by impressionists. He tried to recover the voluminousness of the being by colored taches, not by lines. He never draws things from exterior viewpoint, but by being immanent in the phenomenon itself.

In the phenomenology of Husserl, his starting point was always the direct appearance without any intervention of exterior representation. However, he found intentionality in the midst of the appearance, to bifurcate the phenomenon into immediate sensation and integrated perception. But Monet did his reduction thoroughly staying at the level of sensation. In contrast, Cézanne broke through mere appearance, attaining to the being. But his picture was always in process and did not reach the ordinary perceptive goal. Cézanne's painting has a great affinity with the phenomenology, and moreover, it still contains the possibility to extend its horizon and our experience.

What and How did Benner Learn from Heidegger ?

by

Tetsuya Sakakibara

This article aims to reveal what and how Benner, an authority in the American Association of Colleges of Nursing and advocate of the phenomenological nursing theory, learned from Heidegger. Since Benner learned about Heidegger's phenomenology from Dreyfus, who interpreted Heidegger's *Being and Time* in a very unique way, one must refer to Dreyfus' interpretation of Heidegger in order to shed light on the details of Benner's acceptance of Heidegger. Of the five points concerning the phenomenological view of the person that Benner raised in her book *The Primacy of Caring* co-authored with Wrubel, this article looks into the four points of "background meaning," "caring/concern," "situation," and "temporality" and provides a detailed examination of the relationship of each of the four points with Dreyfus' interpretation of Heidegger that was presented in his *Being-in-the-World*. The examination shows that although Benner did accept many ideas of Heidegger's phenomenology from Dreyfus' interpretation of Heidegger, she made original modifications to Dreyfus' interpretation regarding the concept of "caring/concern" and especially the concept of "solicitude" based on the matter of nursing, and in cases went beyond Dreyfus' interpretation with regard to such aspects. Benner's acceptance of Heidegger indicates the possibility of a new phenomenology from the matter of nursing itself, which also points to the possibility of inter-cultural exchange between nursing and phenomenology.

Manhattan Dynamite and No Pancakes: Tradition and Normality in the Work of Tove Jansson

by

Dan Zahavi

It is not uncommon to read the Moomin tales through existentialist lenses. Although there might be natural reasons for focusing on and privileging the nine classical Moomin books, it would, however, be a mistake to overlook Jansson's comic strips. This is so, not only because of the quality of Jansson's drawings and because of the way she innovatively worked with and developed that graphic medium, but certainly also because of the stories they contain. When read alongside the books, the comic strips add important aspects and nuances to Jansson's portrayal of human existence. By allowing herself the freedom to radically change the setting and scenery of the stories, Jansson was able to explore quite different topics than was possible in the novels, and in particular to offer a somewhat different account of the role of customs, normality and tradition.

The Principles of Community and the Phenomenology of Life

by

Masaya Kawase

Although Michel Henry's theory of community is one that deserves consideration, he only described the theory briefly in some of his books and articles and did not necessarily develop it extensively. Moreover, his remaining ideas about community are only described briefly, making them abstract and inconcrete.

This article attempts to flesh out Henry's theory of community by comparing the theory with other social science studies relating to community and thereby throw light on its concrete, empiric significance. In the process, the studies of Hisao Ōtsuka and Yūsuke Maki are cited in regard to the principles of community before the modern period, and the studies of Gellner and Anderson are cited in regard to the principles of community in the modern period and thereafter.

Such an attempt also contributes to gaining a deeper understanding of the achievements of the theories of community presented in the abovementioned social science studies from a philosophical perspective. In fact, Henry examined changes in the principles of community from the perspective of "phenomenology of life," and, based on his examination, this article also considers the philosophical and phenomenological significance that is deeply embedded in the social science theories of community.

