

Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice

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Abstract

Cosmopolitanism, argue its advocates, offers a philosophy of public governance suited to the global conditions of the twenty first century, (Held 2004; Archibugi 2004). But, as John Maynard Keynes once remarked, what is necessary or appropriate is insufficient in itself to bring about a better world. Cosmopolitanism, despite its appeal, cannot be accepted uncritically.

There are broadly two streams of cosmopolitan thinking and both suffer from complimentary defects. Ethical cosmopolitanism advocates global social justice but tends to have little to say about the political or institutional structures necessary to its realization. Political (or institutional) cosmopolitanism has much to say about the structures and forms of political life necessary for the creation of more democratic governance, from the local to the global levels, but tends to be less explicit about the value or purpose of democracy. Other than, to be valued in its own right democracy is also a legitimate route to other values, most significantly social justice. Cosmopolitan social democracy, which is the focus of this paper¹, may offer a corrective to the complimentary limitations of both ethical and political cosmopolitanism (see Held 2004).

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Introduction

Central to the project of ethical cosmopolitanism is the principle of global social justice crudely, that the duty to ensure fairness in the conduct of social relations is not confined simply to compatriots. The scope of justice, in other words, knows no boundaries. This is a very demanding requirement for it asserts that duties and responsibilities transcend borders. In a world in which immiseration, poverty and enormous inequalities coexist with huge concentrations of wealth and affluence, cosmopolitanism constitutes a radical project for global social justice. Taking cosmopolitan justice seriously must therefore involve accepting that, in some extreme circumstances, protective or corrective intervention in the domestic affairs of states may be necessary in order to advance justice or remedy injustice. (As an aside, this may place cosmopolitans rather uncomfortably close to the political space occupied by some American neo-conservatives although, of course, their underlying values and philosophical outlooks have very little in common.) Global justice therefore implies a machinery of global governance, which as Onora O'Neill reminds us, harbours the potential for a global tyranny. Democratic, or cosmopolitan, forms of global governance may therefore be a necessary requirement for a more just world order. In what follows, I wish to examine how cosmopolitan social democracy speaks to both hope and fear: to the demands of global social justice and the potential tyranny of supranational power, the remedies it proposes, and the critiques to which it is subject. In brief, the analysis addresses three questions:

Why cosmopolitan social democracy?

What are the regulative principles of cosmopolitan social democracy?

How plausible is cosmopolitan social democracy in the context of a world in which might appear to trump right?

Globalization and Global Inequality

It is shocking fact that, in the developing world, almost 30,000 children younger than five die every day from preventable diseases which, in the affluent parts of the world, have been all but eradicated (Thomas 2000). Estimates of the cost of providing basic health care for all those presently deprived of it run to \$ 13 bn p.a., some \$4 bn less than is spent annually on pet food by European and Japanese consumers (Beitz 1999). Such overwhelming disparities in life chances,

however, are not confined to health but are replicated across almost every single indicator of global development. Take, for instance, average world income per head which stood at around \$7,000 in 1999. This conceals a vast chasm between the average per capita incomes for the 900m in the world's affluent regions, which was close to \$26,000, but by comparison \$3500 for the 5.1 billion in the world's poorest regions. Hardly surprising then to learn that the 19 % of the world's population lucky enough to reside in the Western zone of affluence are responsible for 86 % of world consumption expenditures, 79 % of world income, 58 % of world energy consumption, 47 % of all carbon emissions, and 74 % of all telephone lines. By comparison, the poorest 20 % of the world's population consumes only 1.3% of world production, 4 % of world energy, 5 % of world fish and meat production, and owns 1.5 % of all telephone lines. Global inequality, and its ramifications, undoubtedly ranks as 'by far the greatest source of human misery today' (Caney 2001).

For many the principal source of this misery is globalization, and in particular the current neo-liberal form of economic globalization (Thomas, 2000, Wade, 2001). In determining the location and distribution of productive power and wealth in the world economy, economic globalization is a fundamental force in shaping patterns of global inequality and exclusion. These patterns do have dramatic material consequences for households, communities and nations across the globe. They also contribute the conditions for global stability and order. However, whilst there may be a general consensus on the scale of the human tragedy involved, there exists considerable disagreement on three fundamental matters: first, whether the evidence demonstrates conclusively that global poverty and inequality are actually increasing; second, even if this is so, whether globalization is the prime suspect in accounting for these patterns of global inequality and exclusion; and third, whether global inequality really matters. Much of the debate about the consequences and remedies for global poverty and inequality is contingent upon how these questions are answered.

