Article

The Interpretation of Individualisation in Non-Western Theory

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The idea that individualisation is a remarkable aspect of social modernisation stands in the centre of the present paper. Individualisation, often identified as a hallmark of Western[1] culture, has been discussed in various aspects since the nineteenth century in relation to subjects such as political institutions, economic conditions, community formation and family relations, thus having both remarkable socioeconomic and politico-cultural impacts. Yet, due to the existence of various manifestations and interpretations of individualisation in different social conditions, there is no sufficient academic understanding of its general characteristic features and processes on a global scale. Western studies from the nineteenth century laid the foundation of various powerful (universalist) theories to explain individualisation, but their implications within non-Western conditions have often raised doubts about their accuracy. However, the voices of researchers in non-Western societies are not (always) equivocally heard. This study is a small contribution to filling this gap by introducing and discussing two theories on individualisation in non-Western contexts. Despite their emergence in different social conditions, both are helpful for understanding the complexity of individualisation in a more global context.

1. Need for a common academic understanding in a global perspective

In the midst of globalisation, there is a growing need to develop a common understanding about academic terms and approaches from a global perspective. Due to diverse social conditions, academic terms can obtain various local (national)[2] understandings regarding both their conceptual and associative meanings. Comparative studies on the meaning and usage of academic terms from a global perspective can not only decrease miscommunication in international debates, but also throw light upon the different paths of modernisation around the world. Cross-national conceptual typologies can greatly contribute to the creation of a common global academic understanding. For instance, the term *famili(ali)sm*[3] that is often investigated in contrast to individualisation shows a great complexity in its usage and conceptualisation worldwide. Adela Garzón Pérez, who has created the most elaborate typology of the term *famili(ali)sm* thus far (2003), suggests that this term is generally used as both a theoretical and empirical concept in academic works. Pérez discusses this term in relation to three academic fields: political science, sociology and psychology. In doing so, she distinguishes three types of conceptualisation. The first type refers to the

subordination of individual interests to the interests of the family as a group, whereas the second type pertains to the use of the family by the family members as a resource for their personal happiness. In contrast, in the third type familism is viewed as a certain obstacle to the development of civil society. It can be said that whereas the first two types refer to a so-called internal aspect,[4] the latter pertains to a certain external aspect of famili(ali)sm.[5] Csaba Dupcsik and Olga Tóth (2008), linking to Pérez's typology, distinguish two basic types of this term. In the first type, familism is understood as a cultural ideology, whereas in the second familism is rather considered to be a result of particular social conditions, such as a lack of interpersonal (and/or institutional) trust. Similarly to Pérez's typology, it can be said that the first type refers to a so-called internal aspect, whereas the latter pertains to a certain external aspect. Both Pérez's typology and the typology given by Dupcsik and Tóth tell us something important about the characteristic features of the term *famili(ali)sm*. Nonetheless, an even bigger complexity regarding the conceptualisation of *famili(ali)sm* can be seen when taking a closer look at the usage of this term by investigating non-Western academic studies.[6] In light of the usage of the term *famili(ali)sm* in East Asian studies, it can be suggested that the conceptualisation of this term can be approached not only from the perspective of an *internal/external aspect*, but also from that of a *synchronic/diachronic aspect*. The diachronic aspect refers to when the current conditions of *famili(ali)sm* are conceptualised in reference to past conditions, like in the case of East Asian academic writings, whereas a synchronic perspective can be revealed when there is no comparison to past conditions, but rather to conditions in other societies in a synchronic dimension instead. Besides this, there is always an implicit or explicit value attached to the conceptualisation of *famili(ali)sm* that can take three basic forms: 'fully accepting', 'partially accepting' or 'fully rejecting'. These three basic forms seem to stand in a strong correlation to one's personal view of *individualisation* and *individualism*. In societies, where the academic milieu sees an obstacle in *famili(ali)sm* to the promotion or the development of autonomous individuals on behalf of a strong civil society, the conceptualisation of *famili(ali)sm* is often accompanied by a negative tone or value. In contrast, when there is a great emphasis on *famili(ali)sm* in terms of cultural character and national identity in an academic milieu, a more or less positive value attached to the conceptualisation of *famili(ali)sm* can be recognised, as in the case of certain Chinese and Taiwanese academic writings. Here, individualism is often seen as 'being egoistic', 'being against the family', or 'being Western', which is thought to threaten cultural identity in various ways.[7]

2. Interpretation of individualisation from a Western perspective

According to classical modernisation theories, societies that undergo a socioeconomic transformation from traditional to modern produce a remarkable shift from the conditions of a *status* society to that of a society where unprecedented social relations emerge, and where individual autonomy prevails. Individualisation was understood as a process during which people's position in society was no longer decided by fixed social relations (and fixed family relations), but by individual achievements, such as academic record, instead. Liberated from the predetermination of social status by birth that had been difficult to

change from below by the individual, individualisation was thought to produce autonomous individuals that could practice their newly gained *freedom* in the slowly forming civil society. In this interpretation of individualisation, strict family bonds and roles oppressing individuality stand against the autonomy of the individual.[8] On the other hand, although modernisation in this respect appears as a positive process for the individuals, this was not necessarily experienced by people as a simple process, but rather as a process where they were forced to orient themselves outside the traditional framework of family organisations and within a new modern society that produced more and more complex institutions. Individualisation was rather imposed upon people from above – by external factors such as rapid industrialisation, urbanisation and social differentiation, and thus this was more like forced individualisation from above that resulted in *institutionalised individualism* (Talcott Parsons).[9] In this process people not only had to find their bearings, but also had to create social relations outside the family that could function as a formidable defence against the abuse of the rapidly changing economy and bureaucracy.