Eine Untersuchung zur „heiligen Trauer" bei Heidegger

von

Asuka Suehisa

In der Vorlesung im Wintersemester 1934-35 „Hölderlins Hymnen »Germanien« und »Der Rhein«" kennzeichnet Heidegger „die heilige Trauer" als „Grundstimmung der Dichtung". Nach ihm ist die Dichtung weder ein bloßer Sprechakt noch ein Ausdruck persönlicher Erlebnisse, sondern das „Grundgeschehen" des Daseins als Ausgesetztheit in das Seyn, das die Götter, die Erde und die Menschen umfasst. Dichtung ist der schaffende Entwurf, der etwas Abwesendes im Andenken bewahrt. Dieser Aufsatz zielt darauf ab, diese in gewisser Weise esoterisch klingende Vorlesung phänomenologisch aufzuschließen und die sachlichen Gründe dafür klar zu machen, warum Heidegger die heilige Trauer für die Grundstimmung der Dichtung in diesem spezifischen Sinne gehalten hat.

Nach der Kennzeichnung der Dichtung versuche ich zuerst die Merkmale der heiligen Trauer aufzuzeigen, die den Bezug auf Götter als Abwesende eröffnen können. Dabei wird auch deutlich werden, welche Rolle dem Heiligen in der „heiligen" Trauer zukommt. Dann erörtere ich das Phänomen der Einrückung in die Erde, die in dieser Trauer ermöglicht wird, mit Rücksicht auf das Phänomen des „Mitleidens". Durch den Vergleich mit „Erbarmen" und „Flucht" wird der positive Charakter des „Mitleidens" sichtbar, womit sein innerer Zusammenhang mit der Dichtung als dem schaffenden Entwurf ans Licht gebracht wird.

"Inheriting of Will" and Motivation in Husserl's Phenomenology

by

Daisuke Kanda

This article understands Husserl's teleology of history as an "inheriting of will" and examines it from the perspective of "motivation as a demand for complementation." The aim is to reveal the will that is involved in achieving the purpose demanded to be inherited in history.

To this end, in （1）, the article first provides a summary of the teleology of history based on the descriptions in Husserl's *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* and confirms that the teleology of history is related to the "inheriting of will." Next, in （2）, the article examines how Husserl's concept of will should be understood in relation to the concepts of motivation, causality, and Urimpression. Finally, in （3）, the article raises Beruf as concept that represents the entire chain between purpose and means and looks into how determination to achieve a purpose can be understood from a phenomenological standpoint.

As a result, it is shown that "for Husserl, the purpose of history is not like something that everyone wishes to achieve without knowing it."

Phenomenology of Porn Movies: Watching Blue Films and the Ethics of Anachronism

by

Takashi Yoshikawa

Phenomenology involves the process of examining diverse philosophical issues based on experience and experience only. This article provides a phenomenological description of the experience of watching porn movies produced in Japan in a particular era, and engages in the philosophical issue regarding aesthetic experience and porn. The experience of watching porn movies is subject to social and physical constraints such as social institutions and film equipment, and can thus not exist independently of such aspects. By looking at the experience of an observer that is constrained both temporally and spatially rather than the experience of a "neutral observer," phenomenology indicates the importance of the idea of a local aesthetic experience. Moreover, the engagement in moral-philosophical issues from a phenomenological approach does not aim to justify a moral judgement to criticize one's own or another's actions, unlike mainstream contemporary ethics. Based on our experiences, phenomenology examine the problem of sexual discrimination in porn and transform those experiences.