One World, Divided?

Although there is general agreement that the absolute gap between the world's richest and poorest states is now at historic levels and accelerating – the income gap between richest and poorest has doubled since 1960- for neo-liberals this tells us little about underlying trends in global inequality (UNDP 1999). Since the absolute gap is a product of two centuries of industrialization a more relevant

indicator, it is argued, is the relative income gap.² Studies by the World Bank and UNDP demonstrate that the relative income gap between OECD countries and the rest is narrowing – the gap declined from a high of around 88 % of world average income in 1970 to 78 % in 1995 (Wolf 2002). Of course, there are vast differences between regions with East and South Asia rapidly closing the gap whilst for sub-Saharan Africa the gap is widening (UNDP 2001). If global income inequality, in relative terms, is narrowing also significant in this account is the fact that absolute poverty is declining. By comparison with 1980, 200 million less people live in absolute poverty- defined as subsisting on less than \$1 per day- whilst the proportion of really poor has fallen from 31 % of the world's population to 20 % today (Wolf,2002). As Wolf concludes, 'the last two decades saw a decline not just in absolute poverty but also in worldwide inequality among households' (Wolf,2002).

If, according to this neo-liberal view, the global condition is improving, not actually worsening, clearly globalization has to be considered a much more benign force (Wolf,2004). Since globalization promotes trade and investment flows it contributes significantly to economic growth and thereby to lifting people out of poverty (Dollar and Kraay,2002;Wolf,2004).Rather than stunting development and heightening inequality, as its critics charge, globalization enhances the development prospects of states in the South and contributes to making the world a less unequal place. A new global division of labour has evolved, as MNCs relocate production and investment to the newly industrializing states, creating new development opportunities. In the last quarter century of intensive globalization major progress in advancing human development has been made (UNDP 2001). Accordingly, the neo-liberal account suggests that economic globalization is the only effective path leading to global poverty reduction whilst the causes of enduring inequality are to be located principally in the failure of countries to integrate fast enough or deep enough into the world economy. More, rather than less, globalization is the principal remedy for eradicating global poverty.

Other, more sceptical, voices tend to agree with this line of reasoning. Accepting that global inequality is one of the most intractable problems on the global agenda, nevertheless they take issue with the claim that its roots lie with globalization (Krasner 1985; Gilpin 2001). While there is a general acceptance that the global structure of economic power shapes the context of development the fact that many states, in East Asia and Latin America, grew rapidly throughout the

2. The relative income gap is a measure of the difference between the income of the typical individual and the world average income, calculated as a percentage of the latter. The lower the figure the greater is global income equality (Dollar and Kraay,2002).

1980s and 1990s highlights the vital role of national development strategies and effective economic governance. Indeed, the growing divergence in the economic fortunes of developing states, from the deepening impoverishment of Sub-Saharan Africa to the rising affluence of Singapore, suggests that patterns of global inequality and poverty are not dictated solely or even principally by the structure of global economic activity (Landes 1989). In short, states still matter: national or local factors, from resource endowments to state capacity, are perhaps of increasing significance in lifting nations and communities out of poverty (Hirst 1997; Weiss 1998; Gilpin 2001). As a leading sceptic observes, not only is the significance and impact of globalization considerably exaggerated, it blinds scholars to the ways in which 'states continue to use their power and to implement policies to channel economic forces in ways favourable to their own national interests and ...a favourable share of the gains from international economic activities'(Gilpin 2001, p21). Increased global inequality and poverty is by implication more a product of state failure than the structural constraints of global markets.

