

Multiculturalism in South Africa: The 1994 Regime Revisited

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Introduction

Multiculturalism is, like socialism, a beautiful, elusive dream. Just as the socialist idealism longing for a global egalitarian society degenerated into coercive dictatorship, the quest for multiculturalism as a universal norm may become an instrument of the perpetuation of a status quo rife with injustice, depending on the particular configuration of power relations.

In this article, multiculturalism is understood as a state of peaceful coexistence of different groups with distinctive cultural identities, and a policy framework to realize that goal. It must be worth trying and workable to pursue a broad consensus of cultural coexistence in relatively stable societies, where material inequality between different segments of the society may be tangible but not astonishingly high, like Belgium, Switzerland, Canada, and in Asia, countries like Malaysia. However, we cannot be too careful when we deal with race and ethnicity in a society burdened with colonial legacy, where belongingness to a certain group is still deemed to be a passport to institutionalized privileges.

The case of South Africa is illustrative in this regard. After a long history of intra-regional migration of hunter-gatherers, herders and mixed farmers, the southern tip of Africa started to be encroached by Europeans of continental origin in the 17th century, joined by the British in the early 19th century. Like in Canada, then, the British government granted responsible government to the White polity in this region. In spite of palpable cleavage between the two segments of the White population that culminated in the Anglo-Boer War, their relationship could still be broadly understood in terms of European multiculturalism. But, the other side of the reality was a systematical, iron-hearted exclusion of the majority Black population from the boundary of an imagined "White nation". The regime, a monstrous amalgamation of the British indirect rule in Tropical Africa, racial segregation in the American South, and parochial Christian fundamentalism, was later to be called *Apartheid*.

Against this backdrop, the experience of post-Apartheid South Africa can be regarded as a bold experiment where the bounds of possibility of the multicultural approach is continuously tested, now that the South African nation has been born for the first time as an all-inclusive community, crossing traditional boundaries of race, class, and ethnicity, however fragile its foundation is. This article attempts to shed light on the history of group antagonism in South Africa in the latter half of

the 20th century, marking the 1994 regime as a major turning point. After formulating several key ingredients of the “South African miracle”, some lessons learnt from the successful transition will be provided.

1. Separate Development

At the zenith of the Apartheid domination, South Africa’s privileged minority adopted, explicitly or implicitly, two modes of response to group difference. The first was so-called “separate development” (*aparte ontwikkeling*), which by the 1960s became the orthodoxy of the National Party government dominated by the Afrikaners who are, by and large, the descendants of the immigrants from continental Europe¹⁾. In this framework, South Africans were classified into four racial groups: firstly Whites (currently about 9% of the total population), secondly Coloureds (about 9%), thirdly Indians (about 2%), and finally Africans (about 80%). Then, the majority Africans were sub-divided into ten ethnic groups such as Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho, Pedi and Tswana as discrete nations or potential nations, to the tricky effect that the aggregated “White nation” became the largest group in the country, despite the fact that the Afrikaners and English-speaking Whites were distinctively different ethnic groups.

All these groups were considered to be cultural, social and political entities with different aspirations. Every African ethnic group was allowed to control its own homeland where each group was expected to develop along its own line. In reality, however, the homelands occupied in all only 13 percent of the whole territory of South Africa, mostly barren hinterland without infrastructure, and sometimes scattered like remote islands. In cities, Africans, Coloureds and Indians were denied full citizenship and assigned to live in their own residential areas called townships, being segregated from each other²⁾.

Separate development sounds somewhat similar to the notorious principle of “separate but equal”, legitimized in the American South by the Plessy versus Ferguson decision in the late 19th century³⁾. However, in the case of the South African “separate development”, the equal treatment of different groups was not required even as a formal rule of game, given that the subject groups were thought to be intrinsically different entities and denied common citizenship. Several homelands, namely Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei were eventually granted pseudo-independence by the government, and expected to support themselves financially. Although no foreign country recognized the sovereignty of these “nation-states” with no substance, the Apartheid regime propagated this Manchurianization as something parallel to contemporary decolonization process in Tropical Africa.

