

論 説

Controlling Pre-Election Poll and Quick-Count in Contemporary Indonesia

Agus Trihartono

Article

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INTRODUCTION

This paper¹⁾ re-examines the reasons to restrict pre-election poll and quick-count (QC) in post Suharto Indonesia. Following the position of the pollsters, which are significantly increasing in Indonesian electoral politics (Meizner 2009: 95-126, Qodari 2010: 122-140, Trihartono 2010, and Ufen 2011:95-126), controlling the pollsters also have been expanded and enlarged both the intensity and the level of legislation. The law regulated not only the accreditation and limitation of pollsters' activities in the elections, but also the publication of the results of pre-election poll and the quick-count on quiet week and election days. Publication of pre-election poll and the quick-count on the days of election has been limited by the Law Number 10/2008, the Law Number 42/2008, and the regulation of Election Commission (KPU, *Komisi Pemilihan Umum*).

So far, the attempts to ban the publications of pre-election poll and quick-count were based on the rationales that the publications might inform but also affect the voters. Put another way, the limitation of pre-election poll and quick-count were based on the allegations that such publications led to the works of the so-called "direct-bandwagon effect".²⁾ Some politicians also claimed that these bans were to avoid the possibility of social riots due to the possible inaccurate announcement of pre-election poll and quick-count results in the day of election. Moreover, the law makers thought that credibility of pollster bodies was not convincing, thus the research outcomes were accused to be the source of the election complexity.³⁾

Unlike those politicians' arguments, in this article I argue that the reasons behind such regulations were neither the direct-bandwagon effects nor the credibility of pre-election poll as incitement to social disorder, and even social riots. More specifically, it was something to do with the funding flow and elites to support the most prospective party or pair candidates. Simply put, it was the political move to minimize the wave of financial support from businessmen and elites to the probable winner shown by the polls and confirming by the quick-count (an indirect-bandwagon) rather than to reduce the influence of the publication to the voters (a direct-bandwagon), which publicly claimed so far. In addition, blaming the possible inaccuracy in the content of publication of pre-election poll and quick-count as the source of disturbance of the post elections is also somewhat over-exaggerated since, as we will discuss later, the majority of national pre-election poll and quick-count, methodology speaking, were tremendous.

In doing so, the paper comprises key issues as follows: the first section highlights the principal development and the significance of political polls and quick-count from 2003 onwards as well as considers the latest changes. The second discusses the regulation to control the dissemination of pre-election poll and quick-count outcomes both in the parliamentary and the presidential elections and exposes the official rationales behind the controls. The third section, on the other hand, elucidates the fact that the control of pre-election poll publication primarily for reasons of preventing the elites' support to the party

or candidate show by the polls as the potential winner. It is far from the prescribed reasons which weighted the impacts of publication of pre-election poll and quick-count to the voters. Throughout this study, I would like to spotlight the picture of controlling pre-election poll and its justification. This paper shows the efforts to limit pollsters had neither to do with the direct-bandwagon effect nor with the credibility of pollsters. It had to do with businessmen elites support to possible winner candidates.

DIRECT-BANDWAGON, UNDERDOG, AND INDIRECT-BANDWAGON

Before we analyses the issues, it will be helpful to define what we means by a bandwagon and by an underdog, as well as by an indirect-bandwagon. These three concepts are the central idea of this paper.

- a) The so-called direct-bandwagon is the power, which polls supposedly, has to influence voters. More specifically, "voter changes their position after being exposed to polls." Simply put, the publication of pre-election poll supposedly encourages voters who support the candidates leading in the polls, and discourage voters who support those trailing in the polls. Meanwhile, undecided voters might congregate to the winning candidates (Young, 1992: 20-21).
- b) On the other hand, the bandwagon is also followed by the opposite situation so-called underdog. Underdog occurs "when people vote, out of sympathy, for the party perceived to be losing the elections shown by the polls result." (Young, 1992: 20-21). Those effects occur simultaneously so that there is a tendency to nullify one to another. Indeed, underdog always presents along with the bandwagon. The extent of these two elements influencing voters, academically, is not without a doubt. To identify these two effects, so far, brought to a serious academic intense.
- c) Meanwhile, there is also a situation known as Indirect-Bandwagon. It is an effect which supposedly functions to influence the elites, not the voters. The effects mattered on campaign workers, active supporters and financial contributors as well as the media. Put simply, according to Gallup (1947) it is known as the "3 M," the money, the media, and the morale (Young, 1992: 20-21). In this paper, I add one aspect namely the support of political elites (political party leaders and local heads) which obviously remained in Indonesia electoral politics.

PRE-ELECTION POLL, QUICK-COUNT AND THE ELECTIONS IN INDONESIA

The use of pre-election poll and quick-count in post Suharto elections has been ubiquitous and become the required menu and standard manner in the feast of Indonesian democracy. However, the use of pre-election poll and quick-count was not the most recent phenomenon in Indonesia's political arena. It is essential to note that political opinion poll activities had been present since the initial power of President Suharto in 1960s. The initial stage of poll era was marked by the founding PT. *Suburi* in 1967. It was the beginning of the application of quantitative social research in the country. Unfortunately,

the age of PT. *Suburi* was too young to grow since the New Order regime accused their activities engaged in *subversi* (subversion), were considered a sort of espionage, and classified as strategic intelligence activities. After the *Suburi* case, polls activities in Indonesian politics started to deteriorate following the storm arising from a polls activity done by *Monitor* tabloid appraising the most popular person in Indonesia in October 1990. The polls raised the controversy as they put the Prophet Muhammad among persons in the polls questions, and the prophet listed 11th, one ranking behind the editor. As a result, the polls of *Monitor* Tabloid triggered the protest of Muslim organizations and led the government to revoke licenses of publication continuity of the tabloid. Moreover, the person in charge of the polls, Mr. Arswendo Atmowiloto, went to jail. Thus, later on the practice of pre-election poll in the era of Suharto was categorized as illicit.

