

立命館大学大学院
2025年度実施 入学試験
博士課程前期課程

文学研究科

人文学専攻・教育人間学専修

入試方式	実施月	コース	専門科目		外国語(英語)	
			ページ	備考	ページ	備考
一般入学試験	9月	研究一貫	P.1~		P.3~	
	2月		×		×	
	9月	高度探究	P.1~		/	
	2月		P.6~			
社会人入学試験	9月	研究一貫	×		/	
	2月		P.6~			
	9月	高度探究	/		/	
	2月					
外国人留学生入学試験 (RJ方式)	9月	研究一貫	×		/	
	2月		P.6~			
	9月	高度探究	×		/	
	2月		×			
学内進学入学試験	9月	研究一貫	/		/	
	2月					
	9月	高度探究	/		/	
	2月					
APU特別受入入学試験	9月	研究一貫	/		/	
	2月					
	9月	高度探究	/		/	
	2月					

【表紙の見方】

×・・・入学試験の実施がなかった等の理由で入学試験問題の作成がなかったもの、または、問題を公開しないもの
斜線・・・学科試験(筆記試験)を実施しないもの

立命館大学大学院
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博士課程後期課程

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人文学専攻・教育人間学専修

入試方式	実施月	外国語(英語)	
		実施・公開	備考
一般入学試験	2月	P.8~	
外国人留学生入学試験	9月		
	2月		
学内進学入学試験	2月		

【表紙の見方】

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※試験終了後、ホッチキスで綴じること(太線の4箇所)

2026年度 立命館大学大学院文学研究科入学試験問題

2025年9月6日

博士課程前期課程 人文学専攻
教育人間学専修

「専門科目」


全 4 ページ

●受験上の注意

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- ② 全ての用紙に受験番号、氏名等を記入し、提出すること

●試験中の持込許可物件について

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2026 年度入学試験（2025 年 9 月実施）

文学研究科入学試験答案用紙

専攻・専修名	課程	科目	コース	受験番号	氏名
人文学専攻 (教育人間学専修)	前期課程	専門科目	<input type="checkbox"/> 研究一貫 <input type="checkbox"/> 高度探究		

問Ⅰ・問Ⅱ・問Ⅲの中から2つを選択して解答しなさい。

問Ⅰ.【人間研究領域】 次の2問の両方に解答しなさい。

1. 以下の概念について、簡潔に説明しなさい。

- (1)発達と生成（矢野智司）
- (2)子どもの人間学（M. J. ラングフェルト）
- (3)生命鼓橋（森昭）

2. 教育人間学にとっての歴史研究の意味について論じなさい。

問Ⅱ.【臨床教育領域】 次の2問の両方に解答しなさい。

1. 以下の用語について、簡潔に説明しなさい。

- (1)ドリーム・ボディ
- (2)アフメーション
- (3)ヨーガの八支則

2. 「多重知能理論」について説明した上で、教師がこの観点を教育場面に導入することによる児童・生徒・学生への心理的影響と、教育的効果について論じなさい。

問Ⅲ.【心理健康領域】 次の3問の全てに解答しなさい。

1. (1)~(5)を和訳し、定義を記しなさい。

- (1)attachment
- (2)insight
- (3)amnesia
- (4)motivation
- (5)phobia

2. (1)~(5)の概念について、2つの違いを説明しなさい。

- (1)教育人間学と心理学
- (2)レム睡眠とノンレム睡眠
- (3)ストレスとストレッサー
- (4)自我と超自我
- (5)感情転移と転移感情

3. (1)または(2)のどちらか1つに答えなさい。

- (1)認知バイアスを1つ取り上げて解説しなさい。また、そのことを明らかにするための実験計画を示しなさい。
- (2)人格理論を1つ取り上げて解説しなさい。また、その理論の効用と限界を示しなさい。

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2026年度 立命館大学大学院文学研究科入学試験問題

2025年9月6日

博士課程前期課程 人文学専攻
教育人間学専修

「外国語」(英語)

全 2 ページ

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次の文章に関して、後の問いに答えなさい。Blackmore, S. (2005).