The above interpretation of individualisation emerged from North American and Northwestern European conditions, but it was also extended to other regions and was employed as a kind of universalist description. However, modernisation proved to be a rather complex process not only in non-Western societies, but also in North America and Northwestern Europe. The process of modernisation is now considered to include two general historical stages (first and second), and this raises the academic question of what is the basic social unit within these two succeeding historical stages. In the case of industrial societies (during the first stage of modernity) it is considered to be the *family*,[10] whereas in the case of post-industrial societies (the second stage of modernity) it is rather considered to be the *individual*.[11] In the two historical stages the relationship between family and individualisation also varies. In the first stage of modernity, family went through profound changes such as the trend toward nuclear families, a decreasing number of children (two children per mother), the appearance of child-centric values, housewifisation (at least in countries that experienced capitalist modernisation), and an increased consciousness of privacy. On the other hand, whereas there was an obvious shift to stressing individual achievements in general, family formation became relatively rigid, giving preference to only one family form – at least in an ideal sense. This led to the reconstruction of fixed family roles, especially regarding marital relations, with the husband as breadwinner and the wife as housewife. This type of family was considered the basic social unit during the first stage of modernity, where individual autonomy within the family was considered less important. It can be said that whereas individualisation was ongoing in other sectors of the society where people needed to make individual decisions, an almost opposite trend took place within the family. In the second stage of modernity, however, that started in the 1970s in Western countries due to significant institutional reforms and change in the value system, the proportion of this type of family started to decrease, while family forms different from this started to increase. A reconstruction of the basic social unit was on the way through a remarkable shift from the preference for a fixed ideal family form to the recognition of various (family) lifestyles as being equal. The current pluralisation of lifestyles, however, not only involves the equalisation of various family lifestyles, but the number of people postponing or rejecting

family formation is also on the increase. The relationship of family and individualisation differs in the two cases. In the first case, family formation and individualisation do not exclude each other, but to the contrary they enrich each other, since individualisation here does not reject family formation per se, rather it refers to the pluralisation of the family corresponding to individual needs. In the second case, however, individualisation is accompanied by a categorical denial of family formation, thus the two stand in a somewhat antagonistic relationship.[12]

With the advent of post-industrial societies, individualisation from the 1970s on gradually gained a new – extended – interpretation that is often described by concepts such as self-reflexivity and the risk society (Ulrich Beck), liquid modernity (Zygmunt Bauman), post-materialism (Ronald Inglehart), multi-optional society (Peter Gross), or pure relationship and principle of autonomy (Anthony Giddens). For instance, Inglehart argues that there was a general shift from material to post-material values in terms of favouring values related to self-realisation, whereas Gross points to the formation of multi-optional societies in which individuals can design their own (private) lives according to their own will, or sometimes by compulsion. In contrast, Bauman argues that the current form of modernity is being characterised by a much less predictable future in terms of the stability of institutions, and thus people will need to face the need of stronger self-responsibility than before. Giddens goes even further with the description of individualisation by attaching the concept *democratisation* to it. Giddens, by coining concepts such as the 'pure relationship', by which he means (full) sexual and emotional equality, and the 'principle of autonomy', by which he means the individual's right to decide his or her lifestyle as long as it does not harm that of other people, emphasises the democratisation of individual choice regarding one's lifestyle both at the micro and macro-level through supporting institutions. Ulrich Beck has recourse to the concept of *do-it-yourself biography*, and argues that the pluralisation of lifestyles will go so far that no mainstream will be detectable in the future. According to Beck, life events such as studying, working, getting married or having children will lose their mainstream sequential flow. For instance, one may first work and then decide to go on tertiary education, while also having a child (or children) without being married. Although this prediction has not become reality, the concept of *do-it-yourself biography* provides an interesting addition to the conceptualisation of individualisation. Western scholars in recent years commonly argue about a certain pluralisation of individual lifestyles, though there are differences among them in seeing this phenomenon as a result of individualisation imposed on the individuals from above by compulsion, and thus sometimes rather as a negative phenomenon, or seeing it as a (rather) positive phenomenon that gives more equality among people.

3. Two theories on individualisation in non-Western contexts

Both classical modernisation theories and other powerful theories (like those discussed above) significantly influenced the formation of social theories in other regions of the world. Yet, this has not led to a common academic understanding concerning modernisation from a global perspective, but rather to the emergence of interesting empirical and theoretical critiques of Western theories, which need to be studied and understood. In light of this

academic challenge, two theories regarding individualisation in non-Western societies – *empty individualisation* and *individualisation without individualism* – are discussed in this study. The two theories were articulated in societies within different politico-economic contexts and also discuss individualisation from different angles. Yet, the two theories – as their titles suggest – also refer to similar social conditions contrasting with individualisation described in Western modernisation theories.

3-1. Empty (or negative) individualisation – the case of Hungary

The theory of empty (or negative) individualisation – coined by Elemér Hankiss, a Hungarian social philosopher – emerged in the early 1980s in socialist Hungary. Hankiss employed the Weberian interpretation of modernisation and applied it to the conditions of socialist modernisation in Hungary. He argued that socialist modernisation was not able to produce an ethos of its own, unlike capitalist modernisation in Western countries, but to the contrary, there was a lack of social cohesion in terms of values, and that the society became atomised by individuals who felt rather alienated within it. Hungarian society became individualised in an empty or negative sense.[13] Although of interest, the phenomena described in this theory are very complex that need a careful discussion.