From the 1990s to the beginning of 1998, it is the period of polls activity getting up from a long slumber and beginning to reside in a decent place in Indonesian politics. Most importantly, the fall of Suharto in 1998 provided the greater space to political liberalization and democratization which affected the development of democratic institutions. In this period, the development of pollsters was noticeable and polls activities started to accelerate. Thus, one amongst the first polls activities was conducted by the Jakarta-based Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education, and Information (LP3ES, *Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Sosial dan Ekonomi*), which organized public opinion polls on non-political sensitive issues in 1992 supported by the Asia Foundation such as environmental issues, globalization and professionalism which are politically less sensitive. In 1997-2000, particularly following the collapse of Suharto, LP3ES began to do polls on the political situation such as *Dwi Fungsi ABRI* (military dual function), and also issues on national leadership. Moreover, LP3ES had also conducted the first quick-count that took place in Indonesia for the Jakarta area in the elections of 1997.⁴⁾

Following the fall of Suharto in 1998, the number of pollsters increased and marked a significant growth in the desire for political participation and, more importantly, gave larger space for the intensification of civic freedom. The period saw more polls and more reporting of polls than ever before as numerous pollsters had involved in pre-election poll. Borrowing Mietzner words (2009), the period was indicated by the “mushrooming of polls institutions,” both numbers of the organizations and the intensity of the polls activities increase dramatically. Remarkably, the early days of the revival of public opinion polls activities were able to detect the victory of the Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P, *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*) in 1999 elections.⁵⁾ Despite admirable, polls in this period was not part of widely accepted political, social, and economic discourses as many politicians were still unaware and rejected the idea that polls should be included in a shared democratic vocabulary. As Dodi Ambardi,⁶⁾ the executive Director of Jakarta-based of Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI, *Lembaga Survei Indonesia*) illustrated politicians and journalists during the era expressed skepticism regarding the validity of polls capability and its political influences.

The period 2003-2004 was seen as an exceptionally crucial phase for the development of pollsters heading the first direct presidential election of Indonesia. First, the period exposed significant pre-election poll and quick-count, conducted in large scale and nationwide for the first time in local history. The credibility of polls and quick-count also counted as they were directly tested by the public, openly examined by the mass media, and critically discussed in academic circles. Simply put, polls outcomes were scrutinized and compared with the official real-count from the election commission (KPU, *Komisi Pemilihan Umum*). Second, there were many foreign funding supported pollsters' activities so that many pollsters increased their methodology and covered their elections research periodically.⁷⁾ In this period, pollsters in Indonesia had found the best method both in terms of sampling and data set which suits to the geographical uniqueness of Indonesia. The period also witnessed how the debates about research methods had finally found an academic consensus. The theoretical issue was no longer about the 'accuracy' of polls and quick-count results, but it was far into the issue of 'precision'. Most important, the fundamental questions about public opinion polls shifted from "can credible public opinion polls be conducted in the country?" to "Which is the most credible pollster in the country?" Third, media coverage of pre-election poll was massive, and the publication of pre-election poll results was also intensive. The period could be noticed as the revival of the 'passion' of the polls activity in the country. The number of pollster increased to more than sixty until 2009, albeit there were only seven pollsters that produced a final estimate of the outcome of the national elections, compared to five in 1999.⁸⁾ According to Bestian Nainggolan a *Kompas* Daily researcher, there were about 100 publications of public opinion until 2004 increase to about 300 publications of pre-election poll in the period 2005-2009.⁹⁾ There were more polls conducted during the 2004 campaign than ever, and a wider variety of data-collection methodologies had been tried out. The increased number of pollsters and the intensive pre-election poll activities led to the so-called "polls-fever" which later on contributed to the pollsters' acceptance and trust as an important player in Indonesian elections nationally and locally. Indeed, the period witnessed a 'silent revolution' that the major protagonist in Indonesian history, polls as 'machinery', provided channels of self-expression for 'the ordinary citizen' to be heard as a means of reinserting 'the true *vox populi*' into political life.

Moreover, from 2005 onward, the major political parties utilized public opinion polls as the ultimate instrument for political recruitment and candidacy mechanism in the local elections. There are now distributing polls institutions from the national to local elections in line with the first wave of 2005-2008 and the on-going second wave from 2009 to present. Since Indonesia has implemented no less than 510 elections in all regions in 2005-2008 (Cetro, 2008), and there were about 234 local elections during the year 2010 alone (KPU, 2010) as well as more than 1500 pairs of candidates who ran for Governors, *Bupati* and Mayors in a cycle of local elections, the role of pollsters has been very much vital. The application of pre-election poll and quick-count has been ubiquitous and enormously influential since *Golkar* Party declared, in 2005, to rely on polling outcomes as the foremost aspect for candidacy in local contestations. The *Golkar* Way created a domino effect onto

other political parties to follow *Golkar*'s approach utilizing pollsters as a new device in renovating the selection process of political recruitment, and improving the strategies to win the local elections. The National Mandate Party (PAN, *Partai Amanat Nasional*) in 2006, the Democratic Party (PD, *Partai Demokrat*) in 2007, and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP, *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*) in 2010 decided to exploit political polling to be a political parties' tool in dealing with the dynamics of local elections. Last but not least, in this period we see that the activities of pollster move from merely academic research body to be more profitable and business-oriented enterprises (Qodari 2010, Ufen 2011). Institutions of national polls begin to engage intensively in election activities. Some major pollsters such as Indonesian Institute, Indo-Barometer, Cirrus Surveyor Indonesia, LP3ES, Puskapol UI, Indonesian Circle Institute, The Indonesian of Voice-Network, and National Survey Institute, are among the important players in Indonesian electoral politics, nationally and locally.

THE EMBARGO, THE JUSTIFICATIONS

Since the increased role of pollsters in Indonesian electoral politics were obvious with the first direct election in 2004, interestingly, Indonesia took the position to prohibit all implementation and publication of survey results during the last period of the campaign and quiet week. The level of regulation is divided into two layers, namely: the election commission rule and the national law (*Undang-Undang*). Two layers of the rules contain conditions and restrictions binding the implementation of pre-election poll and quick-count as well as the sanctions. The sanctions comprise both fines and imprisonment which is subject to criminal election.

The control of the publication of pre-election poll and quick-count basically is not the individual case of Indonesia. There were also such regulations in many other countries. Such regulations on polls activities remained both in undemocratic countries and democratic countries. In 1996, a survey conducted by the European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research (ESOMAR) and the World Association for Public Opinion Research (WAPOR) reported that 30 of 78 countries surveyed had some restrictions on the publication of polls; 47 had absolutely no restrictions and one had no answer (Virola, 2004). However, most democratic nations do not support the whole prohibition of the publication of pre-election poll; most of them have no regulation and some only prohibit it in the final days or hours until the relevant polls closes. However, the main issue in this discussion is not whether the rule exists or not, but to highlight the reasons underlying the regulation of the publication of polls and quick-count in Indonesia. Controlling polls and quick-count publications is certainly not a violation of democratic values as far as the reason used to justify the restriction is fair and proven.

