

■ 研究ノート

EUs Foreign Policy on Ukraine
-Focusing on process of Association Agreement-

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Abstract: This study analyses EU diplomacy toward Ukraine from 2004 to the Ukrainian crisis. The EU implemented the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004 to avoid divisions between member countries and nearby non-member countries followed by the Eastern Partnership in 2010, which focuses on EU relations with Post Soviet countries. The purpose of Eastern Partnership has been to conclude the Association Agreement. In 2014 Ukraine faced a political crisis caused by its rejection of the Association Agreement. The Ukrainian crisis is still not resolved, particularly due to conflicts in the eastern area in Ukraine. This paper considers EU's foreign policy toward Ukraine by investigating and analysing official papers retrieved from the EU, including those from the summit between the EU and Ukraine. These include an analyses a questionnaire from Ukraine on citizens' attitude about the crisis. The conclusions of the Association Agreement between EU and Ukraine was premature because Ukraine is still internally unstable, which makes further reform difficult.

Keywords: EU (European Union), ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy), Ukraine

I . Introduction

This research document describes EU diplomacy related to Ukraine, which is located in Eastern Europe and is not a member of the EU. This presentation shows how the the EU relates to the Ukraine crisis.

In 2014, a political crisis occurred in Ukraine concerning the rejection of the Association Agreement in 2013. The Republic of Crimean was annexed by Russia and the armed conflicts in the eastern part of Ukraine have not been resolved. However, the EU and Ukraine reached a conclusion concerning the Association Agreement in June 2014, and in November 2016 the EU approved Ukrainians to enter the EU without visas. The relationship between the EU and Ukraine has continued to develop after the conflicts but some EU members do not show much enthusiasm for the development of foreign policies regarding Ukraine i.e.-. Poland was open to Ukraine's approach to the EU whereas Netherlands had a referendum on coalition agreements with Ukraine.

This paper describes the relationship between the EU and Ukraine. Analysis was performed of official papers retrieved from the EU regarding Ukraine's position in EU foreign policy. Based on this analysis, we discuss relation between the Ukraine crisis and the Association Agreement.

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II. EU Foreign Policy for Ukraine

II.1 The EU Neighbourhood Policy

This document focuses on two foreign policies: the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP), including Ukraine as a target and the EU-Ukraine common summit.

The ENP launched in 2004 and targeted not only European neighbouring countries, but also countries in other areas¹⁾. The purpose of the ENP was to prevent divisions between EU member states and non-EU countries resulting from the EU's large expansion in 2004.

This text covers 3 documents and discusses how the EU has design relations with Ukraine.

1) The ENP policy was established by "Wider Europe-Neighbourhood; A New Framework for Relation with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours"²⁾ published by Commission of the European Communities in 2003. This paper is configured in four parts; the first,; 1st part 'Wider Europe – Accepting the Challenge' suggests that the EU should develop neighbourhood countries to promote stability, security and sustainable development. The second part 'Neighbourhood-Different Countries, Common Interests' mentions that EU neighbourhood countries should attempt to face problems regarding 'surrounding Proximity, Prosperity and Poverty'. In addition, this part says that 'the EU has a clear interest in ensuring that these [neighbourhood countries'] common challenges are addressed³⁾'. The third part 'A New Vision and a New Affair' discusses the EU's approach for the spread of EU policies and economics to neighbourhood countries. This section discusses 11 incentives to accept 4 freedoms-free movement of persons, goods services and capital market. The forth part 'A Differentiated, Progressive and Benchmarked Approach' suggests that in order to form the Action plan and benchmark, the commission must admit that the countries involved carry different statuses. In addition, this document proposes the process of creating the Action Plan. In this document, Ukraine claimed to be the second poorest county amongst object countries, not to mention a future member state.

