
TEAM CHIP DIPLOMATS

# Chokepoint for chokepoint: **how the US and China weaponise the Chip Supply Chain**


Semiconductors underpin AI, military power and modern economies, yet depend on a few chokepoints. Washington and Beijing now turn each other's dependence into leverage.





**Research Question**

How do China and the United States weaponise each other's dependencies in critical minerals and advanced semiconductors, and does either side gain a decisive advantage?


**The chip industry needs both.**




Farrell & Newman (2019)




(Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited, 2026)




Allen & Benson (2023)
ASML (2025)

## Changing the route # Changing the source

Rerouting through third countries still relies on Chinese processing

True diversification demands quality, sufficient volume, and reliable delivery

China's leverage depends on reliable alternatives





**Sources:** Department of Commerce U.S. Trade Representative CSIS







Marcin Szczepański (2025).





## Japan's long term shift

89.8% (2010 China dependence) → 62.9% (2024 China dependence)

**Promoting International Cooperation**
**Alternative supply chains**
**Price support mechanisms to reduce reliance on China**

**China's leverage is gradually declining not rapidly**
**Diversification takes time, China remains important in mineral processing and refining**




VERDICT

**No decisive advantage.**

Neither side can use its chokepoint without weakening it.

Drezner (2003)


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