Only the Afrikaners, the offspring of the continental European settlers, have tended to be held responsible for this maniac racist social engineering⁴⁾. But, it must be noted that the Afrikaner government also made most use of the British tradition of colonial governance. In line with the characterization of Southeast Asian plural societies by J.S. Furnivall, social anthropologists such as

Radcliffe-Brown, who took professorship at the University of Cape Town in 1920, described the South Africa society as a composite society, a heterogeneous medley of diverse cultural segments, and called for the protection of fragile Native cultures at least by implication. Anthropologists never endorsed White supremacy per se, but their theory of cultural relativism was exploited by the Apartheid policy makers to justify their scheme of racial and ethnic separatism⁵⁾. While the historical origins of racial segregation in South Africa have been a major target of academic debate, it is also understood that a prototypical institution of rural segregation was laid down by the British administrator Theophilus Shepstone in the Natal Colony in the latter half of the 19th century. The Shepstone system bore a close resemblance to the art of indirect rule in Tropical Africa codified by Lord Lugard⁶⁾.

Cultural difference among all segments of the South African population was officially recognized and strategically accentuated in the mainstream political discourse of Apartheid South Africa. In stark contrast with the situation in other African countries such as the case of Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, a famous Kenyan novelist, who was detained by the Kenyan authorities on charges of writing a play in his native Gĩkũyũ language, South African school teachers were encouraged to teach primary-school subjects in local African languages. On top of this framework of so-called Bantu education, the South African government tried to introduce Afrikaans as a common language of instruction, which was typically used as a medium by which Afrikaner masters gave orders to their subservient African workers, only to give rise to the nationwide insurgency of the African youth in 1976⁷⁾. In the South African context, consequently, the value of English language as a tool of skill acquisition and inter-ethnic communication became appreciated among not only anti-Apartheid activists but also the non-White middle class at large⁸⁾.

2. Non-racialism

Small but influential groups of progressive White intellectuals advocated a second mode of response to group difference, to wit, “non-racialism”, as a reaction to the unilateral, segregationist onslaught waged by the Afrikaner government. So-called White liberals promoted formation of anti-apartheid forums in the 1960s, especially on English-speaking university campus, where Whites and Blacks were supposed to respect each other and to be united against the irrationality of racial segregation. However, this goodwill was eloquently challenged by a new generation of defiant Black youth, led by the famous Black Consciousness philosopher cum activist, Steve Biko, who avowed that artificial non-racialism would undermine the ownership of the liberation struggle of the oppressed.

What Biko criticized is tea party non-racialism⁹⁾. A progressive White person holds a home party where his Black friends are invited, and everybody speaks about a possible change of the Apartheid society. The White person now feels that he is different from his ignorant White fellows because he understands the plight of the Black people much better. But, he is totally happy with his

present life style and dare not part with the privileges, swimming pool and domestic servants. On the part of the Black participants, they start to nurture a feeling that they are different from other Black people, and unconsciously despise their township fellows who do not have urban sophistication. The former was considered to be hypocritical, while the latter to be dangerous. Biko thus contended that the conscientious Whites should work within the White community to make them prepared for a possible radical change, and that the educated Blacks should work within the Black community for the empowerment of the people, rather than to spend time to make friends without a common ground. Faced with this advocacy of separate actions, most White reformers interpreted the Black aspiration for self-determination as reverse racism, criticizing that the withdrawal from racial mixing to their own cocoons was tantamount to a voluntary surrender to separate development.

Biko's vision seems to have been influenced by contemporary radical writings including the emancipatory psychology of race relations bequeathed to us by Frantz Fanon. Biko writes, "That since the thesis is a White racism there can only be one valid antithesis i.e. a solid Black unity to counterbalance the scale. (...) We can never wage any struggle without offering a strong counterpoint to the White races that permeate our society so effectively." "For the *liberals*, the *thesis* is apartheid, the *antithesis* is non-racialism, but the *synthesis* is very feebly defined. (...) The failure of the liberals is in the fact that their *antithesis* is already a watered-down version of the truth whose close proximity to the thesis will nullify the purported balance."¹⁰ For Fanon, the very moment of antithesis underscored by Biko, i.e., the collective voice-raising of the subjugated, was precisely what had been witheringly robbed of, being labeled as the *minor* term of a dialectical progression, by Jean-Paul Sartre¹¹.

