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Session 1

Keynote Speech

The Afterlife of History and the Importance of Seeing Japan from the Sea

Professor Alexis DUDDEN



1. Introduction

I want to begin by saying that my remarks are based on an understanding that Japan, like many countries, especially mine (USA) is deeply divided today. The book I am writing now, *The Opening and*

Closing of Japan, 1850-2020, examines this phenomenon, and, although I cannot say what the Meiji moment felt like in 1850, I believe it is fair to say that Reiwa Japan 2020, is as equally divided as Meiji was, if not more so. This moment is a manifestation of deep divisions *within* societies more than one of national group versus another and approaching the moment this way allows for a far more complicated portrait of identity to emerge.

Decades ago, my favorite historian of modern Japan, Amino Yoshihiko, urged seeing Japan from the sea. For years, I didn't try to understand what he meant, staying instead on land. Increasingly, however, I have come to realize the significance of Amino sensei's observation - and, oddly, it was the LDP's 2012 draft for a new constitution that made me begin to understand. I'll come back to this.

Ten years ago, I was lucky to live for a year in Niigata with my then 4-year-old son and to stare every day at the harsh and beautiful Sea of Japan/East Sea (in Niigata, this ocean is called the Sea of Japan, but later in my talk let me explain why I believe the dual-naming debate is an avenue for engagement). For a year, I stared at the Sea of Japan from Niigata and was struck by how empty it appears, at least on its surface and even the sky above it, given the sea's rich resources and potential for regional exchange. I discussed this emptiness with former Niigata Governor Hirayama Ikuo (formerly Bank of Japan) who made clear why decades of economic and cultural schemes planned for this region remained challenged: "When investment groups want to make a policy proposal, they have to go through five different desks at the Foreign Ministry (in Tokyo): Russia, China, South Korea, North Korea, and the United States. You can imagine what happens."

2. LDP's April 2012 Draft Constitution

Which brings me to the LDP's April 2012 draft constitution which, to the best of my knowledge has not been changed since it was issued; it is just not in the foreground right now because it is so extreme. This document is not a revision of the constitution; rather, it is an entirely new constitution, and some of its striking features include the redefinition of the emperor, the role of women, an obligation to honor national symbols, and a preamble that denies the universalisms definitional to Japan's current constitution. In short, it is *the* document of a divided Japan today. On top of all this, and entirely different from the current constitution and from the Meiji constitution, for the first time in Japanese history, this draft for a future Japanese nation would constitutionally define Japanese territory (領土 *ryodo*) by obliging citizens to defend it.

- Japanese people would now be "obliged" to:
- "...defend our country and territorial land"
- "...defending this beautiful territory and natural environment..."
- (Territorial integrity, etc.)
- Article 9-3. In order to defend its sovereignty and independence, the State shall cooperate with the people to maintain its territorial land, waters and airspace, and to secure their resources.

What is claimed as “Japanese territory” which would oblige Japanese citizen defense already compels American military protection as defined in the terms of the US-Japan Security Treaty:

Article 5 obligates US forces to defend Japanese territory and territorial waters in the event of an armed attack. So, these recent maps made me wonder what the point of claiming territory that only Japan claims as sovereign Japanese territory.

This map is the officially claimed space of Japan right now even though it is aspirational at best and confrontational at worst.

Japan's 2014 Assertion of "Inherency" over the smallest fragments of an Empire it failed to hold onto means that the government of Japan views these islands as integral to Japan's national being. For historians, the notion also introduces the idea that these spaces have always and forever been Japanese, which, in the case of these islands, could not be further from the history involved. Finally, it is only since 2014 that the Japanese government has linked one territorial dispute to another through this policy. Any attempt by a Japanese diplomat to negotiate with a Chinese diplomat over the dispute in the East China Sea would risk losing Japan's claims to Korea, let alone negotiations with Russia, because China, Taiwan, Korea, and Russia are tied together in the same policy vision for Japan.

3. World View from Japan

In turn, all of this draws attention to the particular worldview that undergirds this view within Japan. The notion of territory articulated in these governmental proposals at once denies Japanese history and requires the international community's agreement to such a worldview. It is not "anti-Japanese" to draw attention to these trends; they are Japanese trends, yet they are but one vision for Japan's future; the one



that seeks to erase the history of the Japanese empire in modern East Asia through claims to islands that are but mere shards of the formerly vast imperial, territorial and oceanic space.

This new view of "Japanese territory" from the sea is actually a view from land and would stake Japanese identity on small pieces of land that again only Japan recognizes sovereignty over, yet the approach is not at all unique to Japan: it is a rigid, hard borders approach,

of a piece with Donald Trump's wall along the US-Mexico border or this recent proposal for a floating wall shoring off Greece from refugees.

At the same time, more fluid understandings of Japan's future based on more open-ended understandings of Japan's past equally exist, those which see "borderlines" not "borders" but "borderlines" - in the sea around Japan with which to define a vision for Japan open to productive and peaceful engagement with its neighbors.

1) East China Sea

Currently, the East China Sea seems to have disappeared. Not literally of course, yet only a few years ago around the World War One centennial commemorations, talking heads named the body of water between China and Japan as a likely spot for the outbreak of World War III. Several islands in the East China Sea disputed among China, Taiwan, and Japan had become a magnet for risky seaborne maneuvers, and the air defense identification zones above them had dangerous overlaps. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe intimated that his country and China resembled Germany and France 100 years earlier, and Henry Kissinger wagered that a Tokyo-Beijing clash in these waters would be a catalyst for greater conflict to come.

2) South China Sea

Now, in the wake of centennial celebrations commemorating the end of the war that was supposed to end all wars, militarized activity in the separate but connecting South China Sea has dominated the intervening years. At the same time, the issues that made the East China Sea so volatile in 2014 have only deepened and intensified—and now intersect with the South China Sea conflict making clear that "security" as such has created a state of constant insecurity, with Okinawa and its people at the very center.

4. Okinawa

The **Ryukyu Islands** have long found themselves and their people central to questions of Japanese state-building, national identity and sovereign control. Matsushima Yasukatsu, a leading member of the contemporary movement for Ryukyuan independence from Japan, stresses that Tokyo's decision to "discriminate" indiscriminately against Ryukyu islanders during World War II - despite having forced them to become subjects of the Japanese empire - and to "sacrifice the islands" outright at war's end has made them and their history like a mirror that shows images backwards to contemporary Japan's efforts at nationalized control over them. Tokyo has repeatedly altered its claims vis-à-vis Okinawa and its people since 1945, which in turn makes the islands themselves appear to shift in meaning for Japan.

With **Okinawa**, contemporary words reveal so much because these islands have been inhabited for tens of thousands of years. About ten years ago, workers building the new airport on Ishigaki Island uncovered fragments of rib shards among other pieces of human bone thought to be about 24,000 years old, and local and national papers quickly declared them "the oldest Japanese remains." Today, of course, Ishigaki is Japanese territory, yet claiming these ancient skeletal remains as "Japanese" is another matter.

