

Life-world and the Theory of Social Action in the 1940s: Rereading the Correspondence of Schutz with Parsons and Gurwitsch

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1. Discussing Point

In this report I would like to discuss some subtle different meanings of the basic term 'structure', which Schutz and Parsons use for interpreting human action.

(1) In the case of Parsons we can easily find the relevant term in the title of his book *The Structure of Social Action* (1937; hereinafter abbreviated as SSA). Here 'structure' occupies the central position of his analysis of social action. For example, Parsons uses 'structure' in order to satisfy his interest in empirical facts by analyzing "the *logical structure* of the theoretical system" (SSA p.9) or stated differently by using "the *conceptual structure* of the theoretical system, the voluntaristic theory of action" for understanding problems of empirical research (ibid., p.731). Parsons defines the term as a frame of reference, in accordance with which the researcher will understand the problem of empirical research.

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(2) But in the case of Schutz we can find the very concept of ‘structure’ being replaced by the concept of ‘Aufbau’ [construct], as we see in the title of his book *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (1932; The meaningful construct of the Social World, which is hereinafter abbreviated to SASW), and therein we can find the concept of ‘structure’ only in the 4th Chapter entitled as the ‘Structural Analysis of Social World, i.e., the realm of directly experienced social reality, the realm of contemporaries, and the realm of predecessors’ (*Strukturanalyse der Soziale Welt; Soziale Umwelt, Mitwelt und Vorwelt*). In comparison with Parsons we find out that, in the case of Schutz, the relevant concept is used in a very *different* way, that is, it is used for making discrimination of various meaningful layers or strata, which *the ordinary people* must experience as the constitutors (and not as the researcher or scientific observer) of meaningful constructs to some degree, whenever they transit from the face-to-face situation in the world of directly experienced social reality to indirect social experience in the world of contemporaries, and to the realm of predecessors, i.e., to the world of history. For example, when we think of ‘our friendship’, we can have different and distinguishable meanings we may have in mind, as Schutz shows us. 1) When A speaks of his friendship with B, he may be thinking of a series of past face-to-face relationship which he shared with B (for example, Schutz may think of a series of direct experiences of his first meeting with Aron Gurwitsch at Paris in 1934 by introduction of E. Husserl). 2) When A speaks of his friendships with B, he may mean that, over and above such face-to-face situation, his behavior is oriented to B’s expected behavior or to the fact that B exists. In this case he is oriented toward B as a contemporary (for example, Schutz remembers in New York that Gurwitsch now lives as a contemporary in Baltimore, and he is reading a letter from Gurwitsch which informs him of an adventurous topic from Casablanca, and decides that he should answer to his friend). And 3) When A speaks of his friendship with B, he may be referring to the fact that, external obstacles aside, they can always get together again and begin where they have left off (for example, tomorrow I am going by train to you at Baltimore and I would like to talk with you on that matter). 1), 2) and 3) are only a few examples for the different modes of experience of a ‘friendship’ which will occur in the intermediate zone between the face-to-face situation involving mere contemporaries. In sum, when we live in a social world, we experience ourselves and others in different and heterogeneous modes — more or less intimately or anonymously — in the structurally distinguishable realms of social world.

(3) Significance of Schutz’s concept of ‘structure’ in the PSC

A careful reader will realize that Schutz’s concept of ‘structure’ occupies an especially noticeable position among a series of Schutz’s critical comments on Parsons’s SSA. That is, citing his critical comments, Schutz expresses positively his attitude toward Parsons as follows; “it does not alter my full agreement with Prof. Parsons’s statement that all scientific concepts of social facts already presuppose a conscious or unconscious *theory of the structure of the social world* (SY *italicized*). However, later in his replay (Mar. 17, 1941) to Parsons’ s letter, Schutz altered his wording of “the structure of *the social world*” into the structure of “*social action*” (ibid. p.103) — and that this theory determines the choice of problem as well as the direction of interest inherent in the selection of facts” (PSC p.11). In a sense it seems

to me that this remark was the *point* that Schutz wanted to tell Parsons. I don't know whether Parsons used the term, a theory of the *structure of the social world* in the SSA or not. This is another problem. It is our point that this very term is one of key concepts of Schutz in his book, *SASW* (as we have already pointed out). But Parsons (in a letter addressed to Schutz dated Jan.16,1941) only remarks *on this point* in a general attitude as follows, "*Again and again, in reading your work, you make points which as they are stated sound perfectly plausible, but I am always compelled to ask the question what of it?*" and adding to it, "We seem to be unable to have a meeting of mind." To his partner's saying Schutz might be left absolutely helpless.

Now that Parsons and Schutz make use of one and the same term as a tool for their analysis, we must carefully *reexamine*, if and in what sense they associated the term 'structure' with different meanings. At the same time we must ask, if it might be one of the reason why they stopped their correspondence in a very short periods (1940. 11. 15-1941. 3. 29) and why the two could not after all come to terms.

2. Our Problem and Working

Why did Parsons and Schutz stop their correspondence in such a short periods and why could they not after all come to terms with each other? This is the problem, which I would like to explicate in this paper. By what means do we approach to it? By rereading the '*Parsons-Schutz*' *Correspondence* [abbr. to *CPS*] under special consideration of the background of their social life in the 1940s, we would like to find a clue in order to make this problem clear. So at first we must focus on their theoretical workings in the 40s, when they endeavored to brush up their own sociological theory by mobilizing such key words as '*structure*' (Parsons) and '*construct*' (Schutz). At the same time, we should also take into account the social conditions of their life.

2-1. Referential materials

For the sake of understanding some social characteristics of 'Parsons-Schutz' discussion in *PSC* we are able to get a lot of valuable information from the following materials.