As the thesis was White racism, the antithesis should naturally be a strong solidarity among the Black people, which the racist regime frantically tried to undermine, and the synthesis could be accomplished only through power politics. Beyond the horizon of life-and-death confrontation, however, Biko dreamt of a realization of *Ubuntu* (human solidarity). As a Zulu proverb says, *Umntu ungumntu ngabanye abantu* (a person is a person by means of other people), meaning that your own humanness depends on your recognizing the humanity of others and their recognizing yours¹². Along this line, Biko writes, "We reject the power-based society of the Westerner that seems to be ever concerned with perfecting their technological know-how while losing out on their spiritual dimension. We believe that in the long run the special contribution to the world by Africa will be in this field of human relationship. The great powers of the world may have done wonders in giving the world an industrial and military look, but the great gift still has to come from Africa – giving the world a more human face."¹³

Like Fanon, Biko was strongly inspired by the Hegelian dialectic of lordship and bondage, which is commonly known as the master-slave dialectic. In a famous, ambiguous and yet intriguing section of *Phenomenology of Spirit* about the struggle for mutual recognition, Hegel writes, "Thus the relation of the two self-conscious individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other

through a life-and-death struggle. (...) The individual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a *person*, but he has not attained to the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness.”¹⁴ Hegel further argues that the bondsman could attain independent self-consciousness through formative work, while the lord who simply enjoys the fruits of bondsman’s labor would remain a dependent self. However the labor process in South Africa, in reality, was highly coercive, unskilled and fragmented, deprived of formative dynamics in itself. Black and White South Africans were economically inter-connected but politically imbued with mutual fear and hatred, and the fact that they were living apart made “the aspirations of the two groups diametrically opposed.” As there was nothing for the Blacks to lose, “if you can overcome the personal fear for death, which is a highly irrational thing, you know, then you’re on the way.”¹⁵ Biko and his generation of defiant Black South Africans were well prepared to risk their own life, and Biko was eventually arrested by the security police, tortured to death in September 1977.

3. Transition

In a broad range of anti-apartheid literature, both violent segregationism and benign non-racialism were regarded as something that conceals, justifies or even perpetuates the exploitative base structure of the system and the unequal power relations among racial and ethnic groups. But, by the end of the 1980s, everything started to change. With mounting pressure from within and without, township revolts, prolonged recession, strikes and stay-aways, the UN-led sanctions, disinvestment and other factors combined, the White minority government decided to scrap its Apartheid legislation and enter into negotiation with liberation movements such as the African National Congress, headed by Nelson Mandela who was released from prison in 1990¹⁶.

In retrospect, Apartheid functioned as a great leveler of the South African society. In the framework of racial segregation and separate development, non-White people were more or less equally enslaved and disenfranchised. But, what would come next ? It was widely anticipated that, after a general election based on the principle of one man one vote, the African National Congress would emerge as the victorious ruling party and control a unitary state. In fear of being sidelined, some political forces desperately tried to derail the multi-party negotiation started in 1991, resorting to frequent bombing, rioting, intimidation and even mass killing. The most vocal were Afrikaner right-wingers who enjoyed some diehard support base in the army and police structure, and Zulu nationalists who operated mainly from Kwazulu homeland.

Despite the fact that the ethnic division was fully exploited and manipulated during the Apartheid era, ethnic consciousness was not a mere false consciousness. The African National Congress and the South African Communist Party have recruited cadre as well as rank and file members from all races, not only Africans but also Coloureds and Indians as well as White intellectuals, conspicuously Jewish. In contrast to liberal non-racialism criticized by Biko, underground activities firmly cemented their sense of comradeship; the arrested activists were sent

to the gallows, Blacks and Whites alike. But, at the same time, leaders of the liberation movement were well aware of the sensitivity of racial and ethnic feelings among members through their organizational management¹⁷⁾. Moreover, Zulu nationalists criticized the African National Congress claiming that the ANC was dominated by Xhosa elites, and the intermediate groups such as Coloured and Indian working classes worried that their job security could be undermined through the future affirmative action in favor of the African majority.