3-1-1. Socialist modernisation in light of cross-national comparative studies

The theory of empty individualisation was constructed on the basis of a comparative survey study between Hungary and the United States that aimed to find the characteristic features of the path of modernisation in socialist Hungary.[14] The survey measured thirty-six traditional and modern values in the two countries.[15] The survey results suggested that Hungary was undergoing an ambiguous modernisation at the time. In certain aspects, Hungary seemed to be more *modernised*, whereas in other aspects rather *traditional*, compared to the United States. The survey results also showed a great disparity within Hungarian society – greater than that within the United States. Firstly, perhaps not so surprisingly, young people, those with high educational records, and those with high income tended to show rather modern values, not just within Hungarian society, but also in comparison to the United States. In contrast, those who belonged to the poorest social strata in Hungary tended to have (even) more traditional values than people in the same social strata in the United States. Likewise, regarding gender differences, Hungary showed a greater disparity between the two sexes than the United States. Interestingly, however, whereas Hungarian males showed more modern values on the whole than Hungarian females, the latter stood closer to the population of the United States in general. Similarly, the difference between those living in cities and those living in small towns and villages also tended to show a huge gap in Hungary.[16] The obviously larger social disparity in Hungary suggested a much weaker level of social integrity. This did not favour the interests of the Communist regime at the time that stressed equal social relations and social integration in order to present the greatness of socialism.[17]

Hankiss argued that despite the first implications of the survey results it could not be stated that Hungary was more modernised than the United States. The investigated aspects of modernisation showed great differences between the two countries. After Weber, three

main aspects – secularisation, rationalisation and individualisation – were addressed in this survey. In the case of secularisation, it became obvious that the Hungarian society showed a greater degree of secularisation in comparison to the United States, where Christian values prevailed.[18] In the case of rationalisation, however, the survey results seemed to be rather ambiguous due to two different interpretations or aspects of rationalisation. One refers to rationalisation in an economic sense, or pragmatism in other words, whereas the other pertains to values related to *intellectual*, *logical* and *secular* thoughts that are – according to Hankiss – not entirely separable from the process of secularisation per se. In the first interpretation of rationalisation (pragmatism), the United States obviously showed a more modernised group of values (such as being *efficient*, *ambitious*, *independent*, *responsible*) than Hungary. On the other hand, when it came to the other aspect of rationalisation, people in Hungary presented an obviously more modernised set of values. This difference in the second aspect of rationalisation appeared to be the biggest difference between the two societies.[19] In the case of individualisation,[20] however, people in the United States obviously showed a more modernised scale of values. Whereas a highly concentrated group of values could be identified in relation to *personality* in the United States – such as *internal harmony*, *wisdom*, *dignity*, *self-discipline*, *responsibility* and *freedom*, no similar concentrated group of values could be recognised in the case of Hungary where values related to personality appeared in a rather loosely scattered form. Hankiss suggested that whereas values related to pragmatism and personality (individuality) appeared as the obvious signs of modernisation in the United States, it is rather values related to intellectual thoughts, as well as to expected roles in the public life that seemed to serve as the engine of modernisation in Hungary.[21]

3-1-2. Interpretation of socialist modernisation

Hankiss described the process of individualisation in Hungary as empty or negative, because it is reflex-like and unconscious, and because it does not have any guiding philosophy, or its own view of history, ideology and ethics. It was more like a spontaneous automatic response to Hungary's post-war socioeconomic transformation.[22] According to Hankiss, the great disparity of values in Hungary was partially the result of extremely rapid social change forced from above by the Communist regime in post-war times, but the empty or negative individualisation on the whole was the result of a longer historical process. Whereas the United States had a couple of centuries to promote individualisation through various forms of social practice and debate, there had been no tradition of individualism in Hungary.[23] With the advent of socialism after World War Two, the lingering process of individualisation in a Weberian sense became even more difficult. In socialist Hungary, the regime first practiced totalitarianism in which it aimed to control both the political and economic sectors, civil society and the private sphere. It stressed the importance of collectivity over individuality as an ideal, but reality was different. Whereas the Communist regime was anxious to destroy pre-war communities stigmatised as being against socialist ideology, it did not provide people with new communities that could have replaced their pre-war communities successfully. The regime carried out a systemic atomisation of the society.[24] The taking of private companies into public ownership and the forced collectivisation of

agricultural lands deprived people of the possibility to promote the formation of conscious economic individualism – at least during the 1950s. From the 1960s, the Communist regime had a shift from totalitarianism to authoritarianism,[25] and state control weakened gradually, first within the private sphere. The regime understood that economic stability could not be maintained without the involvement of the people, and thus it gave way to consumerism first, and then at the end of the 1970s – though more tacitly than willingly – also gave way to the emergence of a so-called second economy based on market economic principles.[26] This, however, did not help the establishment of new communities, but led to a further atomisation of the society instead. Individual accumulation of capital became the greatest goal for most members of the society, and though this was often done within the family, this alone could not serve as a new guiding principle in a social sense.[27] There was no other force or arranging principles that could have counter-balanced the appearance of this so-called *wild* individualisation. However, Hankiss stressed that the process of individualisation in the United Kingdom and Holland was not devoid of a similar empty or wild individualisation either, since unlike the bourgeoisie, other social strata suffered a lot from the early stage of capitalisation. It was only from the early nineteenth century that social participation in these countries started to involve more and more people.[28]

Based on this historical precedent above, Hankiss raised the question whether an early stage of wild individualisation was an unavoidable part of individualisation on the long run, and if so, whether Hungary had the chance to see a regeneration process later, just like in Western countries. In answering this question, Hankiss seemed to be pessimistic by referring to Immanuel Wallerstein's world systems theory, pointing to that the process of individualisation in Hungary was not simply lingering, but also taking place within different historical and socioeconomic conditions. Hankiss distinguished a Western European (or Weberian) modernisation that was based on (enterprising) individual rationalism and an Eastern European modernisation that was based on the centralised, planned rationalism of the state.[29] In other words, it can be said that the former was thought to come from below, whereas the latter was described as coming from above.[30] From the 1960s and 1970s, however, the two types of modernisation became entangled with the regime's opening to consumerism and its tacit approval of (partial) individual accumulation of capital. It is also important to note that in Hankiss' interpretation, individualisation in a Weberian sense is not against community formation, but to the contrary, is an essential part of it.[31]