□ Material 1; Uta Gerhardt (2002), *Talcott Parsons; An Intellectual Biography*

One should in this book especially take notice of her referring to 'Parsons's Sociology of National Socialism, 1938-1945' (p.58-128). Prof. Gerhardt characterizes *Parsons as a Scholarship for Democracy* (ibid., p.276). She divides the whole life of Parsons into four periods: 1) 1901-1937; Understanding the Structure of Social Action, 2) 1938-1945; Parsons's Sociology of National Socialism, 3) 1945-1959; The Harvard Social Science War Effort and The Social System, and 4) 1960-1979; New Agenda for Citizenship: Parsons's Theory and American Society in the 1960s.

□ Material 2; Helmut R. Wagner (1983), *Alfred Schutz; An Intellectual Biography*

This is the best book to get a confidential knowledge about the chronological career of Alfred Schutz. The late Prof. Wargner divides his whole life into three periods; 1) 1899-1932;

Viena, 2) 1933–1938; Viena and Paris, 3) 1939–1959; New York. By using Schutz's own words Wargner explains phenomenologically Schutz's biography from the following frame of reference: i) Historical Tradition and Predecessors; ii) Contemporaries and Consociates; iii) Successor Generation; and iv) Reason & Phenomenology.

□ Material 3: Richard Grathoff (hrsg. 1985), *Alfred Schütz-Aron Gurwitsch Briefwechsel 1938–1959 (Philosophers in Exiles, The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch 1936–1959, tr., by Claude Evans)*.

□ Materials 4. Richard Grathoff (ed. 1978), *The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons, The Theory of Social Action; Oct. 30, 1940 – Apr. 21, 1941*.

2-2. Working Hypothesis

(1) It arouses the different way of understanding human action, that when one defines it as real, it becomes real (F. Znaniecki). When we are taking into reconsideration of the 'SASW' by Schutz and the 'SSA' by Parsons, we should not forget that these two works have a common ground in Max Weber's *Understanding Sociology* which aimed at explaining human action, though Schutz criticized Weber's category of 'subjective meaning' because of its obscurity, and Parsons rejected Weber's *theory of ideal type* as a kind of 'type atomism' in its arbitrariness. It must be clarified here what of Weber Schutz and Parsons wanted to solve and tried to overcome by means of introducing their concept of either 'Aufbau' or 'Structure'. The problem of the 'Schutz-Parsons-Divide' (R. Grathoff) comes from, in my opinion, the problem of *relevance* that the two scholars selected as their own theme from Weber's sociology. Being engaged in the same problem of Weber's *theory of social action*, the two had different interests from the beginnings. If the two define differently what social action *is*, then the *reality* of social action must also be different for them.

(2) The problem of 'culture' as a culvert. Of course this is closely related to another significant problem. As contemporaries the two scholars had to face *unavoidably* and were, whether they disliked it or not, necessarily involved in the waves of time — this is the problem of *their* 'imposed' relevance. It means that we must analyze their unique trajectory of 'social and scientific life' that both Parsons and Schutz followed in the 40s, because their discussions over '*the theory of the social action*' makes only sense under the imposed specific conditions of their time, under the impression of the Second World War, in which the two were involved. As far as we read comparatively two different kinds of *Correspondence*, *CPS* and *CSG*, we can not help having an urge to examine the 'latent motives' of Parsons and Schutz which were released under the pressure of each person's cultural background, and which they might have in mind on the occasion of their discussion.

2-3. Contents of their Discussion and its some Characteristics

On this problem one should refer to a table for "Fail-ended Interpretation of Parsons by Schutz" (See Appendix 1). The discussion between the two which was aroused by Schutz's critical review on Parsons's *SSA*, as we knew, revolved around the problem of how to grasp the relationship between the social world of 'everyday experience' (the first order construct)

and the world of 'social science' (the second order construct). But the result of his aim was in vain, as Schutz ended his correspondence with Parsons of his quoting from an anecdote Richard Wagner related of Beethoven; "Beethoven sent an English lord back his manuscript in a cover over the whole length of which he had painted a cross" (SP: March 17, 1941 p.106). From some of their letters we can draw out the main characteristics of their discussion in the *CPS*.

- (1) Letter of PS Jan. 23, 1941: "I find nothing in your argument to shake my position" (p.72).
- (2) Letter of PS Feb. 2, 1941: "I must confess to being skeptical of phenomenological analyses" (p.79).
- (3) Letter of SP Mar. 17, 1941: "You have to go a few steps further in radicalizing your theory'. 'It is meant as a discussion of some basic problems of our science from a different point of view'..." "I think that your analyses are not radical enough as far as *the subjective point of view* is concerned...you do not deal with the specific social categories of acting and mutual interaction, with the problem of the frame of reference relative to the alter ego towards which the actor's own actions are oriented...and that *your theory of values* as well as *the role you attribute to science* is acceptable only if you forego *the explanation of the problem of intersubjectivity* involved in both and if you presuppose *the social world with all its structural differentiation* just as given, allowing '*value*' and '*science*' to enter your system *θύραθεν* [SY: from outside] '*through the door*' (=SY italicized) if I may use this Aristotelian term...all these questions can be clarified by *a radical analysis of social intersubjectivity*" (p.104.)
- (4) Parsons: Retrospective Perspective (Apr. 1974): "It seems to me that Dr. Schutz poses an altogether unrealistically sharp contrast between the point of view of the actor and the scientific observer and analyst, virtually dissociating them from each other" (p.123).

There are some premises for understanding the above mentioned fail-ended discussion between Parsons and Schutz. It will be appropriate here to quote from Parsons's saying, 'if you want to know the matter much more, you must go back and back and back'. This reflective remark of Parsons toward explication of the matter is correspondent to Schutz's theory of relevance, i.e., 'if you want to understand the human action, you must be in quest for the structure of relevance (topical, interpretative and motivational) of the case. Three points should especially taken notice under the context of our discussion.