By contrast, the cosmopolitan argument asserts both that poverty and inequality are worsening (rather than reducing) and that this is a consequence of economic globalization. In short, the benefits of globalization are spread unevenly between and within countries. In the period 1988 to 1993, sharp increases in global household inequality were registered, whilst since 1982 industrial pay inequalities within countries have widened significantly(Wade 2001; Wade and Wolf 2002). Moreover, despite the apparent reduction in the numbers living below the global poverty line (\$1 per day) from 1.3 to 1.2 billion, there are sufficient doubts about the way this figure is calculated to call its accuracy into question (Pogge,2002;Wade and Wolf 2002). Not least is the fact that on every other single measure, from income gaps to health gaps, the gulf between the richest and poorest states has been accelerating rather than eroding (Bradshaw and Wallace 1996). In 1960, the income of the richest 20 % of the world's people stood at about 30 times that of the poorest 20%; by 1997 the corresponding figure was 74 (UNDP 1997). Robert Wade's 'champagne glass' metaphor of the distribution of world income maps in a stark form the contours of the growing gulf between richest and poorest in the global economy. This accelerating absolute gap matters since it reinforces patterns of global exclusion and disempowerment whilst also making globalization ethically, if not politically, unsustainable.

In this cosmopolitan reading neo-liberal economic globalization is the principal source for the widening disparities of life-chances across the globe. For it is not only inequality between rich and poor states that is increasing but also

inequality and poverty within states too. The new global division of labour simply reorganizes, rather than ameliorates, patterns of global inequality and exclusion. The world is no longer divided so much along geographic lines, between North and South, but rather exhibits a new social architecture (Castells 1998; Hoogvelt 2001). This evolving social or horizontal division of humanity into elites, bourgeoisie, marginalized, and impoverished cuts across territorial and cultural boundaries rearranging the world into the winners and losers from globalization (Hoogvelt 2001). Economic globalization, in this view, is the principal causal mechanism which determines patterns of global inequality as mobile capital relocates jobs and production in the world economy, trade intensifies international competitive pressures, and global finance constrains the welfare and redistributive capacities of states (Rodrik 1997; Thomas 1997; Tanzi 2001). This produces several mutually reinforcing dynamics: the increasing segmentation of the global workforce into winners and losers from productive and financial integration; the growing marginalization, exclusion and impoverishment of the losers both across and within states; eroding social solidarity as welfare regimes are unable, or politicians unwilling, to bear the costs of protecting the most vulnerable; and intensifying economic polarization and exclusion within, between and across states (Lawrence 1996; Dickson 1997; Thomas 1997; Birdsall 1998; Castells 1998; Gray 1998; Sklair 2001). Neo-liberal economic globalization is responsible, charge its critics, for nothing less than the globalization of poverty and social exclusion. As Thomas notes, 'The general pace of globalization in the 1980s and 1990s...has increased inequality and risk ...at the intrastate and the interstate level' (Thomas 2000, p23, 26).

It is this globalization of (absolute and relative) poverty that not only threatens to undermine the globalization project but also erodes human security and ultimately the essential conditions for a stable and peaceful world order. As the unevenness of globalization divides the world and nations into polarizing zones of affluence and poverty, inclusion and exclusion, empowerment and disempowerment it generates a deepening fragmentation of world order which finds expression in, amongst other ways, the growth of failed states, transnational terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, transnational organized crime and ethnic/religious conflicts (Castells 1998). Unless neo-liberal economic globalization is tamed, so the argument goes, a 'new barbarism' will emerge as conflicts spill over into the global 'zones of peace' fuelled by growing global poverty, exclusion, disempowerment and inequality. But does global inequality matter?

For sceptics, like Gilpin, of a realist persuasion global inequalities are an endemic feature of world order. First, in a world in which power politics is the dominant reality for states, the endemic struggle for national relative advantage ensures that inequality will never be eradicated. Second, a more just world order is unlikely to come about so long as global institutions have no effective power to coerce, or ensure, the richest states (not natural altruists) pursue policies to realize a fairer distribution of global wealth and income (Krasner 1985). These sobering realities lead to the conclusion that it is only within the borders of the state – the nation as a moral community- that legitimate and effective solutions to the problem of global social injustice can be constructed (Hirst and Thompson 1999). Although global measures may make it feasible to manage some of the worst excesses of world markets, it is only through the apparatus of national welfare regimes and the determined pursuit of national wealth and economic power that global poverty and inequalities can be successfully combated. National governments remain the only ethically proper and legitimate mechanisms for ameliorating and combating the scourge of global inequality and uneven development and thereby realizing the ‘good community’(Hirst and Thompson 1999; Gilpin 2001).Third, the project of global social justice is misguided if it seeks simply to redistribute wealth without a commitment to economic growth and progress. As Wolf argues, the world was a much more equal place at the beginning of the nineteenth century than it is today but the general human condition, for the most part, was nevertheless much much worse (Wolf 2002). Equality may therefore be the enemy of improvements in the global human condition.