2) "Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument"⁴⁾ was published by the Commission of the European Communities in 2003. This document is divided into four parts; the introduction presents the Commission's intention to plan a two-step approach – an initial phase in 2004-2006, and a second step to follow. The objective established the first phase goals: 'Promoting sustainable economic and social development in the border areas', 'Working together to address common challenges, in fields such as environment, public health, and the prevention of and fight against organised crime' 'Ensuring efficient and secure borders', 'Promoting local, "people-to-people" type actions'. In addition, this document aimed to be consistent with the EU's other policies. 'State of Play of Current Co-operation' described the instruments of cross border countries. 'Towards a Neighbourhood instrument; a Two Phase Approach' explains two-approaches; the first phase discusses the details of short-term policy, but the second phase mentions only an outline of long-term policy, and the Commission says that long-term policy is for future study. In this part, Ukraine

aligns with other parts of the post-Soviet Union, so this paper does not suggest that Ukraine will be a member state of the EU.

3) The Action Plan was presented to every objective country in the ENP, and ‘EU/Ukraine Action Plan⁵⁾’ published by the Commission of the European Communities, was presented to Ukraine in 2004. This document outlined a plan to steady EU standards to Ukraine, and proposed six points to reform Ukraine government; ‘Political dialogue and reform’, ‘Economic and social reform and development’, ‘Trade, market and regulatory reform’, ‘Co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs’, ‘Transport, energy, information society and environment’ and ‘People-to-people contacts’. This paper suggested that EU and Ukraine make efforts towards a strategic partnership; it did not mention that Ukraine would be an EU member state.

This section shows that the ENP was a foreign policy promoting reform for objective countries, and Ukraine was also targeted for reform by EU. However, no neighbourhood countries agreed to become an EU Member states.

II .2 The Eastern Partnership

The EaP targets Eastern Europe⁶⁾, while some of the ENP’s problems are caused by targeting many different countries, and the EaP executes framework in the ENP. Regarding the EaP, this document describes the term “European Partnership⁷⁾”. This paper was published by the Commission of the European Communities in 2008 and is split into four parts. The first part, ‘A Changing Context’, states that because the ENP objective countries need different approaches, the EU Commission proposed the EaP for eastern neighbourhood countries. The second part, ‘A More Ambitious Partnership’ claims that the ENP has already made relationships with neighbourhood countries, and that the EaP should create more unilateral relations with the EU and objective countries. The EaP is ‘based on mutual commitments to the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, and the principles of the market economy and sustainable development⁸⁾’ and was intended to conclude the Association Agreement. The third part, ‘Deeper Bilateral Engagement’ explains that the EaP created policies for six objective countries in the same framework as the ENP and how forming the Association Agreement created relationship between the EU and objective countries. The fourth part, ‘A New Framework for Multilateral Co-operation’, sets up the EaP summit held every two years.

According to this paper, the EU did not support Ukraine as a candidate country following the formation of the ENP. In addition, the purpose of the Eastern Partnership was to help establish a treaty between the Association Agreement and Ukraine, but after the Ukraine crisis in 2013 Ukraine rejected the Association Agreement. Therefore, the Association Agreement triggered the Ukraine crisis.

II.3 Myths about the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement-setting the fact straight

After the Ukraine crisis, the EU published “Myths about the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement-setting the fact straight⁹⁾”. This paper discusses ‘myths’ about the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. The myths consist of three points. The first point mentions relations between Ukraine and other region especially post-Soviet Union countries and the Customs Union between the Russian Federation, Belarus and Kazakhstan :‘The Agreement with the European Union would prevent Ukraine from joining the Customs Union between the Russian Federation, Belarus and Kazakhstan’. ‘Countries from the former soviet bloc which have developed closer economic links with the EU over the past decades have not benefited from this’. ‘If the Agreement is signed, Ukraine's traditional exports to Russia, as well as cooperation with Russia companies, will be disrupted because of the adoption of European standards’. The second point suggested negative effects for Ukraine:’ The signature of the Agreement could lead to immediate economic difficulties’ .‘Ukrainian companies will not be able to cope with the introduction of EU standards and regulations and will lose out to EU companies’ .‘To sign the Agreement, Ukraine first has to comply with IMF Conditions related to gas prices, Hryvnia exchange rate and fiscal balance’. ‘Signing the Agreement would lead to a flood of EU goods entering Ukraine. Ukrainian producers would not be able to compete and would go out of business’. ‘Ukrainian companies do not currently comply with EU standards, so they will not be able to export to the EU. Therefore, the Association Agreement is more advantageous to the EU than to Ukraine’. The third point denied ‘myths’ about relations between with Ukraine and the Association Agreement: ‘The costs of reforms in Ukraine linked to the Agreement will amount to up to 160 billion USD’. ‘EU is ready to assist Ukraine only if it signs the Agreement’. ‘The EU has not provided very much funding and assistance to Ukraine in the past and is not prepared to provide much in the future’. ‘The signature of the Association Agreement will permit visa-free travel to the EU for Ukrainian citizens’ ‘The signature of the Agreement represents a first step towards EU membership for Ukraine’.