- ☐ Firstly, they encountered in the middle of the serious disease of the times, the Second World War (their topical relevance).
- ☐ Secondly, it was *Schutz as the wounded* that suffered a serious injury from the disease of the times, and *Parsons as the surgeon* that made operations for the 'disease of the times' (their motivational relevance).
- ☐ Third, *the distinctions in their background of 'methodology of social science'* must be taken into consideration. on the basis of which they built up their argumentation. The difference of the terminology that each of them uses, such as *Aufbau* of [→Continued on p.10]

Appendix 1

A Table for “Fail-ended Interpretation of Parsons by Schutz”

[A] Parsons’ Voluntaristic Theory of Action

A fact can be defined as an “verifiable statement about phenomena in terms of a conceptual scheme”. CPS; p.10

The following Sign of A, B, C and D means a basic conceptual scheme of “unit act”

[B] Schutz’s Critical Examination of Parsons

Unit Act: A=Actor B=End C=Situation: Means & Conditions D=Norm

A...an agent of act

B...a future state of affairs to which the process of act is oriented

C...Act must be initiated in a situation, which is analyzable into “means” over which the actor has control, and “conditions” over which he hasn’t.

D...a certain mode of relationship between these elements, a “normative orientation” of action; a verbal description of a course of action

Subjective Elements


Norm

B, C choice ↔ control D [introduction of value system]

↖ A ↗

<From the **Voluntaristic** point of view of the actor>

- ① Parsons’s concept of concrete and analytical levels
- ② The voluntaristic theory of action and the problem of scientific knowledge on the part of the actor (...Cf., the below map of α & β)
- ③ The problem of motives (...The element of norm and the structure of motives)
- ④ The unit act and its limits (...The problem of relationship between α and β^{\dagger})
- ⑤ The subjective point of view
- ⑥ Types and reality
- ⑦ Social life and social theory^{II} (...allowing “values” and “science” to enter your system *θύραθεν* [from the outside] “through the door” CPS; p. 104)

The unit act and its limits Concerning \dagger -mark of ④ in [B]

◆ **Points of Schutz' s Agreement with Parsons**

- ① A general theory of social science should be founded on a careful analysis of unit act and a theory of the structure of social action.
- ② The theory should be founded on the subjective point of view

◆ **Points of Schutz' s Disagreement with Parsons**


- ③ As far as the subjective point of view is concerned, Parsons' analysis is not enough.
- ④ Parsons has disregarded the special social categories of acting and mutual interaction, the problem of others and social intersubjectivity.
- ⑤ Parsons has disregarded the significance of time element in all human action and the difference between the logical significance of an act already performed (Handlung) and an act just projected (Entwurf) and, on the other hand, the categories of personality and anonymity.
- ⑥ Parsons don't explain the specific attitude the social scientist has to adopt toward the social world.
- ⑦ Insufficiency of the theory of value and the problem of the role of science in the sense of lacking the sufficient explanation of the problems of intersubjectivity.

Model-Construction corresponding to Postulate of the Subjective point of view

...Concerning ② of ◆-mark

- 1. Postulate of relevance 2. Postulate of adequacy 3 Postulate of logical consistency
- 4. Postulate of compatibility

Social Life and Social Theory ...Concerning ¶-mark of ⑦ at the Part of [B]



Too much Kantian!

**Apenndix 2 The Correspondence
And the Process of Du-brotherhood Formation,**

A: Topics of Life History; a. Passology, b. Family [Children and Parents], c. Wife, d. Friends, Concentration Camp, j. Arrangement for Meeting **B: Topics of Science:** α . Farber, β . Husserl, γ . Noema-noesis, ι . Life-world, χ . Horizon & fringes. But ***mark** which is indicated above the item-

85 letters.	<i>a,</i>	<i>b,</i>	<i>c,</i>	<i>d,</i>	<i>e,</i>	<i>f,</i>	<i>g,</i>	<i>h,</i>	<i>i,</i>	<i>j,</i>	$\alpha,$	$\beta,$	$\gamma,$	$\delta,$	$\epsilon,$	$\zeta,$	$\eta,$	$\theta,$	$\iota,$	χ
The first period 1938.8.3 (1.GS)-1941.10.9(25.GS)	1. GS	2									5	5		1	11			6		
	2. SG		1								1	18		10	13			7	8	
	3. SG		1								7			3						
	4. GS	3	1	1	2				1											
	5. GS	1	1	1					1											
	6. GS	1		1	1				1											
	7. SG	1		2	2															
	8. GS	1		2		1					1									
	9. SG	1		1	1		1							1						
	10. GS		1	1		6		1*	1											
	11. GS	1	1		2		1				1	5	24	17	5	2		2		21
	12. SG	1		1	1							1		1						
	13. GS												3			2				1
	14. SG			1						1	1	5	13			2		1		5
	15. GS			1				1*	1	1			3	2				1		
	16. GS			1						1	1		1	2						
	17. SG	1		1						1										
	18. GS	1		1		1	1	1	1					1						
	19. SG	1		1	1	1		1			2									
	20. GS			1	1						1	1								
	21. GS			1					1	1					1					
	22. SG			1						1	3			2						
	23. GS	1	1	1					1	1		1	8		3					
	24. GS			1					1	1										
	25. GS			1					1											
The second period	26. GS		1		1		1			1			3				3			8
	27. GS		1							1			2	1					1	
	28. GS		1							1	2				8					
	29. GS		1								1		7	6					1	
	30. GS		1								2									
	31. GS		1						1					1						33
	32. GS		1	1							3	2	1						1	
	33. GS		1	1				1	1											
	34. SG							1		1										
	35. GS		1																	
	36. SG	1	1					1												
	37. GS					1		1		1			1							
	38. GS	1					1	1			1		4			1		1	2*	2
	39. GS						1	2,1*	1		1	2	4	1		1				
	40. SG		1																	
	41. GS		1			1			1	1	1		1							
	42. SG	1	1				1			1										
	43. GS		1	1		2			1			2	2	1						1

¶: In the 85. Letter of SG, we can find the following proposal of Alfred Schutz to Aron Gurwitsch,

of Schutz and Gurvitsch

through which they say Du one another

e. Sickness, f. the Jude, g. Worry, h. Seeking Employment & Part-time Instructor, i. War & James, δ . Phenomenology, ϵ . Consciousness, ζ . The Field of Consciousness, η . Zusammenhang, θ . number of each Section means as follows; h* France, δ^* Language, ϵ^* Stranger, ι^* Relevance.