The Cosmopolitan Response

Cosmopolitanism takes issue with these claims but most especially the proposition that national community defines the limits of moral community. Ethical cosmopolitanism, in Beitz’s words, is ‘a doctrine about the basis on which institutions and practices should be justified or criticized. It applies to the whole world the maxim that choices about what policies we should prefer, or what institutions we should establish, should be based on an impartial consideration of the claims of each person who would be affected’ (Beitz 1999). Since it takes the well-being of individuals or human security as central it accords primacy to global distributive justice not just to ‘bounded justice’ within societies or international justice between states (Beitz 2001; Moellendorf, 2002; Jones, 1999; and Tan, 2004). In so doing, it presents a radical critique of the existing world order and global

governance arrangements to the extent to which they perpetuate global inequalities and therefore global injustices. As Caney observes, the argument is 'that the current system is extremely unjust and that a redistribution of wealth from the affluent to the impoverished is required' (Caney 2001).

Although it is associated with Rawlsian notions of distributive justice, cosmopolitanism takes issue with Rawl's restricted conception of the scope, and principal justifications for the pursuit, of justice (Beitz 1999; Hutchings 1999; Jones 1999). In particular, Beitz and others argue that the demands of social justice cannot be limited by arbitrary national, ethnic or territorial boundaries but on the contrary transcend them (Jones 1999; Beitz 2001). This is because, in part, globalization and the structures of global politics have bound the fate of communities and individuals together such that it is increasingly 'misleading to describe the international environment as a realm of states knit together by an array of mutual assistance schemes in which any individual state may participate, or not, as it wishes' (Beitz 1999). The world order consists, as Held remarks, of overlapping communities of fate in which traditional notions of political community are being transformed. Such transformations, expressed in amongst other things the qualification of absolute legal and political sovereignty, define what Waldron calls 'the circumstances of cosmopolitanism' (Held 2002).

Taking account of these 'new circumstances', cosmopolitanism argues that there are common structures of action and interconnectedness, which transcend national frontiers. In this respect, 'the new circumstances of cosmopolitanism give us little choice but to consider the possibility of a common framework of standards and political action, given shape and form by a common framework of institutional arrangements' (Held, 2002). Cosmopolitan justice is therefore principally concerned with the justification or ethical grounds 'for the redistribution of wealth from rich to poor across the globe' (Hutchings 1999, p37). It is, as Hutchings acknowledges, only 'secondarily concerned with how this redistribution, justly, might be achieved' (Hutchings 1999, p37). Even so, the implications of this critique for the existing world order are considerable for it implies the need for a radical transformation if the principles of global distributive justice are to be fully realized. More ambiguous are its implications for global governance understood both as an instrument of global injustice and an instrument for global redistribution (Jones 1999; Hurrell 2001; Oneill 2001). Cosmopolitanism is a normative theory, which, in privileging the principle of global distributive justice, delivers a profound critique of the current constitution and conduct of the existing system of (what might be referred to as) 'distorted' global governance. 'Distorted'

in so far as the structures of global policymaking and their effective priorities tend to reflect the interests of the most powerful rather than those in most urgent need. In this respect, cosmopolitanism advocates a commitment to the emancipation of humankind from arbitrary power and injustice of all kinds.

Cosmopolitan accounts of justice are constructed upon four core ethical principles (Held 2002). Firstly, the principle of egalitarian individualism: that individuals are the primary units of moral concern, not states or nations or other collectivities. Secondly, the equal worth of individuals such that all should enjoy equal status in the institutional orders which shape their life chances. Third, both of the above require that every person is due impartial treatment in respect of their claims such that reasoning from the position of the other – a practical empathy as it were- is essential. Fourth, that in the realization of global justice priority attaches to those in most urgent need or the most vulnerable in order to eradicate serious harm.