The following are the rules that control pre-election poll and the quick-count in Indonesia. This first is the national law, the second exposes the Election Commission Regulation, and the last is about political justification behind the law.

a. The National Law

Indonesia has experienced two cycles of national elections both legislative election and presidential elections in 2004 and 2009. In 2004 general elections the national law regarding control the pollsters' activities did not exist. However, as seen in table 1, in 2009 national elections the law makers issued the law to limit the pre-election poll and the quick count.

Table 1. National Law on Pre-election poll and Quick-Count

Elections	National Law
2004 Legislative Election	none
2004 Presidential Election	none
2009 Legislative Election	Law Number 10 year 2008
2009 Presidential Election	Law Number 42 year 2008

Source: Law Number 10 Year 2008 and Law Number 42 year 2008

Regarding pre-election poll and quick-count results, the elections law said that publication of both activities in legislative election and president election could cost the guilty either imprisoned or fines. As shown in table 2, here is what the applicable sections of the Elections Law say:

Table 2. National Law on Controlling Pre-election poll and Quick-Count

<p>Law Number 10 Year 2008 (Legislative General election)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Article 245 paragraph (2) reads “The results of a survey or polls shall not be announced during the cooling off period”; • Article 245 paragraph (3) reads “The results of a quick-count may only be announced not earlier than on the day following the day/date of voting”; • Article 245 paragraph (5) reads “A violation of the provisions of paragraph (2), paragraph (3), and paragraph (4) constitutes a criminal act in the General Elections”; • Article 282 reads “Every person announcing the results of a survey or polls during the cooling off period which may influence or which is aimed at influencing the Voters, shall be punished with a minimum imprisonment of 3 (three) months and a maximum imprisonment of 12 (twelve) months and a minimum fine of Rp.3,000,000.00 (three million rupiah) and a maximum fine of Rp.12,000,000.00 (twelve million rupiah)”; • Article 307 reads “Every person or institution conducting a quick-count and announcing the results of a quick-count on the day/date voting shall be punished with a minimum imprisonment of 6 (six) months and a maximum imprisonment of 18 (eighteen) months and a minimum fine of Rp.6,000,000.00 (six million rupiah) and a maximum fine of Rp.18,000,000.00 (eighteen million rupiah)”
<p>Law Number 42/2008 (the General Elections of the President and Vice President)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Article 188 paragraph (2) states that: “The results of a survey or polls shall not be announced and/or disseminated during the cooling off period”. • Article 188 paragraph (3) states that: “The results of a quick-count may be announced and/or disseminated not earlier than on the day following the day/date of voting.” • Article 188 paragraph (5) states that: “A violation of the provisions of paragraph (2), paragraph (3), and paragraph (4) constitutes a criminal act in the General Elections of the President and Vice President.” • Article 228 states that: “Every person announcing and/or disseminating the results of a survey or polls during the cooling off period which may influence or which is aimed at influencing the Voters, shall be punished with a minimum imprisonment of 3 (three) months and a maximum imprisonment of 12 (twelve) months and a minimum fine of Rp.3,000,000.00 (three million rupiah) and a maximum fine of Rp.12,000,000.00 (twelve million rupiah).” • Article 255 states that: “Every person or institution announcing the results of a quick-count on the day/date of voting shall be punished with a minimum imprisonment of 6 (six) months and a maximum imprisonment of 18 (eighteen) months and a minimum fine of Rp.6,000,000.00 (six million rupiah) and a maximum fine of Rp.18,000,000.00 (eighteen million rupiah).”

Source: Law Number 10 Year 2008 and Law Number 42 Year 2008 of the Republic of Indonesia. Cited from the Decision Number 9/PUU-VII/2009, the Constitutional Court of The Republic of Indonesia.

b. The Election Commission Rule

Apart from the two of Nation Laws stated above, there was also regulation made by the election commission (KPU), which limited the detailed space for pollsters maneuver. As we see in table 3, in 2004 elections the commission required pollsters to publically expose the methodology of both pre-election poll and the quick-count. Among the rules subject to

pollsters were the registration to national and local Election Commission, submitting the profile pollsters, agreement for not to the publish the results of pre-election poll and quick-count in the period of quiet week, agreement for not to favor or disfavor any participant in the election, and exposing publically the methodology and funding sources for the activities.

In the 2009 election, the KPU rules were not only more complex, but also required such an examination of the pollsters whether the pollsters were credible or not. Many pollsters saw these current commission's regulations were obviously excessive and exceeded its authority.

Table 3. The Election Commission Rule

2004 Legislative Election Election Commission Regulation Number No. 701/2003	Pre-election poll and Quick-Count Pollsters required to expose the methodology
2004 Presidential Election Election Commission Regulation Number 48 Year 2004	Pre-election poll and Quick-Count Prohibiting the publication of pre-election poll and quick-count in so-called quiet week (<i>Minggu Tenang</i> , cooling off period)
2009 Legislative Election and 2009 Presidential Election Election Commission Regulation Number 40 Year 2008	Pre-election polls The Pre-election poll can only be done by agencies that receive a registration number from the Commission. (Article 10) Admission Procedure (Article 11): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pollsters apply to the Commission. • Pollsters are required to submit a profile, methodology, and making commitment not to publish the results of polls in the quiet period as well as announcing the methodology and the funding. Registration Number (Article 12) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commission examined the pollsters' administrative completeness and gave approval to qualified pollsters. • Pollster that meets the requirements receives the registration number. Otherwise, pollsters have no right to conduct the polls. Supervision (Article 13): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supervision conducted by the Electoral Supervisory Board and the General Election Supervisory Committee. • Violation of this rule is subject to criminal election.
Legislative Election 2009 and Presidential Election 2009 KPU Regulation Number 40 Year 2008	Quick-count The quick-count can only be done by agencies that have been registered at the KPU (article 15). Registration (Article 16) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pollsters register quick-count activity together with the registration pollsters. • Make a statement that the announcement of the results of quick-count conducted not on Election Day. • Institutions quick-count tells calculation methodology and sources of funding. Sanctions (Article 18) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Violation of this rule is subject to a criminal act of a general election.