Facticity, the Problem of Transcendental Phenomenology and Metaphysics

by

Yusuke Ikeda

This study takes a fresh look at a central theme in phenomenological scholarship, the philosophical and metaphysical meaning of the phenomenological concept of the facticity by illustrating the differentiating conceptions and theories of it in the tradition of *Freiburger-Kölner-Wuppertaler Phänomenologie*, mainly in Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Landgrebe, Eugen Fink and László Tengelyi. This reconstruction shows clearly how the phenomenological tradition of husserlian provenience overturns the modern（especially the kantian）understanding of modality, such as necessity associated strongly with aprioricity, by its own conception of empirical or factual necessity. Basing on this claim, two contradictory positions are developed in phenomenology. On the one hand, the phenomenologists, such as Husserl and the first Heidegger try to ground the specifically phenomenological idea of the metaphysics which should elucidate so called primal facts（Ur-Tatachen）. In other words, their respective program can be characterized genuinely as transcendental philosophy insofar as that of kantian type aims famously at *Grundlegung der Metaphysik*. On the other hand, the second Heidegger and his successors see the original motif of so called "end of metaphysics" exactly in the problem of the facticity discussed in phenomenology. I suggest a possible synthesis of this antithetic stances by illustrating Fink's understanding of metaphysics and especially Tengelyi's program of phenomenological metaphysics, respectively focusing of the phenomenological insight into the factual necessity of the world in our experience.

The Range and Limit of the Facticity as seen from Verbal Viewpoints

by

Kentaro Otagiri

The subject of this paper is to clarify from verbal viewpoints the range and limit of the depictions of facticity（Faktizität）that do not seem to belong to the subject-object structure. Heidegger uses the word "facticity" as a technical term from 1920 to 1930; the *facticity* of the life and human Dasein and the *facticity* of "nature", where this is taken to mean "entities as a whole（das Seiende im Ganzen）", are known as a principal problem of his early phenomenology. It is, according to Ludwig Landgrebe, Heidegger who introduced for the first time the word "facticity" as a phenomenological notion in the philosophy. Facticity lies, as Hans-Georg Gadamer says, in the "impossibility to get behind" facts. This implies that we can neither know the reason or the agent that lies behind a fact nor be or become this reason or agent. This impossibility leaves us in the "non-transitive" or "middle voice" wherein neither subject nor object（in the grammatical and philosophical meaning）, as Jacques Derrida says, can be the starting point of its operation（or its movement）. Hence, I set this philosophical insight into verbs or voices as the viewpoints for the research on the dynamic meaning of this facticity and its range.

First, I explore in the transitive-intransitive duality of the facticity of the life and Dasein in the early Heidegger. Second, the investigation will be carried on into the facticity of the nature in *Being and Time* and the nature in the meaning "entities as a whole". Finally, I confirm the meaning of the *physis* as found in a lecture following Heidegger's abandonment of the term "facticity", in order to clarify an active-middle duality of *physis* which cannot be reduced to the facticity of the human finitude.

Caring for Dependents Who Exhibit Aggressiveness:
The Case of Trudy, Mother of an Autistic Child

by

Mariko Konishi

In 2009, Professor Trudy Steuernagel of Kent State University was assaulted and killed by her autistic son Sky Abbot Walker. Before her death, Trudy had written, anticipating the possibility that she may someday be mortally wounded due to Sky's violence, that her own death would indicate that everyone, including herself, had failed to help Sky. Once this incident hit the news, some blamed the "monster son," while others blamed the "mother who had failed to provide care." However, Trudy's letter clearly denies such interpretations.

This article considers Trudy's struggles and writings to shed light on the social issues that she fought against. To this end, it indicates the problems of the idealization of the ethics of care by Eva Kitty and others and, by applying this to Trudy's case, demonstrates the inappropriateness of the criticisms directed at her. By taking a comprehensive approach to Trudy's letter, the story of Trudy and Sky as provided by their relatives, and Trudy's articles on policies on autism, this article considers how Trudy wanted to save Sky. Furthermore, the article raises some questions regarding the tendency of understanding people such as Trudy in a biased manner.

Recollection as Dialogue: The Development of Husserl's Theory of Memory

by

Takashi Suzuki

Edmund Husserl（1859–1938）distinguishes primary and secondary memory in *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*（1928）. According to Husserl, primary memory is "retention," which holds a passing object to make it perceptible in the present. On the other hand, secondary memory is "recollection"（*Wiedererinnerung*）, which reproduces a past object as a representation. Husserl's theory of memory is based on this distinction, which derives from lectures delivered in 1904 and 1905. However, we can find some traces of the developments of Husserl's thought about memory in his later publications and manuscripts.

