

A Coherent Goals-Rights System in the Light of Political Liberalism¹⁾

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Abstract

To be qualified as a right implies to be recognized as having a universal value. It describes a political ideal of *equality* in a highly abstract form. Yet, in the exercising of a right, we must consider differences in personal characteristics or social contexts, since the extent to which individuals can concretely exercise rights might differ greatly according to such differences. To respect every individual impartially, we must set up public rules for the effectiveness of rights that will direct each individual in concrete terms the *doings and beings* he/she can actually realize depending on his/her will. *A Coherent Goal-Rights System* proposed by Amartya Sen mainly focuses on this problem. It is considered as a pluralistic coherent-value system, in which different kinds of values are appropriately balanced under certain criteria and it attempts to overcome certain kinds of dualism such as *goal-based* vs. *rights-based values*, or *individualism* vs. *holism*. The purpose of this paper is to explore a way to balance social goals and rights, the right to civil freedom, the right to well-being freedom, and the right to political freedom.

1. Introduction

Impartiality, generality, publicity, non-reduction, continuity, and priority (each element not to be outweighed without any justification) are characteristics that every kind of political values including rights and social goals should satisfy. Meanwhile, the essential characteristic of a right is that it is ultimately attributed to an individual (to his/her will or interest). For example, Ronald Dworkin calls it a “trump” by which an individual can claim “equal concern and respect” from society. On the other hand, it is known that the exercise of a right by one individual might restrict the realization of the rights of other individuals or the realization of certain social goals either directly or indirectly. The purpose of this paper is to explore a way to balance social goals and rights, and to balance different kinds of rights with one another; the right to civil freedom, the right to well-being freedom, and the right to political freedom. The goal in other words is that of understanding Sen’s idea of *a Coherent Goal-Rights System*.

Before proceeding further, I should comment on the distinction between the problem what is, or ought to be, qualified as a right and the problem of the extent to which an individual can concretely exercise his/her rights. That is the distinction between the qualification of a right and

the effectiveness of a right respectively. For something to be qualified as a right implies that it is recognized as having a universal value at least for all human beings, regardless of any difference in individual characteristics or social contexts. It describes a political ideal of *equality* in a highly abstract form. Yet, in the exercise of a right, we must consider differences in personal characteristics or social contexts, since the extent to which individuals can concretely exercise rights might differ greatly according to the differences in personal characteristics or social contexts. To respect every individual impartially, we must set up public rules²⁾ concerning the effectiveness of rights, which will direct each individual in concrete terms of the *doings and beings* he/she can actually realize depending on his/her will.

A *Coherent Goal-Rights System* mainly focuses on this problem and is considered as a pluralistic coherent-value system, in which different kinds of values are appropriately balanced under certain criteria. Previously, Sen has criticized the rigorous *welfarism* that reduces different kinds of value to a single homogeneous quantity called *welfare* and recommended a more pluralistic approach that adopts *utility* partially as an *admission condition*³⁾. A *Coherent Goal-Rights System* is an idea that advances this approach, which intends to overcome certain kinds of dualism such as *goal-based* vs. *rights-based values*, or *individualism* vs. *holism*. It assigns a certain array of weights taking into account not only the influences brought by exercising individuals' rights but also the effects of various social goals such as rise in national income, improvements in social welfare, and the maintenance of economic growth. It is assumed that although the concrete range of weights may change according to variations in people's interests or social institutions, how they change must satisfy ethical criteria specified in the previous stages.

In the following sections, we try to verify Sen's innovative idea, by connecting it with the conception of "highest-order interest" proposed by John Rawls in the context of social contract.

"[I]n formulating a conception of justice for the basic structure of society, we start by viewing each person as a moral person moved by two highest-order interests, namely, the interests to realize and to exercise the two powers of moral personality. These two powers are the capacity for a sense of right and justice (the capacity to honour fair terms of cooperation), and the capacity to decide upon, to revise and rationally to pursue a conception of the good." (Rawls, 1982, p.164-5)

Following the social choice theory developed by Sen that we examine in the next section, we intend to propose the conception of *public interest*, which develops the Rawls theory. It is characterized by the following two aspects. First, it claims a substantive meaning that values exist that are held publicly and cannot be separated among individuals. We can define these values as directly in the *public interest*. Second, it has a procedural dimension, that is to say the ultimate foundation of values and interests should be grounded in a publicly formed "overlapping consensus" based on individuals' judgments. We can also call this publicly formed "overlapping consensus" *public interest*.