The situation was extremely volatile, complex and chaotic. The political tension reached the ultimate height in April 1993 when young Secretary-General of the Communist Party, Chris Hani, who was widely regarded as the natural successor to Nelson Mandela, was brutally shot dead in front of his house by a right wing assassin. Deep anger, desperation and fear prevailed in the whole nation, and the most violent reaction from the oppressed communities was barely kept under discipline by Mandela's message of the last restraint. South African political leaders, regardless of race, were terrified of ominous, pressing foreboding, to see another Yugoslavia in their own country. Since 1990 when all Apartheid laws were repealed, some 16,000 people had been killed due to political violence¹⁸⁾. The country was on the brink of civil war.

In the crisis situation of the end of 1993, the whole nation started to turn the other way round. In November, all major political parties signed the Interim Constitution, which had been gathering shape in the course of multi-party negotiation, and was to be enforced after the first non-racial general election. The major part of Afrikaner right-wingers formed a new political party, the Freedom Front, and decided to take part in the election to the effect of marginalizing the ultra-rightist militia. The Inkatha Freedom Party of Zulu nationalists also decided to join the bandwagon just one week before the election. The historic election took place in April 1994 with the voter turnout rate nearly 100 percent. The result was that the African National Congress took 62.7 percent of the total vote, the formerly ruling National Party 20.4 percent, and the Inkatha Freedom Party 10.5 percent. All political parties including small parties were allocated seats in the parliament according to their share of the vote. Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as the first democratically elected president, with former president, Frederik Willem de Klerk, being a Deputy President.

This dramatic turnaround is called the "South African miracle". What made it possible? What is to be focused upon in this article is that the key factor seems to have laid in the nature of the carefully elaborated constitution itself, which manifested a comprehensive response to the complexity of the multicultural situation in South Africa in a strikingly fresh way, given the historical context of the country. The common understanding was that the disadvantaged communities left behind during the Apartheid era should be immediately empowered at least in terms of political participation. At the same time, however, there was another consensus that the national loyalty should be built on top of ethnic loyalty, by providing all groups with room for self-expression. In addition to the widely acclaimed provisions for all generations of human rights, including the right to good environment, the right to housing, the right of children, and abolishment of capital punishment, the new constitution also clearly recognized the rights enjoyed

by cultural, religious, linguistic, and traditional communities as groups. Eleven languages, i.e., nine African languages and Afrikaans as well as English, were recognized as the official languages, and the right of self-determination of any community within a territorial entity of the country was constitutionally guaranteed. Also quite effective was the so-called sunset clause, in which the job security of the currently employed White civil servants was assured until their retirement.

4. The 1994 Regime

But, these are only a part of the new set of constitutional innovation in South Africa. What was clearly effective and distinctly original could be found in its provisions of well-calculated incentive system which was to accommodate conflicting aspirations and interests of all major groups. The new government of South Africa formed after the general election according to the constitutional prescription exhibited three distinctive institutional characteristics: first, a compulsory coalition of major political parties, second, proportional representation, and thirdly, devolution of executive power to the newly established nine provinces. This set of constitutional arrangements was influenced by the theory of consociational democracy propounded by the Dutch-American political scientist, Arend Lijphart. The essence of the Lijphart model was derived from a pioneering work by the Nobel Prize economist, W. Arthur Lewis, on the governance of new-born fragile nation-states in post-colonial West Africa¹⁹.

Let us briefly discuss the effects of these three features in turn. First: coalition government. All major parties were given ministerial positions in the cabinet according to their share of the vote, and a party that received more than twenty percent of the vote was to nominate a deputy president. Forming a coalition government was compulsory for the majority party, and this power-sharing provision was constitutionally effective until 1999. As the National Party left the coalition government in that year and the Inkatha Freedom Party in 2004, the contemporary South African politics has returned to the normal majority politics. However, this prescription of compulsory coalition did provide an effective short-run refuge from the grim, falling-apart political situation in the early 1990s, showing reluctant parties a feasible option other than outright boycott.