We will demonstrate one such development of his theory of memory in the following manner: First, we will explore Husserl's 1905 lecture on judgment, where he presents the idea that the performance of recollection is not only a simple reproduction but also an examination of the past self. In order to examine one's own life, one needs to maintain a distance from the attitude of the past self. Husserl claims this requires a kind of empathy （*Einfühlung*）—not for the other but for the past self.

Second, we will explain how the idea of empathic recollection relates to Husserl's later thought. This line of thought is finally connected to the concept of "life-history"（*Lebensgeschichte*）, which appears in a manuscript in 1931. There he compares memory to a dialogue between the present and the past self. A life-history cannot be formed by simple reproductive recollection; it requires dialogical recollection because one's ability to reproduce the past is so incomplete that memory includes some gaps. Husserl's descriptions enable us to reflect on the active and productive role of memory.

La représentation de la vie et la dialectique tragique

par

Tomohiro Matsuda

Jacques Derrida laisse, au milieu des années 1960, deux articles sur Antonin Artaud : « la parole soufflée » et « La théâtre de la cruauté et la clôture de la représentation ». Il y aborde le « théâtre de la cruauté » chez Artaud et réfléchit sur un rapport de la vie et de la représentation qui se situe au centre de la théorie artaudienne sur le théâtre. Le théâtre de la cruauté est envisagé comme nouvelle tentative pour mettre en scène la force de la vie, au lieu du théâtre classique dont la structure est hiérarchisée par le souffleur et son texte. Ce problème de la vie a pourtant, aux yeux de Derrida, un lien essentiel avec la représentation ; l'espace dynamique de la vie, ouvert au théâtre, est un effet de l'opération expressive, dans la mesure où le théâtre de la cruauté reste encore une mise en scène. À partir de là, Derrida s'interroge une question de savoir quel est le statut de la représentation du théâtre de la cruauté, sinon celui-ci ne soit aucune reproduction mimique du texte préexistant hors de la scène. Avec cette question, il tente de trouver chez Artaud un rapport réciproque de la vie et de la représentation, à partir duquel il souligne la « dialectique » et la « tragédie ». Dans ce présent travail, j'essayerais de montrer pourquoi et comment Derrida a trouvé chez Artaud la dialectique tragique quiest la structure de la réciprocité de la vie et de la représentation.

Limit-Phenomena and the Modality of the Absolute Ought in Husserl

by

Anthony J. Steinbock

In this article, I take up the phenomenon of the absolute ought as a "limit-problem" for phenomenology, and I attempt to situate it in a complex of interrelated "limit-phenomena" as introduced by Husserl, namely, loving, the person, and vocations. These are limit-phenomena, however, only if we adhere to one kind of givenness in phenomenology, namely, presentation. In my view, however, the descriptions of the absolute ought, the person, loving, and vocation, etc., belong in general to a phenomenology of revelatory experience, and more generally within Husserl's thought, to a generative phenomenology. With the conviction that phenomenology is in principle open to all types of givenness, no matter how they give themselves, I attempted to give an account of the modality presupposed in Husserl's evocation of the absolute ought, and I suggested kinds of modalizations that would be peculiar to this kind of givenness.

Elaborating upon the experience of the "ought" advanced by Husserl, I draw a distinction between a practical, praxical, and absolute ought, where the latter is the manner of givenness of the person. The absolute ought is the modality of the givenness of the other person（the person as revealing-revealed）, and it is the modality of self-givenness（or self-revelation）as the person, "Myself," in a vocational sense. Finally, I distinguish from the question of modality, what I consider to be five main types of modalizations of such interpersonal experiences pertaining to the absolute value of person in the manner of an absolute ought. These, I suggest, can be understood as the clash of oughts, ressentiment, self-betrayal, contravening a preference, and pride.