Source: KPU Regulation Number 701 year 2003, KPU Regulation Number 48 Year 2004, and KPU Regulation Number 40 Year 2008.

c. The Justifications

There are four justifications to control pre-election poll and the quick-count as follows:

First, a direct-bandwagon effect mattered as voters rally to the leading candidate. Almost all parties feared that the results of pre-election poll led voters to favor particular candidate and certain party shown by the polls as the possible winner. The concern was based on the (common) assumptions that the pollsters prompted the development of advocacy-polls.¹⁰⁾ This is the use of polls by interest groups to make an impression of strong popular support for specific candidates. Proponents of this idea view that since the pre-election poll were prevalent in the election period, polls' issue was certainly about the political realm. Accordingly, many politicians saw suspiciously: the polls are merely a part of a political conspiracy. Since the intensity of the polls was obvious and numerous, the polls was seen as a means of raising the particular party's or candidate's victory in the elections. At this point, the politicians have seen the polls as a political tool of a political party rather than an academic research.¹¹⁾ To point out, the Gerindra (*Gerakan Indonesia Raya*) party leader and Wiranto, Hanura (*Hati Nurani Rakyat*) party leader, both were also the presidential candidates, argued that the pre-election opinion polls were simply an instrument to shape public view. Meanwhile Wiranto emphasized the polls were to mislead public choice.¹²⁾ Although both Subianto and Wiranto did not deny if there were also pollsters, which conducted surveys objectively and independently, the poll was widely used as a device to influence the public opinion to vote for the possible winner. Polls publication mattered especially to simple-minded people who would follow the 'polls' as the reason to choose the most popular pair.¹³⁾

In addition, a Golkar Party Chairman, Muladi, and Bambang Eka Cahya Widodo, a member of the Election Supervisory Board (*Banwaslu, Badan Pengawas Pemilu*), also noticed the poll results were easy to be manipulated to mislead the public choice. Specifically, polls influence people's choice as "the pollsters can distort people's preference."¹⁴⁾ In addition, Ganjar Pranowo, a law-maker of the PDI-P admitted that the assumption that poll results affected voters was very obvious among politicians. Therefore, many politicians were very sensitive to the bandwagon issue, proved or not, because it affected the victory or the defeat in the election. Thus, controlling the pollsters was the safest way to protect their interest.¹⁵⁾ Accordingly, a member of the Election Commission, Andi Nurpati, requested that pollsters must perform disclaimer that "the activity of pre-election poll and quick-count was scientific, not to influence community in the vote."¹⁶⁾

Second, despite useful, some politicians perceived that Pre-election poll and quick counts were the source of election trouble. The concerns were that both poll and quick count produced by 'incredible' pollsters led to the possibility of mass disruption. Such rules, therefore, were essential to deter the community from the possibility of post-election riots caused by the publication of the poll and quick-count. The politicians argued that the control was needed to reduce the complexity of the elections.¹⁷⁾ Accordingly, some politicians doubt that pollsters which are mostly funded by individuals or groups associated with the candidate in the election, were not only dependent, but also subject to be manipulated. Even President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), a person who really gained most benefit from polls activities in the 2004 presidential election, expressed his

wrath against the poll results of a number of pollsters that were not based on need, but by the order: "Not all the results of the public opinion polls are valid, credible, and reliable."¹⁸⁾

Furthermore, many discussions, therefore, were dominated by the question about the independency of pollsters. Accordingly, media observers from the University of Indonesia, Effendi Gazali, invited people not to believe in either pre-election poll or quick-count in the country.¹⁹⁾ There were proponents who perceived that the rules to control the pollsters were imperative to ensure that only reliable pollsters conduct pre-election poll and quick-count. Hence, there was a proposal the KPU was not only to register but also to conduct such an accreditation of pollsters. In addition, according to KPU commissioners, Andi Nurpati,²⁰⁾ the commission required the pollsters to explain to the public how the data had been obtained, how the research methods had been applied, which was the financial funding, and most important, pollsters should also make disclaimer whether they have proximity to political parties or particular candidates. The regulation, therefore, was vital since there were some pollsters that were not reliable.

In addition, as pollsters were truly varied in their reliability, it was possible that the outcome of the polls and the quick-count differed from one another compared to actual results of the election commission. In such cases, if the difference is obvious, the survey results and as well as quick-count move from problem-solver to problem-maker. The losing candidates were most likely to use the results of the polls and quick-count for demanding cancellation of the election or a re-election to the constitutional court. Furthermore, differences in pre-election poll results and a quick-count with the actual results could spark riots and clashes between supporters of competing parties or candidates in the elections. In this sense, controlling the pollsters was in order to prevent the possibly of erroneous results affecting the quality of elections and social order.

NEITHER DIRECT-BANDWAGON NOR UNDERDOG: JUST POLITICAL GAMES

In this section, the paper shows two aspects: First, the concern of direct-bandwagon, which has been used as one *raison d'être* for controlling the polls and the quick-count, is not convincing. In contrast, I argue that the so-called indirect-bandwagon clearly mattered. At the very least, indirect-bandwagon has four aspects, namely the concentration of the flow of finances (usually stand by the businessmen), mass-media coverage, the morale of the campaign team, and the support of political elites. In this paper, I only highlight two aspects to discuss both the businessmen support and the political elites' ones. Second, accusing pollsters produced unreliable outcome seems over-exaggerated. In fact, utilizing "Median Average Deviation" on quick-count, as we will discuss later, the pollsters that participated in national elections mostly were credible.

a. Direct-Bandwagon Effect

There is no single convincing academic evidence indicated that direct-bandwagon mattered. All claims of politicians so far did not bring into account any fundamental and empirical research. According to Saiful Mujani (2004), the Indonesian authoritative researcher on voting behavior, direct-bandwagon was not detected in any Indonesian voting

behavior. Based on empirical data taken from four national surveys conducted by the Indonesian Survey Institute in 2004 legislative elections,²¹⁾ the effect of the announcement of pre-election poll results before the Election Day were not significant to influence the people preference in voting the candidate and the party.

According to Mujani (2004), having analyzed 40 percent who stated they had participated and gave notice on the poll results, and the data cross-checked to their choice of political parties in legislative elections in 5 April 2004. The results showed: paying attention to polls results had no any correlation with voters' choice to political parties in the elections. The study confirmed that the direct-bandwagon effect did not work in the voters' behavior in Indonesia.²²⁾ Furthermore, according to Dodi Ambardi, the executive director of the Indonesian Survey Institute, there has not been any evidence that certain voters choose a party or a candidate just because the party or the candidate had high rank in many pre-election polls.²³⁾ In line with Ambardi, Agung Prihatna (2007), the former research director of Jakarta-based LP3ES, argued the study of LP3ES showed that the most voters had made their decision to choose certain party or candidate at the period of quiet week (*Minggu tenang*, cooling off period) until D-day of election were less than 5 percent in average.²⁴⁾ Indeed, the majority of Indonesian voters had already made a choice even far before the campaign period. Related to the 2009 presidential election, for instance, Indra Piliang, a member of JK-Wiranto campaign team, confirmed that the image of the candidate before the campaign was more powerful than after the campaign.²⁵⁾ Thus, it was clear that there was no any academic verification showed the pre-election poll and the quick count affected to so-called direct-bandwagon.