Okinawan islanders continued longstanding agricultural and fishing practices as their livelihood through the end of the devastating Asia-Pacific War (1931-45). In 1944, a Canadian man named E. Herbert Norman, one of the greatest historians of Japan, wrote a report for the Canadian government detailing features of life throughout the Japanese empire that he viewed as critical for the Allies' understanding of Japan for any meaningful and successful future postwar policy planning for Japan. Norman was a son of Christian missionaries and

raised in Japan, and at the time he wrote this report (November 1944) it was still possible to emphasize the rudimentary nature of Okinawan life and also to describe the islands themselves as relatively undeveloped, something unimaginable today now that the islands hold such a central and militarized place in America's post-1945 world order. Norman wrote:

> (The Ryukyu Islands') loss to Japan would not be of any serious economic consequence since the chief occupation of the islanders is fishing and Japan's best fishing grounds are in northern waters. (Norman 1944)



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世界地図を眺める子どもたち。大阪朝日新聞の１９３５年の連載「海洋ニッポン」の写真説明には「糸満人の世界分布図に感激の胸おどらす第二世たち」とある。記事は、糸満漁夫…

In the simplest terms, in 1944, it was impossible to foresee what has become of Okinawa and Okinawans' way of life today in the front line of the US-Japan security arrangement.

Also revealing were Norman's observations about who might control Okinawa after the war's end. It is worth remembering that China at the time was an Allied nation. One of my colleagues has located maps of ideas for dividing Japan into four regions after its eventual defeat instead of Korea, but Japan was seen as a potential area for American, British, Chinese, and Russian control, so that did not happen, yet in 1944 Norman was able to write that:

> Although these islands have been administratively part of Japan since 1879, and their inhabitants are perhaps closer to Japan than China in language and custom, the Chinese still have a case to argue that they should be, by right, Chinese.

Norman understood that although Japan had incorporated the islands into its empire during the early moments of its overseas

territorial expansion, after Japan's defeat China could make legitimate claim to the islands in terms of the region's lengthy *pre*-Japanese imperial history; additionally, Norman's notice indicates that the Allies' postwar settlement with Japan would not collapse if Tokyo were to forfeit claim to Okinawa together with Korea and Manchuria (the plan that was already in the works). The reality, therefore, in 1944 for Norman's analysis that the islands were economically and strategically of minimal consequence to Japan proper brings into relief how profoundly American occupation of the islands *after* 1945 has changed them and their people forever.

The United States would officially return Okinawa to Japanese administration and control in 1972, yet the overwhelming presence of American military personnel and weapons *continues* to render questionable the full dimensionality of this legal change. The statistics are well-known, yet always bear repeating; Okinawa comprises less than 1% of all Japanese territory, a scant 0.6%; yet 75% of the total number of US forces, civilian employees, and their dependents stationed in Japan live and work there; and all roughly 30,000 of them take up 20% of Okinawa's territory.

Governor Denny Tamaki opposes the new base at Henoko and especially Tokyo's disregard for Okinawan opposition, maintaining

that the Japanese government must express the will of his Japanese constituency to the United States (a foreign country).

Halting construction of the heliport planned for Henoko is a practical step with positive ramifications for efforts at peace in Korea and de-escalating potential clashes with China.

As is increasingly being made public, and has likely been known to the Alliance planners since 2014, the new base faces a structural problem in addition to the opposition of Okinawan people. There isn't enough soil in Okinawa to create the foundation for the heliports, so Japan is importing the dirt from the mainland. Tamaki and his supporters maintain that if this base is so important to the safety of Japan, then the Japanese government should authorize its construction on the mainland in the areas from which soil is being imported to Okinawa and dumped onto the coral reefs of Oura Bay.

The soil issue recalls a controversial incident from Okinawa's past that brings the security nexus full circle. In 1958, a year before Governor Denny Tamaki was born; a team from Okinawa was allowed

to participate in Japan's annual Koshien baseball tournament in the mainland for the first time since the end of the war. At the time, Okinawa was still under U.S. occupation. When the Okinawan team lost, they scooped up dirt from the mainland stadium to take home to Okinawa.

Citing the United States Plant Quarantine Act, American officials in Naha barred the team from bringing the "unclean" soil to Okinawa. For decades, Okinawans would continue to bear the burden and humiliation of being somehow less than Japanese.

The imposition of yet another US military base in Okinawa in the name of securing Japan - and Tokyo's tactic of throwing dirt at the problem - only reinforces Okinawan subordination.

By ending the construction of this base, the United States could begin to atone for its past conduct, take into consideration the democratic desires of Okinawans, and begin to think more broadly about peace in the East China Sea and beyond. And, as this slide shows the issue is now as much Japan versus US as Japan versus Japan. Which brings me to the next topic.

5. “People Doing”: Nature and Ogasawara

We do not really know why what we now call the Ogasawara Islands were uninhabited when sixteenth and seventeenth-century Spanish and Japanese seafarers first visited. However, from what we do know of the ancient stone tools and pottery shards discovered there in the twentieth-century, Pacific Ocean voyagers had long known about these islands and had left their mark on them at intervening moments in time.

No one was there in the 1820s when various American and British whaling captains arrived, a condition that paved the way for a historically-curious thirty years during the mid-nineteenth century when an American, an Englishman, and a Croatian declared sovereignty over the islands and ran them as their own country. Eventually - following some dicey incidents in the 1850s and 60s at the dawn of US-Japan relations involving ownership over them - in 1875 the newly established Meiji government in Tokyo claimed the islands as Japanese territory, making them the second overseas addition to the nascent Empire of Japan (between Hokkaido’s 1869 incorporation and before Okinawa’s 1879 annexation). With the key exception of a twenty-three-year hiatus after Japan lost World War II and the 48 million-year-old islands became American-occupied territory and reverted to their earlier name, the “Bonin Islands”, the Ogasawara Islands have remained under sovereign Japanese control unlike other imperial island additions that Japan contests with neighbors today (although some official US government maps still prefer the name “Bonin,” and the southernmost island in the chain, Iwo Jima/Ioto, is of questionable sovereignty since only Japanese and American military planes land there).

A total of 2,415 Japanese citizens live on the Ogasawara Islands today. Mapping these islands' place into modern Japanese history as well as their broader environmental possibilities is of a piece with a number of compelling studies are underway about the Fukushima crisis that draw attention to the modern/contemporary distinction between "life" and "lifestyle"/ "livelihood" (*inochi* versus *seikatsu*). Helpful in this regard is a reconsideration of the eighteenth-century philosopher, Ando Shoeki's, brilliant parsing of the Japanese word for nature -自然 (*shizen*) as "*hitori suru*" (literally "an individual doing/making"). Notably, Shoeki viewed a world with no distinction between human history and natural history precisely because he understood that such dichotomies generated the social ills surrounding him (as a physician in northern Japan, he came to understand and demonstrate among other things that famine was politically created and sustained - a highly advanced observation for the time and for world history).

The most visible debate on Ogasawara today is about whether or not to open a commercial airport on Chichijima. An equally important challenge is on resulting from the June 2011 establishment of the Ogasawara Islands as a UNESCO World Heritage Natural Site after which ongoing effort began by officials involved to revert some of the islands to what some describe as their "pre-people" state of being. Japanese citizens are not being removed, yet the first order of business for many in achieving this imaginary "pristine environment" is the culling of non-human invasive species ranging from a host of plants and fungus to goats, rats, and domesticated cats. The irony of this unfolding simultaneously with the ongoing March 2011 Fukushima nuclear crisis is not lost. As one young mother of two explained to me while shopping at a small supermarket on Chichijima: "They want us to import tainted beef from the mainland while they kill our goats. Our goats are the cleanest meat in Japan!!"