Theories of self

We can now return, a little more confused, to the question 'Who or what am I?'. All these phenomena challenge the usual assumption of one conscious self to one body, and leave us wondering how to explain both the exceptional cases and the normal sense of self. For if it is possible to have several conscious experiences going on at once, why do we feel ourselves to be unified?

There are numerous theories that attempt to explain the sense of self. There are philosophical theories on the nature of persons,

personal identity, and moral responsibility; psychological theories of the construction of social selves, self-attribution, and various pathologies of selfhood; and neuroscientific theories of the brain basis of self. We cannot consider all of these here, so I have chosen a few examples that have obvious implications for consciousness.

① William James's 1890 book *The Principles of Psychology* has been called the most famous book in the history of psychology. In two large volumes he tackles every aspect of mental functioning, perception, and memory, and agonizes over the nature of the experiencing self. He claims that this is 'the most puzzling puzzle with which psychology has to deal'.

James first distinguishes between the 'me' which is the empirical self or objective person, and the 'I' which is the subjective, knowing self or pure ego. It is the 'I' that seems to receive the sensations and perceptions occurring in the stream of consciousness, and to be the source of attention and the origin of effort and will. But what could it be? James rejects what he calls the soul theory but also rejects the opposite extreme – the idea that the self is a fiction; nothing more than the imaginary being denoted by the pronoun 'I'.

His own solution is a subtle theory perhaps best understood with his famous saying that 'thought is itself the thinker'. He argues that our own thoughts have a sort of warmth and intimacy about them which he attempts to explain in this way: at any time there may be a special kind of Thought which rejects some of the contents of the stream of consciousness but appropriates others, pulling them together and calling them 'mine'. The next moment another such Thought comes along, taking over the previous ones and binding them to itself, creating a sense of unity. In this way, he says, the Thought seems to be a thinker. This sounds like an extraordinarily modern theory, entailing no persisting self or ego. However, James rejected extreme bundle theory and still believed in the power of will and a personal spiritual force.

One hundred years on, neuroscientists are taking up the problem. Ramachandran refers to his work on filling-in (Chapter 4), which seems to raise the question of who the picture is filled in for. Through this research he says '... we can begin to approach the greatest scientific and philosophical riddle of all – the nature of the self. Ramachandran suggests that filling-in is not done for someone but for something and that something is another brain process; a process in the brain's limbic system.'

Global workspace theories take the same line of argument, equating self with particular groups of interacting neurons. For example, in Baars's theory, a hierarchy of contexts determines what gets into the spotlight in the theatre of consciousness. Dominant among these is the self-system which allows information to be reportable and usable. Multiple personality can be explained by different context hierarchies competing for access to the global workspace and to memory and the senses, but this does not allow for the kind of co-consciousnesses described by James and Hilgard.

Another example is Damasio's multi-level scheme. Simple organisms have a set of neural patterns that map the state of an organism moment by moment, and which he calls a proto-self. More complex organisms have core consciousness associated with a core self. This is not dependent upon memory, thought, or language and provides a sense of self in the here and now. It is a transient self, endlessly recreated for each object with which the brain interacts. Finally, with the capacity for thought and autobiographical memory comes extended consciousness and the autobiographical self. This is the self that is told in your life story; it is an owner of the movie-in-the-brain and it emerges within that movie.

All these theories have in common that they equate the self with a particular brain process. They may begin to explain the origin and structure of the self, but they leave the mystery of consciousness untouched. In each case, brain processes are said to be experienced by a self because they are displayed or made available to another

brain process, but just how or why this turns them into conscious experiences remains unexplained.