2. Individual Actions and Social States

In proposing “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal”, Sen (1970) used a social choice framework to describe freedom of action⁴). He did so because he recognized the fact that even an individual private action can be an object of *public interest*. Moreover, he noticed that since an individual private action is nothing but a constituent of a social state, an individual is able to restrict the range of possible social states (in other word, state of affairs) through changing his/her own action. Furthermore, he took into account the limit of separability-hypothesis more seriously. Thus we can say, that Sen, in his early stage, opens a way to evaluate combinations of individual actions from a public viewpoint and to explore the problem of the *effectiveness* of rights. In this section, we will clarify the relation of individual actions and social states according to Sen’s framework.

Let us consider a set of individual actions, each component of which is physically realizable if and only if an individual actually chooses it. A profile of individuals’ actions that each individual actually chose (not being left to mere preference) realizes a social state. Here, if this realized social state can be decomposed again under a certain correspondence with the individuals’ original choices, it may be natural to attribute the value (including a negative value) of each component to each individual, thus regarding the set of individual actions as his/her private sphere. The libertarian ideal of *individual autonomy*, which insists that individual’s choice concerning his/her private action should not be socially interrupted in its realization, as well as the ideal of *original appropriation* (a strong sense of private ownership) which insists that every fruit of his/her individual action should be attributed to each individual can be understood in this context.

However, a constituted social state, even if it is derived only from the actions of individuals, is not necessarily clearly decomposed into individual parts. A combination of individuals’ actions might form a non-separable common state—such as being trusted, harmonious with and cooperating with one another. Moreover, it might induce some external, uncertain, and irreversible influences not only on human beings but also on some other parts of nature, sometimes far beyond the current time and space. In these cases, there is no obvious way to attribute the value (positive or negative) of a social state to individuals. In addition, it is not obviously true that any individual choice concerned with his/her private action should be necessarily free from any social interruption in its realization.

Furthermore, there are cases in which a society includes individuals who are not physically able to realize some basic *doings and beings*, in other words, whose decision to act is not dependent only on their own will. In these cases, even if there is an obvious way to decompose a social state and attribute each component to each individual (e.g. according to contributions), we cannot immediately say it is reasonable to do so. For example, if our priority is to secure some basic *doings or beings* for all, then it is taken as more reasonable to regard a social state that is realized by individuals’ actual choices as a common pooled value, and to search for a rule of redistributing it among all individuals.

When we take into account cases like the above, we cannot think any more that the answers to the following questions are self-evident: Should a set of individual actions that is physically realizable if and only if he/she actually chooses also be socially realizable depending only on his/her will? Should a set of individual *beings and doings* that is physically non-realizable even if he/she intends to choose be also left socially non-realizable depending only on his/her will without any support? To answer these questions, it is necessary not to rely on intuitions derived from personal experiences or on prior assumptions but to deliberately inquire into the nature of individual actions from various points of view⁵⁾. Can we find any procedural or substantive principle that will allow us to set up concrete rules concerning the effectiveness of rights? Before going into a concrete discussion concerning this issue, we want to consider a theoretical framework for such discussions.

3. The Basic Idea of *Political Liberalism* on the Relation of Rights and Social Goals

First, let us briefly overview previous studies on the relation of social goals and rights. Then contrast the idea of political liberalism with them.

(1). Philosophical Theories on Social Goals (public good, public interest) or Rights

1. Utilitarianism: Starting with an assumption that social welfare is a sum of individual welfare components (assumption of “additive separability”), it proposes a social goal to maximize the aggregation of individuals’ welfare.
2. Libertarianism: Individual rights exist prior to any social institution. A social goal applies only after individuals have exercised their rights. Yet, the kind of right they admit is only the so-called “right to negative freedom”.
3. Civic Republicanism: Social goals that cannot be separated among individuals are prior to individual private goals and rights.
4. Political liberalism derived from the “social contract” by Rousseau: Both rights and social goals should be assigned according to a social contract based on the general will⁶⁾.

(2). Economic Theories on Social Goals or Right

1. “Social welfare function” proposed by A. Bergson and P. Samuelson, which embodies a certain social goal.
2. “Social welfare function” (in other word, a *constitution*) proposed by Kenneth Arrow represents an aggregation rule to make a social goal based on individual values.
3. Sen’s social choice theory represented by “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal”⁷⁾.