This paper discussed three points; first, EU / Ukraine relations, as well as Ukraine’s relations with other countries; second, the economic gap between the EU and Ukraine, especially the difference in company; third, this paper clears up other countries’ misunderstandings, and explains that the EU may have targeted Russia in error.

Although the EU and Ukraine concluded the Association Agreement in 2014, the east area of Ukraine is still confusion. It could be said that the Association Agreement only trigger for the Ukraine crisis and not cause of Ukraine conflict.

The next part discusses the EU-Ukraine summit, focusing on relations with the ENP.

III. The EU-Ukraine summit

The President of the European Council and the President of Ukraine participated in the EU-Ukraine summit, and the statement of that summit concerned the opinions of both participants. The EU-Ukraine summit started in 1997. Before 2008, the statement confirmed the Ukrainian

situation, but after 2008 the statement referred to their common history and worth ,for three reasons. First: According to the Eastern Partnership, which started in 2008, the EU must form deeper relationships with target countries. Second: At this time the President of Ukraine was Yushichenko who supported the EU, but Ukraine’s government was in turmoil because of opposition to the major party. To prevent the breakup of Ukraine’s government, the EU included a passage welcoming Ukraine into the EU standard. Third: The statement continued to refer to common history and worth after Yushichenko resigned, because the next president, Yanukovych, adjusted relations between Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine has common history with the EU, and Yanukovych did not reject the EU; when he was the President of Ukraine, he started discussions to conclude the Association Agreement.

It is important that the EU acknowledged that Ukraine has common history and worth because one condition of joining as an EU member state is that new member states should share common history and worth with the EU. Therefore, some Ukrainians who supported the EU may have hesitated to approach the EU.

The next part shows how the Ukraine crisis affected the Association Agreement.

IV. Questionnaires in Ukraine

To understand Ukrainians’ attitude about the Association Agreement, we distributed questionnaires in Ukraine. The Kiev International Institute of Sociology in Ukraine and the Levada-Center a Russian non-governmental research organization, surveyed Ukrainian and Russian citizens about the protests that occurred in Ukraine during January-February 2014. This questionnaire consists of three questions. The first asked ‘What is the reason for people to go to protests in Kyiv downtown?’ Most Russian answered, ‘influence of the West that aims to include Ukraine in its sphere of political interests’ but most Ukrainian answered ‘outrage with the corrupted regime of Yanukovych’. It can be said that the Ukrainians who joined the protests were not only questioning the Association Agreement, but also did not trust Yanukovych. The second section established that Ukrainian people also distrusted the police because of the way police treated people who went to protests. The third question asked ‘On your opinion, who is responsible for the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine first of all?’ Most Ukrainians and Russians answered, ‘Authorities led by Yanukovych’, but the second most popular opinion from the Russian group is ‘Authorities of the Western states’ and second most common opinion from the Ukrainian group was ‘Opposition’. It can be said that while the Ukraine crisis occurred because of postponements of the conclusion of the Association Agreement, the confusion was increased because of government corruption.

Table.1” Attitude of Ukrainians and Russians towards protests in Ukraine¹⁰⁾”

Q: What is the reason for people to go to protests in Kyiv downtown?