3-1-3. The emergence of a double society in socialist Hungary

In relation to the theory of empty individualisation it must be noted that Hankiss in another work (1989) talks about the formation of a double society in socialist Hungary that paradoxically helped the development of a kind of reflexivity not seen in Western countries. Hankiss argues that the so-called *first* society refers to the conditions of a society that was manifested on the surface, and therefore it was visible. This first society was characterised by atomised individuals, vertical social relations instead of horizontal community relations, a lack of freedom of speech, the centralisation of power by the Communist government, the predominance of Communist ideologies as well as political interests. Under the surface, however, a so-called *second* society was gradually appearing through the formation of latent micro-level

social relations, the regeneration of local communities, the emergence of subcultures differ-ent from the mainstream Communist ideology and a certain (latent) public sphere that was critical towards the Communist regime. On the other hand, Hankiss emphasised that the two societies could not make a perfectly contrasting pair due to the regime's oppressive policy making versus the formation of a free civil society. Yet, according to Hankiss, due to the then present political oppression, people in socialist Hungary managed to develop a stronger reflexivity than people in Western societies. This relative and latent autonomy of the second society became possible due to the fact that Hungary changed from a totalitarian society in the 1950s to a so-called authoritarian society from the 1960s. In the 1950s, Hungary was a totalitarian society because the Communist regime as the only political actor attempted to control every segment of the society including the economic sphere by intro-ducing a planned economic system, civil society and even the private sphere centred on the family. This totalitarian control of the state started to decrease from the 1960s, and it was gradually changing into an authoritarian state that gave the people a certain degree of freedom in return for their tacit approval of the Communist regime as the only supreme leader of the country. In the 1960s, it gave more autonomy to the private sphere (family relations) and also to the development of so-called market gardens besides the already ex-isting socialist farmer's co-operatives. In the late 1970s, the Communist regime tacitly ap-proved the appearance of a so-called second economy that was based on capitalist principles, and that eventually made up about twenty percent of the total national economy before the collapse of the Communist regime in 1989. State control over civil society, however, de-creased much more slowly than in the case of the economic and private spheres, though the civil society in the 1980s was obviously stronger than in the previous decades. Nonetheless, the changing state control over the economic sphere, the civil society and the private sphere suggests a dynamic relationship – instead of a static relationship – between the political sphere, economic sphere, the civil society and the private sphere.[32]

3-1-4. The applicablility of the theory of empty individualisation to post-socialist Hungary

Hankiss' empty individualisation theory was articulated during socialist times, and it be-came the most systemised theory of socialist modernisation in Hungary. Though there were various theoretical debates on the conditions of socialist modernisation in different academic fields, Hankiss' theory can be considered the most complete theory, at least from a sociolog-ical point of view. Interestingly however, Hankiss, who actually wrote several sociological critiques about the post-socialist social conditions from the 1990s, did not employ his theory to the newly forming social conditions after the collapse of socialism in 1989. This is very astonishing because the problems he describes in his theory based on the social conditions during the socialist times – such as the weakness of community and value formation – fur-ther worsened from the 1990s. This may sound contradictory to what could have been ex-pected after the political change: a great improvement of the previous social conditions, along with a reverse process of the so-called negative individualisation towards a rather positive individualisation. This was considered possible at the time of the political change because the previous controlling, paternal, role of the state ceased after 1989, and this gave way to the formation of various grassroots communities and associations that started to

increase rapidly from the early 1990s. Whereas there were 8,796 registered non-profit organisations in 1989, the number increased to 63,894 in the next twenty-five years (2014).[33] Many of these associations are related to education, social services, cultural activities, health care, community development, religion or sport. This quantitative increase in non-profit associations suggests that Hungary's post-socialist transformation has been successful, and that this has promoted the development of autonomous – and not atomised – individuals with a strong ability to realise their interests through group formation from below. In reality, however, many of these registered associations are not functioning at all, whereas others are not completely free from political influence from above, as in the case of urban development.[34] This latter group of associations may discourage people from joining grassroots associations, and this condemns them to stay at home instead, preventing the development of autonomous individuals with strong social networks. By taking a look at statistical data on trust, negative social progress can be observed indeed.[35] First of all, only 28.7% of respondents replied positively to the survey question regarding "most people can be trusted" in 2009, which is even lower than the proportion of respondents giving a positive answer (31.9%) during the socialist era (1982). Likewise, trust in the state, the press, education system, social service system, social insurance system, justice system, major companies or labour unions is generally much weaker in post-socialist Hungary than it was during socialist times.[36] The abolition of the one-party system and the great decrease in paternal state control over the population has not promoted the development of better social conditions favouring positive individualisation. Thus it can be concluded that Hankiss' theory about Hungary's empty individualisation might be even more valid today than at the time this theory was first articulated.[37]

3-2. Individualisation without individualism

The concept of *individualisation without individualism* emerged in a socioeconomic context different from that of the theory of *empty individualisation*. It became the essential concept of a remarkable social theory called the theory of compressed modernity (or modernisation) coined by Chang Kyung-Sup (a prominent South Korean sociologist) that describes the path of capitalist modernisation in the East Asian context. The theory of compressed modernity was originally based on South Korea's recent socioeconomic conditions, but it was later extended to the conditions of Japan and Taiwan too. Compressed modernity is defined as a particular social condition where both social and cultural change, as well as political and economic transformations take place at a very high speed, producing both quantitative and qualitative changes over time and space. Firstly, according to this theory, the speed of change is so huge that there is no time for various distinct historical periods to follow each other smoothly, but instead the characteristic features of distinct historical periods – such as pre-modern conditions, as well as first and second modern conditions – become confluent. Secondly, from a spatial perspective, indigenous conditions get tangled up with foreign elements and form a sort of blended material – not in a harmonious way, but rather in an antagonistic relationship.[38]