		<i>a</i> ,	<i>b</i> ,	<i>c</i> ,	<i>d</i> ,	<i>e</i> ,	<i>f</i> ,	<i>g</i> ,	<i>h</i> ,	<i>i</i> ,	<i>j</i> ,	<i>a</i> ,	β ,	γ ,	δ ,	ϵ ,	ζ ,	η ,	θ ,	ι ,	χ
(48.GS.)	44. SG			1	1						1	2					1*				
	45. GS		1								1	1	5								
	46. GS			1							1	3	1								
	47. SG		1						1	2		2	3								
	48. GS		1						1		1						3,4*				
The third period 1945.6.11(49.SG)-49.7.17 (81.GS9)	49. SG			1																	
	50. GS		1								1		1					3		1*	
	51. SG			1	1				1*		1	2								2*	
	52. GS		1						1		1			2	2						
	53. SG			1														2			
	54. SG		3	1			5		1*						1						
	55. GS		2			2	3		1,1*		1										
	56. SG		1	1			1		1*		1										
	57. GS		1			1	1		1,1*		1										
	58. SG			1	1	1	1	1	1*												
	59. GS		1				1	1	1*		1	2						1			
	60. SG			1			1		1		1							1			
	61. GS			1	1		1														
	62. GS		1			1	1		1,1*	1	1										
	63. SG			1			1		1,1*												
	64. SG			1	1				1,1*	1											
	65. GS			1					1,1*		1				2						
	66. SG			1	2		1		1,1*	1	1										1*
	67. GS		1	1	1				1	1											
	68. GS										1	3									
	69. SG			1				1			1	10									
	70. GS		1	1			1	1	1		1	1									
	71. SG			1	1		1	1	1		1	2									
	72. GS		1					1	1		1			1	2						
	73. GS		1			1		1	1*		1				6		2				
	74. SG			1									2		1		1				
	75. SG				1				1												
	76. GS		1		1										1						
	77. SG		1						1						1						
	78. GS		1						1						1						
	79. SG			1	1				1						3*						
	80. GS		1	1											1*						
	81. GS		1						1*		1										
50.1.25-50.10	82. SG								1		1				1*						
	83. GS		1		2						1		2		1,3*						
	84. GS										1		1							2	
	85. SG			1							1	2		2					1		
	86. GS																				

Why do we still say "Sie" to one another ? I won't go along with this nonsense any longer †

[→Continued from p.5] social world (Schutz) and *Structure* of social action (Parsons), does not simply refer to a problem of wording, but rather essentially to a problem of grasping social phenomena, the phenomenological way of thinking (Schutz) on the one hand, and the way of thinking of 'analytical realism' and of 'Kantian Scheme of Understanding' (Parsons) on the other (their interpretative relevance).

3. Between Life world and Science in the 1940's —Another Correspondence: *The correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch: Philosophers in Exile*

3-1. *Contents of the CSG*

(1) The problem of meaningful *Aufbau* (construct) of their friendship: The Chart for Schutz and Gurwitsch (see Appendix 2) might be useful for getting an overall picture of 'GSC', through which one could get an insight of the various contents of their letters, and make sense, to a degree, of 'the situation of the times'. *The meaningful Aufbau of their friendship* shall mean here the process of mutual interaction, through which the two persons are going to call 'du', i.e., to approve of themselves as a Duzbrüderschaft (to enter into an intimate brotherhood of 'Thou'). We checked from their *Correspondence* that it took for about 12 years and 85 letters from their first letter, when the two changed the style of calling their partner from 'Sie' to 'Du'.

(2) Schutz's 'mythical' discourse and the problem of 'Nazism': To begin with, let us carry a few letters of Schutz addressed to Gurwitsch

(i) A letter of Schutz

Dear Friend Gurwitsch,

Many thanks for your good and kind letter of the 20th. You are completely right, my daytime life consumes me and doesn't allow me to sleep at night. In these dreadful times all words have received a perverse meaning: Spring is the code word for offensive, moonlight no longer interests lovers and poets but rather the night bomber, Olympia has become the quintessence of godlessness. Through the old, newly-revived myths of Thermopylae and the battle of the seven against Thebes the stymphalidic birds now storm, fouling all food and killing all humanity with their wings of steel—...

Are you still enough of an optimist to believe that phenomenology will serve itself out of the ruins of this world — as philosophia aere perennius? I simply don't believe that anymore. The bushmen will surely first have to become acquainted with the National Socialist store of ideas. That doesn't stop us from wanting to die as we have lived, and therefore we have to try to create in *our* world that order which we have to do without in our *world*. The whole conflict — including that between our different approaches — lies hidden in the shift of emphasis. [quoted from the letter of 22.SG April 26, 1941].

(ii) A letter of Schutz

Dear Friend Philalethes!

Many thanks for your very kind letter and for the enclosed copies of your essay

[which means Aron Gurwitsch's contribution entitled "On the Intentionality of Consciousness" (1940) to the *Husserl Memorial Volume* edited by Marvin Farber=Sato]. Although the days since its arrival have not been precisely conducive to reflective contemplation..., I have now read your work attentively three times...