Finally, a completely different approach is provided by Dennett. Having rejected the Cartesian theatre, he also rejects its audience of one who watches the show. The self, he claims, is something that needs to be explained, but it does not exist in the way that a physical object (or even a brain process) exists. Like a centre of gravity in physics, it is a useful abstraction. Indeed, he calls it a 'centre of narrative gravity'. Our language spins the story of a self and so we come to believe that there is, in addition to our single body, a single inner self who has consciousness, holds opinions, and makes decisions. Really, there is no inner self but only multiple parallel processes that give rise to a benign user illusion – a useful fiction.

It seems we have some tough choices in thinking about our own precious self. We can hang on to the way it feels and assume that a persisting self or soul or spirit exists, even though it cannot be found and leads to deep philosophical troubles. We can equate it with some kind of brain process and shelve the problem of why this brain process should have conscious experiences at all, or we can reject any persisting entity that corresponds to our feeling of being a self.

I think that intellectually we have to take this last path. The trouble is that it is very hard to accept in one's own personal life. It means taking a radically different view of every experience. It means accepting that there is no one who is having these experiences. It means accepting that every time I seem to exist, this is just a temporary fiction and not the same 'me' who seemed to exist a moment before, or last week, or last year. This is tough, but I think it gets easier with practice.

Blackmore, S. (2005). *Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press.

(全2頁の1)

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人文学専攻 (教育人間学専修)	前期課程	外国語 (英語)	研究一貫		

1. ここに書かれている内容を日本語で要約しなさい。

2. 下線部①の人物の哲学と心理学における功績を英語で簡単に説明しなさい。

※試験終了後、ホッチキスで綴じること(太線の4箇所)

2026年度 立命館大学大学院文学研究科入学試験問題

2026年2月8日

博士課程前期課程 人文学専攻
教育人間学専修

「専門科目」

全 4 ページ

●受験上の注意

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人文学専攻 (教育人間学専修)	前期課程	専門科目	<input type="checkbox"/> 研究一貫 <input type="checkbox"/> 高度探究		

問Ⅰ・問Ⅱ・問Ⅲの中から2つを選択して解答しなさい。

問Ⅰ.【人間形成領域】 次の2問の両方に解答しなさい。

1. 「人新世 (anthropocene)」は、オゾンホールの解明でノーベル賞を受賞した科学者パウル・クルツェンが2002年『ネイチャー』誌に発表した概念であり、人間が地球のあり方に影響を及ぼし、これまでの1万年か1万2千年の温暖な時代である完新世を終わらせようとしているという主張である。人新世をめぐる議論において問われているのは、人間が人間だけで自己完結的に生きるのではなく、地球において生息している様々な人間ならざるものとの連関の中で生きているという現実をどう考えるのかという問題である。教育人間学の立場から「人新世」の問題提起に対して応答しなさい。

2. 以下から2人を選び、論者の主張を概説しなさい。

- (1)エドワード・タイラー
- (2)J. V. ユクスキュル
- (3)ハンナ・アーレント

問Ⅱ.【臨床教育領域】 次の2問の両方に解答しなさい。

1. 以下の事項について、教育人間学・臨床教育学的視点から簡潔に説明しなさい。

- (1)臨床の知
- (2)子どもと大人
- (3)教育問題

2. 教育人間学・臨床教育学的観点から見た「教育現実と言語」の関係について、あなた自身の見解を述べなさい(字数制限なし)。

問Ⅲ.【心理健康領域】 次の3問の全てに解答しなさい。

1. (1)~(5)を和訳し、定義を記しなさい。

- (1)control group
- (2)fight-or-flight response
- (3)rationalization
- (4)object permanence
- (5)reinforcement

2. (1)~(5)の概念について、2つの違いを説明しなさい。

- (1)教育人間学と教育心理学
- (2)IQ と EQ
- (3)無意識と前意識
- (4)感覚と知覚
- (5)EEG と HRV

3. (1)または(2)のどちらか1つに答えなさい。

- (1)A. マズローと C. R. ロジャーズそれぞれの代表的な理論を概説したのち、人間性心理学の歴史的意義とその限界を示しなさい。
- (2)催眠現象の特徴を概説したのち、催眠を教育に応用する方法を一つ提案しなさい。