The paradoxes inherent to Japan's twenty-first century attempt at a nationally organized, internationally-sanctioned, scientifically-engineered "pre-people environment" on the Ogasawara Islands are clear, heightening the significance of the basic contours of "peopling" them in the first place. Within the chronological frame of what we teach as modern Japanese history (roughly the demise of the Tokugawa system to the present, or, 1820-2020), the Ogasawara Islands reveal in real time at once globally and nationally significant histories: the violence inherent to establishing permanent human residency in settler colonies anywhere in the modern world and also one of the most visible multi-racial/multi-ethnic origin stories within the mythically homogenous Japanese nation-state.

Fast forward to the present and the 2011 UNESCO designation of the islands as a World Heritage Natural Site, and the impetus towards an imaginary "pre-people" past becomes important on multiple levels. For example, spaces devoid of modern humans and their necessary flora

and fauna such as onions and goats would enable erasure of the islands' historically blended beginning as well as a complete "Great Leap" through the disastrous chronicle of the end of the Japanese empire there in 1945 (American military strategists tricked the Japanese command stationed on Chichijima and Hahajima in the spring of 1945 by going instead west to Okinawa after the battle for Iwo Jima; in addition to the devastating record of starvation conditions for the over 30,000 Japanese troops and Korean slave-labor involved in building tunnels on these islands similar to those better known in Iwo Jima's Mount Surabachi, Chichijima holds the distinction confirmed at the war crimes tribunals of demonstrated instances of cannibalism of captured American pilots). An imaginary "pre-people environment" would also circumvent dealing with the record of nuclear weapons stationed there through the 1968 reversion (Okinawa was and is America's "first line" of defense; Ogaswara, the "second line" [its weapons are now on Guam]; waste materials remain). Perhaps most important to the present and future, however, the effort towards a "pre-people" space on the Ogasawara Islands sustains the Japanese state-directed ruse of the meaning of "environment" juxtaposed with the nation's most significant environmental history unfolding today and into the future: the Fukushima crisis.

6. Shimizu Ryoichi

Here I'd like to introduce the lifework of Shimizu Ryoichi and his family. Dismissible perhaps by some as a hippie surfer, Shimizu Ryoichi could be described instead as an astute businessman comfortable with living in nature. Following a childhood spent as a Japanese "high growth economics" kid with abundant consumer goods - yet an existence comparable to an American military kid in terms of

the numerous physical relocations necessary to sustain the father's "livelihood" (seikatsu) - Shimizu arrived on Chichijima in 1983 as a tourist and stayed. Considered the most knowledgeable sea kayaker and trekker on Chichijima (here what Amino Yoshihiko urged we understand as a "*hyakusho*" in Japanese history could be helpful - more than a "peasant" an individual who does "one hundred things" for survival), Shimizu has built his family's house and a profit-generating guest house from the materials on the land he purchased. It's solar-powered with composting toilets, and he calls the elaborate tree-house like structure by an Indonesian word of unknown etymology: "*Pelan*" (gathering place). He learned the word while on a surfing trip and

decided he wanted to bring people together from around the world with himself and his family in the middle of it. (Here, Amino's "*muen*" [unconnected place] resonates, too). *Pelan*'s stated aim is the globally meaningful, American Indian instruction to work for seven generations to build a better planet: "7 世代後に美しい地球を!"

It is simple, on the one hand, to see that the state would reduce Shimizu Ryoichi, his wife, Chika, and their two children at best to "alternative lifestyles" within Japan today or at worst "irrelevant." On the other hand, the Shimizu family fully participates in the nation: they pay taxes; their children attend the island school; they sing *Kimigayo* at sporting events. They define themselves as one hundred percent Japanese. At the same time, Shimizu family life endeavors for a Japan that currently does not make space for how they live nor how they envision the nation's future: through awareness and action in nature instead of erasure and avoidance. Their commitment to living life in nature in a sustainable manner connects them to a "peopled environment" and demonstrates the possibilities of what Shimizu's "*pelan*" can offer on a national level, too. Soon after the March 2011 crisis began, they posted notice on their guest house website that anyone afflicted by the triple disasters (noting both those affected by the earthquake and tsunami and also specifying those choosing to leave because of the nuclear plant meltdowns) would be welcome to live for free at the guest house for the first 30 days; should they wish to stay longer and to relocate to the Ogasawara Islands, they would be charged half the usual fee (generally about 4500 yen per night; 90000 per month). Today, the advertisement remains, although the terms have changed slightly (the fee is half price from the start but comes with a program to help transition to life on Chichijima). While the Shimizu family copes with efforts to cull the family goats and cats to force an imagined "pre-people environment" into existence (Chika has

confronted municipal officials sent from Tokyo by asking whether she could prepare some goat stew for them; the kids hide their cats), the dichotomies of human and natural history endure.

The recent human record on Ogasawara - and likely its distant one, too - demonstrates people choosing how to live in nature and how "to make" and "to do" their lives in nature. Today, its place in Japanese history and the Pacific Ocean offers unusual ways to broaden the discussion of who counts as Japanese and also reveals meaningful approaches Japanese citizens are taking to address the Fukushima radiological crisis. Premising the Ogasawara Islands in this fashion, however, demands a "peopled environment" in the past, present, and future that is welcomed rather than shunned by state-led directives.

7. The Anthropocene and the Sea with No Name

The final example I want to consider involves thinking about the anthropocene, or the "Great Acceleration", a new geological moment that measures human impact on the planet. That is, human activity is now part of the rock record. Ando Shoeki arguably did see humans violating nature, yet it would have been difficult even 300 years ago to predict how quickly we would begin to destroy ourselves. And yet here we are in a historical moment in which climate change is now seen as negatively destructive force as are nuclear weapons.

So I'll turn to the decades-long naming dispute at the International Hydrographic Organization centers on the body of water between Japan and Korea. Oceanographers refer to this sea as one of the northern Pacific Ocean's "marginal seas", and depending where you stand along its spiky coastline, it is variously known as the Sea of Japan, Korea's East Sea or simply the East Sea. I am not advocating one name in preference over another, and ideas for new names regularly appear. During the first decade of this century, for example, a Japanese woman thoughtfully suggested, 'The Blue Sea', while a former president of South Korea proposed the 'Sea of Friendship' or the 'Sea of Understanding'. Agreement on a new name is remote, however, leaving international news broadcasters such as CNN to explain regional military tensions taking place in 'waters off the Korean Peninsula'.

For millennia, a steady stream of human traffic has crossed over this sea's northern and southern openings, largely from the Asian continent moving eastwards to what is now called Japan. Thus, the name East Sea originated as a directional term (literally, 東海), with the first known written record of it carved into an early fifth-century stele commemorating the life of King Gwanggaeto the Great, the nineteenth monarch of Goguryeo, northernmost of Korea's ancient dynasties.