Table.1-1 Compare with Ukraine and Russia

Answer	Ukraine	Russia
influence of the West that aims to include Ukraine in its sphere of political interests	30.00%	43.10%
nationalistic moods	26.40%	30.50%
outrage with the corrupted regime of Yanukovich	42.90%	16.80%
aim to get relief for Ukraine from economic and political dictatorship of Russia	12.20%	11.50%
aim to make Ukraine as civilized and the other European countries	27.40%	11.20%
feeling of civic dignity that does not accept self-will of authorities	24.90%	11.10%
protest against tough actions of ‘Berkut’ /internal troops	25.50%	3.50%
other	4.50%	1.00%
difficult to answer	9.40%	13.00%

Table1-2 Region in Ukraine

Answer	West	Centre	South	East
influence of the West that aims to include Ukraine in its sphere of political interests	5.30%	16.90%	44.00%	57.40%
nationalistic moods	10.30%	17.40%	35.10%	45.00%
outrage with the corrupted regime of Yanukovich	67.60%	54.80%	26.60%	20.00%
aim to get relief for Ukraine from economic and political dictatorship of Russia	25.10%	13.40%	6.90%	3.60%
aim to make Ukraine as civilized and the other European countries	52.50%	31.00%	14.70%	11.50%
feeling of civic dignity that does not accept self-will of authorities	47.70%	31.10%	14.40%	5.30%
protest against tough actions of ‘Berkut’ /internal troops	42.80%	33.60%	19.00%	3.90%
other	1.90%	2.50%	7.50%	6.40%
difficult to answer	2.90%	8.40%	15.50%	10.00%

Table 2. On your opinion, who is responsible for the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine first of all?

Table 2.1 Compare with Ukraine and Russia

Answer	Ukraine	Russia
Opposition	34.10%	33.40%
Authorities of the Western states	18.30%	36.20%
Authorities led by Yanukovych	49.40%	43.60%
Authorities in Russia	6.90%	3.80%
difficult to answer	15.80%	12.70%

Table 2.2 Region in Ukraine

Answer	West	Centre	South	East
Opposition	10.00%	21.00%	42.60%	67.90%
Authorities of the Western States	3.90%	10.00%	27.10%	34.60%
Authorities led by Yanukovych	80.30%	58.10%	34.70%	22.80%
Authorities in Russia	11.70%	8.90%	4.20%	2.30%
difficult to answer	11.20%	19.10%	21.10%	9.50%

Table 3. Whom do you support right now in the conflict in Ukraine?

Table 3.1 Compare with Ukraine and Russia

Answer	Ukraine	Russia
On the side of authorities led by Yanukovych	23.30%	13.60%
On the side of protesters	40.10%	9.30%
None of the sides	31.90%	62.80%
difficult to answer	4.70%	10.60%

Table 3.2 Region in Ukraine

Answer	West	Centre	South	East
On the side of authorities led by Yanukovych	2.60%	10.70%	32.20%	51.90%
On the side of protesters	80.40%	51.00%	19.60%	7.50%
None of the sides	12.60%	32.50%	41.70%	39.40%
difficult to answer	4.30%	5.80%	6.60%	1.20%

Table 3.3 Gender in Ukraine

Answer	male	female
On the side of authorities led by Yanukovych	19.80%	26.10%
On the side of protesters	43.20%	37.60%
None of the sides	33.00%	31.10%
difficult to answer	4.00%	5.20%

Table 3.4 Age in Ukraine

Answer	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-
On the side of authorities led by Yanukovych	14.20%	20.20%	21.50%	26.30%	27.60%	37.60%
On the side of protesters	43.60%	42.10%	43.30%	38.80%	37.10%	31.40%
None of the sides	36.10%	31.70%	31.00%	32.00%	31.30%	27.10%
difficult to answer	6.20%	5.90%	4.10%	2.80%	4.10%	3.90%

Table 3.5 Education level in Ukraine

Answer	Basic	Incomplete secondary	Complete secondary	Higher
On the side of authorities led by Yanukovych	28.90%	30.90%	25.80%	17.30%
On the side of protesters	33.30%	41.80%	36.10%	45.10%
None of the sides	37.80%	25.50%	32.60%	32.00%
difficult to answer	0.00%	1.80%	5.40%	5.60%

“Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted a public opinion poll as a part of regular “Omnibus” during February 8-18, 2014. 2032 respondents were surveyed with face-to-face interviewing method in all regions of Ukraine (including the city of Kyiv and AR Crimea. The sample is random and representative for the Ukrainian population aged 18 years and older. Statistical sample error does not exceed 2.2% (excluding design-effect).