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2026年度 立命館大学大学院文学研究科入学試験問題

2026年2月8日

博士課程後期課程 人文学専攻
教育人間学専修

「外国語」(英語)

全 6 ページ

●受験上の注意

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文学研究科入学試験答案用紙

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人文学専攻 (教育人間学専修)	後期課程	外国語 (英語)		

【問題】以下の問題文を読んで、後掲の設問に答えなさい。なお、解答は全て答案用紙に書きなさい。

Martin Buber, another Jew who engaged in spiritual resistance during the era of Nazism, also sees “wholeness” in responsive relationships with others, with a similar awareness to Lévinas of overcoming totalitarian “totality.”

Yoshida (2007) clarified the dialogical view of wholeness in Buber’s thought as follows.

In contrast to “totality,” Buber spoke of “wholeness” in a lecture entitled “Human Development and Worldview” in 1935, at a time of deepening division due to clashes between totalitarian groups. When a community, whether a nation or a state, seeks to incorporate the outside world and expand by integrating and assimilating people into its worldview, it is creating totality. “Totality is what makes it up, but wholeness is essentially what results and grows up.” It is not deliberately and systematically constructed or organized, but arises naturally in the call and response with others that one faces at any given time. It is the wholeness that emerges in the course of responsive relationships with others, but it cannot be objectified or grasped on its own.

In Buber the “other” has heterogeneity/otherness, as compared to the concept of the “I-thou” relationship of the early 1920s, which he came to explicitly emphasize later, after experiencing Naziism. For example, in his article “Distance and Relation” (1950), Buber emphasizes that one can only enter into relations through the mediation of “the rigor and depth of human individuation, the fundamental otherness of the other,” while in his article “Following the Collective” (1956), Buber reiterates that “community” formation through “identification” is in danger of turning into totality.

Let us note here that *heterogeneity* in “diversity and heterogeneity,” which has been a key term in this paper, is described in a fundamentally strong sense as the “*otherness of the other*.” When a community tries to integrate others by sharing commonality and identity with others, it tends to turn into totality. This does not mean that individualism or privatization is acceptable but what, then, is the basis for “the communal” that includes otherness and diversity, or, in the definition used in the previous section, “publicity” that is distinct from “communality”? Buber (like Lévinas) says that it is to face the fundamental otherness of the other and to affirm it as heterogeneous rather than to assimilate it.

The wholeness that arises in this way is infinitely open, but because it is bound together by each response to the other, its diversity is not diffused discretely. The tension between the “centrifugal force to differentiate” and the “centripetal force to identify,” so to speak, continues to be sustained by the call and response through otherness.

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Buber's key concept of "encounter" is that the self is transformed by stepping out of the community, encountering the alien other outside of it, and accepting the otherness. The other key concept in Buber, "dialogue," is to call, and to respond when called upon by the other, to fulfill one's responsibility to respond. In Buber, in this kind of encounter and dialogue in response to the heterogeneous other, a third path of "responsive wholeness" through dialogism emerges between the privatized individualism in the absence of the other and the totalitarianism that identifies others with totality.

This section grasps the aspect of "responsive wholeness" that opposes "totality" by overlaying Buber's thought with that of Lévinas, who saw infinite openness in the face of the other.

This paper raises the issues of "inclusion" in the boundary area of public education in Japan, i.e., diversity that is inclusive inside formal schools or diversity that is open outside formal schools (Section 1), and proposes an alternative model for thinking about these issues by rethinking the concepts of "inclusion" and "wholeness" (Section 2). The alternative model will allow us to think about how to draw an intersectional and responsive line between boundary areas that do not fall into the "inward/outward" dichotomy of public education as a whole. Below, this section discusses the boundary of that inclusion, summarizing our arguments to this point.