.....And as Theophilus, as whom I write this letter, I am waiting for the harmony of both spheres [Schutz refers here to a difficulty concerning the theory of noema by Husserl. If this world is one, a unitary life-world for me and you and everyone, on the one hand, and if, on the other hand, my noema remains a component of my solipsistic primordial sphere, and then how is intersubjective identification or identity possible? = Sato]..... And so these reflections have filled a day of the greatest anxiety and agitation, and I can only offer you, the cause and stimulus of this longest letter of my life, a hearty thanks.....

But all of that is secondary to the question whether the beast to which power is given will again force kings to bow before him. Let us, dear friend Philaethes, use the time which is given us, and let us hope, as best we can, that the barbarian will not disturb our circle. Though I would like to sign this letter as Theophilus — I can't bring myself to do it, in the last chapter of the *Theodicy* —..... Your Pangloss...(quoted from the letter of 2. SG August 19, 1939).

3-2. Examination of each letter

☐ On Schutz's experience of 'National Socialism'

We must take notice of the date of his letter (i). It was addressed to Gurwitsch on April 26, 1941. This letter was written immediately after another letter that was addressed to Parsons from Schutz, "Discussion is a poor 'Ersatz' for a dialogue" (April 21, 1941), the last letter of Schutz to Parsons. Including Schutz's letter (ii) this letter surely offers us a very important datum, when we are going to compare *CSG* with *CPS* — how much insensitive he was on a lot of experiences that he directly or indirectly faced and how he expressed himself of what he experienced at that time.

From these letters we can draw some notable characteristics:

☐ In his letters the contemporary world as his anonymous surroundings is described in the form of 'mythical expression' — like "their wings of steel", "the stymphalidic birds", "myths of the battle of Thermopyles" (from letter (i)), "the beast, to which the power is given", — and even he himself and his friend are not called under their real name, but symbolically under the pseudonyms, such as *Philaethes* ("lover of truth" from the last chapter of the *Theodicy* by Leibnitz), *Theophilus* ("lover of God"; *ibid.*), and *Pangloss* (from: Voltaire's *Candide*; in letter (ii)). Imagine! Under what condition is man not able to use his own name?

☐ His letters are written by a discourse of his "distinctive" evaluations — such as "in these dreadful times", "All words have received a perverse meaning", "The spring time is the code word for offensive", "Moon light no longer interests lovers and poets" "but rather the night bomber". "Phenomenology will save itself out of the ruins of this world? I don't

believe that any more” (letter of (i)) and “All of that is secondary to the question whether the beast to which power is given again force kings to bow” (letter (ii)) etc.—.

□ As a whole the statement of his letter to Gurwitsch is characteristically divided in the schema of dichotomous oppositions, that is, the writing style of the ‘entweder oder’, like “either Our World, or Their (mythical) World” [letter (i)].

□ Proclamation of Non-compromise belief — like “That doesn’t stop us from wanting to die as we lived”, “we have to try to create in *our* world that order which we have to do without in our *world*”, “the whole conflict lies hidden in the shift of emphasis” (letter (i)) etc.

3-3. *Summing-up*

All these mean a manifestation of his ill feelings upon the National Socialism as his ‘significant other’. It is important to notice that all through the CSG it is once, and only once *that* Schutz named openly *the Nazis*. Why? It must be an estrangement of him from the gigantic chaos of ‘anonymous’ disaster! “The myth is a form of expression on a chaotic state of one’s feeling [mind]” says Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945). Man loses “the sense and words of everyday”, when one faces (experiences) the extraordinary events, which transcend of the scope and limits of language expression for all experience and imaginations in one’s ordinary life. Either “behemoth” (Franz Neuman, *Behemoth: the structure and practice of national socialism*, 1942) or “the stymphalidic birds” will do, it is for Schutz with regard to the ‘lived experiences’ [Erlebnisse] of events that he attempted to make a good guess through these sort of mythic statements, but not as to the experienced knowledge [Erfahrung] *about* events. It is the matter of ‘the world within his mind’ where he directly feels trembled with the state of *statelessness*, of *chaos* and of *lawlessness*, into which he is drawn, and which is going to swallow up ‘his own world’ at one gulp. One of issues, about which Schutz and Parsons discussed, I think, lies consciously or unconsciously in the problem of treatment with such a strained state of feeling-complex of the actor to the extent of being hesitated even to call it by its name directly. Therefore, the fact that the word ‘National socialism’ lacks in the CSG, doesn’t mean its absence of Schutz’s strong interest, but the very contrary is true.

4. *Talcott Parsons and the Nazis-problem in Germany: Parsons’s Sociology of the Nazism: 1938-1945*

4-1. *Problem*

(1) In her writings *Talcott Parsons An Intellectual Biography* Uta Gerhardt characterizes the period of 7 years (1938-1945) after Talcott Parsons published his book, *The Structure of Social Action* as Parsons’s Sociology of National Socialism. Gerhardt wrote in her book, “Parsons uttered himself [and performed publicly] as a political activist propagating his openly anti-Nazi convictions”, “from the infamous Nazi pogrom against Jews on November 9, 1938 to the defeat of National Socialism and end of the Second World War” (ibid. p.59) In fact, Parsons joined ADHG (abbr. of American Defense Harvard Group; which was founded in

the summer 1940) and placed the skills of democracy against the totalitarian threat. In 1941 Parsons as chairman organized a discussion group on German social structure, and functioned as a leader of the group which strove to pull together what social-science knowledge had evolved in Nazi Germany so that competent conclusion could be drawn also regarding American policy and postwar planning (ibid.). In this function, Parsons drafted the paper of resolution for the committee on National Morale (February 1941).

German National Socialism is not only in principle incompatible with modern liberal society, — it has now become an immediate and acute threat to its very existence (ibid.).