These principles, however, tend to be given little institutional expression in the justice literature. Ethical cosmopolitanism is largely silent about the institutional and political structures which might deliver greater global social justice. In contrast political cosmopolitanism, which tends to be silent about the claims of justice, has much to say about the institutional designs for a more democratic world order. These complementary silences suggest that perhaps it is in combination, in the form of an account of cosmopolitan social democracy, that both can begin to offer a more convincing cosmopolitan philosophy of global governance in which democratic practices reinforce global justice. For realizing cosmopolitan justice requires a reformed and more robust system of global governance, which can at a minimum regulate global markets and prevent transnational harm to the most vulnerable (UNDP 1999). Just as the Bretton Woods conference created the framework of an open world economic order conducive to social democracy so it should not be beyond the contemporary political imagination, argue many cosmopolitans, to think through the outlines of a global New Deal for governing globalization in ways, which promote both global democracy and global justice or human flourishing. This can be termed the project of cosmopolitan social democracy.

Cosmopolitan social democracy can be conceived as a basis for combining the democratization of global governance with the pursuit of global social justice (Held 2004). It engages, in other words, ethical cosmopolitanism with political cosmopolitanism. It seeks to nurture and institutionalise some of the core values of social democracy – the rule of law, political equality, democratic governance,

social justice, social solidarity, and economic efficiency- within transnational and global power systems. Cosmopolitan social democracy provides an ethical and conceptual language for thinking about the political and institutional conditions, as well as the barriers and limits to, the entrenchment of global social justice. It also builds upon the developments and achievements of the present world order – from multilateralism to universal rights- as well as a convergence amongst progressive political opinion concerning the regulation of globalization and the taming of geopolitics. However, it remains as of yet only thinly articulated and subject to many powerful critiques and opposition.

Cosmopolitan Paradise versus Realist Dystopia?

Communitarian, neoliberal, realist and even some radical critiques take issue with the advocates of cosmopolitan social democracy on a number of important grounds: theoretical, institutional, historical and ethical. These critiques argue that the project is fatally flawed because its principle arguments are inappropriate, impractical, irrelevant and invidious.

Inappropriate:

Communitarians, such as Kymlicka, are unconvinced by the cosmopolitan premiss's which inform theories of cosmopolitan social democracy. Democracy and justice, argues Kymlicka, have to be rooted in a shared history, language or political culture: the constitutive features of modern territorial political communities (Kymlicka 1999). These features are all more or less absent at the transnational level. Despite the way globalization binds the fate of communities together the reality is that 'the only forum within which genuine [justice and] democracy occurs is within national boundaries'(Kymlicka 1999). In a culturally heterogeneous world there can be no shared understandings of justice or democracy nor duties owed to some abstract global community such that the very idea of cosmopolitan social democracy is simply inappropriate. It reflects a category error: namely, inappropriately reifying the domestic analogy to the global level.

Impractical:

For political realists sovereignty and anarchy present the insuperable barriers to the realization of social democracy beyond borders. Even though elements of an international society of states may exist, in which there is an acceptance of the rule of law and compliance with international norms, order at the global level, suggest realists, remains contingent rather than enduring. Geopolitics is an ever present and a daily reality. These are not the conditions in

which any substantive democratic experiment is likely to prosper since a properly functioning democracy requires the absence of political violence and the rule of law. In relations between sovereign states, organized violence is always a possibility and the rule of law largely an expression of *realpolitik*. International order is always order established by and for the most powerful states. In this respect, global governance is merely a synonym for Western hegemony whilst international institutions remain the captives of dominant powers. States act strategically to encourage international governance, only where it enhances their autonomy or circumvents domestic scrutiny of sensitive issues, so generating a political imperative prejudicial to the democratization of global governance (Wolf 1999). Short of a democratic hegemon, or alternatively some form of world federation of democratic states, imposing or cultivating cosmopolitan social democracy, the conditions for its realization must accordingly appear impractical. Few sovereign democratic states are likely to trade national self-governance for a more democratic world order whilst no authoritarian state would ever conceivably entertain the prospect. Cosmopolitan social democracy remains, for realists, a signally utopian ideal and thus impractical in respect of the effective maintenance of world order. As E.H. Carr argued some time ago, 'International governance will always be the slogan of the most powerful' (Carr 1981).