Levada-Center conducted the survey basing on the sample representative for Russia, during February 21-25, 2014. 1603 respondents aged 18 years and older were surveyed in 130 settlements in 45 regions of the country. Statistical sample error does not exceed 3.4%.”

Source: Kiev International Institute of Sociology

V. Conclusion

In conclusion, the EU’s foreign policy has extended EU standards to the border countries and tried to avoid dividing neighbour countries. This study established that Ukraine was not mentioned as a Membership Country in the ENP; on the other hand, the EU-Ukraine summit showed common history with EU and Ukraine, meaning that Ukraine may expect another approach by the EU. This study also finds that even though the EU has continued spreading its standards, objective countries are difficult to reform. Consequently, Ukraine was also actively pursuing EU standards. Therefore, the beginning of Ukraine the crisis was related to EU foreign policy regarding for Ukraine, but the continuation of the crisis is due to government corruption. In the next step we study the effects of EU foreign policy and how it can/cannot reform in a given field.

[Notes]

- 1) The ENP was objected Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine.
- 2) COM (2003)104 final
- 3) Ibid.p.9
- 4) COM (2003) 393 final
- 5) COM (2004)791 final
- 6) The EaP objected Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
- 7) COM (2008) 823 final
- 8) Ibid.p.4
- 9) Retrieved from 30th June,2017 from http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/january/tradoc_152074.pdf
- 10) *Kyiv International Institute of Sociology* “Attitude of Ukrainians and Russians towards protests in Ukraine” (Retrieved from 30th June,2017 from <http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=231&page=1>)

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EU の対ウクライナ政策 — 連合協定の締結過程を中心に —

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【要旨】本研究は EU の対外政策の影響力を分析し、事例としてウクライナを取り上げる。ウクライナを事例として取り上げる根拠として、EU の対外政策の一つである連合協定の棚上げがウクライナ動乱のきっかけになったことが挙げられる。連合協定は、EU と非 EU 諸国との間における政治、貿易、社会、文化、安全保障上の結びつきを強める協定であり、EU と他国の間に深い経済的・政治的な結びつきを形成するのみならず、他国の政治改革を推し進める条約であるといえるだろう。本研究は、EU の第五次拡大以降近隣諸国となった地域を対象に実施された欧州近隣諸国政策（ENP）が開始された 2004 年からウクライナ動乱が勃発した 2014 年までを中心に上げ、EU とウクライナの関係を整理する。そして、連合協定を含めた EU の対外政策とウクライナ動乱の関係性を考察する。

主に EU の公式文書を元に分析を行う。具体的には ENP と ENP の枠組みの中で東方近隣諸国に対して実施された東方パートナーシップ（EaP）に関する文章を取り上げる。そして、EU とウクライナの関係性について、EU-ウクライナサミットを取り上げる。また、連合協定のウクライナ動乱に対する影響をウクライナ国民に対するアンケート調査を元に考察する。

本研究を通して整理した点として、ENP の枠内ではウクライナは加盟候補国にすらなりえない地域であると示されていたが、一方で EU-ウクライナサミットではウクライナの「ヨーロッパ」回帰について示されており、ウクライナに対して EU 加盟の期待を持たせた可能性があることである。また、ウクライナ国内におけるウクライナ動乱の論点は、連合協定の棚上げではなく国内政治の腐敗であった。そのため、連合協定はウクライナ動乱長期化の原因ではなかったことに加え、対象国に改革を促す対外政策は影響を与えていなかったことがわかった。

キーワード：欧州連合，近隣諸国政策，ウクライナ