We can observe that most of these theories except for few including Rawls’s *political liberalism* derived from the “social contract” (Rousseau), Sen’s social choice theory and others, have assumed a dichotomy where *social goals* versus *rights* and argue as to which is prior to the other. Underneath lies another dichotomy, that between *individualism* and *holism*. Each theory has a firm position as

to whether social goals over and above individuals' interests exist or not, or whether private spheres that are beyond any social interruption exist or not. In contrast to these theories, *political liberalism*, on one hand, denies neither the possibility of social goals distinct from and independent from individual interests nor the possibility of private spheres beyond social interruption. On the other hand, political liberalism insists that individual rights cannot be prior to *public interest*, and that *public interest* cannot be prior to individual rights. The relation between them can be described as follows.

There may be a case where a social goal *actually* goes beyond individuals' private interests since it cannot be clearly decomposed into individuals' actions or interests, and no one can evaluate its value in terms of his/her private interest. There may be a case where an individual action or state cannot be socially *actually* interrupted, since it belongs to his/her deep inner integrity or private sphere. Furthermore, there may be a case where the realization of a social goal *objectively* harms an individual or where the realization of someone's right *objectively* disadvantages others.

In view of these cases, it might be reasonable to admit the existence of a *substantive public interest* and to regulate the range of actions that an individual can socially realize based on his/her own choices. But based on what reasons can we judge what "*actually* goes beyond" or what "*objectively* disadvantages"? The distinctive feature of *political liberalism* appears in its answer to these questions. It asserts that *objectivity* cannot stand without any recognition by members of the society, and that an *overlapping consensus* among individuals concerning reasonable judgments in the political domain is indispensable. We can call this idea *procedural conception of public interest*. The possibility that there exists a *substantive public interest* is not denied; political liberalism only asserts that since the problem of how to regulate individual rights is fundamentally a political matter, the ultimate foundation of such regulation should be grounded on the individuals' reasonable judgments.

In this way, the focus of arguments is transferred from *which social value is prior – rights (that are essentially attributed to individuals) or social goals (that are commonly attributed to society) – to how we should balance rights and social goals* and how we should assign appropriate *effectiveness* to both rights and social goals. In the next section, let us consider the problem in a more concrete context. What kinds of viewpoints are appropriate for evaluating the values of individual actions and for setting up concrete rules concerning the *effectiveness* of rights?

4. Principles of the Effectiveness of Civil Rights and Well-being Rights

To explore this problem, it helps to clarify three types of rights, *the right to civil freedom*, *the right to well-being freedom*, and *the right to political freedom*, and examine each of them.

First, *the right to civil freedom* (in short, civil rights) requires that an individual action not be publicly interrupted in its *realization*. So with respect to the *effectiveness* of the civil right, the following two points should be examined and balanced against each other. 1) The intrinsic

meaning of an individual action, regardless of the physical feasibility or the agent's will for its *realization*, and, the intrinsic meaning of the public regulation for an individual action, not the mutual regulation (coordination) among agencies should be examined. 2) The consequential positive and negative effects of an individual action, if it is chosen by an individual and socially realized (or alternatively, forbidden to be chosen and realized) by various types of individuals who are differing in physical, mental, and other qualities connected to each other's actions in each social and natural environment should also be examined.

Next, the *right to well-being freedom* (in short, well-being rights) refers to the kind of *doing or being* that an individual who cannot physically realize their rights on the sole basis of his/her will. In such cases, the physical realization of such goals should be publicly taken into consideration. The central issue is how to distribute the external resources that are necessary to realize these objectives among the various members of the society. For example, income or welfare services are publicly provided for someone who cannot physically realize some basic action or physical state he cannot attain whether in the context of competitive market or through a private contract. In this context, "publicly" implies a way of distribution by which costs and benefits are not necessarily equivalent for each individual. So, as for well-being rights, the following points should be examined and balanced against each other. 1) The intrinsic meaning of a kind of *doing or being* that should not be physically *unrealizable* and must be provided publicly, made *realizable*, should be examined; 2) The effects consequent on publicly securing this kind of *doing or being* for all individuals, independent of the agent's will itself (i.e. whether he/she actually chooses or not), on the *effect* on others' rights, for example, rights to resources or well-being freedom, and so forth should be examined; 3) The consequences of each kind of *doing or being*, when it is actually (physically and socially) chosen and realized (or conversely left unrealized in actuality) by various types of individuals who differ in physical, mental, and other qualities, in various social and natural environments, and relative to distribution rules and the actual choices of others, should be examined. Regarding this type of right, the *equilibrium*, which is actually realized through individuals' choices given a certain distribution rule, needs to be predicted if possible.