Second, the prescription of proportional representation promoted the participation of political parties, especially smaller parties. In the past history of White-only elections in South Africa, the single-member constituency system was considered to be the unquestionable norm, which always enabled the governing National Party a stable majority in the White-only parliament. Under the system of proportional representation introduced in the post-Apartheid era, however, the waste vote was kept minimum, and a minority party which would enjoy 5 percent support rating, for example, could get 5 percent of the seats at the national parliament. Although pros and cons of these two electoral systems have been extensively debated by political scientists, the simple fact is that the zero-sum game politics concomitant with the single-member constituency system can be too dangerous in a multicultural society with serious political rifts. It is noteworthy that contemporary

dictatorship in such countries as Zimbabwe and Burma happily coexist with the single-member constituency system.

Third, provincial devolution was also carried into effect to facilitate the participation of ethnic minority. A minority in national politics may become a majority in local politics; Afrikaner politicians can still canvass Western Cape voters for a considerable support, and Zulu nationalists are still quite popular in the rural countryside of Kwazulu-Natal. In post-Apartheid South Africa, a set of radical reforms took place in terms of demarcation and amalgamation of municipality. The basic principle was to take a rich, traditionally White town and poor, traditionally non-White towns, to combine them into a single municipality, and the new nine provinces were themselves the outcome of the unification of homelands and their adjacent White areas. These arrangements were thought to contribute to the financial sustainability of regional units and to the creation of communication routes between local leaders across the boundaries of race.

After 1994, the political landscape of South Africa drastically changed. The incidence of ethnic violence has dramatically been reduced. Instead, recorded criminal violence such as armed robbery, burglary, carjacking, often accompanied by homicide, has skyrocketed so that the city of Johannesburg is now dubbed the crime capital of the world. The combination of high unemployment rate and high crime rate is the single most important challenge faced by post-Apartheid South Africa, which witnesses widening gap of haves and have-nots while the country is being integrated into the global economy.

Still, it is also true that South Africa after Apartheid enjoys a considerable degree of stability of governance at least with regard to domestic politics. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) set up in 1995 was instrumental in compiling the records of gross human rights violations in the Apartheid era, granting amnesty to the perpetrators in exchange for their confession of truth regarding politically motivated atrocities, and assisting the rehabilitation of the victims. The activities of the TRC have contributed to the legitimization of the new political dispensation through the liquidation of the past, though many of the victims have accepted the amnesty decisions only grudgingly²⁰). At any rate, by now, it seems that race and ethnicity have ceased to be the principal factors destabilizing the South African daily politics.

5. Lessons

From the above brief overview of the transition from segregation to plural democracy in South Africa, we can tentatively draw three general lessons. First, well-defined constitutional provisions for multiculturalism based on a broad consensus among all segments of the population can be an immensely useful tool to appease violent ethnic conflicts. Promoting tolerance and mutual respect for other cultures is essentially important, but this psychological transformation should be accompanied by a well-calculated incentive system which would satisfy the desire of all major players. With this regard, the South African interim constitution and the election in 1994 can still be

a shining model and deserves close scrutiny. With nationalist passion flaring in Russia's periphery in mind, Lenin as the Bolshevik leader once affirmed the rights of nations to self-determination, commenting that the rights of divorce would not weaken but strengthen the tie of a married couple, though the principle eventually turned out to be a cosmetic mockery in the Soviet Union. In the case of contemporary South Africa, secessionism has completely lost its original momentum in spite of, or exactly due to, the clear reference to self-determination in the constitution.

