

Transcendental Philosophy and a More Transcendental Philosophy

by

Toru Tani

In this contribution to the special volume in honor of Professor Hiroyuki Kitao, I inquire into the possibility of a more transcendental philosophy, following the Kant interpretations of E. Husserl and M. Heidegger as my guides.

The first part is an overview of Husserl's philosophical orientation and the inferences of his phenomenological observations for the transcendental constitution of the objects of experience. The important aspects here are: 1) the concept of imagination (*Einbildung*) that works between sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) and understanding (*Verstand*), 2) the passive synthesis that works at the level of sensibility, and 3) the constitution of time and ego.

Next, I consider two aspects of Kant's concept of imagination: namely, the function at work between sensibility and understanding, and the function that is the common root of these two. I further indicate how the two functions work in the synthesis of apprehension, the synthesis of reproduction, and in the synthesis of recognition. Here, I refer to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant. Of particular importance is the interpretation of the synthesis of recognition, which is linked to the problem of the ego and its finitude (*Endlichkeit*). I show how Heidegger's interpretation of Kant—that Kant “recoils” (*zurückweichen*) from the abyss of imagination—becomes clearer if we refer to Husserl's concept of *zurückweisen*, or “leading back to.”

Finally, I indicate the possibilities of my own imaginings (*meine eigene Einbildungen*) for philosophy.

Le dépassement dans l'adhérence
— Considérations sur Merleau-Ponty, *Le problème de la parole. Cours au Collège
de France 1953-1954. Notes.*

de
Takashi Kakuni

Dans cet article, je me concentre sur *Le problème de la parole. Cours au Collège de France 1953-1954. Notes* de Merleau-Ponty et discute son approche du sujet parlant.

Dans ce cours, Merleau-Ponty reprend le *Cours de linguistique générale* de Ferdinand de Saussure et interprète la linguistique saussurienne comme un retour à la parole, en critiquant l'historicisme et le logicisme qui domine chez les linguistes et les philosophes contemporains. À l'encontre de leurs analyses, il s'efforce de libérer ce qu'il nomme "l'intérieur du langage" et se livre à une description de ce qui s'y passe lorsque le sujet parle.

Ensuite, Merleau-Ponty se saisit du concept d'"*innere Sprachform*" au sein de l'étude de l'aphasie par Kurt Goldstein, et relie également le concept saussurien de structure avec celui de "*Gestaltung*" chez Goldstein. Ce faisant, il semble essayer de rattacher le concept de différenciation, lequel est propre à la linguistique, à celui d'une différenciation ayant lieu au niveau de la dimension corporelle et perceptive, laquelle apparaît d'ordre pré-linguistique.

Enfin, l'interprétation merleau-pontienne de l'autobiographie d'Helen Keller souligne le caractère prédominant de la relation intersubjective et pré-langagière avec les autres. Merleau-Ponty suggère ainsi que la linguistique – entendue comme un retour à la parole – se relie avec la phénoménologie des relations intersubjectives et corporelles avec les autres.

Derrida's Reading of Benjamin in the 1970s

by

Daisuke Kamei

Walter Benjamin seems to be a very important figure in the development of Jacques Derrida's thoughts from the early to the late years. In his two writings on Benjamin, "Des tours de Babel" and "First name of Benjamin," Derrida patiently and persistently reads Benjamin's texts ("The task of the translator" and "The critique of violence"), which shows his extraordinary interest in Benjamin's thinking.

As an attempt to determine how Derrida read Benjamin, this paper investigates Derrida's lecture on Benjamin in the 1970s. Derrida had begun his reading of Benjamin before the publication of "Des tours de Babel," and he gave his seminar titled "Walter Benjamin," which had three parts in total. By interpreting the materials, including his texts for the seminar, we would like to describe some aspects of their encounters.

Possibility of Applying Harm Reduction Strategy to Drug Use in Sport

by

Yoshinori Hayashi

Recently, harm reduction strategy has been proposed by the growing number of researchers as an alternative to the ongoing anti-doping policy in sport. This paper aims to investigate why harm reduction strategy should be applied and to what extent it is effective in the context of drug use in sport. The discussion will lead to the following suggestions: (1) There are no principled reasons for rejecting harm reduction strategy and sticking to the ongoing punitive policy; (2) More effort is needed to enhance public understanding to the idea of harm reduction in sport, exemplifying its concrete harm-minimizing strategies in light of the various different contexts of drug use; (3) There is a pressing need for addressing the drug use in fitness sport, and harm reduction strategy is promising especially among this neglected population amidst the furious doping debate.

Husserl's Theory of Enjoyment

by

Takashi Suzuki

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) classifies many types of intentional lived experiences (intentionale Erlebnisse) and describes them along with their intentionality and mode of fulfillment. In the theoretical attitude, one of the basic types of intentional lived experience is "judgement," an act which explicates contents of an object and claims its existence in an articulated form. Nevertheless, we can live without taking a theoretical attitude. For example, we can see the blue sky without judging anything and just enjoy its beauty. Then, how can such an "enjoyment (Genießen)" be described as a type of intentional lived experience? Husserl occasionally works on this problem, especially in *Ideen II* (1912-15) and some of the manuscripts included in *Husserliana*, vol. XLII. Unfortunately, his theory of enjoyment is not presented in the published works, but its reconstruction is significant because enjoyment plays important roles not only in connection to theoretical acts, but also in our daily practice. A phenomenology of enjoyment leads us to the clarification of our lifeworld (Lebenswelt), where we enjoy eating and drinking, walking around, playing the piano etc.