Given the many arguments involved, the *right to political freedom* (in short, political rights) will be discussed in the next section.

5. Principles of the Effectiveness of Political Rights

First and foremost, it seems reasonable to demand formal and substantive equality of participation.

1) Every individual should be formally guaranteed to equally participate in the political decision-making process. That is to say, no individuals should be interrupted in presenting his/her judgment, and that judgment made by each individual should be aggregated with an equal weight (the condition of formal equality). 2) Every individual should be substantially guaranteed to equally participate in the political decision-making process. In other words, not only should such

information necessary for forming a reasonable judgment for all be provided but also some support necessary for accessing to information—for example a braille for a blind person— should also be provided (the condition of substantive equality). In addition, we can consider the following *populistic* conditions on aggregating process. 3) Individual judgments should not be restricted in their content beforehand (the condition of *unrestricted domain*). 4) Every judgment should be equally treated, independent of the name of the agency or option (the condition of *anonymity* and *neutrality*). 5) Evaluations that coincide among members unanimously should be publicly respected (the condition of the *Pareto Principle*).

Yet, if we require all of these conditions to be satisfied, we cannot escape from Sen's Liberal Paradox⁸⁾, namely, that under certain profiles of individuals' revealed preferences, society may fail to respect unanimous evaluations, leaving room that certain reasonable individual actions, e.g. an individual choice which is indispensable for his/her integrity, to be socially realized. In order to guarantee the comparability between the reasonable *effectiveness* on civil and welfare rights and on political rights, we should examine some of the above *populistic* conditions on the aggregating process.

As a way of solving this problem, we can think of the following alternatives: 1) Introducing a positivistic assumption that people actually have a tendency of revealing such preferences that make the Pareto Principle and minimum liberty comparable (factual assumption of *domain restriction*). 2) Clarifying the epistemological conditions which ethically regulate the process of forming individual reasonable judgments. In addition, we should assume that certain institutions to support such conditions will be set up (normative assumption of *domain restriction*). 3) Assuming aggregating rules that respect procedural and substantial criteria of higher principles that have existed historically (for example, constitutions and international laws) or ideally. For example, John Rawls inquires into the possibility of a reasonable overlapping-consensus as follows. As for ordinal law and policies he assumes regulation by constitutional congress, while as for the highest principles of society, e.g. the first principles of justice, he assumes some ethical self or mutual regulations on the range of judgments people reveal.

To verify this solution fully, we must inquire into epistemological and institutional conditions of the process of forming individual reasonable judgments and a social reasonable judgment, and the background theories that support the possibility and the reasonability of those conditions. We will examine this problem briefly in the next section. Here, we want to note one point. To exercise political rights means to take responsibility for creating *public interest* and forming judgments to be counted publicly. Thus as for political rights, the problem of regulating the effectiveness of rights means to cultivate the individuals' epistemological abilities and informational bases indispensable for making reasonable *public interest*. It requires inheriting and re-interpreting deep and broad human political experiences in history and ideas.

6. The Epistemological Nature of Individual Public Judgment

As mentioned before, in setting up concrete public rules concerning the *effectiveness* of rights, we must evaluate both their intrinsic meaning and the predictable consequences they induce⁹⁾. While the contents of evaluations are inevitably diverse among individuals according to their more comprehensive ideas, at least in a political dimension, that is, for the purpose of making public rules, we can consider certain characteristics commonly satisfied by individual evaluations. First, to evaluate intrinsic value or broadly external consequences of a right and to set up a public rule that works as a universal code of behavior for individuals in their social interaction¹⁰⁾, it is inappropriate to rely on a non-reflectively, self-central or group-oriented viewpoint with limited information (i.e. tailoring the rule to serve to their personal desires). Rather, what should be endorsed is an *impartial* and *reflective* viewpoint that considers diverse individuals (differing in personal features or social positions) with broad information and an imagination for understanding the universal meanings of the particular difficulties they are facing and struggling with. Furthermore, *transparency*, *accountability*, *verifiability* are also required. An evaluation that satisfies these characteristics is nothing but a *public judgment* an individual develops as a citizen. We can suppose that, referring to Rawls and the arguments of *deliberative democracy*, the function of verifying individuals' private preferences and their public judgments and cultivating the latter is embodied in a *deliberative* public forum and individuals' inner and mutual ethical reflections through public discussions.