3-2-1. Precarious social conditions in contemporary South Korea

Chang Kyung-Sup positions South Korea's current social conditions into a wider context that refers to a general functional decline of previously stable-looking institutions including the representatives of the political and economic sectors such as the state, political parties, industrial enterprises, the welfare system, education, as well as the functional decline of the family and civil society. Chang argues that South Korea entered the phase of second modernity in a highly compressed way, and that this rapid social change was further destabilised by the East Asian economic crisis of 1997. This promoted the process of neoliberalisation in particular. According to Chang, liberalisation, or in other words flexibilisation, of the labour market induced the increase in irregular employment, whereas the financialisation of the labour market through global capital brought about gradually increasing debts of the state and family households. The general decline of predictable and reliable institutions accompanied by a serious change in demographic conditions increased the necessity of self-reliance for South Korean families and individuals. Although the state stresses the importance of *family*, it does so in order to reduce its own expenses, by emphasising Confucian familial values as a 'beautiful' custom of the past. Nonetheless, although South Korean families can barely rely on the state, many people feel safer working as a public employee than working for an economic enterprise. This is also because it gradually became more difficult to achieve regular employment, and the current social security system mainly covers those who work in full-time regular positions. Public education is also considered less reliable due to an increasing gap between the achieved school diploma and the obtained job after graduation. Nonetheless, whereas families are more and more expected to function as a sort of social safety net and also as a sort of rescue institution, their burden is so increased that family members eventually become a source of risk to each other. For instance, parents being unemployed or underemployed are less capable of providing safety in a material sense, whereas their knowledge and values also become more and more old-fashioned in a rapidly informatising world, thus they can serve less as a firm base for their children. Moreover, children can less and less provide both emotional and instrumental support for their parents in their old age. As a consequence, there is an increasing separation among family members in terms of the physical, material and/or emotional senses, and this promotes the trend of a so-called risk-aversive individualisation.[39]

3-2-2. Individualisation and compressed modernity

The highly condensed characteristic feature of compressed modernity brings about serious social constraints in contemporary East Asian societies that manifest themselves through a phenomenon that Chang calls *individualisation without individualism*. Individualisation here refers to the social changes described in Western studies – such as in Ulrich Beck's individualisation theory, or in the second demographic transition theory hallmarked by Dirk J. van de Kaa and Ron Lesthaeghe – that promote the emergence of various individual lifestyles. Whereas Beck refers to the pluralisation of individual lifestyles as a constraint imposed upon the people by the weakening social functions of previously predictable institutions during the time of the second modernity that force people to (re)design their lifepaths ('biographies'),[40] in the second demographic transition theory the pluralisation of lifestyles

is rather positioned as a positive phenomenon – a result of the pluralisation of values on behalf of individual self realisation as a contrast to the previously more rigid social expectation to *lifestyle*.[41] Chang's *individualisation without individualism* refers to a social condition that appears to produce Western-style individualisation on the surface that can be detected in demographic trends, but which in fact lacks the set of values that would accompany and assist a visible process of individualisation. For Chang, individualisation here seems to be opposed to family-centredness (or familism), more precisely to family-centred values, and according to the compressed modernity theory, surface-level individualisation and strong family-centred values coexist in an antagonistic relationship in contemporary East Asian societies. In other words, social phenomena such as the declining fertility rate, marriage delay, increasing divorce rate, bachelorship, and lonely old age are appearing in East Asian societies in a social context different from that of Western countries. These phenomena are not the result of the strengthening of values favouring individual self realisation, but rather a result of a process that Chang Kyung-Sup calls *risk-aversive individualisation*.

Chang distinguishes five different types of individualisation: risk-aversive individualisation, reconstructive individualisation, nomadist individualisation, institutionalised individualisation and demographic individualisation. Risk-aversive individualisation is referred to as a social tendency where individuals aim to lower the risks of modern social life related to family as much as possible by prolonging, or returning to, individualised life stages. This type of individualisation stands close to another concept in Chang's terminology that is called *defamiliation*, which includes phenomena such as the plummeting fertility rate, marriage delay, divorce, childlessness and domestic violence, and which is not about denying family per se, but rather about (just) decreasing family life.[42] Reconstructive individualisation is referred to as a social tendency where the individuals – acting as autonomous members of the society – constantly design and redesign their lifecourses ('biographies') so that they are able to face the challenges imposed upon them by the conditions of the second modernity. As a related concept, institutional individualisation, as already explained above, is referred to as a social tendency where social institutions force people to lead individualised lifestyles.[43] Nomadist individualisation is, however, refers to a very different type of social tendency from a qualitative perspective where people attempt to detach themselves from the existing social institutions such as education or family and do not desire any kind of social participation. Finally, demographic individualisation is referred to as a demographic tendency of individually separated lives, manifested through an increase of life expectancy and empty nest phenomenon. According to Chang, defamiliation, risk-aversive individualisation and demographic individualisation are not necessarily preceded by positive individualism,[44] whereas the other three types are always accompanied by some sort of positive individualism as an overall cultural foundation.[45]

3-2-3. Compressed modernity and familism

Chang interprets the contemporary social conditions of South Korea within the framework of risk-aversive individualisation. He argues that the reason for the emergence of this type of individualisation derives from the functional overload of South Korean families caused by several reasons. Among other things, Chang points to the appearance of a sort of accidental

pluralism regarding family ideologies in contemporary South Korean society. He identifies four types of family ideology: Confucian familism, instrumental familism, affectionate familism and individualist familism. Confucian familism refers to Korea's pre-modern family ideology that was based on moral hierarchy regulating gender and generational relations. This, through a certain modernised form, has a great influence on contemporary South Korean society. Affectionate familism, however, refers to family values typical of the modern family that first appeared in Western societies with an emotional and protective function, where women were put 'in charge' of the family's emotional integrity. In contrast, instrumental familism is not about emotional protection, but more about instrumental support among family and kinship members in order to achieve social promotion or to realise material interests. Finally, individualist familism pertains to two social trends, that is, the effects of consumerism on family members – especially on young people – and the democratisation of gender relations through women's increasing participation in labour. According to Chang, these four types of familism are all present in South Korean society, sometimes even within the same family, and this brings about a great functional overload of families since it is difficult, or even impossible, to meet all the expectations expressed through these different types of familialist ideologies.[46] The four types of familism are also a good example of South Korea's compressed modernity character, in which pre-modern, first modern and second modern conditions coexist.