Irrelevant:

It is partly for such reasons that even those of a more radical or progressive persuasion harbour significant doubts about the relevance and desirability of cosmopolitan social democracy. The fundamental issue is not more democratic global governance but quite simply more effective global governance. As the UNDP puts it, the most pressing issue for humankind is whether globalization can be given a human face (UNDP 1999). Democratizing global governance, even if it were feasible, may be more likely to strengthen and legitimise the hegemony of global capital and entrenched vested interests than it is to challenge their grip on the levers of global power (Gill 1995; Burbach, Nunez et al. 1997). The historical record of advanced capitalist societies, argue the sceptics, demonstrates how the imperatives of capitalism take precedence over the workings of democracy (Miliband 1973). Therein lies the prospective fate of cosmopolitan social democracy. Accelerating global inequality and looming environmental catastrophe simply cannot be resolved by a dose of cosmopolitan social democracy. On the contrary, as Hirst suggests, what is required are much more powerful and effective, rather than necessarily democratic, global bodies which can override the entrenched interests of global capital (Hirst 2000).

Invidious:

Even if cosmopolitan social democracy was a plausible ideal it remains, many conclude, a politically and ethically invidious aspiration (Zolo 1997; Gorg and Hirsch 1998; Dahl 1999; Hirst 2000; Mayall 2000). Put simply it is dangerous because it harbours the potential for a new form of (Western) global tyranny and domination. At the heart of cosmopolitan social democracy is an intractable tension between a normative commitment to effective national democracy and the desire for democracy beyond the state. This dilemma arises from the fact that the democratic practices and decisions of one have enormous potential to override or negate the democratic credentials and requirements of the other. In most mature democracies this dilemma is resolved through constitutional mechanisms but these are signally absent in the international arena. Without effective safeguards – which in the absence of a global constitution cannot be institutionally grounded – the danger of cosmopolitan social democracy is that it is susceptible to crude majoritarian impulses, which have the potential to negate the legitimate democratic rights and wishes of (national) minorities. Conversely, without the institutional capacity to enforce the democratic will of the majority against the entrenched interests of the Great Powers of the day cosmopolitan social democracy simply becomes hostage to the interests of the most powerful geopolitical forces. Herein lies what might be referred to as the paradox of cosmopolitan social democracy, namely that without a capacity to enforce the transnational democratic will on the most powerful geopolitical and transnational social forces it is necessarily condemned to being inconsequential yet the very existence of such a capacity creates the real possibility of the tyranny of cosmopolitan social democracy thereby subverting its very desirability. In these circumstances, cosmopolitan social democracy either must be fundamentally irrelevant or will nurture invidious and dangerous interventionist impulses ultimately undermining the solidarity necessary for world order. The realization of global social justice, in other words, may well be in tension, or even, incompatible with the desire for a more democratic world order.

Cosmopolitan Impulses

In response, advocates of cosmopolitan social democracy argue that by discounting the significant political transformations being brought about by intensifying globalization and regionalization the sceptics seriously misread the form and immanent tendencies of political change in the current world order

(Elkins 1995; Castells 1998; Linklater 1998; Clark 1999; Held, McGrew et al. 1999; Mittleman 2000). The present world order combines, in an unstable mix, elements of (to borrow a current cliché) paradise and power: that is, of cosmopolitan principles and *realpolitik*. The practice of global politics is no longer simply best understood as a realist utopia. Important transformations are irrevocably altering the conditions, which made sovereign, territorial, self-governing political communities possible.

Associated with these developments is the considerable institutionalisation of world order. With this has come the elaboration and entrenchment of some significant cosmopolitan principles within the society of states (Crawford 1994). Thus the principles of self-determination, popular sovereignty, democratic legitimacy, the legal equality of states, and even redistribution (through aid) have become orthodox principles of international society. As Mayall comments there has been an 'entrenchment not just of democracy itself, but democratic values, as the standard of legitimacy within international society' (Mayall 2000). Despite its unevenness and fragility, it represents, the forging of some of the necessary conditions - the creation of 'zones of peace' and the rule of law - for the cultivation of cosmopolitan social democracy (Held 1995).