Although modern technologies have replaced earlier days of sail, intense north winds make this sea notoriously difficult to cross. Most ancient navigators headed along its coastlines to the few straits that offered a better chance of safe passage: the Korea or Tsushima Straits, the Kanmon Straits, the Tsugaru Straits, the Soya or La Pérouse Strait, and the Strait of Tartary. Very little river water discharges into this sea barely one percent of its volume - and today places called Russia, North Korea, South Korea and Japan contain its 978,000 square surface kilometers. Russia claims almost half of this sea's total 7,600-kilometer coastline even though Russian explorers were the last to show up in the region. The Russians' seventeenth-century designation for the sea, 'the Japan Sea', named the area to which they were heading and appears to have relied on or was coterminous with Matteo Ricci's 1602 map of the world that, for the first-time historians are aware of, designated this body of water in Chinese characters as '日本海' (Japan Sea).

Notably, the 'Japan' piece (日本) as understood in European translation derives from Marco Polo's famous thirteenth-century phonetic transliteration of China's name for the country: 'Ciapangu' (as

it appeared verbatim on Martin Behaim's astonishing 1492 globe). And we know from Amino Yoshihiko's work that we should understand 日本 from the sea itself:

> … (Writing and texts) came to Japan via the sea, which functioned as both a transportation route and an obstacle to intercourse.' The name 'Japan' (日本), Amino further explains, literally translates as the 'source of the sun . . . reflect(ing) a strong consciousness of the Tang empire on the Chinese mainland . . . (And, moreover, unusually) the name 日本 signifies a natural phenomenon or orientation and . . . is neither the name of the place of origin of the dynastic founders nor that of a dynasty or tribe.'

The word "Ciapangu" ultimately Europeanized as Giappone in Italian, Japon in French and Yaponskey in Russian, as it would thus appear to name the sea on seventeenth-century Russian maps: Японское море (Yaponskey More). There seems to be no evidence that any Japanese used the name Sea of Japan in print before the late eighteenth-century until the painter and illustrator Shiba Kokan printed it on his 1792 map of the world (the famous 'Chikyu Zenzu': 地球全図).

In 1928, when the International Hydrographic Organization agreed to Japan's request for the sole name, 'Sea of Japan', Korea could not object because it was under Japanese occupation. That said, the collection of early modern European maps that current international arbitration tribunal's favor seems equally divided between references to the Sea of Japan and East Sea/Korea's East Sea. Thus, Korean geographer Ryu Yeon-Taek explains that the Korean government today prefers a dual naming scheme for this sea until all parties involved –

including Russia and indigenous groups – settle on an alternative new name. Any Neolithic-era name that may have been in play among the indigenous Nivkh, Orok and Ainu people - whose few descendants still live along the thin stretches of water where mainland Russia breaks off towards Sakhalin Island - failed to make the grade of modern maps, although they treasure their ancestors' boots and clothes made of salmon skin hides. Fishing formed the basis of these communities' existence, and at least for the Ainu, a god of the sea that storytellers call Repun appears in drawings either as a whale or as a male figure with a harpoon. Legend relates tales of Repun's beneficence in fish catches when the hunt on land was meager, yet none of the storytelling groups seems to have had a specific name for the ocean that Repun makes bountiful, nor, however, did they have writing.

Exploring this sea's richness via spots along its coastlines and islands - rather than one nation at a time or time period after time period - helps create a sense of this oceanic history as a connective place for the region and beyond as well as its future possibilities.

To begin, this body of water's vital and unusually warm current is its most crucial thread. Over the course of the past fifteen to twenty million years that the Japanese main islands have been back-arc spreading from the Asian mainland and tectonically creating the physical space for this body of water to come into being, this famous ocean current also known as the Japan Current - has brought fish larvae, plankton and other food to the myriad creatures inhabiting this sea. In short, as the nineteenth-century English geographer and hydrographer Alexander George Findlay described, the Kuroshio is 'a remarkable stream'. At 46 degrees north latitude, Japan's life-giving Kuroshio Current even makes for pleasant swimming during summer months at the sea's northernmost reaches on the beaches of the lush, tiny island of Moneron, off the southern tip of Russia's Sakhalin Island. Moneron is the only landmass in the Straits of Tartary, and its astonishing diversity

makes it the Russian Federation's first national marine park. The island's name originates with the French navigator Jean Francois de La Perouse's 1787 visit to the region who named it after his expedition's chief engineer, Paul Merault Monneron (although the island is spelled without two 'n's'). The French name stands today even though the great Japanese cartographer, Mamiya Rinzo, and his colleagues visited and mapped it during their great 1808-09 expedition north through Sakhalin and eastern Siberia. Japanese called the island Kaibato until 1945, reworking the Ainu name Todomoshiri into Chinese characters - literally 'place of sea lions' in both Japanese and Ainu. In August 1945, the Soviets reverted to the French name when they subsumed control of it together with all of Sakhalin. Moneron's human population comes



and goes with the transient Ainu and vanished Japanese having given way to equally nomadic Russians, today arriving as eco-tourists to frolic with the island's resident sea lions that sunbathe on basalt boulders or browse among sea stars and anemones underneath the waves.

Forking in two at the tip of the Ryukyu Islands in the East China Sea, one trajectory of the Kuroshio heads north around Tsushima Island, splitting in two again into the Tsushima Current and the East Korea Warm Current, which together bring southern saline-charged nutrients across the sea to the Tsugaru Strait, between Hokkaido and Japan's primary island, Honshu.

There, the currents recombine and break free into the Pacific to rejoin the current's southern branch in the North Pacific gyre. Within that great whorl - the largest ecosystem on earth - the Kuroshio conveys its warmth to the southern islands of Alaska and the coastline of British Columbia before heading back again across the Pacific. Unfortunately, today this means that the current contributes to one of the planet's greatest challenges: the Great Pacific Garbage Patch, a man-made collection of insoluble plastic and chemical particulate gunk, most conservatively estimated to be the size of France, although likely larger than the United States.

The Kuroshio's warm northerly branch makes Vladivostok Russia's only ice-free Pacific port and home to the Russian Pacific fleet. Distressingly, throughout the Cold War Russia took enormous license with its control over these waters and dumped astonishing amounts of radioactive waste up through the 1990s, including two nuclear reactors off the coast of North Korea in 1978. Today, North Korea maintains several nuclear facilities along this ocean's coastline, while South Korea operates three. For its part, Japan operates the world's largest nuclear plant, the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa facility, south of Niigata, an area of Japan known in earlier times as Echigo, this coast's central port and critical to the country's early modern economy for rice, fish, timber and salt, among many other goods. Merchants along this coastline perfected a near shore trade route known as the 'Kitamaebune' (literally the 'northern bound ships'), which operated annually from the mid-seventeenth century through the advent of Western schooners in the region. Although the sails on these ships remained too weak in the face of this sea's ferocious northerly winds to accomplish more than one trip per year, the 'Kitamaebune' trade was integral to the calculus of the

world's first commodity exchange at Osaka (in 1800 Osaka rivaled Paris in manifold ways, especially in terms of market economy). Ships departed from Osaka's ports on Japan's southern face into the Inland Sea and headed west through the Kanmon Straits dividing Honshu and Kyushu, and from there cruised along Japan's northern coastline to what is today southern Hokkaido. This greatly added to the process of bringing the 'barbarian lands' (蝦夷) into Japanese consciousness, which in 1869 were renamed Hokkaido and colonized as the first piece of Japan's modern empire. Throughout such discordant human histories, the 360 currently known fish species in this sea do their best to thrive, with herring and sardines the most lucrative commodities, and giant octopus and squid holding the greatest mystery. In terms of what human activity is doing, however, this body of water has one of the most precipitous fish depletion rates currently being measured.