3-2-4. Theoretical implications of compressed modernity

Chang's compressed modernity theory was employed as a core theory for the Global Centre of Excellence (GCOE) Program in Kyoto University (2008–2012) under the title of *Reconstruction of the Intimate and Public Spheres in 21st Century Asia*. Based on this theory, several societies were studied and compared both in Asia and outside of Asia in order to obtain a deeper understanding of the different paths of modernisation in various non-Western contexts. The research studies suggest that Japan takes a certain middle position between Western countries and East Asian societies in terms of the timing of modernisation, and also in terms of the degree of its *compression*, from a sociological and demographic point of view. In light of these results, it can be said that Chang's compressed modernity theory has a great potential to challenge the second demographic transition theory proposed by Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk J. van de Kaa – though a proper typology of compressed modernity regarding non-Western societies is still in order.

On the other hand, it must be noted that Chang's explanation about the gap between the demographic manifestation of various lifestyles and the results of value surveys showing strong family-centredness needs further study. Whereas the demographic manifestation of lifestyles suggests a quasi-Western pluralisation of lifestyles that could echo with the theory of the second demographic modernisation, this manifestation is not supported by value surveys that suggest the existence of strong familialistic values versus individualistic values. This kind of gap appears to be a general phenomenon in several non-Western societies, but researchers may interpret this gap in different ways. For instance, Hungarian researchers explain this gap in an opposite way to Chang's suggestion. Csaba Dupcsik and Olga Tóth argue that the demographic manifestation of various lifestyles that have gradually appeared

in Hungary over the past twenty or thirty years are being supported by real values, which however cannot be detected in value surveys. Value surveys in Hungary show strong values related to family and marriage instead. According to Dupcsik and Tóth, these values found in surveys, however, do not show real values, but they seem to be more like the impacts of widely spread dominant conventional phrases such as those expressing one's love towards family and marriage, whereas there seems to be a lack of phrases that could express unconventional values regarding the freedom of individual choice about one's lifestyle.[47] Though it is difficult to confirm whether this kind of interpretation of the gap between demographic manifestation and the results of value surveys is correct, the ambiguity of value surveys suggested by the two Hungarian sociologists should be kept in mind.

As an extension of the compressed modernity theory in a South Korean context – and also of its application to the East Asian context in a wider sense, Chang Kyung-Sup's compressed modernity theory, along with its core concept *individualisation without individualism*, stood in the centre of an international study of various societies with the experience of socialist modernisation. In this study (entitled *Family and Social Change in Socialist and Post-socialist Societies*, edited by the author), six post-socialist countries in Eastern Europe (Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania) and two socialist societies in East Asia (China and Vietnam) were analysed in detail.[48] The main research question of this study was about whether the current social change in transitional (post-)socialist societies, seen through individualisation manifested in demographic trends, is identical to the social change that has been characterising Western societies since the 1970s. The results show that the path of social change appears identical to that in Western countries only on the surface, and that they show more similarities to the social change seen in capitalist societies in East Asia, and in countries in Southern Europe. Chang, who undertook a theoretical discussion about these empirical studies within this international research project, argues that identifying the current demographic changes in these countries as *ideational individualisation*, [49] as in the case of Western countries, is wrong, and that these countries rather show a sort of risk-aversive individualisation with strong family values instead. According to Chang, there is a sort of ongoing convergence between (post-)socialist societies and East Asian as well as Southern European capitalist societies that he collectively calls *familial liberalism*. Familial liberalism refers to the process of so-called double liberalisation in terms of economic and social governance that manifests itself through the appearance of family-related economic freedom and social responsibility.[50] Chang argues that in these countries a significant proportion of the population do not have recourse to any meaningful organisational or financial basis for autonomous economic activities, and thus they are compelled to rely on their own families instead. This seems to be a common ongoing phenomenon in both East Asian, Southern European and Eastern European countries in recent years. However, this convergence does not derive from a common historical and cultural background, but rather from a sort of social condition that Chang calls *institutionalised familialism*. Chang distinguishes three kinds of familialism here: ideational familialism, institutional(ised) familialism, and situational familialism. The first term refers to values stressing family-centredness from historical and cultural aspects. The second pertains to familial functions and duties imposed upon individuals from above through various

institutions. The third refers to family-centred behaviours and attitudes that occur in specific situations where such behaviours are viewed as rational and justifiable.[51] According to Chang, familial liberalism basically derives from institutionalised familialism and situational familialism that also induce the emergence of ideational familialism. In the case of (post-)socialist societies, Chang's statements are particularly significant, because the state's paternalistic care and control of individuals has decreased significantly in all these countries due to radical systemic transformations since the 1980s, and thus individuals were compelled to use the family as their main reliable source of support.

4. Concluding remarks

The theory of empty individualisation and the concept of individualisation without individualism emerged at different times and in different social contexts, and thus individualisation is also discussed from different perspectives. The former was articulated in the early 1980s as a result of a careful analysis of the path of socialist modernisation. Hungary's empty individualisation was contrasted with the so-called positive individualisation of Western countries, and it was explained mainly as a result of the rapid social change after World War Two that created a lack of social and value cohesion, as well as a lack of community formation in post-war Hungary. According to Hankiss, whereas there had been various types of communities based on religion or profession in pre-war times, the post-war Communist regime stigmatised these communities as not being compatible with the new socialist society, and thus it aimed to destroy them. However, the same regime failed to provide new alternative communities that could have created autonomous individuals and social cohesion.[52] For Hankiss, positive individualisation is not interpreted as an egoistic phenomenon, and more importantly, it is not understood as something that works against *communities* – just like the existence of numerous various types of communities does not (necessarily) work against the creation of strong social cohesion. For Hankiss, (autonomous) individuals and communities are both necessary for the achievement of well-functioning social integrity. Hankiss puts emphasis on *communities*, but barely discusses individualisation in relation to *family*. Nonetheless, he notes that the ambiguous post-war socialist modernisation drove people into the private sphere (family) by depriving them of the possibility to have a social life (life outside the family) – i.e., the freedom of creating and joining communities from below as autonomous individuals. In contrast to this, the concept of individualisation without individualism was articulated almost two decades later in a non-Western capitalist context, and unlike in the case of Hankiss it referred not to the first stage, but rather to the second stage of modernisation. In doing so, it is not modernisation in a Weberian sense but rather the interpretation of individualisation by Ulrich Beck that serves as a reference point here, with family change rather than community formation as the subject of analysis.[53] Chang focuses on the family-centred characteristic features of South Korean society, and thus individualisation is discussed in relation to family change, and more precisely family values.