Of course, the fact that individual judgments are based on a public viewpoint cannot guarantee the existence of an overlapping agreement among individuals. To aggregate individuals' judgments in order to construct a public judgment that chooses a public rule, an *aggregating rule* such as the *simple majority rule* or the *Borda rule* may be further required. An important point is that if individuals' judgments are regarded as being based on public viewpoints, a constructed *public judgment* can be recognized at least to be reasonable no matter what its content is. Moreover, as long as the opportunities of revising public rules are guaranteed, it is possible for an individual to keep holding his/her own public judgment that does not fully coincide with the constructed public judgment. He/she can try to revise not only the chosen public rule but also the *aggregating rule* itself. As a result, if his/her criticism is publicly known and is deeply disseminated into the majority in society, he/she can get a chance to revise those rules.

"Reasonable political conceptions of justice do not always lead to the same conclusion..., nor do citizens holding the same conception always agree on particular issues. Yet the outcome of the vote is to be seen as reasonable provided all citizens of a reasonably just constitutional regime sincerely vote in accordance with the idea of public reason. This doesn't mean the outcome is true or correct, but it is for the moment reasonable, and binding on citizens by the majority principle....Citizens learn and profit from conflict and argument, and when their arguments follow public reason, they

instruct and deepen society's public culture" (Rawls, 1996, lvi-lvii).

Sen proposes an idea that actualizes Rawls's perspective by focusing on activities of individuals to "expand the reach of our sense of justice" to individuals who actually belong to plural groups, positions and categories¹¹⁾. It is assumed that such individuals are committed to diverse interests and are able to form multiple judgments reflecting particular features of the groups, positions or categories. Moreover, such individuals have opportunities to observe, reflect on and evaluate the claims of a group from others' viewpoints inside their own identities. These experiences shall support individuals' ethical exercises to acquire public viewpoints to evaluate the universal meanings of particular difficulties and claims of different groups. According to Sen, it is a *collaborative responsibility* of those who participate in a public rule-making process to form and express their deliberate *individual public judgments*, rather than their *individual private preferences* of their own¹²⁾.

7. Concluding Remarks

In concluding this paper, I want to illustrate a way to balance the three kinds of rights civil rights, well-being rights and political rights and social goals. First, let us suppose the social goal is to achieve an upper limit of automobile exhaust per year in a society, based on an estimation of the negative effect of automobile exhaust on the environment. Secondly, let us assume the diverse preferences individuals actually have: a conspicuous concern to have a low-exhaust, but expensive hybrid car, a very private taste to have a car that is a lot faster than a hybrid car, and so on. Moreover, let us remember that there are more than a few people who cannot afford to buy an expensive hybrid car, or who cannot afford to buy any car though they may want one, or there are a lot of people, e.g. elderly or disabled, who have inhibited their cravings for mobility itself. Third, let us further assume there exists a public forum to choose public policies to approach to the social goal, one of whose results is to regulate individual diverse preferences in a certain way. And let's also assume someone who originally has a claim for non-regulation policy to respect individual freedom of choice has a chance to hear the silent voices of people who have no means to move. He might agree with such a public policy which improves a public transportation system to be a more universal (low price and high quality), and more low-exhaust one, even if his taxes become higher as a consequence. Furthermore, after being informed of the high estimation of the negative effect of the automobile exhaust on environment, he might agree to such a policy which partially relates the social cost of automobile exhaust to the price of a car, even if this leads to a higher cost in order to buy a faster but high-exhaust car. The problems of what kinds of public policies are chosen and how to assign the effectiveness of civil rights, well-being rights, and social goals are determined depending on individuals' exercises of their political rights. According to Sen,

In dealing with global environmental problems (such as global warming), there is an important need to consider people around the world as more than elements in a total picture of per-capita world consumption. They do, of course, buy goods and contribute to that per-capita figure, but they also have distinct interests and concerns, and considerations of fairness and justice apply to them. They are also agents who are interested in their own predicaments and those of others—now and in the future. (Sen, 2002, p.547)