8. Conclusion

My remarks have tried to see Japan from the sea in order to interrogate Japanese society's relations to security, nature, and the environment in hopefully helpful and new ways. While certain political forces would try today to barricade Japan in the sea, opening up Japan's oceanic borderlines more productively engages Japan with Japan, with Asia, and with the world. It also is a more honest approach to Japanese history.

Discussion

Professor Kozue AKIBAYASHI's Remarks

I would like to thank Professor Mun and others for giving me this opportunity to talk about Professor Dudden's studies. I am sure others are grateful too. I'm fascinated by her illustration of history and I am overwhelmed to make comments. I would like to continue the privilege that I had earlier today when Professor Dudden and I traveled here together from Kyoto station. We had a short conversation starting with the episode when we missed each other last summer when we were enlisted on the Peace Boat together. The Peace Boat did the Japan cruise for the first time in thirty years; I was on the first half of the tour, and Professor Dudden was on the latter half of the tour. It gave us an opportunity to look at the ocean which surrounds Japan.

Through Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, a feminist peace activists' movement in Okinawa, my colleagues and I are trying to grow a global movement to achieve demilitarized security, and Professor Dudden is also familiar with this movement. These women and I have been doing this for the past twenty-some years and trying to figure out what research and activism can do together. This was part of the conversation earlier so I would like to ask this question from me to you, and I would like to give a bit of a background to these activities. OWAAMV will be celebrating its 25th anniversary this year. You might recall the incident of the 1995 sexual assault by US soldiers in Okinawa that many will probably be referring to later this year. That led to the island wide movement challenging what Professor Dudden described as 'insecurity created by the very territorial idea of security.' I have argued that these feminist peace activists spearheaded the movement to put forward fundamental criticism of security discourse

and policies. Their analyses come not only from the territorial issue but also the long history of sexual violence by US soldiers starting in 1945 in Okinawa.



Actually, the Japanese Empire Map study that you showed at the very beginning was the very same map of the scope of the locations of "comfort stations" used by the Japanese imperial military during the Asia-Pacific war.

When the Okinawa women formed their activity against military violence in 1945 their fundamental criticism was questioning the military and the belief in militarism and that, as some of the feminist international relations scholars have argued, is the basis that underlies the territorial security policy, the assumption that the military is what protects the territory on the borders. Okinawa Women Act Against

Military Violence are critical not only of the direct and more visible impacts of the military presence in Okinawa, but also have analyzed that the idea of militarized security has caused insecurity in the host communities of US military in Okinawa. There are gaps within Okinawa too, some people are safer and not affected as much as others are, and those, for example in Henoko and Futemma and other areas are the ones who are more affected. I think that the differences within Okinawa itself should be noted. It's not only Japan versus the United States and Japan versus Japan but we could also say Henoko versus Naha for example. There are layers, and by seeking out the layers of oppression and the burden we may be able to contribute to different perspectives of the history.

When Okinawan women felt disappointed at the Japanese mainland women's movements for their lack of understanding of the situation in Okinawa, they started to look for closer relationships with feminist peace activists in communities hosting US military in places other than Japan, especially the Philippines and South Korea because their colonial backgrounds are very similar to that of Okinawa. Moreover, the proximity of the US military activities and presence in their daily lives and the direct connection with sexual violence, including the sex industry as a part of the exploitation by soldiers, have led them to create a closer connection with the women's groups in those communities. Perhaps you know women's groups like *Durebang* in the US military camp towns in South Korea or women's groups in the Philippines as well. They are also trying to expand the scope of their policies on security to environmental destruction by the military presence and other issues. These international feminist peace network's activities have illuminated the colonial history that was shared by the communities in Guam and in Hawaii and overlapping with the military occupation in those areas as well as the annexation and the colonization of indigenous communities in Guam and Hawaii.

I would argue that there have been activities on the ground, particularly from my areas of expertise, feminine peace movements, working for creating or sharing a new perspective of history in the region. Significantly, a group from this International Network of Women Against Militarism has joined a more specific action. That was a vision of closing the Demilitarized Zone on the Korean Peninsula by first crossing the DMZ, starting in 2015. The action is called Women Cross DMZ. We were a group of about thirty feminist peace activists from sixteen countries, South Koreans could not take part because they could not cross, nor *Zainichi* Koreans because that was too risky for them.

This international group of women from different areas wanted to internationalize this issue of the Korean War that is still going on. Professor Dudden briefly mentioned the US occupation and the Allied Forces' plan that resulted in the division of the Korean Peninsula and argued that it's not so much a problem between North and South as a problem of the international community, namely the neglect of responsibility of the international community to end the Korean War. The effort of Women Cross DMZ has also been continuing precisely because we share such a view. We are facing probably a better situation now than in 2015 when the tension on the Korean Peninsula was much higher, but our movement is still struggling to eliminate the DMZ. In 2015 we actually did cross the DMZ from the North side to the South side. We wanted to cross at Panmunjom because that would be very symbolic, but we figured that it was too much. Well, we tried. We negotiated with the North Korean Government and the South Korean Government and the UN Command, meaning the United States and the UN. We tried all these channels, but we couldn't cross in the Panmunjom area and instead we crossed at the Kaesong area. This year is the fifth anniversary of the crossing of Women Cross DMZ, and we are trying to do it again, maybe to cross the other way, from the South

side to the North side. However, this Coronavirus situation is something that we didn't expect, and it could be a difficult obstacle to our purpose.

These are actual activists' activities we are doing. Also, we are trying to address the national history narrative and as a part of that we are collecting the direct experiences of women being colonized or being militarized. We are utilizing these oral histories to formulate our own narrative of the history of the region and share a common experience of the history. We are not only sharing but trying to build solidarity to effect change, to decolonize, and maybe, to remove the DMZ on the Korean Peninsula, and also bring about gender equality because we believe that DMZ or US military occupation, the insecurity created by security, also has a commonly underlying sexism and misogyny in its structure.

So I am ending my comment here and I already placed my first question so as a committed historian, could I ask you to maybe to give us some suggestions in the way you were talking about languages that can be understood by the regular people or policy makers?

Thank you very much.

Professor DUDDEN's Response

Thank you for your really thoughtful and challenging comments. I would define myself as a pacifist realist. I'm sitting next to a very active humanist and I would describe us all as humanists, and the first question I would like to answer is: "Do you want to have hope?" which I do appreciate and to which I would reply that I have to have hope. I am a historian, and I don't get paid enough not to have hope. It is all I have, but also I am a teacher and a mother, and I don't mean to glamorize motherhood as the answer, rather, I am responsible for a fourteen-year-old and if I don't have hope why should I encourage him? I get chills when I say that but that is why I continue to be honest with myself and so I have to come up with something that I think I am doing to make the planet better. I don't know what it is yet, but I want to address what (both) of you said, and I want to say that you both have very interesting points of convergence on your expression of camouflaging international law and I think that's great. The camouflaging of Henoko in the sense that both of these tricks of the state, in particular the deploying of troops without following international law as you rightly say absolutely occludes, makes everybody blind to the violence endemic to international law. Putting Henoko offshore, even if it's not going to happen, is a complete distraction from the violence of daily life for Okinawan women and girls, as highlighted by the 1995 rape to begin with. The idea that to atone for that rape we would build another new base, but one that we wouldn't be able to see - which is part and parcel of these offshore disputes where we can test each other's resolve without having to see them - that the violence builds on land behind them both.