During the *PSC* or in the period before and after, that is, between 1938 and 1945, according to Gerhardt, Parsons published nine articles and wrote three manuscripts (unpublished in his life time) on the subject of National Socialism — for example, ‘Nazis Destroy Learning, Challenge Religion’ (Nov.23,1938) ‘Sociology of Anti-Semitism’ (1940) ‘Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany’ (1942) ‘Some Sociological Aspects of the Fascist Movement’ (1942) and so on—. All these papers were written from a standpoint of his Ant-totalitarianism aimed at critical appraisal against Nazism and Fascism. Here we see a figure of Parsons who performs his role as a surgeon of ‘the disease of the days’.

(2) “The Structure of Social Action” as the text book for American democracy: Under the international situations of those days the whole world was fallen into the ever-growing antagonistic relations of anomie or War of All against All. I am sure that Parsons’s work “*The Structure of Social Action*” (1937) fitted very much to the requirements of the days as the *text book for democracy*, because his proposal of ‘the voluntaristic theory of social action’ was, in a sense, a ‘synthetic’ one (Gerhardt: p.51). The Synthetic way of thinking always refer to the search for structural types, in the event juxtaposing War of All Against All, on the one side, and integration or social order, on the other. According to his text book, Parsons made a list of Anti-democratic value-patterns which existed latently behind the pre-Nazi German society, that is, National Socialism, feudalism, formalism, authoritarianism, patriarchalism, militarism, fundamentalism, romanticism, communism, anti-Semitism, ritualism’ and so on. A parade of ‘social scientific’ conceptions is going to pass in front of us, so to speak, in good order. I wonder, it might be a spiritual uplift of the philosophy for ‘practical value of puritanical Christianity’ as ultimate value, which sustains American Democracy.

(3) Schutz was invited to Haverd Seminar: On October 1940 Schutz received a letter of invitation from Talcott Parsons to write a contribution for ‘*HSR*’ (abbr. of Harvard Seminar on Rationality) which had been jointly organized by Parsons and Schumpeter. When we think about the Parsons’s letter of invitation to Schutz in the light of the fact that Parsons was in 1940 a member of *ADHG* (abbr. of American Defense Harvard Group) and in the position of chairman of the *GCMNU* (abbr. of Group’s Committee on Morale and National Unity) in the fall of 1940, it is difficult for us to think that the *HSR*, organized jointly by Parsons and

Schumpeter, was aiming at purely academic discussion on the relevant matters. Rather it is natural if Parsons tried purposively to assign this seminar as ‘an organized action program’ which was based on the clear practical interests in a frame of the *ADHG*..

Here is some data for making a fair guess as to the case. In a letter of Parsons addressed to Schutz (October 30, 1940), we are able to find out the name of Dr. Voegelin, who was, as we know, one of Schutz’s friends since his childhood in Vienna days, and he was a Vienna political scientist as a refugee. At same period Parsons had also ‘a detailed correspondence’ with Voegelin concerning the problem of ‘Anti-Semitism’.

(4) Was it the matter of doing up a button otherwise? The *PSC* began with this letter of invitation from Parsons to Schutz. But after they exchanged 5 letters each other, the correspondence was stopped without getting any productive answers. In his five letters Schutz expressed himself to Parsons on his own opinion, with carrying quite different kinds of problem that Parsons might have expected from him — though the problem itself was for Schutz a very much serious one. But, on the other hand, we don’t know whether Schutz had been under the situation of a good knowledge of the fact that ‘the problem of Nazis’ was to Parson a burning concern.

4-2. *Summing-up*

In order to lay the foundation of sociology on the theory of social action, I think, we need to take into consideration much more deeply the problem of relationship between ‘the study of human action by the social scientist’ (Parsons’s ‘voluntaristic theory of action’) on one hand, and the way of common thinking of ordinary people who naturally perform their actions in everyday life (Schutz’s ‘Phenomenology of the social world’) on the other hand. It was the later problem that Schutz pointed out, and that Parsons marked in negation. I would like to make notes of Parsons’s reply to Schutz again.

“We seem to be unable to have a meeting of mind.”

“I find nothing in your argument to shake my position.”

“I must confess to being skeptical of phenomenological analysis.”

It is like this when one says, “I have no one to turn to”. Concerning the Correspondence of Parsons and Schutz, Kurt Wolf had once expressed it in a metaphor as a dialog of the speech handicapped persons. This metaphor still sound strongly to my ears. Is there a possibility to have a happy end for the failing discussion between Parsons and Schutz, if they were in an intimate relation to the extent they would listen to each other, and if they were afford to be in sympathy with the matter — as Schutz wrote to Parsons, “discussion is a *poor ‘Erzatz’ for a dialog*”? Or will it sill remain to reach no agreement, as Wolf characterized it as a Dialog of the dumb?

5. Conclusion: What was Parsons-Schutz Problem? — *〈Between〉 Methodology of Sociology and 'Wissenschaftslehre'*

(1) What was Parsons-Schutz Problem? In this report I emphasized the difference of significance of two technical words, 'structure' and 'Aufbau'. It seems to me that behind these two words all the problems are hidden, including the problem of *interest* for two scholars, of their methodology of sociology, and of the relationship between social life and social theory. To the basic word like 'Structure' / 'Aufbau' the quest of all these things is intrinsically relevant, because the basic words of the researcher indicate his intention or interest, and influences more or less the other relevant problems. Politics, needless to say, and even science are expected to reply the demands for the time, especially under the situation of *Außeralltäglichkeit* like wartime.