The In-Between as Movement of the Border

by

Hans Rainer Sepp

The topic of the in-between refers to the problem of the border, as long as it helps to clarify the understanding of the 'middle' as well as of part and whole and centric and eccentric. All these terms are closely related. The in-between could almost be defined as the handling of the border that life itself is. This thesis is tried to prove itself in reference to Zhuāngzǐ, Platon, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Fink and Nishida.

Methodenprobleme der Lebenswelt-Phänomenologie in der *Krisis*

by

Dieter Lohmar

The thesis of my contribution is that Husserl's Crisis should be regarded as a contribution to a phenomenological humanities. After presenting the different subprojects of the Crisis, focusing specifically on the respective methods used, I will discuss methodological aspects of Husserl's attempt to give a founding and a limiting critique of the natural science. Part of this task is a historical analysis of the development of modern sciences without using the transcendental reduction. In my view, this will reveal the overall character of the Crisis as a contribution to humanities, specifically, a new phenomenological humanities（phänomenologische Geisteswissenschaft）.

In Search of Ego—From Self-consciousness to Becoming Person

by

Liangkang Ni

In the history of Eastern and Western thoughts, meditations of and debates about whether or not there is an "ego" has never come to an end. To this question, nevertheless, comparisons between phenomenology of consciousness, Buddhism Vijñaptimātratā and Confucian theory of mind nature offer a contemporary solution. On the one hand, the "horizontal eidetic intuition" of "ego" during reflections can only offer the structural understanding of "pure ego" equivalent to a pole in the whole stream of consciousness. All the experiential activities start from this "polar ego" which however is itself of no experiential content whatsoever; on the other hand, genetic phenomenology, Buddhism Pawiccasamuppqda and contemporary Confucian theory of mind nature reveal the genetic meaning of "linear ego" on the basis of employing the method of "longitudinal eidetic intuition". Hence, they offer a genetic-historical plan of understanding to the "becoming person" of ego, and show in specific fashion the experiential connotations of "person", namely, the generation of personal nature and habit, and that of the individual person as a monad and the intersubjective persons as the society. The fundamental vein of thought of a contemporary theory of ego is thus constituted from theoretical self-recognition to practical self-cultivation（self-perfection of person）.

Husserl's Transcendental Subjectivity and Heidegger's Dasein

by

Nam-In Lee

There are scholars who claim that there are fundamental differences between transcendental subjectivity as the main topic of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and Dasein as the main topic of the hermeneutic phenomenology that Heidegger developed in *Sein* und *Zeit*. However, it is the aim of this paper to show that contrary to what they claim, there are fundamental similarities between the two philosophers. In section 1, I will show this first by demonstrating the fundamental similarity between constitution in Husserl and interpretation in Heidegger, then by addressing the similarity in a more detailed manner by critically examining some views of those scholars who claim that there is a fundamental difference between Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. In section 2, I will critically examine the views of Biemel and Ricoeur on the relationship between constitution in Husserl and interpretation in Heidegger and show that there is indeed a fundamental similarity between them. In section 3, critically examining Biemel's view that transcendental subjectivity in Husserl is without world whereas Dasein in Heidegger is always disclosed to the world, I will show that not only Heidegger's Dasein, but also Husserl's transcendental subjectivity is disclosed to the world and has world as its essential component. In section 4, critically assessing von Herrmann's view that Husserl's transcendental subjectivity based on intentionality only relates to objects within the world but not to the world itself whereas Heidegger's Dasein always relates to the world, I will show that there is no basic difference between them in this respect. In section 5, I will close with some remarks on a future task concerning the relationship between transcendental subjectivity and Dasein.

