

## < 国際関係学部研究会報告 >

第 1 回 ( 1999 年 5 月 11 日 )

### A Holistic Approach to Improving Health in Rural Communities

Prisca Nemapare

In Zimbabwe, it is estimated that 570 for every 100,000 women die due to pregnancy related problems. Many more live in chronic pain. The causes of death and ill-health among women include malnutrition. This is a preventable problem. Because of the prevalence of poverty, malnutrition takes a toll on women. But in order to address this issue, it is imperative that nutrition not be addressed in isolation of the other problems such as income generation, access to food, water supply availability and basic hygiene. In order to get the projects to be sustainable, community involvement is critical.

The project is an attempt to not only piece together the picture of women's health in a rural setting, but also to identify needs, and ways to improve health status and evaluation. Therefore the project is multi-pronged. It includes health assessment, education, project development and implementation and evaluation.

Health assessment suggest women's health to be marginal, particularly those in the childbearing years. In addition, maternal health seems to influence infant health as well. Therefore, it is very essential that women be educated about the consequences of poor health by providing communities with assistance on projects which will help them access food, increase their income, and acquire knowledge.

第 2 回 ( 1999 年 6 月 8 日 )

### South Asian Nuclearproliferation: Less Than Feared?

William H. Kincade

This presentation is based on prior research on post-Cold War nuclear weapons diffusion and on current research on the case of nuclear arms proliferation by India and Pakistan. The thesis in both cases is that fewer nations are interested in developing nuclear arsenals owing to economic, technological, military, and domestic political constraints and to the increasing 'delegitimization' of nuclear weapons globally. The analysis predicts — cautiously — that Pakistan and India will not 'weaponize' their nuclear devices to a significant degree. Instead, they seek to acquire the status of Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) 'on the cheap.' That is, they want to take advantage of the provision of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that accorded nuclear weapons status to countries that had exploded a nuclear device. Both states have succeeded so far in the media in obtaining the status of nuclear 'powers.' In fact, however, both are nuclear 'pygmies' and will likely remain so because of the constraints on developing a significant nuclear weapons arsenal.

第3回 (1999年9月28日)

国際文化共生論の新構築

高橋 正義

日本文化特殊論, エスノセントリズム, 個人的体験に根ざしたステレオタイプ化した異文化論もおもしろい。しかし, こうした領域から一定の距離を置き, 民族・人種, 宗教, 国籍の異なる人間の共通部分を積極的に掘り起こし, その共通部分をインターフェースとして活用することにより異文化の範囲を最小限に押さえ, 異なる文化に新しい橋を築く可能性を探る「共生文化論: 文化インターフェース論」の新構築を提起した。

新たな学問領域を掘り下げて行くことにより国際間に横たわる今日的課題の芽を摘み取れる可能性が大きいとの仮説を立証するべく取り組み中の国際技術協力の実践現場からのフィードバックを踏まえ, なぜその様な考え方に立ち至ったかについて背景と動機についても言及した。新たなグローバリゼーションの21世紀を迎えるに当たり, 国際関係学において共生文明, 共生文化の学問領域を深める作業に取り掛かりことの必要性を国際技術移転のフィールドからの実践フィードバック例をベースにプレゼンテーションを行った。

第4回 (1999年10月26日)

Is There a Japanese State?

Nicholas Onuf

In everyday circumstances, we talk about 'the state' routinely. Nevertheless, as an outsider to Japan, I believe it is worth asking whether there is a Japanese state. Contemporary social theory tells us that the state is a social construction and, as such, a fiction. Furthermore, there are conceptual grounds

for calling the state-the state in general-a fiction in a way that many other social constructions are not. Why single out Japan?

Be assured that Japan is a 'nation'-perhaps the best possible example of the phenomenon of nation as social construction. When Meiji intellectuals and politicians fashioned the 'national polity' along the lines of the German 'organic state,' they fused nation and state, and brought Japan into the modern world. Nevertheless, the state and the nation are conceptually distinct, as German thinkers always claimed. They always identified the nation with the people in a corporate sense and the state with the apparatus of rule.

More precisely the ideal state possesses a rationalized chain of command potentially capable of monopolizing access to the physical and social assets within the state's territory. The actual state resembles the idea state only in small degree. There are circumstances, however, in which particular states may choose to increase effective control. The most obvious is war. Anthony Giddens claims that the state 'no longer have enemies.' Nevertheless, the potential for enemies, and thus the possibility of war, comes with the privilege of statehood. We have to presume that most states are organized with this in mind.

Even if states no longer have enemies in the form of other states, quite a few of them are vulnerable to enemies within. Not only is civil war a frequent occurrence, but such wars test a state's ability to monopolize the use of force. Finally, states that no longer have enemies, whether external or internal, still have to face natural disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes. They also must respond to unforeseen disasters that stem from human negligence and errors of judgment. Nuclear accidents and oil spills are conspicuous examples. We can easily imagine terrorist acts with consequences on the same sort of scale. Financial

panics can bring economies to a stand-still. I would group all of these events together and call them emergencies.

For the state to meet our expectations in time of emergency, as in time of war, it must transform itself into a rationalized chain of command. State authorities grant themselves emergency powers, offering no justification beyond reason of state, and public dissent is not likely to be tolerated. The state's coercive capability will be much in evidence.

In the last half-century, Japan has had no emergency on the scale necessary to test the state's ability to transform itself into a singular, rationalized

chain of command. The Hanshin earthquake and, more recently, the Tokaimura nuclear 'incident' raise doubts that it can. In both cases, the central government was slow to respond, and disorganized in doing so. In short, the government failed to mobilize itself, as a state, precisely when everyone would want it to. As a consequence, local and prefectural officials have become quite skeptical about the central government's ability to respond to emergencies in general, and they wish to be consulted when future emergencies arise. In doing so, they only compound the problem.