(2) The Parsonian pattern of the solution of issues is stemming from "Structure". The way refers from sociological theory to social life, or from 'the second order construct' to 'the first order construct'. Simply speaking, the way of Parsonian thinking is characterized as *the path of going down from the social theory to the social life*. The role of social (and sociological) theory, in the case of Parsons, lies in throwing its light of reason over the social life (phenomena) by means of its theoretical scheme — 'a fact' is an empirically verifiable statement about phenomena in terms of a conceptual scheme'. The reverse is impossible, because the phenomena of social life are chaotic. The 'way of thinking' about such a dichotomy as theory vs. phenomena of social life is going back to the ideal type theory of M. Weber, is, so to speak, an offspring of Kantian transcendental philosophy wherein the scheme of Understanding functions as the ground for life based on its 'universal' meaning. As far as Parsons defines 'a fact' as 'a statement about phenomena in terms of a conceptual scheme', he is a Kantian. And he admitted himself of that — "Since the early 1940s. I still adhere with undiminished conviction to what...may be called a Kantian view" [PSC; p.116]—.

Parsons is like a Surgeon performing an operation of 'the disease of the times'.

In the above mentioned sense Parsons might have a very high self-confidence. He as a surgeon was competent to give his challenge to the 'disease of the days', and enough to extract it only by means of its operation through a bright light of 'Understanding [Verstani]', that is, through the 'voluntaristic theory of action' (in the SSA). He had already made arrangement for that operation. You know that Parsons's SSA is, as its subtitle shows 'a study in social theory', a work which succeeded in a synthetic integration of representative European sociological theories of Marshall (England), Pareto (Italy), Durkheim (France) and Max Weber (Germany). Therefore, he was very confident about his theory, which should have been enough to extract a solution for the disease of the times.

It was the circumstance of these days that activated Parsonian voluntaristic theory of action. We must remember that the PSC was motivated by the uprising of Fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism, and the appearance of the crisis of democracy. I am sure Parsons thought that a social application (or praxis) of this theory would make it possible to overcome 'the

crisis of the days', and that would allow a new type of 'social integration'. Above all, in that case, it is 'norm' as a general analytical element occupying the central position in this theory that made it possible for Parsons to shift smoothly from this value element to his Anglo-Saxon cultural value system, Puritanism. We must take notice here that this 'event' of shifting from one of 'analytical general' elements of human action into a 'practical causal' factor happened 'under a general crisis of the circumstances around him, and that all such things accelerated him of his performing various concrete actions, and allowed him to take his value judgment endlessly approaching to his factual judgment. In so far his 'voluntaristic theory of action' always formed for Parsons the basis of 'universalistic' lines toward his practical actions.

In sum, the development of his voluntaristic theory of action was the first step to Parsons's commitment to American 'democratic' values. Because of this, he was taking up the post as a vice-chairman in HDG, which led to Parsons's historical studies on 'Sociology of National Socialism', which again motivated Parsons to invite Schutz to *HSR*; Through interpreting these series of events from 'a voluntaristic action frame of reference' — 'an actor acts his action in terms of a series of means and ends in a situation in accordance with *normative orientation*' —, it leads Parsons into the social life. It was, I must emphasize here, a rare moment that the politics as a vocation and the *Wissenschaft* (science) as a vocation, both of which should be, in Weberian sense, essentially made a sharp distinction, were synthesized into one and the same person of Parsons. 'The disease of the days' became pushing back of Parsons's voluntaristic theory of action, and progress of 'the disease of the days' gave him no time of rereading and rethinking Schutz's critical examination of his own theory. So it is that "I find nothing in your argument to shake my position".

(3) The Schutzian pattern of the solution of these issues stemming from "Aufbau" is as follows: Schutz was interested, from the beginnings of his study exemplified by posthumous manuscript *Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur*, in the relationship between the social life and social theory. As Hermut Wargner wrote, Schutz's occupation with the pre-scientific material of life as totality originated with his finding of the sociological problem; it was to be an exploration of elementary life processes that belong to the foundations of the subject matter of sociology but had never been examined by Weber or any of his student (Wagner, P21). No, Parsons didn't do it. Schutz, who relied firstly his theoretical anchoring point on Bergson's philosophy of life, and later on the Husserl's concept of life world, developed his own theory of social life world, which was built up on the key concept of 'Aufbau' as we have already shown.

While corresponding with Parons, Schutz was, in the same period, in correspondence with another partner, Aron Gurwitsch, with whom he was putting 'the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl' in question. The correspondence of A. Schutz and A. Gurwitsch began with the letter of making arrangements with each other, concerning the contribution for the Journal "*PPR*" (*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 1. Volume: the Husserl Memorial Volume, ed. Marvin Faber). Schutz, unlike Parsons, was very much interested in Husserl, and also Husserl in Schutz too. According to H. Wargner, since Schutz visited Husserl (1859.4.8-

1938.4.27) at Freiburg in June 1932, he visited sometimes Husserl. Husserl appraised 'Kantian transcendental philosophy' very highly as the second 'turning point of philosophy' after that of Descartes, and at the same time he situated his phenomenology as *the third and the last turning point* (Husserl (1977, S. 109f).

We should pay attention that the *série* from M. Weber to Husserl and finally to Schutz are in a delicate position to another *série* from M. Weber to Kant and finally to Parsons, sometime being subtly connected, and in other times keenly in opposition to each other. Perhaps, under the critical situations of the days both Parsons and Schutz, or rather Parsons would have no place and time, enough to take a re-consideration into both *série* of European modern '*Gedankengut*' (Thought-goods).

Schutz, on the contrary, unlike Parsons, could understand the significance of 'phenomenological turn after Kant' by Husserl through his own experiences, for example his lived-experience of 'anomie' in European society (nihilism) and his lived-experience of 'adjustment' in American Society after the migration (stranger). In Schutz's letters in the 1940s we will find symptomatic description of his over-sensitive responses to the social world (for example, a letter of telling Myth, letters of telling neither Nazism nor democracy, letters of friendship, letters of intimate We-relationship, letters of turning his eyes only upon the concrete situation and so on). These things might not be neatly stored in a Kantian 'Schema of Understanding'.