Central to this governance beyond the state is the growing institutionalisation of transnational regulatory regimes and global rule making (Gill 1995; Elazar 1998). The expansion of international law and its pervasive encroachment on many aspects of state power and functioning contributes to the new circumstances of cosmopolitanism. Despite the limits of international law, it has become an institutionalised framework redefining state power and sovereignty. Sovereignty is being redefined and rearticulated with aspects of cosmopolitan (or qualified) sovereignty becoming more visible in the conduct of global affairs. Sovereignty is less a political barrier to the cosmopolitan impulse than a medium through which it is diffused in transnational networks and power systems.

Alongside these developments is the growing perception that power is leaking away from democratic states and electorates to unelected and effectively unaccountable global bodies, such as the WTO. There is now increased political pressure on G8 governments especially to bring good governance to global governance (Woods 1999). A broader global consensus appears to be emerging on the need for such reform, drawing some political support from across the North-South divide and amongst diverse constituencies of transnational civil society. Of course, cosmopolitan social democracy involves more than simply transparent and accountable decision-making. A transnational public sphere is required within

which genuine political deliberation on the global public interest and agenda of global governance can be joined (Crack, 2004). Moreover as advocates of cosmopolitan social democracy point out there are many currently existing suprastate bodies, from the EU to the ILO, whose institutional designs reflect novel combinations of traditional inter-governmental and democratic principles (Woods 1999). While the EU represents a remarkable institutionalisation of a distinctive form of democracy beyond borders, it is by no means unique. The International Labour Organization, for instance, has institutionalised a restricted form of 'stakeholding' through a tripartite system of representation corresponding to states, business and labour organizations respectively. Beyond this, newer international functional bodies, such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the Global Environmental Facility, embody stakeholding principles as a means to ensure more representative decision-making (Woods 1999).

Finally, with the growing significance of transnational civil society most especially in the humanitarian realm, the advocacy and pursuit of global social justice has produced a historically distinctive form of global politics of contention (Tilly, 2004). Institutions of global governance and dominant agencies –whether states or corporations- are increasingly becoming the focus of collective claim-making by agencies of transnational civil society, from the Jubilee 2000 Campaign to the campaign for Global Trade Justice. A global redistributive politics is in the making. In this redistributive politics states, as Onora O'Neill has written, are no longer the sole or primary agents of justice in the global arena (O'Neill 2001). Huge amounts of humanitarian aid and assistance of all kinds is channelled through NGOs whilst the powerful advocacy networks promoting the duties of global social justice represent a form of practical political cosmopolitanism. Public attitudes are also more complex than is often presumed with one recent study concluding that 'citizens do not see global justice as an either/or issue...relationships of solidarity do not stop at national boundaries' (Noel, Therien 2002). Of course, states remain crucial, in the face of global market failures, to the politics of global redistribution since they are powerful vehicles for resource generation and legitimate resource re-allocation. Nevertheless, the politics of global justice, as the campaigns to cancel Third World debt or for widening access to AIDS drugs, involves a combination of argument and pressure that constitute a politically and strategically crucial aspect of the contemporary 'circumstances of cosmopolitanism'.

Conclusion: Present at the Destruction or Reconstruction?

As the world observes daily the apparent dissolution of world order and reassertion of the rule of force, few could be forgiven for thinking that the circumstances of cosmopolitanism are rapidly being extinguished. The prospects for cosmopolitan social democracy appear decidedly remote. Yet the present conjuncture has produced many contradictory and unintended consequences. Whilst it has demonstrated the limits to international law and multilateralism, it has also generated intense debate about the need to tame unilateral power, and the conditions necessary to reinvigorate a progressive multilateralism. Whilst it has shown the limits to democracy equally it has politicized populations. Cosmopolitanism, in various guises, today finds expression amongst diverse groups with diverse political projects, across continents and cultures, seeking to advance justice and the conditions for human flourishing. Crises beget political opportunities – the cosmopolitan moment may not yet have arrived but its energies have not been extinguished. On the contrary, the cosmopolitan project has been re-energized by the emerging contradictions of a globally integrated but politically fragmented world order. In the current circumstances, cosmopolitan social democracy may offer an inclusive and ethical philosophy of global governance – a global political imaginary for the twenty first century-through which deliberation and mobilization of progressive forces for a more just and democratic world order might be conducted. In short, a language of the triumph of hope over fear.

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