Body and World. On the Margins of the Phenomenology

by

Karel Novotný

The paper refers to the ideas of Edmund Husserl about the correlation of the body and the appearing of the world as they were critically reframed by Emmanuel Levinas after the World War II and Hans Rainer Sepp in some of his recent papers. On the one pole of the correlation there is a position of the body that precedes the interiority of the consciousness, on the opposite pole there is a resistance of the real that precedes the constitution of the world. Both borders of the correlation are so connected in the fundamental non mediated bodily contact with the exteriority, a contact that seems to reach beyond the scope of the phenomenology of Husserl. On the other hand, this phenomenology does not know any limit of the I nor any limit of the world that the subjectivities constitute around as their milieus. This correlation is the absolute of the phenomenology. But the world built up around as a milieu is something that presupposes its margins, and to show that was the aim of the paper.

Kraft als ein Gesichtspunkt transkultureller Ästhetik

von

Mathias Obert

Ausgehend von Christoph Menkes jüngeren Überlegungen zum Begriff der „Kraft" in der Ästhetik wird zunächst in kritischer Absicht seine Auseinandersetzung mit der europäischen Problematik anhand von Johann Gottfried Herder und Friedrich Nietzsche nachgezeichnet. Vermittels eines zwiefachen transkulturellen Perspektivwechsels über die kulturellen Horizonte Europas hinaus wird auf dieser Grundlage sodann der Gesichtspunkt der „Kraft" in ostasiatischen Kunstübungen wie der Schreibkunst herausgearbeitet und für ein zeitgenössisches Nachdenken fruchtbar gemacht. Im Mittelpunkt steht die Frage nach Formen der Subjektivierung und Desubjektivierung des Künstlersubjekts hier und dort Weisen einer andersartigen Selbstwerdung, die in leiblichen und responsiven Lebensvollzügen wurzelt, wobei diese wesentlich über den Bereich des Ästhetischen hinausreichen. Statt das Ästhetische ausschließlich auf Wahrnehmung, Einbildungskraft und schöpferisches Tun zurückzuführen, wird anhand vormoderner Zeugnisse zur chinesischen Kunsttheorie die ethisch-leibliche Dimension der „Kraft" im ästhetischen Verhalten aufgewiesen. Von dieser außereuropäischen Warte aus wird ferner in umgekehrter Richtung versucht, anhand einiger Beispiele aus der modernen europäisch-amerikanischen Kunstgeschichte die gewonnenen Thesen und Einsichten konkret zu erhärten und sie so auf einer allgemeineren Ebene für die Philosophie zu erschließen. Zum Schluß ergibt sich – gewissermaßen gegen Menke und über ihn hinaus – ein Bild von „Kraft" als einem leiblichen Moment künstlerischen Übens, das sich zwischen der Kunstfertigkeit eines Subjekts und einem responsiven Eingehen auf ein Weltgegenüber entfaltet.

The Ambiguity of Lived Religion: A Phenomenological Proposal
for Reconceptualizing the Relationship of Religion and Violence

by

Michael Staudigl

This paper proposes to address the notoriously discussed relationship of religion and violence in a phenomenological key, that is, in inherently non-reductive, anti-essentialist, and non-instrumental terms.

In order to achieve this task, the author argues for developing a non-foundational phenomenological account to explore the phenomenon beyond traditional binary conceptualizations that interpret religious violence in terms of mere instrumentality, social pathology, or aberrancy. As the author claims, Alfred Schutz's "social phenomenology" offers an appropriate account to confront religion in such different terms. In a first step of this paper, the author presents some major concepts and theoretical premises of Schutz's overall account. In a second part, these concepts are applied to develop a phenomenological account of the "religious life-world," explored in terms of a specific "finite province of meaning." In a third step, this overall framework will then be used to explore more closely the critical relationship that ties violence and religion in a paradoxical way. The author argues that this relationship must not be understood in ontological terms but as something that is articulated in a variety of interrelated experiential levels, including embodied experience, narrative semantics, and symbolic topologies of social interaction. In the last analysis, this insight will lead me to argue for a relational understanding of „religious violence," that is, one that refutes any causal nexus but rather insists on its inherently contingent character.