If I could begin, I would like to address things individually today. I have two specific answers for each of you. But I will propose to you

that in 2020, with the anniversary of the rape, I wasn't thinking in those terms, thank you for reminding me, and maybe I should be thinking of the seventy-fifth anniversary, we have this year. Already Vladimir Putin is throwing the biggest party in May to celebrate the end of W.W.II, but we all know when we sit in the Asia Pacific region that in fact, the war has three more months to go and they were the exceptionally violent ones that began the nuclear age. I would also propose that we think of 2020 not as the end of W.W.II, but as the seventy-fifth anniversary of the US occupation of Japan, and I think that it does not make me a radical leftist to use this language, but for many years it would have defined me as a radical leftist. Here I'm thinking how D. H. Norman in 1944 did not see what Okinawa would become today, and in my research there is not a single US military planner in 1945 who saw the US occupation lasting for seventy-five years, and if we start using that language in everyday life maybe we can draw attention to something.

I know John Dower tried very recently to draw attention to Japan and Manchuria, in comparison to America and Iraq, and because the US is not yet ready to call itself an empire, in spite of everything that is wrong with the US, the book got trashed and it shouldn't have gotten trashed, it's an excellent book; but we just need to start saying that the United States has never stopped trying to occupy Japan militarily. If we want to figure out how to have agency and independence and autonomy as Japanese people that's a separate discussion, but the United States' military occupation of Japan for seventy-five years makes this the longest. It's about a third of my country's history, in terms of chronology, and when you put those numbers out there it is rather alarming. It's the permanent basing, the permanent industrial/military complex that's probably more keenly felt in Okinawa than anywhere else on the planet.

Increasingly, Guam with very similar colonial relations and post-colonial histories is heading in the same direction, and this brings me to an essay which I believe Wada Haruki has recently published. He gave a talk in Seoul in November in which he said: "We cannot keep calling the San Francisco Treaty a peace treaty. It is not a peace treaty; it is the creation of a permanent state of war in East Asia."

So words do matter, and when you ask what I can do actively, I wish I had your courage sometimes; I mean I'm not sure I would have the courage to do what you do all the time. I try, but the courage that I would have as an activist is through words, and this is what all of us in this room are privileged to have; I mean Donald Trump may be after mine and maybe after yours but we still have freedom of speech, and I don't mean to sound like a silly child when I say that. We have freedom of speech, but we know how rare that is, and so it is incumbent on all of us to use it.

I really appreciate your discussion of the need to talk about the history of international law instead of simply accusing nations of violating it, the US being the largest violator of that bar none. With the territorial disputes it certainly helps in the current discussions of treaties about slave labor or slavery issues. In both instances we can discuss how international law itself has changed, particularly with people, less so with territory. I think that what we're seeing is a sort of reterritorialization of sovereignty but I will definitely try to engage with your language and, to quote you, this is camouflaging how international law is itself a history and it is generative and changing.

So, thank you very much for that point, and what I will do is try to write more proactively, and I think the Ogasawara case is a good example.

Benjamin Savory



Let's to go back to Nathaniel Savory's son. I didn't talk about the peopling as much as I would have liked to today but what I wanted to emphasize is mythical homogeneous model nation-state of Japan. Of course it began as a multi-ethnic multi-racial, multi-cultural society about 38,000 years ago, and it's always forever been multi-ethnic ever since the origins of Japan.

On Ogasawara we can see it in modern times. We can see it in modern times because Maria de los Santos y Castro is Benjamin Savory's mother who was Nathanial Savory's forced wife; and I am not using this term lightly because the way that there were people on the Ogasawara islands after Nathaniel Savory showed up in 1830 was an instance of forced sexual slavery. I'm not using the terms "state sponsored" or "militarized", but in 1830 Nathanial Savory and his two friends on the island of Hawaii kidnapped 13 girls. They were Filipina, Samoan, and Hawaiian, and I found the documents. They took 13 girls and women from Hawaii to the Ogasawara for the express purpose of building a population. Two of the girls escaped on whaling ships back to Hawaii, several of them went insane and ran into the woods and created ghost stories that still live on the Ogasawaras; so when you hear

the wind at night it's one of those girls. The others decided for whatever reason to stay with these men and they had more children.

So, to answer, the beginning of the violence in Ogasawara connects itself to the violence in Okinawa and other militarized spots but it's also the colonial history around the empire. In that sense sometimes historical research can be connected to activism to deepen what activists in the present are trying to show is going on. I think it does help to connect our work and so thank you very much.

My one final question is one that the wonderful professor Norma Field always asks: How much are you personally prepared to pay in a capitalist society? What are we as professors prepared to give up for what we do? And she's really clear on this point. Are you prepared to give up your house? Are you prepared to give up your car in order to be the activist you believe yourself to be? I'm not questioning you personally; I'm directing this to myself. Am I willing to give up being here? I can be honest and say: "I don't think so"; but I am also not willing to hide behind this privilege and that's why I think it's okay to be called names on the internet, and to stand up against things in writing. This counts as activism increasingly now that this new form of communication called the internet has taken over. I think there are things that we can do to turn what we know into a broader form of activism, but then we still have to rely on your physical labor, on your actual physical crossing of the DMZ and breaking down that border, for which I am incredibly grateful. I think we all are doing this together, so this does connect us. I also appreciate your mentioning of the language of camouflage and hiding it.

Thank you both so much.

Questions and Comments

Moderator: Thank you. Now it's time for questions and comments from the floor on the keynote speech or the discussion we have had.

Questioner 1: From the viewpoints of seeking co-existence and reconciliation in Asia, what kind of factors exist behind the divide according to your interpretation?

Professor Dudden: In a word, money.

Questioner **1**: Well that's closely related to the second session.

Professor Dudden: Well let me give an example. I think it is also related as you said to the second session. I think in the 1990s the sort of the beginnings of the extremes of wealth and power that came from globalizing economies or actually from multi-national corporations which come in the wake of the collapse of the so to say bipolar order have given very similar dislocations around the world and we are seeing in so many societies so many populist surges. However, I think each society manifests what it's going to target differently, and on this point, I admire the work of Professor Nakano Koichi and I have learned a lot from him.

When Prime Minister Abe returned to office, the first thing he did was announce that he was going to target the Kono statement and I really didn't understand why he would pick that because as a historian, militarized sexual slavery, the comfort women are one balance of historical product and the Nanjing Massacre is another. So, I thought; why are you picking that one and not that one? It just didn't make sense, and I naïvely thought it's because Korea is easy and China is scary, this

is what I was thinking, so I asked Professor Koichi: "Is it because Korea is smaller and weaker?" And He replied, "No. Abe wants to get rid of the Asahi Shimbun". And you can agree or disagree but that's what made me begin to reflect, and the consistent tearing apart of the free press in Japan under the Abe administration has been very remarkable. It is definitely happening in the US now but it's interesting that this is what Abe in his second term went for first. Pierre Bordeaux, the wonderful French sociologist said that censorship is most powerful not when people are not allowed to say something but when everybody ends up saying the same thing. That's what we've been seeing in Japan.