b. Underdog Effect

From the empirical data of four national surveys conducted by the Indonesian Survey Institute in 2004, the publication of the polling results before the Election Day did not drive the underdog effect. There was some politician assumption that underdog effect might influence the people to vote for the Democratic Party (PD) and the Justice Party (PK). Nonetheless, having cross-checked to voters who paid attention to the polls publication and at the same time vote for Democrat Party (PD) and Justice Party (PK), the study of Mujani (2004) clarified that the direct bandwagon effect was zero. Simply put, according to the study, the factor which influenced to vote for Democratic Party and Justice Party was not the poll publication before the election: it was the level of education of voters. Put another way, although the level of education was correlated with the behavior to pay attention to the polls. However, the education levels were beyond doubt the factor drove people vote for the Democratic Party and the Justice Party in 2004 general election. In short, the underdog effect did not occur in 2004 general election.

c. Indirect-Bandwagon Effect

Instead of direct-bandwagon, I argue a called indirect-bandwagon works in national elections in Indonesia. In the 2009 presidential election, as this section will only focus on, there were three pairs of candidates who ran for the race: Megawati-Probowo Subianto (Megapro), SBY-Boediono, and Jusuf Kalla-Wranto (JK-Win). Many polling by bellwether

pollster showed the pair of SBY-Budiono having the massive lead over their rivals, predicting a first round victory for SBY-Budiono. For instance, the polling conducted a month before the election by Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI), has SBY-Budiono leading Megawati-Probowo Subianto 71% to 16%, with Jusuf Kalla-Wranto bringing the rear at 6%.²⁶⁾ Simply put, the polling result most likely affected an indirect-bandwagon, have an effect on to the support concentration of businessmen's financial flow and the political elite's to the most prospective winner. As we will discuss later, the candidates that had low prospect of victory had been neglected by their businessmen friends and political elites. Accordingly, as we will discuss in next section, the support of elites and businessmen, openly or secretly, shifted to the pair SBY-Boediono.

c.1. Financial Flow

Regarding the concentration of support from businessmen and elites to the most likely winner and left the prospective loser was admitted by both campaign team Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto and several senior politicians of Megawati-Prabowo. They revealed some key aspects as follows:

Team leader of Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto campaign (JK-Win), Mr. Fahmi Idris, found the help of businessmen, the support of political elites, including the support of local heads, in 2009 presidential election to their candidate²⁷⁾ decreased dramatically after polls showed the pair would be defeated. As *Golkar* Party, a premier JK-power based, was the winner and runner up of 2004 and 2009 legislative elections, the JK-Win team obtained only little support financially and politically from businessmen and political elites.²⁸⁾ Although few businessmen were still loyal to Jusuf Kalla,²⁹⁾ many of JK's friends truly moved to the pair SBY-Boediono. Consequently, the JK-Win campaign team has many limitations in implementing the winning strategy.

In addition, Fahmi Idris argued that the low prospect of JK to be the election winner, shown by polls, also lowered *Golkar* party elite support to Jusuf Kalla. The *Golkar* party elite no longer concentrated to JK even many of the *Golkar* party elite explicitly supported the pairs of SBY-Budiono. In the mean time, of one the chairmen of the *Golkar* party, Muladi also pointed out that the polls that showed the victory prospect of SBY-Boediono, had been also a divisive factor which triggered the breaking of an ongoing coalition between *Golkar* Party and the Democratic Party in presidential election: the poll results made the relationship between the two parties becomes downgraded.³⁰⁾

Similarly, the pair of Mega-Prabowo had also a bitter experience related to the decrease of financial and political support. In time the pair of SBY-Boediono predicted to be a winner by polls, many businesses were escaped from Megapro. Senior politicians PDIP, Heri Akhmadi,³¹⁾ acknowledged that businessmen's support to Megapro was dried. Consequently, the campaign team was mostly financially supported by both Megawati and Prabowo themselves, particularly from both the family of them.³²⁾ Support from businessmen only from those who ideologically have a long attachment to Sukarno (Megawati's father).

Regarding financial assistance, there was also one embarrassing situation of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) : the migration support from Mr. Murdaya

Poo from Megawati to Susilo Bambang Yudoyono. Mr. Poo was also a national businessman and the owners of *Berca* Group and formerly a party treasurer moved to be the chairman the PDIP. Previously, Mr. Poo was a staunch supporter of Megawati and one of the financial pillars of the PDIP. Following the 2009 election, Mr. Murdaya Poo was alleged to support the pair of SBY-Boediono. Even, Mr. Poo's wife Hartati Murdaya, a leading Businesswoman, at the mean time had been the important campaign funders of the pair of SBY-Boediono's Democratic Party. Consequently, the PDIP finally fired Mr. Murdaya Poo from his position as both the chairman of the National Party Leaders Assembly of the PDIP and the House of Representatives member.³³⁾

So far, businessmen's financial support, before the era of polls, they usually provided the same financial support to all candidates. The calculations were, whoever the winner would be, they were still beneficial to the businessmen. However, the polls have changed the pattern of businessmen's support to the candidate.³⁴⁾ Since the era of polls, the businessmen support to the candidates mostly refers to the polls outcome. The more the candidates have the prospect to be the winner, the more they gained financial support from the businessmen.

c.2. Political Elites Support

In the 2009 presidential elections, the obvious feature of political elite behavior were the regional heads (governors, regents, and mayors) tended to supports to the potential winner. Regarding the elections, the position of the head region was theoretically neutral. However, the fact demonstrates that indirect-bandwagon shift the neutrality of local leaders. First, many regional heads explicitly or implicitly in the side of the candidate who had the greatest chance of victory show by the polls. One of the obvious pattern was the move of 17 local leaders of the province of West Sumatra (governor, district heads, mayors, and 9 Vice Regents and Mayors) declared to be part of the campaign team of SBY-Boediono.³⁵⁾ Other pattern was local leaders secretly supporting a potential presidential candidate during the campaign. Once the candidate was elected, the local leaders migrated to be the member of the ruling party. Some local heads change their political party-based to from their old ones to the ruling party (Democratic Party).³⁶⁾ This pattern is currently known as "party switching" or (*Bajing Loncat*, footpads).³⁷⁾ The chairman of National Executive Board of the Democratic Party, Achmad Mubarok, confirmed that along with the victory of the pair of Yudhoyono-Boediono, many local heads confirmed to leave their old parties and join the Democratic Party as the ruling party.³⁸⁾

On the other hand, from the JK-Wiranto side, the support of the local elites of *Golkar* Party, who most of them were local leaders, had divided. Some of the *Golkar*'s local leaders preferred to attend the SBY-Boediono campaign rather than those belonged to JK-Wiranto. As Indra Piliang (2009) mentioned, when JK visited local areas in Indonesia, there were only few of *Golkar*'s local leaders willing to pose with the JK-Wiranto, or welcomed JK at the airport. Many of local heads preferred to roll out other activities so that they have reason not to meet with JK. In short, polls had torn the internal support of *Golkar* party to their presidential candidate.