Second, there is no culture that is internally homogeneous, changeless, and fixed in boundaries. After 1994, the expression such as "We are South Africans" has become well rooted in the public discourse; many South Africans, Blacks and Whites, now seem to share a certain degree of collective attitudes, to one's bewilderment, for example, when they express xenophobia against migrants from other African countries. On the other hand, the cultural difference between a Xhosa-speaking businessman who was born and raised in downtown Johannesburg and a Xhosa peasant who lives in countryside of Eastern Cape is surely much greater than the difference between a rural Xhosa and a rural Zulu²¹). In post Apartheid South Africa, municipality seems to provide a new arena for cultural conflicts and interchange. In contrast to the national elections based on proportional representation, the municipal elections are based on a ward system, where the relationship between a delegate and his or her constituency is much closer. As the Apartheid-style top-down imposition of ethnicity has gone away forever, various forms of group consciousness are expected to be created in micro politics, in a variety of local contexts, in the long term²²).

Third, in a society with a noticeable degree of overlap of ethnic/racial division and material inequality, any policy to accommodate a multicultural state of the society should be effectively supplemented by a visible plan to redress the inequality. It was not so difficult for high officials of the Apartheid government to pay lip service to Zulu nationalists or Xhosa nationalists, watching traditional dance performances, committing themselves to respect so-called native cultures. With considerable perks, those Africans working for homeland governments were incorporated as a supporting pillar of the Apartheid regime. However, majority people were simply left behind, and the whole country eventually drifted toward the brink of total collapse. The minority regime had to pay the price of neglect.

Conclusion

The tenet of Black Consciousness was premised on the grand scheme of millenarian dissolution of fundamental difference beyond a continued period of deadly politics, while that of separate development was based on the notion of perpetual preservation of the difference of given cultural entities. With the establishment of the Government of National Unity in 1994, people inside and outside South Africa celebrated the unity of the South African rainbow nation, as if the dream of Biko's generation had eventually been realized on the earth at the great sacrifice of human life and dignity in the Apartheid era.

However, the euphoria soon started to be eclipsed by the grim reality. In 1998, in a statement at the National Assembly, President Thabo Mbeki described the post-Apartheid situation of South Africa as a country of two nations, the rich White nation and the poor Black nation²³⁾, the wordage which reminds us of the misery of British industrial revolution depicted in Benjamin Disraeli's novel, *Sybil*. Vestiges of master-slave relationship are still ubiquitous in every part of South Africa, where no less than 44 percent of Africans are jobless, and Mbeki himself is sometimes held in bitter criticism for the contradiction of his pro-poor words with his pro-market economic policy²⁴⁾. It is worth while and possible to solve contradictions, but it must be impossible to dissolve the chains of antinomies. The truth should lie in the political slogan fervently chanted by the liberation movements in the former Portuguese colonies in Southern Africa, which is: *A luta continua* (The struggle continues).

Despite the historic achievement of breaking away from segregationist institutions, the post-Apartheid world in which contemporary South Africans live would be "one in which men think they want one thing and then upon getting it, find out to their dismay that they don't want it nearly as much as they thought or don't want it at all and that something else, of which they were hardly aware, is what they really want."²⁵⁾ The predominantly Black underclass, swelling and mostly being unemployed, lacks effective voice representation, while a better-off stratum of Black middle-classes and a handful of multiracial upper-classes are showing up as active political players. Whether the notion of multiculturalism becomes something more than a luxury in future South Africa will surely be conditioned by the trajectory of the prolonged process of empowerment of the deprived half of the population. In the latter half of the twentieth century, people talked about the South African exceptionality. What we witness now, in stark contrast, is that Mandela's much-celebrated rainbow nation turns out to be a microcosm of the world, with an alarming degree of polarization.

Notes

- 1) As for the most comprehensive history of Afrikanerdom, see: Herman Giliomee, *The Afrikaners: Biography of a People* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2003). The Afrikaners and the majority of Coloureds speak Afrikaans, a creolized form of the Dutch, as their home language.
- 2) In the South African lexicon, Coloured people are the mixed descendants of the White settlers, the indigenous people around Cape, and the slaves taken in from tropical Asia and Africa. The origin of Indians is the community of indentured workers brought by the British authorities in the latter half of the 19th century. The Black Consciousness Movement qualified the Black people as those who were oppressed because of the color of skin, united in the cause of human liberation, and comprised of conscientized Africans, Coloureds and Indians.
- 3) Historical comparison of racial segregation in South Africa and the Americas has been substantially advanced by: John W. Cell, *The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American South* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Anthony W. Marx, *Making Race and Nation: Comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
- 4) The most sophisticated academic expression of this view can be seen in: Leonard Thompson, *The Political*

Mythology of Apartheid (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985).