Section 1 first raised the issue of the conflict/dilemma between the view that diversity and heterogeneity can only be guaranteed to all students if they are included in formal schools (i.e., diversity included in formal schools) and the view that formal schools should have boundary areas open to the outside world where diversity and heterogeneity can be ensured, because homogenization pressure is unavoidable within formal schools where standardization and formality are inevitable (i.e., diversity that extends outside formal schools).

Next, political theory was employed to understand the problem, identifying the tension and conflict between the policy position of including all educational opportunities in formal schools and the policy position of allowing them to develop outside formal schools as a struggle over the multiple freedoms to educate. The paper argued that it is undesirable to grant ultimate authority to any one of these freedoms, and that ensuring the reconciliation of "inclusion" and "openness" is a difficult challenge.

Further, the same issue is discussed with reference to the debate on the public nature of education. Publicness, as distinguished from communality, can be seen as both "official" and "common" as well as "open." When "publicness" is viewed not as the integration or reconciliation of heterogeneity and diversity, but as a mechanism

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for the creation and manifestation of heterogeneity and diversity itself, it is argued that minorities, who have different values from the dominant values of formal schools, can be allowed to exit it and create their own unique educational opportunities by extending the logic of publicness, that is “guaranteeing heterogeneity and diversity.” The question is how “inclusion” can be open to the outside without creating closed boundaries.

Based on the above discussion in section 1, section 2 proposed a thinking model of “responsive wholeness” that is not “concentric totalization,” referring to the ideas of Lévinas and Buber in order to understand “inclusion” that is open to the outside. Using this model, then, how can we rethink the boundary area of public education?

As a premise, since formal schools in the public education system are responsible for enhancing social integration by guaranteeing equal opportunities for common education, they should be conscious of avoiding the pitfall of inclusiveness in the “concentric totality” model, in which all members of the system are included and made identical. Indeed, being conscious of this, the public education sector has been striving to emphasize the inclusion of “diversity and heterogeneity” as a principle of publicness. However, based on the “responsive wholeness” model, we should not only consider this diversity as diversity held within formal schools, but also emphasize the otherness and heterogeneity of others who appear outside formal schools. It is something that can never be assimilated into our commonness, something outside of our concentrically totalizing common world. And as long as there is a responsive relationship with the external yet heterogeneous other, it is included in an open wholeness, a publicity open to diversity.

In order for this responsive relationship to be established, it is important to note that the “included” side, that is, the side with its own heterogeneity, is not passive but active (emergent) agency. The dominant majority side that seeks to include other entities should start by listening to and responding to the voice of the “questioning” other. The key here is the relationship with others, with faces and voices that are not subject to the system. There, a space (topos) is required that can hold the relationships responding to this questioning. This topos has no fixed boundary separating the inside from the outside, but “arises” each time a responsive relationship is established.

Therefore, the boundaries of public education should be tentative, intersectional, and responsive, which can be done by redefining the concept of inclusion through a “responsive wholeness” model. How can we institutionalize such an asylum-like topos in the boundary area where the formal and the informal intersect in public education? We must envision this topos while considering what is to be gained and what is to be lost by its institutionalization. The specifics of this study will be the subject of future work, beyond the scope of this paper.

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【出典】 Reprinted from Atsuhiko Yoshida, Inclusion and Wholeness: Rethinking Boundaries between the Formal and the Non-Formal in Japanese Public Education, in: *Educational Studies in Japan: International Yearbook*, No. 17, March, 2023. pp. 5-18.

【設問】

1. 文中で論じられている“totality”と“wholeness”の概念の差異について、簡潔に説明しなさい。
2. 下線部分全体を和訳しなさい。
3. 問題文の後半で、著者は、日本の公教育における「インクルージョン」のあり方について、ブーバーやレヴィナスの思想を踏まえて、どのような提案を行っているか。400～600字程度で要約して説明しなさい。

以上