The similar phenomenon was also existed in Mega-Prabowo side. Many PDI-P cadres, mostly local heads, switched their power-based to the Democratic Party (the SBY-Budiono power-based). According to Ganjar Pranowo,³⁹⁾ many PDIP cadres moved to Democratic Party because they wanted to seek political protection. In addition, there was an understanding among local leaders that only the ruling party could provide any political guard. To mention some, the North Sulawesi Governor, Sarundajang, and the mayor of Semarang, Central Java, Sukawi Sutarip are among local heads that move from PDIP to Democratic Party.

The above explanation shows that indirect-bandwagon worked after the publication of polls both to businessmen and local elites or local leaders.

THE CREDIBILITY OF POLLSTERS

Other discussion among politicians to limit pre-election poll and quick-count was the fact that the credibility of the pollsters was alleged less credible. In fact my study highlights the opposite fact: the credibility of majority pollsters which participated in Indonesia's national elections was tremendous. Judging from the performance of the pollsters' outcome in quick-count in 2004 and 2009 legislative elections and 2004 and 2009 presidential election, I argue that the politicians' allege to concern the credibility of pollsters, methodologically speaking, was not true.

Table 4. Absolute Error Average of Quick-count Outcome Compared to Official Results of Elections

Pollsters	2004 General Election ⁴⁰⁾	2009 General Election ⁴¹⁾	2009 Presidential Election ⁴²⁾	Pollsters
LP3ES	0.18	0.16	0.41	LP3ES
		0.08	0.15	Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI)
		-	0.36	Information Research Institute (LRN)
		0.1	0.43	Indonesian Survey Circle
		0.09	0.47	Cirrus Surveyor Indonesia.
		-	1.9	<i>Puskaptis</i>
		0.23		National Survey Institute (LSN)
	24 Parties	38 Parties	3 Pairs	

Source: LSI (2004), and *QC Results of Some Pollsters* (LSI, 2009)

In the field of quick count, the table 4 demonstrated that most national pollsters in Indonesia have been advance in managing the research. Utilizing so called Mean of Absolute Deviation – MAD⁴³⁾, compared to the official outcome from Indonesian election

Commission (*KPU, Komisi Pemilihan Umum*), the Jakarta based pollster, LP3ES, did quick-count in 1999 national election with only 0.18 absolute errors. Further, in the 2004 general election with 24 political parties competed in the election, as shown at table 5, all pollsters did the quick-count very well with 0.08 to 0.023 of MAD. Further, in 2009 legislative election 0.15 MAD of 2009 presidential election. In short, in the context of pollsters' performance, considering the geographical difficulties as well as the large and the heterogeneity of population, pollsters in Indonesia had shown the advance skill in conducting research. Accordingly, blaming the credibility of pollsters is somewhat overstated.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE FREEDOM

This study also found that the effort to over regulate pollsters had raised the fight-back from the pollsters by submitting a judicial review to the constitutional court (MK, *Mahkamah Konstitusi*), led to the strengthening of pollsters' associations (AROPI and PERSEPI), and increased the internal verification amongst pollsters in conducting polls and the quick-count.

a. Judicial Review

The Association of Public Opinion Research (AROPI, *Asosiasi Riset Opini Publik Indonesia*) 9 February 2009 submitted an application for a judicial review of Section 245 of Law Number 10/2008 on General Elections to the Constitutional Court (MK) and the Regulation of the General Elections Commission (KPU) Number 40/2008 for The Supreme Court (MA, *Mahkamah Agung*). The AROPI requested the Courts to cancel the election Law which argued to limit and reduce the constitutional rights of the pollsters. Meanwhile, regarding the provisions of Commission Regulation Number 40/2008 which required pollsters to submit survey methodology, the association argued that it reflected the intervention of political institutions in the academic realm.

As result, in 31 March 2009 the Constitutional Court (MK) allowed pollsters announced the results of a survey in the quiet and quick-count results (quick count) on polling day⁴⁴⁾ as follows:

- a. The Constitutional Court (MK) allowed pre-election poll and quick-count as far as the activities done through the academic method.
- b. Prohibition against the quick-count was not in accordance with the Basic Law (the national Constitution) as it inhibited individual desire to know the quick-count results.
- c. Conducting the quick-count or publishing quick-count results were not the interference to the citizen's constitutional rights. Therefore, the quick-count was able to be conducted and to be announced on the same day of election.
- d. Prohibition quick-count was seen as the criminalization of the constitutional rights of Indonesian citizens.

b. Strengthening Internal institutions

Controlling the pollsters to do pre-election poll and quick-count has raised awareness among pollsters to strengthen their internal credibility by joining the pollsters' association. Many pollsters also recognize the importance of 'codes of conduct' as guidance in conducting legitimate polls and quick count and strengthening internal self-control which become their priority to maintain the credibility of their research.

There are at least three aspects of ethics for pollsters to do poll and quick-count as follow: First, publishing the quick-count and polling results altogether with announcing all research financial sources. Thus, public can judge whether or quick-count results of this survey are trustworthy or not. Second, as all quick-count and polling publication become public properties, then public is entitled to access the entire database. Third, the public also has the right to inspect and examine the research process of the poll and the quick-count.⁴⁵⁾

In regard to strengthening internal institution several polling agencies have joined the associations: the AROPI and the PERSEPI (the Indonesian Association of Public Opinion Survey). However, since AROPI alleged only accommodate those who have close ties with its chairman, Denny JA., some other pollsters eventually joined other associations called the PERSEPI comprised at least 22 pollsters. In addition, there are also the pollsters that are not part of AROPI and PERSEPI. The main jobs of these two associations are support and evaluate their members' research activities, particularly the poll and the quick-count.

CONCLUSION

The politician concerns of so-called the direct bandwagon effect and the credibility of pollsters does not have the basic arguments. This paper shows that the impact of publication of polls and quick-count was to the migration of business and political elite support to the most likely winner candidate (indirect-bandwagon). This paper also accentuates that credibility of the majority pollsters were, methodology speaking, credible. Last but not least, the control of the polls and quick-count have triggered the pollsters' fight-back through judicial reviews to Constitutional Courts, and encouraging pollsters to conduct their internal control by forming and strengthening the pollsters associations.