　Behind the obvious differences in the perspective used for discussing individualisation, however, the two interpretations of individualisation also reveal similar social conditions.

Both Hankiss and Chang stress the rapid speed of social change that is thought to be responsible for precarious social conditions in the first place. Although the discussions of the individual, family, community and social cohesion appear in different lengths and proportions in the two theories, both point to the lingering development of a strong civil society, and thus also to the weakness of communities that people could join as autonomous individuals. Moreover, both indicate that the potential of people's social participation is restricted, and that they are rather deemed to exist within the framework of the family where the family members are forced to rely on each other. This does not mean, however, that the type and degree of reliance on the family is identical in the two countries, since, for instance, the social security system was relatively strong in socialist Hungary – presumably stronger than in contemporary South Korea – at the time Hankiss articulated his theory of empty individualisation, but the precarious formation of communities in both countries that forces individuals into the domain of their families appears to be a common experience. Nonetheless, the greatest similarity between the two theories refers to the gap between the actual manifested process of individualisation and the lack of a set of values supporting this manifested process of individualisation. Both theories describe the actual conditions of individualisation in their own social context as a negative and ambiguous process that is both the cause and a reflection of emerging social constraints. It can also be ventured to say that the two theories appear to complement each other in describing the general precarious way of modernisation in non-Western contexts. Whereas both theories discuss the gap of manifested trends and contradictory values from different angles – Hankiss approaches the process of individualisation from the perspective of autonomous individuals and community formation, and Chang approaches it from the perspective of family formation, the general statements of the two theories may be considered valid for both societies. Nonetheless, when looking into details, it cannot be said that Hungary and South Korea are experiencing exactly the same path of modernisation, only that the two countries seem to share certain similar trends on their paths of modernisation. Thus it can be ventured to say that the two theories may give a better general understanding of modernisation in non-Western contexts, and that both theories have the potential to be extended to describing the paths of modernisation in other non-Western societies.

Finally, it must be mentioned that neither of the two theories is purely indigenous in the sense that both take Western theories as a reference point for their theoretical orientation, and that the authors in both cases develop their arguments while reflecting on Western theories. This, however, has been a typical and common way of conducting social studies since the nineteenth century, due to the existence of a certain vertical power relationship between Western and non-Western academia. This also led to the precarious situation that non-Western scholars tend(ed) to compare the social conditions of their home country with Western societies more frequently than with other non-Western countries, and thus the study of the differences and similarities regarding the paths of modernisation from a global perspective could not be fully realised. However, more frequent communication between non-Western scholars is needed in order to obtain a better understanding on social change in a global sense, not only by carrying out international empirical survey studies, but also through a careful comparison of theories emerging in non-Western academic studies.

Notes

1) The term *Western*, as a collective name for an (imagined) group of countries, is slightly problematic due to the ambiguity of the countries it is supposed to refer to, and also due to the fact that *Western* countries – in not being a monolithic group of countries – can differ from each other significantly. Yet, it becomes necessary to have recourse to this term in the history of social studies due to the strong embeddedness of the *Western/non-Western dichotomy* perspective in both theoretical and empirical academic studies. In this paper, *Western* is used in a narrow sense, and it is referred to countries in Northwestern Europe and North America, not including countries in Southern or Central-Eastern Europe. The reason for this limitation derives from the fact that popular Western theories are (mainly) based on theoretical and empirical research studies of countries in Northwestern Europe and North America that are often thought to lead modernisation.

2) I.e., the development of social studies took place within various distinct *national* narratives rather than within the framework of a global narrative.

3) The terms *familism* and *familialism* are not clearly distinguished in academic studies in English.

4) I.e., the conceptualisation of *famili(ali)sm* is based on the conditions within the family.

5) I.e., the actual conditions of civil society as an external factor are used as a reference point for the conceptualisation of *famili(ali)sm*. Nonetheless, it must be noted that civil society is not the only external factor that is often used in academic papers for the conceptualisation of *famili(ali)sm*, but it is also often conceptualised in relation to family policies or economic enterprises as external factors.

6) Pérez addresses mainly Western studies, and thus her typology lacks a global perspective.

7) See Rajkai (2013) for details.

8) It must be noted that it is not *family* per se that is thought to stand as opposed to the individual here, but rather those oppressive aspects of the *status* society that deprive the individual of *autonomy*.

9) Ulrich Beck (2002) also employed the term *institutionalised individualism*, but in a slightly different sense. Whereas this term in Parson's interpretation refers to something *socially stabilising*, in Beck's interpretation a new connotation is added to it. For Beck, this term contains a *socially transformative potential* that is thought to lead to the undermining of the seemingly stable social conditions during the first stage of modernisation in industrial societies. In doing so, this term in Beck's writings is referred to another stage (the second stage) of modernisation, typical of post-industrial societies. In contrast, in Parsons' interpretation it is rather referred to the first stage of modernisation – though Parsons himself does not distinguish a first and second stage of modernisation. See Sørensen and Chritiansen (2013: 57–58) for details.

10) More precisely, one specific (ideal) family form that does not favour other family forms.

11) There is a great emphasis here on individual freedom of choice regarding the formation of one's lifestyle that can lead to the spread of various family forms, or even to the rejection of family formation.