On the boundlessly open horizon, now the world of everyday life appears clearly itself, that is, the world where the extraordinary events occur around him with growing unusual expansion. This world is now, so to speak, the reality 'not to be overlooked' for Schutz. Because it is the world of 'meaning', of which Schutz might undeniably have had direct experience in his mind, and it is the reality that man usually experiences, 'before' it would be named by 'concept', and would be eliminated or treated by means of an operation, and 'over' these things one experiences it as pregiven. Schutz did not turn his face away from the reality, that is, 'manifestations (Erscheinungen) of various kinds of meaning of 'refugee', which he himself directly experienced. He endeavored to 'understand' the reality which elevated around him, just as it was.

To sum up some characteristics of *Schutzian pattern of the solution of issues*. As I already mentioned, in early 1930's Schutz wrote "*Meaningful Construct of Social World*". And then the PSC comes. In his last letter to Parsons (March 17, 1941) Schutz expressed his general attitude toward the sociology of Parsons. "I, like you, am convinced that a general theory of social science has to be based on (A) a *careful* (SY: notice!) analysis of unit act" (=from Schutzian point of view this phrase should be *read* as the problem of 'the constitution of meaningful lived experience' in the constitutor's own stream of consciousness). That means, "if you would like to know how to analyze the unit act, you should read the second chapter of my book" [SASW]) and (B) "on the theory of social action" (Schutz asked Parsons to make a *careful* analysis of his theory on 'foundations of a theory of intersubjective understanding' [Fremdverstehn] and on 'the structure of the social world: the realm of directly experienced social reality, the realm of contemporaries, and the realm of predecessors'. You know the

former indicates the third chapter, the later the fourth chapter of his book *SASW*). His life experience and praxis of social life as an exile in America itself became problematic to Schutz. *The correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch 1939-1959* itself is the excellent work on it. This work must be interpreted as a work for the constitution of a subjective and intersubjective meaningful Aufbau (Construct) of a person, who 'suffered of the disease of the Days'; the phenomenology of the voice of the constitutors as the suffered. And an idea of the sphere of science 'between' sociology and philosophy comes soon to Schutz. That is Schutz's conception of phenomenological sociology.

In a word, Schutz founded out his starting point of methodology of social science by means of his own social life and praxis of his life, such as the problem of 'skylla and charybdis' (problem of 'Nihilism' in Europe) and the problem of 'stranger' in America. In the 1940's Schutz did neither express himself by using jargon of social theory in line with the strict sense of scientific frame of reference, nor endeavored actively to get rid of the 'disease of the time' in front of fighting camp. Rather he oriented himself to the 'so called labyrinth, where various types of 'pre-scientific' knowledge of everyday life are fertiley constituted. That is not knowledge constructed in its frame of social theory (for getting rid of the disease of the days), but the *prescientific* knowledge of various kinds, such as knowledge of mythic. It makes a clear contrast to Pasons' posture toward these times. The difference of the two intrinsically comes from the original interest in Weber's Understanding Sociology. It would be of great pleasure for the author, if the readers might have gotten some ideas on the posed questions of this paper, that is, the reason why they stopped their correspondence in a very short period and why they could not after all come to terms each other.

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1940年代の生活世界と社会的行為理論

—『シュッツ＝パーソンズ往復書簡』と 『シュッツ＝ゲールヴィッチ往復書簡』を読み直す—

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1940年代の時代状況（第二次世界大戦下の生活世界）を背景にして、ほぼ同じ時期に開始された2つの往復書簡『アルフレッド・シュッツとタルコット・パーソンズの往復書簡1940.10.30-1941.4.21』および『アルフレッド・シュッツとアロン・ゲールヴィッチの往復書簡1939.8.5-1959.5.16』がある。一方のシュッツとゲールヴィッチの手紙の交換はシュッツの突然の死まで長期間継続したのに、他方のパーソンズとの手紙の交換は「ほんの短期間のうちに終焉」した。なぜシュッツ＝パーソンズ往復書簡は短期間に中断したのか。この中断理由は、両者によるウェーバー理解社会学の理論的摂取の違い（シュッツ＝パーソンズの分かれ目問題：リチャード・グラトホーフ）にあると指摘されているが、本稿は同時期の『シュッツ＝ゲールヴィッチ往復書簡』をも参照することにより、問題の本質にさらに一層深く近づくことができることを示した。ウェーバーの「職業としての学問」と「職業としての政治」の峻別のエートスを自らの学問の基礎ともする二人の理解社会学の継承者が第2次世界大戦の「危機とカオスの時代」を生きる中で遂行した各々の「理路と生活」を比較によって明らかにすることである。本論文の主な作業は(1)「構造」(Structure＝パーソンズ)および「構築」(Aufbau＝シュッツ)という社会的行為の理論をめぐる2つの基本概念の比較検討(内在的理論問題)、次に(2)1940年代の「学問と生活世界」の考察、両者のたどった社会生活ならびに研究生生活のユニークな軌跡(「暗渠」としての〈文化〉問題、即ちブラクシスの先行与件「究極価値か理由動機か」の問題)について検討し、(3)この2つの作業をととして、何故シュッツ＝パーソンズ往復書簡は中断したのか、その「動機の構造」を読み解く、以上の三つの作業から成り立っている。論文の構成は以下のとおりである。

論文の構成 (1)論議の焦点 (2)問題と作業；2-1 参考資料 2-2 作業仮説 2-3 両者の議論の内実とその議論のいくつかの特徴 (3)1940年代の生活世界と学問の「間」—もう1つの往復書簡 3-1 往復書簡の内容 3-2 要約 (4)タルコット・パーソンズとドイツのナチス問題 4-1 問題 4-2 要約 (5)パーソンズ＝シュッツ問題とは何であったのか

キーワード：理解, Structure/Aufbau, 社会的行為の「構造」分析／社会的世界の「構造」分析, 時代の病のなかの外科医と患者／ナチズム問題, 暗渠としての文化, 「社会的意味構築」の事例としての往復書簡

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