Notes

- 1) Some parts of this paper had been presented in the 2nd International Conference on Sustainable Future for Human Security 2011, Kyoto University, 8-10 October 2011.
- 2) Up to present, bandwagon-based argument still exists. The chairman of election special committee of Indonesian House of Representative Arif Wibowo stated that direct-bandwagon effect is the main concerns of the law-maker. See, *Pikiran Rakyat Daily*, *Hasil Survei Pengaruhi Perilaku Politik: Pansus Membahas Keberadaan Lembaga Survei* (The survey result influences voting behavior: special committee reviews the existence of pollsters), 20 October 2011.
- 3) *Kompas Daily*, 21 November 2007.
- 4) Interview with M. Husain, the former research director of LP3ES, Jakarta 25 May 2010.
- 5) In the 1999 elections, at least, there were five pollsters conducting surveys of voting

behavior, namely the Resource Productivity Center (RPC), the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), LP3ES, R&D of *Kompas* Daily, and *Political Laboratory of the University of Indonesia (Komite Pemberdayaan Politik -Lab Politik UI)*. Most of them detected the victory of PDIP in the 1999 legislative election.

- 6) Interview with Dodi Ambardi, Jakarta, 10 August 2010.
- 7) There were new players such as the Center for Islamic Studies and Society (PPIM, *Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat*), Indonesia Survey Institute (LSI), *Soegeng Sarjadi* Syndicated (SSS), and *Danareksa* Research Institute (DRI). There appeared also polls conducted by the mass media such as polls by SMS (short message system) of the SCTV (*Surya Citra Televisi*), and tele-poll of MARS Indonesia.
- 8) There are many pollsters conducting poll, but less of them participate in pre-election polls. According to Crespi (1946) the real reason is that the pollster doesn't want the poll to be compared to the election. We will find that the pollsters which methodology speaking is weaker suddenly turn out to be silent in the days approaching the elections. By stopping few weeks in advance, pollsters can claim that the poll was accurate as of the time it was taken, no matter how the election turns out.
- 9) Interview with Bestian Nainggolan, Jakarta, 31 August 2009.
- 10) See for example, the politicians dialogue at MetroTV, title; *Survei LSI dinilai menyesatkan* (LSI survey is reviewed misleading), Election Channel, 5 June 2009. See also, Television dialogues, *Survey Politik Pendongkrak Popularitas* (Political Survey Increase Popularity), Program title: *Genta Demokrasi*, 3 December 2008, available at: <http://www.metrotvnews.com/genta_demokrasi/topics.php?id=2174&idp=176> (visited in 10 December 2008).
- 11) Interview with Taufiqul Hadi, Vice General Secretary of Central Executive Board of United Development Party (PPP, *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*), Jakarta, 9 August 2009.
- 12) See Wiranto, *Ini omong kosong, pelecehan, manipulasi yang luar biasa*. (This is bullshit, harassment, and a great manipulation!), *inilah.com*, Jakarta 20 April 2009, available at: <<http://m.inilah.com/read/detail/100326/wiranto-merasa-dilecehkan-lsi>> (visited in 15 December 2009).
- 13) See *Suara Merdeka* daily, "Prabowo: Poll Affects Public Perception, July 29, 2009.
- 14) See *Koran Tempo*, *Bukan Semata Registrasi Lembaga Survey* (It is not merely about pollster registration), 13 January 2009.
- 15) Interview Ganjar Pranowo, Jakarta, 25 August 2010.
- 16) *Kompas* Daily, *KPU Imbau Lembaga Survey Cantumkan Sumber Dana* (Commission urges Pollsters expose Funding Source List), 22 December 2009.
- 17) On-site interview with law-maker from Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*) who asked not to be mentioned, 15 February 2011.
- 18) See *Koran Tempo*, November 2, 2008.
- 19) *Effendi Gazali*, *Quick Count Dibayari Munculkan MURI (Musibah Republik Indonesia)* (Quick Count paid, Come up the MURI (Disaster of Republic of Indonesia), 7 June 2009, available at: <<http://us.detiknews.com/read/2009/07/07/163651/1160773/700/quick-count-dibayari-munculkan-muri>> (visited 20 October 2011).
- 20) See *Koran Tempo*, *Bukan Semata Registrasi Lembaga Survey* (It is not Merely about Pollster Registration), January 13, 2009.
- 21) The top ten winner of 2004 legislative election were as follows: Golkar Party, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, the National Awakening Party, the United Development Party, Democratic Party, the Prosperous Justice Party, the National Mandate Party, the Crescent