We try to reconstruct Husserl's theory of the enjoyment in the following manner: first, we will show that enjoyment is the experience where a value is originally given. Hence, we can say that enjoyment has a theoretical role in the sense that it can support value judgement. Second, we will discuss the practical role of enjoyment. Enjoyment is a practical activity because it is a part of our daily practice to satisfy a desire driven by some stimuli or representations. Therefore, we can situate Husserl's theory of enjoyment in his comprehensive program which aims to explain our wills, actions, and satisfactions as resulting from our "drives (Triebe)." Finally, we will compare Husserl's reconstructed theory of judgement to Levinas' theory.

Subject Formation and Assumption of One's Identity

by

Maiko Sakai

In this paper, I examine the structures of the phenomenon in which a person assumes their identity.

In the first section, using the discussions of Jean-Paul Sartre's "being for others" and Karl Löwith's "fellow-man," I confirm that a person develops their attributes in relation to others. In contrast to the scenario where a person initially starts as a blank slate with no attributes and then obtains those attributes later, in this scenario, they generate their own personas or roles through their interactions with others.

In the second section, I discuss the process of subject formation on the basis of Judith Butler's "disavowed identification" and interpret Shane Phelan's description of "(be)coming out," that is, coming out as a "practical creation of the self", as the specific description. This section reveals that the subject formation or assumption of one's identity is a process that not only transpires once and then becomes immutable but a process that takes place incessantly throughout life. I also concur with Kazuko Takemura's discussion of discrimination as a development of Butler's concept.

In the third and final section, by referring to some specific descriptions, including mine, I demonstrate that attributes are not always assumed positively and smoothly but can occasionally cause anger or distress by deconstructing the very foundation based on which the person has previously lived.

On Time and History in Husserl

by

Kohei Yanagawa

The relationship between the two concepts of “history” and “time” is ambiguous. In this paper, I attempt to answer the questions “What points do time and history have in common and in what points are they different?”, and to answer these questions, compare the “unities” of each. In Chapters 1 and 2, I first overview each mechanism of their constructions. Through this overview, it is confirmed that the experience stream constitutes itself through self-perception, and that history is established when a “person” belonging to some community is motivated by past generations and motivates future generations in relation between them. This overview also confirms that each of time and history is established as unity. In Chapter 3, we discuss each of the unity more closely, pointing out that both of them support the experience in their own way and in an indispensable way. That is, unity of time make experience possible, and unity of history support our smooth cognitions and behaviors. On the other hand, however, we also point out the following differences between them: while the unity of history is established through the active action of conscious subjects as multiple personalities, the unity of time does not require such active action, but rather is established “lacking-egoically”.

Kant and the “Why be Moral?” Question: Based on Professor Hiroyuki Kitao’s Works

by

Shunsuke Sugimoto

The question, “Why be moral?,” is a fundamental, and arguably the longest debated one, in the field of ethics. Recently, the responses of Kantians such as Thomas Nagel, Christine Korsgaard, and Stephen Darwall have attracted attention. However, Immanuel Kant’s own response to the question is by no means obvious. Professor Hiroyuki Kitao has discussed the question several times in his research on Kantian ethics. Therefore, referencing Kitao’s writings, I seek to explore how Kant himself answers, or could answer, “Why be moral?”

Autonomy with Others

by

Nobutoshi Nagamori

As in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Hiroyuki Kitao's philosophy is concerned with the question, "What is autonomy? In order to consider this subject, at least two questions must be answered. The first question is "What does the idea of autonomy mean?" and the second question is "Why be autonomous?". The latter question involves the classic question in ethics: why be moral?

The purpose of this paper is to respond to these two questions. In other words, by building a semantics and normative theory of autonomy, we seek to clarify what Kantian autonomy is. To achieve this goal, we place Kitao's philosophy in the tradition of transcendental philosophy and show what arguments have been made in this tradition and how successful (or unsuccessful) they have been. In particular, two positions, Kantian constructivism and transcendental pragmatics, are critically examined. A comparison with these positions will reveal the originality of Kitao's philosophy of "autonomy with others": the idea of autonomy is not individual, but can only be achieved through interaction with others. Finally, we summarize Kitao's claims about autonomy as (1) universality and (2) plurality, and defend (2) as a novel attempt to extend the possibilities of Kant's philosophy.

Formulations of Categorical Imperative and the Metaphysics of Morals in Kant's
Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals

by

Yuki Takaki

Immanuel Kant suggested various formulations of the categorical imperative in the second chapter of his *Groundwork for Metaphysics of Morals* (1785). Their roles are still under discussion among Kant researchers in many ways. Some argue that the formulation of autonomy is most important, while others argue that the argument over all the formulations after the formulations of a universal law is just “an ethical interlude” and “irrelevant for the critical arguments.” Against this background, this paper aims to examine the roles of these formulations and argue for the priority of the formulation of autonomy. In order to do so, the effects of the metaphysics of morals discussed in the second chapter of *Groundwork* are examined.

First, I argue that the metaphysics of morals in the second chapter is expected to realize two effects, speculative and practical, while it has three elements or levels. Second, I will summarize the content of the second chapter. Third, I will discuss how these two effects can be realized in the second chapter. In conclusion, I argue that the formulation of autonomy brings those two effects of the metaphysics of morals, while the other three formulations are partly useful in order to bring access to moral principles. The idea of autonomy is effective in excluding empirical interest from the determination of categorical imperative (speculative effect) and in bringing forth pure and moral interest into human hearts (practical effect).