What do I think caused all of this? I am enough of a historical Marxist to believe that it's the economy. There were dislocations and how are we going to deal with these social dislocations? I think each society is picking a different object and I think that one thing that was unforeseen in Japan's moment has been the Fukushima meltdowns. I have no way of proving it, but I do not think it's an accident that the territorial disputes and especially the militarization of the territorial disputes really began to ratchet up after Fukushima. Anything to turn the public's view away from the nuclear reactors is valuable to the governing power, and so in the mix, the groups that were questioning Fukushima needed to be silenced quickly, and so that's what I see. How that manifests in other societies is different but it's for similar reasons. I wish I had a better economics answer, and I'm thinking of Joseph Stieglitz's *Globalization and its Discontents* and works like that. We are seeing the 1% growing wealthier in Japan, as we see the 1% growing wealthier everywhere, and watching populist surges that are being left behind while they think they are being brought along, and that's the similarity I see from France to Turkey to Japan to the United States.

Questioner 1: Would you like to interpret the situation? Maybe this bad situation began since around 1995 with the collapse of the "casino

economies" and in addition the most important thing is that around 1995 is the time that Abe and the right-wing politicians tried to make a plan to promote a backlash against those kinds of things. Maybe it's based upon the hatred created by radical nationalism, as in the historical narrative of the Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference) in 1997?

Professor Dudden: Yes, I completely agree with you that they are the surface effects, absolutely.

Questioner 1: So around mid-1995 the right-wing got the hegemony and now we are faced with a terrible situation.

Professor Dudden: Yes. I completely agree.

Questioner 1: I have a comment about seeing Japan from the sea. It is a beautiful concept, like the open waters, or like a cosmopolitan idea of space; but on the other hand, expressing these ideas is a little bit dangerous. For example, the Americans are realists who emphasize the sea. They found Japan as a sea power which contains land powers. Now China may also be seeing Japan from the sea as another kind of view.

Professor Dudden: Yes, and no. I am a sailor, and I find that a lot of people who write about the ocean have never actually been on water and so they think it's very easy to have these borders and these borderlines which is completely impossible when you are on the water, and so it's always amusing to me. But I don't disagree with you. The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea has in many respects created a lot of these problems not only through exclusive economic zones but also the continental shelf regimes. It's totally legal to extend the nation-state 350 miles into the ocean, that's the pink map of Japan, and one way of thinking about it is if you are in this room and you are

planning to have grandchildren, by the time your grandchildren are our ages there will be no blue on a globe. It will all be pink or yellow or green to match the nation-state that's claiming it, because that's the trend in international law. So, I definitely see a track into an oceanic pursuit on the one hand and on the other hand the ocean is the last space on the planet over which to claim national dominance. How that national claim is being claimed is still being mediated.

If we take the hard border approach to the ocean, which Donald Trump is doing by this Indo-Pacific notion and all of the posturing in the South China Sea, we are setting the United States up for a coming war with China. I mean China is developing a blue water navy, all of the language of this is set to have W.W.III. It's a very similar part of the world, the Pacific Ocean again and the Chinese are following Japan in 1915 now, picking little islands and the United States has its little islands and the parallels are all there.

At the same time the activism is also there to push back. In very compelling ways, largely fueled by climate change because the islands are sinking, the fish are disappearing, and increasingly there are legal mechanisms to defend against that and so it's a question of how to switch the discourse away from complete national, nation-state, rapacious empire building.

In my book I'm trying to say that the twenty-first century is an age of ocean empires, but very different from the sixteenth century of Spain and Portugal. This is nation-states claiming the open ocean as territory. If that can be pushed back or mediated before a territorial dominance of the seas that surely is where climate change comes in, because the water rising is the push back, the actual physicality of the ocean is pushback. I do have hope, I have to have hope that through understanding the ocean from the perspective of a refugee is how we have to move forward, because if you've got people trying to escape a

war zone only to get to the Aegean Sea and come up against a wall in the sea what does that mean?

Is this really the future of the planet? Because that does mean that we are destroying ourselves! So again, it's not an answer but I do think there are two approaches that can be taken to the ocean, one is a fluid borderline and the other is the rigid approach.

Questioner 2: Thank you very much, that was fascinating. I really like the idea that we take an honest approach to history. I agree with that, but at the same time I would like to ask: What would you say if I say that are you romanticizing history? Are you beautifying history? There ought to be some sort of negative heritage of "fluid Japan" in the past that didn't really come out. I'm from a political science background, and I felt that your talk is so fascinating and so interdisciplinary that it should have a lot of implications for policies. So, what would be the policy implications of your discussion? How can we use this history as a lesson to form a hopeful future? Can you elaborate a bit more about

what kind of hopeful future you're hoping for based on the historical discussion?

Professor Dudden: On the one hand it's fine if I romanticize history but I don't want to beautify it. That is to say I believe that the only value history has is to show a moment where a choice was made, because history is always about a decision, and if we can learn from a decision that went terribly wrong, then maybe we don't have to make that (wrong) decision again, and we can think of countless examples.

Let's take an example from American history. When the African slave trade ended in the early nineteenth century, it was technically possible for the United States to have ended the practice of slavery then, but instead, even though slavery as in the transatlantic importation of bodies was illegal, it got worse, because the practice was kept legal, and so from the moment that it became illegal to import Africans slave, owners started peopling their plantations by raping the slaves. They turned the plantations into body producing factories of totally free (as in monetary free) labor to the extent that before the American civil war in the 1860s the value of all African American slaves in the United States was greater than the value of all American manufacturing and production because it was free labor, which is just an astonishing statistic. Fifty years earlier had the decision been made to end slavery, the United States today might have a very different understanding of justice and equality. Instead we have huge human rights problems related entirely to the post moment, those 50 years.

So, what I'm saying is that I don't mean to romanticize history, but I believe you have to examine that past in order to open up the possibility of a different future. Perhaps that's romantic but it's not beautiful. That would address the history of rape and pillage and violence and it would address the history of lynching and terror and say this is not acceptable.

In terms of a policy description for what I'm working on, I think it's already on the books. I mean I'm not against there being a United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, but there has to be enforceability, because this beautiful body of law does absolutely nothing except for the opposite of what's intended. It was created so that we did not destroy the world's oceans. The man who created it, Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo, gave the most beautiful speech at the United Nations about how the oceans are the womb of life and that's why we have salt tears because we as human creatures come from the ocean - it was a really beautiful speech. He gave this speech precisely because he saw oil companies and fishing companies tearing apart the oceans and depleting all of the resources. He died a very unhappy man in 1997 due to the advent of the exclusive economic zone, because the point of the plan was sharing, but it's become complete private property. If we go to some of the provisions in the law, the joint development agreement for example, which China and Japan used until 2009 in the East China Sea, until maybe historical impulses or jockeying with each other for power came into being. Then immediately the Senkaku/Diaoyutai gets described as a resource war but it's not a resource war; there is very little liquid natural gas and oil in the East China Sea. In fact, I think somebody's run the numbers - if you take all of the fossil fuel out of the East China Sea it will electrify Beijing for one week. That is not worth going to war over. I mean it's just not enough, so it's not a resource war. Also, there are very few fish left in the East China Sea, so if you're a fisherman in Okinawa you have to go fight in the Philippines for survival.