- 5) J.S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948); Saul Dubow, *Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa c. 1919-1936* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989).
- 6) David Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in Natal, 1845-1910* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1971); F.D. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1922). Supposedly liberal Capetonians' overreaction to the spread of infectious disease is said to have been responsible at least in part for the institutionalization of urban segregation. Maynard W. Swanson, "The Sanitation Syndrome: Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy in the Cape Colony, 1900-1909", *Journal of African History* 18, 1977.
- 7) Alan Brooks and Jeremy Brickhill, *Whirlwind before the Storm: The Origins and Development of the Uprising in Soweto and the Rest of South Africa from June to December 1976* (London: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1980).
- 8) The English language spoken in South Africa has adopted a large vocabulary from other South African languages, so do the African and Afrikaans languages. See: Jean Branford, *A Dictionary of South African English*, 4th Edition (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991). At present, more than 90 percent of Indians, about 40 percent of Whites, and 15 percent of Coloureds are supposed to speak English as their first language, but these groups being put together constitute only 8 percent of the total population.
- 9) Steve Biko, *I Write What I Like* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988), chap. 5 (the essay entitled "Black Souls in White Skins?").
- 10) *Ibid.*, pp. 65, 106.
- 11) Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, tr. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove, 1967), p. 133.
- 12) By now, alas, this rich African concept has become a commercial buzzword with the worldwide high stature of Nelson Mandela; even a Linux-based computer OS called "Ubuntu" is available on the market. As for Black Consciousness and *ubuntu*, see: Francis Wilson and Mamphela Ramphele, *Uprooting Poverty: The South African Challenge* (Cape Town: David Philip, New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), pp. 267-272.
- 13) Biko, *op.cit.*, p. 61.
- 14) G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 113-114.
- 15) Biko, *op.cit.*, pp. 93, 172.
- 16) As for a penetrating analysis of the transitional period, see: Allister Sparks, *Tomorrow Is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa's Road to Change* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
- 17) Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba, *Comrades against Apartheid: The ANC and the South African Communist Party in Exile* (London: James Currey, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992).
- 18) In the transitional five year period of 1990-1994, the total fatalities due to political violence reached at 16,022. South African Institute of Race Relations, *South Africa Survey 1995/96* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1996), p.52.
- 19) Arend Lijphart, *Power-Sharing in South Africa*, Policy Papers in International Affairs no. 24 (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1985). W. Arthur Lewis, *Politics in West Africa* (Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press, 1965). Yoichi Mine, "The Political Element in the Works of Arthur Lewis: The 1954 Model and African Development," *The Developing Economies* 44(3) 2006.
- 20) A plethora of books and commentaries have been written about the South African TRC. As for a good overview of the parallel activities of truth commissions around the world, see: Priscilla B. Hayner,

Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York: Routledge, 2002).

- 21) One can replace Zulu or Xhosa in this sentence with any other ethnic designations.
- 22) The identities of post-Apartheid “underclass institutions” are neither racial nor ethnic, but local and parochial. Simon Bekker and Anne Leildé, “Is Multiculturalism a Workable Policy in South Africa?,” *International Journal of Multicultural Societies* 5(2), 2003.
- 23) Thabo Mbeki, *Africa: The Time Has Come* (Cape Town: Tafelberg), pp. 71-72.
- 24) South Africa’s Gini coefficient is said to have worsened from 0.65 in 1995 to 0.70 in 2000, almost the highest level in the world. Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass, *Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005), pp. 303, 319. As for a critical review of the “hypocrisy” of Mbeki’s government, see: Patrick Bond, *Talk Left, Walk Right: South Africa’s Frustrated Global Reforms* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2004).
- 25) Albert O. Hirschman, *Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 21.