In conclusion, I would like to make a brief summary of this paper. The usefulness of the concept of a *right* is that it can remind us of the intrinsic value of persons that stand against the logic of number, or quantity. Such a micro view perspective of a right is a perspective that can remind us of the intrinsic value of creatures other than humans or the intrinsic value of nature itself, apart from their “use value” for humankind. Needless to say, it is important to point out the actual possibility of mutual benefits among generations, or among humans, non-human creatures, and nature itself in terms of welfare. However, we cannot deny the possibility of the occurrence of certain conflicts among them. The concept of a right shows its real ability in this context. It reminds us there are many values that cannot be reduced to one element, and cannot be aggregated to a single homogeneous quantity, say, welfare. On the other hand, the essence of *public interest* based on individuals' public viewpoint is that it can grasp and respect the value of a person, a non-human creature, or nature itself, even if they actually exist in a remote place and time from here and now. Of course, an individual cannot be detached from his/her own position, a categorical group, or his/her community or society either with regard to his/her existence or recognition.

Yet, as Sen says, today individuals actually belong to plural positions, categorical groups, communities or societies and experience diverse interests and values. Considering this situation, let us assume that an individual tries to establish plural claims opposing claims, which he/she knows through experience and tries to create a certain consistency among them, estimating the universal meanings of them, as a problem of integrity for himself/herself. Then, he/she can acquire “open impartiality”, as Sen insists. A public forum is nothing but a place where individuals who have mutually overlapping experiences come together. They can collaborate to reflect partially common experiences and can listen to others' particular experiences. This in itself is a new experience and all of these experiences will promote the formation of an individual public viewpoint. The combination of a micro perspective of *rights* (reminding us of intrinsic values) and a broad perspective of *public interest* (based on individuals' public viewpoints) are inevitable to balance political values, such as social goals and rights.

Notes

- 1) This paper was presented at the 4th Conference on the Capability Approach: 5-7 September 2004, University of Pavia, Italy. I am most grateful to Professor Amartya Sen, who opened the splendid vistas

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- 2) In this paper, the conception of rule corresponds to what J. Rawls calls “the practical conception”, which is distinguished from “the summary view”. That is to say, the rules that define a practice (a practice means any form of activity specified by a system of rules which defines offices, roles, moves, penalties, defenses) “are publicly known and understood as definitive; and it is essential also that the rules of a practice can be taught and can be acted upon to yield a coherent practice,” and “the practice is logically prior to particular cases”. (Rawls, 1955, p.37, this citation is from 1999)
- 3) Sen and Williams, 1982, p.6, n.11
- 4) Note that in this paper, the phrase “individual actions” is used as a conception which includes “individual states”, that is to say, individual beings.
- 5) This point is related with the idea of “broad consequentialism” proposed by Sen. (Sen, 2000)
- 6) Notice that “social contract” of Rousseau and Rawls is different from *private contract*. According to Rawls: “Following Rousseau’s opening thought in *The Social Contract*, I shall assume that his phrase “men as they are” refers to persons’ moral and psychological natures and how that nature works within a framework of political and social institutions; and that his phrase “laws as they might be” refers to laws as they should, or ought, to be. I shall also assume that, if we grow up under a framework of reasonable and just political and social institutions, we shall affirm those institutions when we in our turn come of age, and they will endure over time” (Rawls, 1999, p.7)
- 7) Sen (1970a, Chapter 6*; 1970b; 1992).
- 8) Precisely, Liberal Paradox is induced without anonymity or neutrality. See, Sen, 1970.
- 9) The conception of consequential evaluation according to Sen is one which includes both intrinsic meaning and the predictable consequences. See “[i]f rights are embedded in a system of consequential evaluation, we are immediately led to questions about the badness of the violation of rights, or the goodness of their fulfillment, it has implications on good choices and good actions. These consequential implications suggest how different rights may be assessed vis-à-vis each other, and how the priorities between them may be systematically appraised within a coherent consequentialist framework.” (Sen, 2000, p.499).
- 10) This expression is from Kotaro Suzumura. Refer to Gotoh and Suzumura, 2000.
- 11) Sen, 2001, It is noticed that “actually belong to” is not a necessary condition, though it may obviously promote the condition. A key condition is in a kind of epistemic condition, i.e., “open impartiality”, which makes it possible to be free from any kind of local prejudices while taking diverse local information into consideration, and furthermore, which makes it possible to understand the particular meanings of position-situated evaluations in each context, and, at the same time, to reasonably recognize a certain universal, human meaning of each position-situated evaluation. See, Gotoh, 2004
- 12) Sen, 1999b, p.283.

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