However, if we go back to what the law says there are codes on piracy and theft, but there's no enforcement for it, because of the private possibility, and that's the thing about capitalism - is it possible at this stage to imagine completely overturning capitalism? Or are we really talking about lessening the extremes? So, I guess my policy prescription

is, let's all re-read the international laws, the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, and let's figure out how to police it. Konishi Hiroyuki has a really interesting policy proposal for Japan for the Jieitai (Self-defense force). He says: Okay, Japan has a Jieitai, we know we have a military force, but do we have to fight America's wars? Why don't we use our Jieitai to become the world's first major humanitarian crisis response team? Why don't we make the Japanese military responsible for climate change problems so that Japan is called into the Philippines, so that Japan is called into China, as a positive force? We know from the last series of typhoons that a militarized response is needed to counter climate change catastrophe. Why can't Japan's marine self-defense force become the police that actually enforces UNCOS instead of falling prey to the United States? They say: "Oh well you'll get more, you'll get more", and we'll destroy the planet that way so I'm just saying it's already there on the books, we just need to act together instead of from selfish greed.

Questioner 3: You were saying that if you get part of the law it's not very helpful, but the rest of the law is actually very helpful.

Professor Dudden: The easy addition of open ocean as territory and the nationalization of the continental shelf are really bad, so we could get rid of those, but the other initial thing that Arvid Pardo proposed was that because the ocean was a common state, the profit from anything taken out should be used to eradicate poverty on land. That totally did not happen, and if it had the IMF or the World Bank would look very different today. That is why he said we can control this so that there is enough to go around. A land-locked state like Mongolia, doesn't have any rights to the ocean. They have to lease their fishing rights from North Korea, even to be allowed in the sea. The ocean has enormous potential for everyone as long as we don't say the ocean is

mine, not yours. The number one rule of being on a boat is you help another boat in distress. It doesn't matter what the flag is; otherwise, you're dead.

Questioner 4: I understood that, from the Professor Dudden's expressions, we have a current situation where the strong men who support the dominant political forces are too powerful in comparison to the weak opposing political forces. The different voices empower the strong man. It's a very challenging situation right now, so please explain what you mean by differences of policy to open a more possible future.

Professor Dudden: If you look at this sketch of Japan's claimed territorial waters this is all technically exclusive Japanese space – that's upheld by law. However, what is not, but is being claimed here are the South Kuril Islands (Hopporyodo), the Dokdo/Takeshima and Senkaku/Diaoyutai, which technically doesn't exist. This part Ogaswara, does. Okinotori is not really an island, it shouldn't quite be there, it's Japanese, it's Japan's rock, but so there are some parts of this map that don't exist. So I'm not trying to take any territory away from Japan, I don't mean it that way, but here, here, and here are possibilities for a negotiation, and first of all these are tiny spaces compared to the rest of what Japan gets. Ogasawara is 100% Japanese, so it gets a huge amount of the Pacific and with Minamitori-shima a huge amount of the Pacific. With that space Japan is technically the world's sixth or seventh largest nation - which is currently India- so that amount of ocean going to Japan makes Japan huge. Meanwhile, those little dots that Japan is claiming because of its history problems doesn't actually add a whole lot.

Instead, we could go back to joint-ownership. I admit that I'm living a pipe dream; this is crazy talk. No one's going to share. Is

Russia's going to share? No way, but they did share in the past. Since 1945 they shared, and it's only since 2014 when this really hardline policy connected each of these points together for the first time both as foreign and domestic policy that they stopped sharing. This decision by Japan has meant that there's no ability to go and create a second agreement here, in which we can propose that maybe the Chinese fishermen can be there, and the Russian fishermen can be there, because now it's all one policy that defines the Japanese State so that and if you give anything you give up all of it. So, I'm just suggesting.

When I was in Kyoto, Minshuto took out a full-page ad in the Asahi newspaper, and probably every other paper for the election and it used the word 'Borderline'. It said we will protect Japan's borderline and it wasn't saying Japan is weak and may be taken over, but we have to have this border, or we will cease to exist, and Japanese citizens must defend this territory. However, instead of claiming this, we could say that these are points of convergence, because Japanese modern history happened first on these little islands, then on the larger land area. But these claims do not make sense in terms of how those islands became Japanese territory in the first place. On a 1905 map for example: Where was Sakhalin? To say that Karafuto (South Sakhalin) should be claimed if Takeshima is claimed, just does not make historical sense. So, these are places that you know for a more possible acceptance of Japan in Asia.

Hatoyama Yukio's vision which was not ready to happen but saw Japan back in Asia is the conversation that increasingly needs to happen again. I believe that through pulling back on this map, we could, without giving up the safety, not the security but the safety of being Japanese in Japan, there could be progress.

I am not asking Koreans to give up Dokdo. That would be suicide, it's just not going to happen, but at the same time to have to always take such a militarized approach only sustains the legacy of empire rather

than overcomes it. And the United States must leave Okinawa. All I am asking is that we be honest about how things happened in the first place, instead of camouflaging it and pretending that it's always been Japanese territory. Hold on to this point.

I'll end with this point; the United States does a terrible job on Ioto. Now, if you are a Japanese and if your parents or grandparents are buried on the South Kuril Islands (Hopporyodo) which are Russian territory or at least administered by Russia, and you want to make *hakamairi* (pay respects at one's ancestors graves) you can do so. However, the United States government doesn't allow Japanese to do *hakamairi* on Ioto, and that is bad US policy, because if you need to connect territorially, it's not because you need to wave a flag, it's because you need to pay your respects to your ancestors, and so I think there are points of convergence that could be made into policy if history were actually looked at honestly.

Thank you for your attention.

Moderator: This discussion session has been really fascinating and I have understood a good deal. I am not so knowledgeable in this area as I specialized in the western part of Asia, but as an ordinary Japanese citizen I share your concerns. Well, I think we all have more comments, and this discussion could continue but time is up so let's conclude this session by thanking our presenters and all of you for participating.

Thank you very much.

Participants' Profiles

Keynote Speech 1

Professor Alexis DUDDEN

Alexis Dudden is professor of history at the University of Connecticut, where she teaches modern Japanese, Korean, and international history. She publishes regularly in print and online media and is completing a book project tentatively called, *The Opening and Closing of Japan, 1850-2020*. Dr. Dudden received her BA from Columbia University in 1991 and her Ph.D. in history from the University of Chicago in 1998. Since 1985, she has lived and studied for extended periods of time in Japan and South Korea.

Discussant: Professor Kozue AKIBAYASHI

Kozue Akibayashi is a professor at the Graduate School of Global Studies at Doshisha University. She received her Ed.D in education from Columbia University. Her research and activism have been on

feminist analysis of peace and security, demilitarization and decolonization of security. She is an active member of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the oldest women's international peace organization that began in 1915. She was elected as International President at WILPF's 100th Anniversary Congress in 2015 and served until August 2018.