12) See Shimizu (2015) for details.

13) See Rajkai (2007) for details.

14) Hankiss, along with three co-authors, wrote a nearly 500-page-long manuscript on Hungary's path of modernisation. The manuscript could not be published officially because of its obviously critical tone regarding socialist modernisation.

15) This was based on a classification system of values called the Rokeach Value Survey (RVS)

that includes two sets of values with eighteen values in each.

16) The former showed more modern values than the latter.

17) See Hankiss et al. (1982: 245–253) for details.

18) See Hankiss et al. (1982: 259) for details.

19) See Hankiss et al. (1982: 260–262) for details.

20) I.e., the appearance of autonomous and responsible individuals in Hankiss' interpretation.

21) See Hankiss et al. (1982: 263) for details. Also see Andorka (1997: 503–505) for further details. Rudolf Andorka, a prominent Hungarian sociologist, gives the following description about socialist Hungary on the base of the survey results presented by Hankiss. According to Andorka, the survey results suggest that *peace* and *family*, as well as *trustfulness*, *responsibility* and *readiness to help* appear as the main values in both countries. The survey results, however, also suggest that whereas *the fatherland* (patriotism), *work*, *welfare*, as well as *intellectuality* and *discipline* were more valued, *freedom*, *equality*, *wisdom*, *salvation*, as well as *forgiveness*, *dignity* or *efficiency* were less valued in Hungary than in the United States. According to Andorka, this suggests that it was not a sort of socialist set of values that differentiated Hungarian society from the United States, but rather values related to the improvement of living conditions. In contrast, it is rather values related to *self-realisation* that stood in the foreground in the United States. In other words, Hungarian society was showing rather materialist values, whereas the United States, post-materialist values.

22) See Hankiss et al. (1982: 266) for details.

23) Nonetheless, Hankiss also argues that Hungary had a theoretical potential to promote individualisation from the seventeenth century before socialism appeared in Hungary after World War Two – through the formation of the bourgeoisie, rich peasants, craftsmen, as well as through labour movements (Hankiss et al. 1982: 267–269).

24) See Hankiss et al. (1982: 270) for details.

25) See Section 3-1-3 for an explanation of totalitarianism and authoritarianism.

26) See Hankiss et al. (1982: 283–285) for details.

27) See Hankiss et al. (1982: 272) for details.

28) See Hankiss et al. (1982: 273–274) for details.

29) See Hankiss et al. (1982: 275–276) for details.

30) Hankiss does not make reference to Talcott Parsons' institutionalised individualism here.

31) See Hankiss et al. (1982: 270) for details.

32) See Rajkai (2014b) for details.

33) Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (Hungarian Central Statistical Office). Although the number of registered non-profit organisations reached 66,145 in 2009, there has been a slow decrease in their number since 2010.

34) See Rajkai (2012 and 2014b) for details.

35) The World Values Survey online database provides indispensable data on the formation of values and attitudes regarding various aspects of society from the early 1980s.

36) Also see Rajkai (2014b) for details.

37) Also see Rajkai (2010) for details.

38) See Chang (2010a: 5–8) for details.

39) See Chang (2010b: 26–28) for details. Also see Section 3-2-2 for an explanation of risk-aversive individualisation.

40) See Beck (2002) for details.

41) See Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa (1986) and van de Kaa (2002) for details.

42）Chang argues that defamiliation and risk-aversive individualisation proceed simultanously in contemporary South Korean society, but it is difficult to distinguish them through their demographic manifestations. See Chang (2010b: 28) for details.

43）Though Chang does not say so, it can be suggested that these two types of individualisation are, in fact, interrelated.

44）It must be noted that it does not become clear what exactly Chang means by positive individualism here.

45）See Chang (2010b: 25) for details.

46）See Chang (2010a: 14–26) for details.

47）See Dupcsik and Tóth (2008) for details.

48）See Rajkai (2014a) for details.

49）That is, individualisation supported by a significant change in values towards individual happiness and self-realisation.

50）See Chang (2014: 24) for details.

51）See Chang (2014: 24–25) for details.

52）Nonetheless it must be noted that in reality a certain type of community formation in socialist Hungary existed through the workplace. Employment in socialist Hungary was relatively stable, and changing jobs was relatively rare, and unemployment did not exist officially, thus it was possible for people to form small working communities. After the political change in 1989, the unemployment rate suddenly increased, and the formation of working communities became less stable than before.

53）Chang also touches upon the problematic development of community formation in modern South Korean history in relation to the ambiguous development of civil society.

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非西欧社会理論における個人化の解釈

　19世紀以降、社会のあり方や社会変動について様々な有力な理論があらわれてきた。中でも、とりわけ西欧中心の社会理論が世界諸国でよく研究されており、このように先導的な役割を持っていると言っても過言ではない。ところが、非西欧文化圏の社会状況に対する西欧中心社会理論の適用性には限界があり、社会的モダニゼーションについてもグローバルな（普遍的な）理解ができたとは言い難い。むしろ、様々な現地の（ナショナルな）ナラティブや解釈が存在しているのが現状である。その関係で、グローバルな理解を促進するために、非西欧諸国における独特な社会理論の（さらなる）可視化・理解・共有化が大変重要な作業であろう。本稿ではこのような問題意識を背景に、グローバルな理解を促進することに貢献したく、社会的モダニゼーションの一側面である個人化を取りあげる。具体的には、非西欧文化圏における個人化論のあり方を検討の対象としながら、異なる社会的コンテクストにおいて形成された2つの個人化論を紹介し議論する。1つは、社会主義期のハンガリーで生み出された「空虚な個人化」論であり、1つは、資本主義体制を実現している韓国において形成された「個人主義なき個人化」論である。2つの個人化論は異なる社会的条件において異なる視点から個人化現象を語るものであるが、間接的な意味で共通性も持っており、そしてほかの非西欧社会の社会的条件にも当てはまる可能性を秘めている理論である。

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