- Star Party, the Reform Star Party and the Prosperous Peace Party.
- 22) See Saiful Mujani, *Survei dan Perilaku Pemilih* (Survey and Voting Behavior), available at: <<http://www.lsi.or.id/riset/43/survei-dan-perilaku-pemilih>> (visited, 20 October 2011). See also Interview with Saiful Mujani by Wimar Witoelar in talk show title: *Perspektif*, 19 June 2009, available at: <http://perspektif.net/english/article.php?article_id=1097> (visited in 20 October 2011) ; see also Saiful Mudjani, *Survei dan Perilaku Pemilih*, Kompas 14 June 2004.
 - 23) Interview Dodi Ambardi, Jakarta, Dodi Ambardi, Jakarta, 10 August 2010.
 - 24) See Agung Prihatna, *Pembatasan Publikasi Survei Opini Publik dan Quick Count* (Limitation Announcement of Survey and quick-count)", *Kompas Daily*, 17 December 2007, available at: <<http://www.kompas.co.id/kompas-cetak/0712/17/opini/4084497.htm>> (visited 16 October 2009).
 - 25) Indra J. Piliang, JK-Wiranto Defeat: A Preliminary Explanation "*Kekalahan JK-Wiranto: Sebuah Penjelasan Awal*", (Forum-Pembaca-KOMPAS, 15 July 2009).
 - 26) National poll, conducted from 15-21 May 2009, multistage random sampling, face-to-face interview, and 1.230 respondents in 33 provinces.
 - 27) In the 2009 presidential election, there were 3 couples run for the election, namely: Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto of the Golkar Party (*PG, Partai Golkar*) and People's Conscience Party (*Hanura, Hati Nurani Rakyat*), Megawati-Prabowo of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP, *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*) and Great Indonesia Movement Party (*Gerindra, Gerakan Indonesia Raya*), and the pair Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Boediono from Democrat party (PD, *Partai Demokrat*).
 - 28) Kompas daily, *Ini Penyebab "Gembosnya" JK-Wiranto* (This causes of JK-Wiranto's collapse, 10 July 2009, available at: <<http://nasional.kompas.com/read/xml/2009/07/09/1458320/ini.penyebab.gembosnya.jk-wiranto>> (visited 10 July 2009).
 - 29) One of them is Jusuf Wanandi. Although previously Wanandi has already known that JK would lose, Wanandi continue to support the presidential election.
 - 30) In the 2009 presidential election, there were 3 couples run for the election, namely: Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto of the Golkar Party (*PG, Partai Golkar*) and People's Conscience Party (*Hanura, Hati Nurani Rakyat*), Megawati-Prabowo of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP, *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*) and Great Indonesia Movement Party (*Gerindra, Gerakan Indonesia Raya*), and the pair Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Boediono from Democrat party (PD, *Partai Demokrat*).
 - 31) Interview with Heri Akhmadi, senior politician Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, Jakarta, 31 May 2010.
 - 32) Hashim Djojohadikusumo is the younger brother of Prabowo Subianto and he is one of the main supporter of pair Megawati-Prabowo. He is among Indonesia's 40 Richest. available at: <http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/80/indonesia-billionaires-10_Hashim-Djojohadikusumo_3HVQ.html> (visited in 15 December 2010). See also, Taufik Kiemas, husband of Megawati, is identified as the third riches member of national legislator. See further, Elizabeth Fuller Collins, *Indonesia Betrayed: How Development Fails*, (2007), University of Hawaii Press, p.153.
 - 33) The formal reasons of the decision to dismiss Murdaya Poo from PDIP Party due to Mr. Poo accused violated the party discipline, Tjahyo Kumolo, "*Nggak Rugi Pecat Murdaya Poo*" (No Loss to Fire Murdaya Poo), 4 December 2009, see <http://www.pdiperjuangan-jatim.org/v03/index.php?mod=berita&id=2991> (visited 16 January 2010).
 - 34) Interview with a national businessman of Indonesian Businessmen Association (APINDO,

- Asosiasi Pebisnis Indonesia*), who asked his name not to be mentioned, Jakarta, 28 August 2009. Further, he said that "the giant businessman in Jakarta had been long queue to provide financial support to candidates, SBY-Budiono, who have the best chance to win."
- 35) Governor and local leaders migrated to be the member of SBY-Budiono campaign team. It stated in official letter (*SK, Surat Keputusan*) of SBY-Budiono Campaign team, number 03/SK/TIMKAMNAS.SBY-BUDIONO/V/2009 on 31 May 2009, available at: <http://us.metro.vivanews.com/news/read/65583-17_kepala_daerah_sumatera_barat_dikecam> (visited in 12 January 2011).
 - 36) The following are among local leader who migrated to Democratic Party after SBY-Budiono are elected as the presidential election winner: Sukarwo (Governor of east Java), Dede Yusuf (Vice Governor of West Jawa), Zainul Majadi (Governor West Nusa Tenggara), Ilham Arif Sirajuddin (Makassar Mayor), Fauzi Bowo (Jakarta Governor), Agusrin Najamuddin (Bengkulu Governor), Djufri (Bukit Tinggi Mayor), Satono (East Lampung regent), and A. Palino Popang (Tana Toraja vice Regent). See Kompas 31 May 2011.
 - 37) The term footpads surfaced when PDIP's chairperson Megawati Sukarnoputri's deliver her speech in Central Java and East Java, Media Indonesia, 11 Apr 2011.
 - 38) Interview Ahmad Mubarak, Jakarta, 14 June 2010.
 - 39) Interview with Ganjar Pranowo, Jakarta, 25 May 2010.
 - 40) Political opinion polling and Election in Indonesia, the Performance of Pollsters in Forecasting Elections in Indonesia 1999 and 2004 (*Jajak Pendapat dan Pemilu di Indonesia, Kinerja Lembaga Jajak Pendapat dalam Meramal Hasil Pemilu 1999 dan 2004*), Indonesia Survey Institute, Jakarta, 23 May 2004.p.81-86
 - 41) Ibid. p.81-86
 - 42) Author Personal Note, Jakarta, 1 September 2009, and some of data of quick-count 2009 presidential election belong to Indonesian Survey Institute, *Hasil QC beberapa Lembaga* (QC Results of Some Pollsters), LSI Workshop, Jakarta, 29 August 2009.
 - 43) In statistics, the median absolute deviation (MAD) is a robust measure of the variability of a univariate sample of quantitative data. It can also refer to the population parameter that is estimated by the MAD calculated from a sample.
 - 44) See *Suara Karya* Daily, *Maruarar Siahaan: MK Kabulkan Sebagian Permohonan AROPI* (Maruarar Siahaan: The Court granted Most Petition AROPI), 31 March 2009.
 - 45) Agung Prihatna, *Law draft: limitation Poll and Quick Count Publication (RUU: Pembatasan Publikasi Survei Opini Publik dan Quick Count)*, 17 December 2007, available at: <<http://www.kompas.co.id/kompas-cetak/0712/17/opini/4084497.htm>> (visited in 15 August 2009).

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(AGUS, Trihartono, Doctoral Program in International Relations,
Graduate School of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University)

現代のインドネシアにおける選挙前投票調査と クイック・カウントの法的規制に関する研究

本稿ではインドネシアにおいて、選挙前投票調査とクイック・カウントが法的に規制されている本源的理由を考察する。インドネシア共和国総選挙法（2008年法律第10号，2008年法律第42号）と選挙管理委員会規定は、選挙前投票調査とクイック・カウントを以下の理由で規制している。すなわち、①ダイレクト・バンドワゴン効果を防ぐため、②選挙前投票調査とクイック・カウントの異なる結果によって誘発される地域住民の破壊活動を防ぐため、③選挙の複雑化を最小限にとどめるためである。しかし、2009年から2011年にかけて著者が実施したインドネシアでの現地調査にて、選挙前投票調査とクイック・カウントが規制されている別の大きな理由が浮き彫りになった。それは、選挙前投票調査とクイック・カウントの結果が示す当選見込み候補者に政治エリートや企業経営者、マスメディアなどの支持が集中するのを防ぐため、というものである。さらに選挙前投票調査とクイック・カウントの双方の投票予測と実際の投票結果とを比較した結果、前者と後者の予想値には大きな隔たりがないことも明らかになった。よって、法的規制に関するこれまでの議論は経験的に支持されておらず、本質的なものではないのである。

（アグス トリハルトノ，立命館大学大学院国際関係研究科博士後期課程）